Ebrahim Khesh v. Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry of Home Government of India
2019-04-02
ANANDA SEN
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Petitioner, in this writ application, prays to quash the office order No.P.VIII-3/99-EC-II dated 18.01.2000 issued by Commandant 45 Battalion, C.R.P.F. Airfield Dimapur, Nagaland, whereby and where under the penalty of dismissal has been impound upon the petitioner. He also challenges the office order No.R.XIII.2/02-EC-I dated 29.04.2002 issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.R.P.F., Nagpur, Maharashtra, whereby and where under the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been rejected. He further prays that all his retiral benefits be disbursed to him. 2. At the very outset, counsel appearing for Union of India raises a preliminary objection in respect of maintainability of this writ application before this High Court. He submits that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction, as no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. He also takes another objection, i.e., the delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in challenging the order. 3. The petitioner was appointed as Constable in the C.R.P.F. in the year 1976. He completed his training in Madras and joined 45 Battalion at Meerut. There was allegation that on the basis of fake educational certificate, he got appointment. While, he was in Dimapur, Nagaland, he was served with a memo of charge. A departmental proceeding was initiated and the same was conducted in Dimapur, Nagaland. Order of dismissal was passed in Dimapur, Nagaland, Petitioner preferred an appeal before the D.I.G. of Police, C.R.P.F., Nagpur. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal in Nagpur. Thereafter, this petitioner challenged these two orders before this Court at Ranchi, Jharkhand. 4. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India submits that from the aforesaid facts, it is quite clear that none of the cause of action arose within the State of Jharkhand. 5. From the aforesaid facts, admittedly, I find that none of the cause of action arose before this Court. A query was made from the counsel for the petitioner as from where petitioner was appointed, to which the counsel for the petitioner, on instructions, submitted that the petitioner was appointed in Patna, Bihar, which is also not within the jurisdiction of this Court. 6. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the educational certificates were from the State of Jharkhand, which may give rise to the cause of action at Jharkhand.
6. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the educational certificates were from the State of Jharkhand, which may give rise to the cause of action at Jharkhand. A report was sought for in the departmental proceeding from the District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi and that evidence was generated in Jharkhand, Ranchi, thus, according to him, this Court has jurisdiction. 7. I am unable to accept the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The report, which the District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi had sent to Dimapur Nagaland, was used as an evidence in the departmental proceeding, which was conducted in Nagaland. Place from where the report is sent for the purpose of evidence cannot be said to be a place where any part of cause of action arise for the purpose of filing a writ application. Thus, I find that no cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction. 8. Further, on the point of delay, I find that the order of dismissal is dated 18.01.2000 and the appellate order is dated 29.04.2002. Petitioner is challenging the aforesaid orders after 16 years and 14 years respectively. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir versus R.K. Zalpuri & Others reported in (2015) 15 SCC 602 referring to several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraphs 26 and 27, has held as under: - “26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court. 27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim “deo gratias” – “thanks to God”. 9. In the case, which was before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the delay was 5 years and the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the said delay is fatal.
9. In the case, which was before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the delay was 5 years and the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the said delay is fatal. In this case, the delay is of more than 14 years and there is no explanation also. Thus, this application also fails on the ground of delay and laches. 10. In view of what has been held above, on both the grounds, this writ application fails. This writ application is, accordingly, dismissed.