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2019 DIGILAW 792 (CAL)

Subrat Mukherjee v. Kakali Sensharma

2019-08-09

DIPANKAR DATTA, SAUGATA BHATTACHARYYA

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JUDGMENT : Dipankar Datta, J. We had heard these intra-court writ appeals and the applications filed therein on 5th March, 2019 and decided the same finally by dictating an order in open court. However, when the order was placed for our signature, it was found that the learned Judge of the writ court had allowed a relief which was not claimed in the writ petition by the first respondent/writ petitioner (hereafter the writ petitioner) and that we had concurred with the learned Judge without our notice being drawn to such fact by the appellants. In view thereof, the appeals were listed once again. Upon notice to the parties, the unsigned order dated 5th March, 2019 was recalled. The appeals were heard afresh on the limited point as to whether the learned Judge was justified in granting a relief that was not even claimed by the writ petitioner. The parties cited several decisions for and against the point. Having regard to the same, we considered it necessary and accordingly, reserved the judgment in the appeals. 2. By a judgment and order dated 14th February, 2018, W.P. 1020 (W) of 2015 presented by the writ petitioner was allowed. The order impugned in the writ petition dated 4th December, 2014 terminating the service of the writ petitioner was set aside by the learned Judge on the ground that she was denied reasonable and adequate opportunity to defend herself against the allegations levelled against her. It was further directed that the writ petitioner shall be deemed to continue in service from the date of such termination till date of the judgment. The contesting respondents in the writ petition, i.e., the employer of the writ petitioner, were granted liberty to frame charges against her and to conduct an enquiry in accordance with law. The writ petitioner was held entitled to monthly remuneration from the date of termination of her service till conclusion of enquiry in terms of the liberty that was granted; however, she was held not entitled to join service until completion of enquiry. It was also held that the writ petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 6% (simple) on her entitlements from the date of termination till date of the judgment. 3. M.A.T. 342 of 2018, directed against the said judgment and order dated 14th February, 2018, is at the instance of Dr. Subrat Mukherjee, being the respondent no. It was also held that the writ petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 6% (simple) on her entitlements from the date of termination till date of the judgment. 3. M.A.T. 342 of 2018, directed against the said judgment and order dated 14th February, 2018, is at the instance of Dr. Subrat Mukherjee, being the respondent no. 2 in the writ petition. C.A.N. 2558 of 2018 is an application for stay filed in such appeal. 4. The other appeal, M.A.T. 343 of 2018, is also directed against the same judgment and order. It is at the instance of the Project Director, State Project Management Unit, ICZM Project, West Bengal. Since the project director was not a respondent in the writ petition, he has filed an application for leave to appeal being C.A.N. 2560 of 2018. 5. The prayer made by the project director for leave to appeal is granted. C.A.N. 2560 of 2018 stands allowed. We now proceed to dispose of the appeals as well as C.A.N. 2588 of 2018 by this common judgment and order. 6. The facts giving rise to the appeals lie in a narrow compass. By a letter dated 30th November, 2010 of the project director, the writ petitioner was offered appointment on the post of Geologist-cum-Remote Sensing Specialist on contractual basis for the State Project Management Unit, Integrated Coastal Zone Management Project, West Bengal, assisted by the World Bank. The appointment was contractual and purely temporary, coterminous with the currency of the project, and subject to the 19 conditions mentioned therein. Condition No. 11 being relevant for the purpose of a decision on these appeals, is quoted below :- 11. Notwithstanding anything contained herein above, your services may be terminated at any time by the competent authority of the SPMU if you are found to be guilty of any insubordination, intemperance or other misconduct or of breach or nonperformance. The writ petitioner duly accepted the offer of appointment and joined the post of Geologist-cum- Remote Sensing Specialist. 7. On or about 29th September, 2014, the appellant in M.A.T. 342 of 2018 issued a show cause notice to the writ petitioner reading as follows :- It was reported to the undersigned that on 4.3.2014, you, along with some other staff members, tried to interfere with an enquiry entrusted by the undersigned to the Administrative Officer, ICZM Project. 7. On or about 29th September, 2014, the appellant in M.A.T. 342 of 2018 issued a show cause notice to the writ petitioner reading as follows :- It was reported to the undersigned that on 4.3.2014, you, along with some other staff members, tried to interfere with an enquiry entrusted by the undersigned to the Administrative Officer, ICZM Project. Subsequently, an enquiry into the matter was conducted by the Senior Environment Officer, Environment Department, Government of West Bengal. The report of the said enquiry shows that your actions in connection with the above matter amount to misconduct and insubordination. 