JUDGMENT : A.S. Supehia, J. 1. The present application has been filed seeking quashing of the F.I.R. registered at B-Division, Patan City Police Station, District Patan being C.R. No. II-112 of 2017 for the offence punishable under Secs. 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'the I.P.C.') and under Sec. 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. 2. The brief facts of the case leading to filing of the present application are as under: 2.1. It is alleged that the dispute as regards the land bearing Survey Nos. 301, 302, 303/1 paiki-1, 302/1 paiki-2 and 302/1 paiki-3 is pending before the Patan Court between the applicant and the respondent No. 2-original complainant. 2.2. It is alleged in the F.I.R. that having maintained the animosity regarding the dispute, on 8-8-2017, when the complainant was at his home alone, at about 8-00 p.m. at night, someone knocked the door and when the complainant opened the door, the applicant and other two persons were came and told the complainant to withdraw the civil suit. It is alleged that having stated so, the complainant was pushed and he was threatened with a knife and was told that if he shouts, he would be killed. It is further alleged that the complainant was given threat, and thereafter, the applicant and other two strangers left the house of the complainant. 2.3. It is stated that on the next day in the morning, the complainant informed about the said incident to his neighbour Bharatkumar Vasubhai Brahmin and his son namely Ankit, who is residing in Ahmedabad. It is further stated that the complainant made an application to the District Superintendent of Police, Patan regarding the said incident through an Advocate. It is also stated that the complainant had not received any injuries in the alleged incident and had not taken any treatment. 2.4. It is stated that since the alleged incident took place during the season, wherein the complainant was busy in the agriculture activities, he had not gone to the Police Station for giving his statement with regard to the alleged incident and on 24-11-2017, he went to the Police Station to lodge the F.I.R. 3. Learned Advocate Mr. Jigar Gadhvi appearing for the applicant has submitted that the allegations made in the F.I.R. are false, vague, general, vexatious, mala fide and malicious in nature. Learned Advocate Mr. Jigar Gadhvi appearing for the applicant has submitted that the allegations made in the F.I.R. are false, vague, general, vexatious, mala fide and malicious in nature. He has submitted that the F.I.R. itself does not inspire any confidence and the same is registered after a considerable long delay about more than 3½ months and the explanation as regards the delay in registering of the impugned F.I.R. is unbelievable that the complainant was busy in conducting agriculture activities, and therefore, the F.I.R. could not be registered instantly. He has submitted that the complainant has cooked up the false incident only with a view to pressurize the applicant, who is a bona fide purchaser of the land in question, which is also referred to in the F.I.R. and on interim order protecting the possession of the applicant on the said land has been passed, and therefore, there was no reason for the applicant to administer any threat to the complainant. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. Jigar Gadhvi for the applicant has submitted that in connection with the land in question, a false F.I.R. being C.R. No. I-35 of 2015 registered at B-Division, Patan City Police Station, dated 25-3-2015 for the offence punishable under Secs. 323, 406, 420, 467, 471 and 506(2) of the I.P.C. wherein the respondent No. 2 is shown as an accused. He has also submitted that the applicant has preferred quashing petition being Misc. Criminal Application No. 6360 of 2015 before this Court and this Court vide order dated 7-4-2015 had granted interim order in favour of the present applicant. He has submitted that this Court vide judgment dated 29-7-2019 passed in Misc. Criminal Application No. 6360 of 2015 has quashed the F.I.R. being C.R. No. I-35 of 2015 against the present applicant. 5. Learned A.P.P. Mr. Hardik Soni has submitted that at this stage the impugned F.I.R. may not be quashed and set aside since prima facie the offence registered against the present applicant is established. 6. I have heard the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties. 7. A useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kishan Singh (Dead) Through Legal Heirs v. Gurpal Singh, reported in 2010 (8) SCC 775 , more particularly Paragraph No. 22 thereof. "22. 6. I have heard the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties. 7. A useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kishan Singh (Dead) Through Legal Heirs v. Gurpal Singh, reported in 2010 (8) SCC 775 , more particularly Paragraph No. 22 thereof. "22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging a F.I.R., the Court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. In such cases the Court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the Civil Court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal Court. The Court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an F.I.R. is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the Court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. (Vide : Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1238 ; State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 AIR SCW 237; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., AIR 2000 SC 754 ; and Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P., 2008 (12) SCC 531 : AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 634 : 2008 AIR SCW 6901)." 8. Section 503 of the I.P.C. defines "criminal intimidation", which reads as under: "503. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 AIR SCW 237; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., AIR 2000 SC 754 ; and Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P., 2008 (12) SCC 531 : AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 634 : 2008 AIR SCW 6901)." 8. Section 503 of the I.P.C. defines "criminal intimidation", which reads as under: "503. Criminal intimidation:- Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation:- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this Section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation." 9. Section 506 of the I.P.C. prescribes for "Punishment for criminal intimidation", which reads as under: "506. Punishment for criminal intimidation:- Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc., and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both." 10. I may with profit refer to the observations made by this Court in the case of Mehul Chunibhai Choksi v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2018 (1) GLR 349 . I may with profit refer to the observations made by this Court in the case of Mehul Chunibhai Choksi v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2018 (1) GLR 349 . This Court while examining the provision of Sec. 503 of I.P.C. has held thus: "The essential ingredients:- The offence of criminal intimidation has been defined under Sec. 503 of the Indian Penal Code and Sec. 506 of the Indian Penal Code provides punishment for it. Sec. 503 reads as under: "Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threats, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation:- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the persons threatened is interested, is within this Section. An offence under Sec. 503 has following essentials: 1. Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. 2. The threat must be with intent : (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. A bare perusal of Sec. 506 of the Indian Penal Code makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that an accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant. Mere threats given by the accused not with an intention to cause alarm to the complainant, but with a view to deterring him from interfering with the work of construction of the wall, which was undertaken by the accused applicant, would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation. Mere threats given by the accused not with an intention to cause alarm to the complainant, but with a view to deterring him from interfering with the work of construction of the wall, which was undertaken by the accused applicant, would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation. In the entire F.I.R., there is no whisper of any allegation that the threats which were administered actually caused any alarm to the first informant and he felt actually threatened." As regards the offence under Sec. 506(2) of the I.P.C. is concerned, no offence is said to have been established against the applicant in the present case since the contents of the F.I.R. reveal that the alleged criminal intimidation has not caused any alarm to the complainant. It is settled proposition of law that mere threats given by the accused not with an intention to cause alarm to the complainant would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation. The complainant has not stated that the criminal intimidation caused him such a degree of alarm and he actually felt threatened that the applicant will actually cause injury to him. The delay in lodging the F.I.R. would itself be fatal for satisfying the ingredients of Sec. 503 of I.P.C., if the same is not satisfactorily explained. In the present case, the complainant has stated that since he was busy with agricultural activities, the F.I.R. has been lodged belatedly. Such an explanation fortifies that no alarm was caused to the complainant and he actually did not feel threatened. It appears that the impugned F.I.R. has been lodged with oblique motive to wreak vengeance against the applicant due to their rivalry, hence, the same is required to be quashed and set aside. 11. On the backdrop of the aforenoted analysis, the present application is allowed. The impugned F.I.R. registered at B-Division, Patan City Police Station, District Patan being C.R. No. II-112 of 2017, as well as all other consequential proceedings arising out of the aforesaid F.I.R are hereby quashed and set aside qua the applicant. Rule is made absolute. Direct service permitted.