8. The writ petitioner responded thereto by her letter dated 29th September, 2014. For the purpose of furnishing an effective reply to the show cause notice, she requested the appellant in M.A.T. 343 of 2018 to provide her: (i) The Enquiry Report of the Senior Environment Officer, Department of Environment, Govt. of West Bengal on the matter of alleged attempt to interfere on 04.03.14 into the enquiry entrusted by the Project Director on the Administrative officer (ii) Report of the three-member expert committee regarding alleged flaws in the map prepared by CZMP team and also for putting blame on the administration in order to hide the unsatisfactory progress of wrok as reportedly mentioned in that report. 9. The request of the writ petitioner was favourably considered and she was furnished the reports that she required. 10. Upon receipt of the reports, the writ petitioner submitted a further representation dated 10th October, 2014. She intended to show the serious flaws and discrepancies in the show cause notice dated 29th September, 2014. It was made clear by her that the representation was not an answer to the show cause notice, which she assured to submit within 10 working days of receipt of the documents and papers mentioned therein. 11. By a letter dated 20th October, 2014, the appellant in M.A.T. 342 of 2018 furnished to the writ petitioner the documents and papers that she had asked for. 12. There is correspondence on record reflecting that the writ petitioner had sought for time to submit her reply to the show cause notice on the grounds mentioned therein and the accusation on the part of the appellant in M.A.T. 342 of 2018 that the writ petitioner was avoiding to give a reply to the show cause notice. 12. There is correspondence on record reflecting that the writ petitioner had sought for time to submit her reply to the show cause notice on the grounds mentioned therein and the accusation on the part of the appellant in M.A.T. 342 of 2018 that the writ petitioner was avoiding to give a reply to the show cause notice. Ultimately, the writ petitioner did in fact give a detailed reply to the show cause by her letter 19th November, 2014 whereupon the impugned termination order dated 4th December, 2014 was issued by the appellant in M.A.T. 343 of 2018. The last two paragraphs of the order dated 4th December, 2014 read as follows :- (vi) That under the facts and circumstances, it is evident that in your letter dated 19.11.2014, you have failed to give satisfactory explanations to the serious charges of misconduct, insubordination and non-performance made against you. Therefore the authorities have no other option but to terminate your service. vii) Your contractual service is therefore terminated with immediate effect under Clause No. 11, read with Clause No. 7 of your appointment letter no. 083-ICZMP/7A-03/2010-11(15) dated 30.11.2010. 13. The contention raised on behalf of the writ petitioner, which succeeded before the learned Judge, was that she had not been proceeded against by initiation of a disciplinary proceeding on charges of misconduct, insubordination and non-performance of duty, and the previous (enquiry) reports were made the foundation for arriving at a guilt of misconduct committed by her; such an action was in the teeth of a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court including, inter alia, the decision reported in (Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, (1999) 3 SCC 60 ). 14. Appearing in support of the appeals, Mr. Mitra, learned senior advocate contended that the writ petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to meet the allegations levelled against her in the show cause notice and to explain her conduct and that the learned Judge erred in the exercise of jurisdiction while holding that the writ petitioner was proceeded against in breach of the principles of natural justice. 15. It was next contended by Mr. 15. It was next contended by Mr. Mitra that the writ petitioner was neither a civil post holder nor a member of the civil service of the Union or the State and hence, was not entitled to protection of Article 311 of the Constitution; hence, she was not entitled to opportunity of the nature contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. However, the mind of the learned Judge having been coloured by reason of a mistaken perception that the writ petitioner was entitled to such a protection, the ultimate finding rendered by His Lordship applying a wrong test stands completely vitiated. 16. To support his arguments that an employee appointed on contract is not a Government servant to whom Article 311 shall not apply, Mr. Mitra referred to and relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (Union Public Service Commission Vs. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela & Ors., (2006) 2 SCC 482 ). The decision reported in (Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. Vs. Gurudas Singh, (2004) 13 SCC 418 ) was relied on for the proposition that an authority may be State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of it being subject to Part III thereof, but that would not necessarily mean that such an authority is State for the purpose of Article 311. Also, the decision reported in [Dr. Gurjeewan Garewal (Mrs.) Vs. Dr. Sumitra Das (Mrs.) & Ors., (2004) 5 SCC 263 ] was cited where the Court held that only persons holding civil posts are entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 17. It was the further argument of Mr. Mitra that the writ petitioner was appointed in connection with a project, and there is evidence galore how, because of lack of devotion to duty and for not maintaining high standards of commitment and responsibility by the writ petitioner, the project had suffered. He argued that it was in such circumstances that the writ petitioner, having failed to perform and contribute to the cause and progress of the project coupled with indulging in acts of omission/commission amounting to misconduct and insubordination that the employer lost complete faith in her and it was felt necessary not to continue her in service and to terminate her service in accordance with the terms and conditions of her appointment. 18. Finally, Mr. 18. Finally, Mr. Mitra took exception to the extent of relief granted by the learned Judge in favour of the writ petitioner. According to him, the writ petitioner had not worked in connection with the project since the time termination of her service was effected. She had been appointed on contract and it was also temporary, and by efflux of time the project has been discontinued. The learned Judge while directing reinstatement in service granted the writ petitioner full back wages without even making an attempt to ascertain whether the writ petitioner was in gainful employment elsewhere and how she had survived all these years, if at all she was not in gainful employment since such termination. It was further contended that the writ petitioner did not even pray for back wages, yet, she was granted relief. Such grant of relief, he contended, was impermissible. According to him, since the termination was faulted for breach of natural justice, the proper course would have been, if at all, to direct reinstatement for the limited purpose of holding an enquiry and the relief of back wages should have been made dependent on the result of the enquiry. 19. Based on such submissions, Mr. Mitra prayed for quashing of the judgment and order under challenge and for appropriate orders to sub-serve the ends of justice. 20. Per contra, Mr. Ghosh, learned advocate for the writ petitioner contended that proved misconduct, insubordination and non-performance of duty by the writ petitioner without holding any enquiry into her conduct upon extending reasonable and adequate opportunity of defence being the foundation for issuance of the impugned order of termination, the learned Judge was right in his approach in applying the law laid down in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra). He further contended that although the learned Judge may not have been correct in observing that the writ petitioner was entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution, there is no dispute that the employer of the writ petitioner is an authority answering the description of Article 12 of the Constitution and, therefore, such employer was subject to Part III of the Constitution and naturally under an obligation to act fairly and reasonably in the matter of proceeding against the writ petitioner; and terminating her service without complying with the principles of natural justice is totally opposed to the guarantee available under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 21. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (K.K. Saksena Vs. International Commission of Irrigation & Ors.,2015 4 SCC 617), Mr. Ghosh contended that if a wrongful order of termination from service issued by an Article 12 authority is set aside by a court of law, the relief of reinstatement would be available notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereafter the Act) and the learned Judge having granted liberty to the employer of the writ petitioner to proceed against her by conducting a regular enquiry, such judgment and order does not warrant any interference. 22. Referring to information obtained from the net, Mr. Ghosh apprised us that the subject project is still continuing. 23. Insofar as the relief of back wages granted by the learned Judge is concerned, the contention advanced by Mr. Ghosh is this. Upon reinstatement of the writ petitioner being ordered, grant of back wages was a consequential relief that the learned Judge in the wise exercise of discretion had allowed and except for a few months when the writ petitioner was employed elsewhere, she could legitimately expect such relief; and, thus, we ought to mould the relief in this behalf appropriately. 24. Mr. Ghosh has cited several decisions before us to draw home the point that back wages would be consequential to an order for reinstatement. 24. Mr. Ghosh has cited several decisions before us to draw home the point that back wages would be consequential to an order for reinstatement. The decisions relied on are: (i) [Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. S.C. Sharma, (2005) 2 SCC 363 ]; (ii) [Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324 ]; (iii) [Shiv Nandan Mahto v. State of Bihar, (2013) 11 SCC 626 ]; (iv) [Fisheries Department, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Charan Singh, (2015) 8 SCC 150 ]; (v) [Marwari Balika Vidyala v. Asha Srivastava, 2019 4 Scale 600 ]; (vi) [Dayaram Dayal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1997) 7 SCC 443 ]; (vii) [Indian Oil Corporation v. Manohar Kumar Keswani, (2008) 1 CalHN 778]; (viii) [M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. The Employees of Hindustan Tin Work, (1979) 2 SCC 80 ]; (ix) [Union of India v. R. Reddappa, (1993) 4 SCC 269 ]; and (x) [State of Uttar Pradesh v. Daynand Chakrawarty, (2013) 7 SCC 595 ]. 25. Responding to our query as to why back wages had not been claimed in the writ petition, Mr. Ghosh answered that the writ petition was presented immediately after the order of termination was received by the writ petitioner and having regard to the order dated 13th January, 2015 initially passed by a learned Judge of this Court while admitting the writ petition, it seemed to her that not much time would be consumed in the writ petition being decided and she would be entitled to back wages, provided the writ petition succeeds, even without a prayer to that effect. As such, she had not been advised to amend the prayer clauses in the writ petition claiming back wages. 26. The decisions of the Supreme Court reported in [Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, (1966) AIR SC 81], Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) AIR SC 1896], [Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. v. Bajrangi Rabidas, (2013) 12 Scale 69 ], [M. Sudakar v. V. Manoharan, (2011) 1 SCC 484 ], [Joshi Technologies International v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 728 ] and [Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur, (2013) 5 SCC 427 ] as well as the decisions of this Court reported in [Bhowanipore Gujrati Education Society v. K.M.C., (2008) 4 CalHN 420] and [Anup Kumar Kundu v. Registrar of Co-op. Society, W.B., (2008) 1 CalHN 140] were relied on to trace the extent of powers exercisable by a writ court, a fortiori, by the writ appellate court. 27. In reply, Mr. Mitra contended that having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in [Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli & Ors. Vs. Lakshmi Narain & Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 58 ], which has also been followed in a decision of recent origin reported in [The Maharashtra State Cooperative Housing Finance Corporation Limited Vs. Prabhakar Sitaram Bhadange, (2017) 5 SCC 623 ], there was no question of reinstating the writ petitioner in service and that the only remedy that could be pursued by her was to institute a suit before a civil court for damages against her employer. 28. We place on record Mr. Ghosh s fair approach in bringing to our notice that the view expressed in Vaish Degree College (supra) was followed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in its decision reported in [Sri Anupam Ghosh Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1991) 2 CalHN 451]. However, he hastened to add it that in view of the recent decision in K. K. Saksena (supra), the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions must be held to have been diluted to some extent and the relief of reinstatement that the writ court can grant to an employee of an Article 12 authority upon holding the order of termination to be wrongful, must also be held to have been included in the exceptions formulated in Vaish Degree College (supra), though not expressly but impliedly. 29. Four questions arise for decision on these appeals:- (i) whether the order terminating the writ petitioner s service was legal and valid ? (ii) should the answer to the first question be in the negative, could the writ petitioner be reinstated in the manner the learned Judge directed? (iii) was the learned Judge justified in directing that the writ petitioner shall be entitled to such monthly remuneration that had been denied because of the order of termination from the date such order was issued till the date of the judgment, albeit without rendering any duty? (iv) what order the circumstances warrant? 30. We proceed to answer the first question first. (iv) what order the circumstances warrant? 30. We proceed to answer the first question first. Having regard to condition no.11, extracted supra, there can be no doubt that the employer of the writ petitioner reserved unto himself the right to terminate her service if she were found guilty of any insubordination, intemperance or other misconduct or of breach or non-performance. Such condition refers to the term guilty and necessarily, a finding of guilt could not have been recorded unless a regular enquiry was held. 31. In our view, if indeed materials existed pointing towards insubordination, intemperance or other misconduct or of breach or non-performance by the writ petitioner, the employer could have issued a simple non-stigmatic order of termination observing that the service of the writ petitioner was not required any further for the project. It is regrettable that this course of action was not resorted to. What the employer of the writ petitioner did was to arrive at findings on the point of misconduct, insubordination and nonperformance of duty behind her back, granted an opportunity to her to show cause and followed it up by passing an order terminating her service. If it were the law that an order terminating the service of an employee could be passed only on the basis of considering her response to a show cause notice, we may not have interfered. However, that is not the position in law. If the disciplinary authority wishes to terminate the service of an employee and his/her misconduct is the foundation there for, the law insists that the delinquent employee be first told what the allegations against him/her are, who the witnesses are who would depose in support of the allegations and what are the documents that would be relied upon against him/her. Should the delinquent employee deny the allegations and seek an opportunity of hearing, an enquiry ought to commence to unearth the truth. The disciplinary authority himself may hold the enquiry, or he may delegate the task to any other officer. In such case, the delinquent employee not only gets the opportunity to demolish the employer s case by cross-examining the witnesses but also gets the opportunity to explain her conduct by adducing evidence in defence. The disciplinary authority himself may hold the enquiry, or he may delegate the task to any other officer. In such case, the delinquent employee not only gets the opportunity to demolish the employer s case by cross-examining the witnesses but also gets the opportunity to explain her conduct by adducing evidence in defence. Upon completion of enquiry and if the allegations are found to be proved, the report of enquiry has to be furnished to the delinquent employee (if the disciplinary authority is not the enquiry officer) and opportunity extended to him/her inviting comments there against. It is only after considering such comments that the disciplinary authority may proceed to pass an appropriate order. If the enquiry is conducted by the disciplinary authority, the report need not be given to the disciplinary authority. This is the broad framework of a domestic enquiry. 32. So far as the present case is concerned, admittedly no such opportunity as penned above was extended to the writ petitioner. The action of the appellant in M.A.T. 342 of 2018 not to hold any enquiry but to rely on the previous reports (which indicted the writ petitioner) as if they are sacrosanct, and to issue the order of termination based thereon suffers from the vices of illegality and procedural impropriety. If an opportunity were extended to the writ petitioner to cross-examine the authors of the reports, she could have either failed in her pursuit to prove them wrong; in the alternative, she could have shown that what they had reported was absolutely wrong. This would have enabled the enquiry officer to come to a definite finding as to whether the writ petitioner was guilty of the allegations or not. The employer should have borne in mind that the order of termination would visit the writ petitioner with civil consequences and such an order could not have been made without conforming to the principles of natural justice, as laid down in the decision reported in [State of Orissa Vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors., (1967) AIR SC 1269]. 33. In our considered view, on facts and in the circumstances, granting an opportunity to the writ petitioner to reply to the show cause did not amount to adequate and reasonable opportunity to defend herself. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors., (1967) AIR SC 1269]. 33. In our considered view, on facts and in the circumstances, granting an opportunity to the writ petitioner to reply to the show cause did not amount to adequate and reasonable opportunity to defend herself. As has been held in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), the employer was at liberty not to hold an enquiry, not to arrive at any finding against the employee and if it did not want to continue an employee in service against whom there were complaints, the employer was at liberty to terminate the service of the employee and in such case it would be a case of motive and the order would not have been bad. However, once allegations against an employee are made the foundation of an order of termination, such an order has to be tested on the anvil of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. Certainly, the impugned order of termination does not pass such test. 34. We are conscious that the decision in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) was rendered while deciding a claim of a probationer whose probationary service stood terminated. However, having read the decision, we are of the opinion that the test laid down therein applies to termination of a contractual appointment by a stigmatic order, upon a finding of guilt being arrived at without holding any enquiry, as well. 35. While, however, holding that the writ petitioner was denied reasonable and adequate opportunity of defence, we express our inability to be ad idem with the learned Judge that the writ petitioner was entitled to protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. No doubt the employer of the writ petitioner is an Article 12 authority but that would not mean that every employee of an Article 12 authority is entitled to the protection envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The decisions relied on by Mr. Mitra are apt. 36. No doubt the employer of the writ petitioner is an Article 12 authority but that would not mean that every employee of an Article 12 authority is entitled to the protection envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The decisions relied on by Mr. Mitra are apt. 36. This does not, however, detract from the position that each and every employee of an Article 12 authority is entitled to claim that if allegations touching the conduct of an employee are made the foundation of an order of termination from service, a proper inquiry has to be held into his conduct unless of course the governing Discipline and Appeal Rules vests the employer with a power to dispense with an enquiry if it is considered not to be practicable in the facts and circumstances but upon recording adequate reasons there for. The present case does not qualify to be one such case and, therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the learned Judge was perfectly justified in interfering with the order of termination. 37. The first question is answered accordingly. 38. We now move on to the next question as to whether the relief of reinstatement could have been granted to the writ petitioner. 39. In Vaish Degree College (supra), the Supreme Court was considering whether a contract of personal service could be specifically enforced. The Court noted the bar imposed by section 14 of the Act and observed that a civil court does not have the jurisdiction to grant the relief of reinstatement in service as grant of such relief would amount to enforcing the contract of personal service. However, three exceptional situations were carved out by the Supreme Court, where an order of reinstatement could be made despite the bar created by section 14 of the Act, namely, (i) where a public servant is dismissed from service contravening Article 311 of the Constitution; (ii) where a workman s service is terminated and the industrial tribunal/labour court holds such termination to be bad; and (iii) where a statutory body terminates the service of its employee in breach of the mandatory provisions of the statute. 40. 40. It is no doubt true that following the decision in Vaish Degree College (supra), the coordinate Bench in Anupam Ghosh (supra) had the occasion to observe as follows : We cannot persuade ourselves to hold that the impugned action of termination of service was made in contravention of any statutory provision and the employment and corresponding duties relate to matters of public law character. The service of the writ petitioner and conditions thereof flow from private contract between the parties and in view of the position of law discussed hereinbefore, the impugned action of termination of service is not amenable to writ jurisdiction even if it is held that the company is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 41. In course of hearing the arguments advanced by the parties, we were feeling a bit hesitant as to whether the learned Judge was right in directing that the writ petitioner would be deemed to be in continuous service right from the date of termination of service, since that would amount to enforcement of a personal contract of service. However, the decision in K. K. Saksena (supra) relied on by Mr. Ghosh appears to provide appropriate guidance to us for deciding the point. Paragraph 52 of the said decision, heavily relied on by Mr. Ghosh, is reproduced below : 52. It is trite that contract of personal service cannot be enforced. There are three exceptions to this rule, namely: (i) when the employee is a public servant working under the Union of India or State; (ii) when such an employee is employed by an authority/body which is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India; and (iii) when such an employee is workmen within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and raises a dispute regarding his termination by invoking the machinery under the said Act. In the first two cases, the employment ceases to have private law character and status to such an employment is attached. In the third category of cases, it is the Industrial Disputes Act which confers jurisdiction on the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to grant reinstatement in case termination is found to be illegal. 42. In the first two cases, the employment ceases to have private law character and status to such an employment is attached. In the third category of cases, it is the Industrial Disputes Act which confers jurisdiction on the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to grant reinstatement in case termination is found to be illegal. 42. Although it is true that while rendering the decision in K. K. Saksena (supra) attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the decision in Vaish Degree College (supra), we cannot be unmindful of the rapid strides made by the Constitutional courts while dealing with unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary and highhanded actions of authorities which answer the description of Article 12 of the Constitution. This has led to a flurry of decisions expanding the scope of judicial review of administrative action offending the Fundamental Rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution and we see no reason as to why the exceptions carved out in Vaish Degree College (supra) should be confined, inter alia, to statutory bodies and may not extend to other authorities which are State within the meaning of Article 12. If indeed a statutory body can be directed to reinstate its employee, provided the order of termination issued by it is found to be wrongful and unsustainable in law, we wonder whether there is any worthy reason, apart from section 14 of the Act, to give immunity to an Article 12 authority from suffering an order to reinstate its dismissed employee. In our view, a civil court would be required to follow section 14 of the Act and not give a declaration that the contract subsists, although the employer may have terminated the contract of personal service by acting in breach of the terms thereof. However, when an Article 12 authority does so in breach of Article 14, section 14 of the Act cannot have the effect of overriding Article 14. An Article 12 authority cannot legitimately contend that in matters of employment, it would have the liberty of acting contrary to the Fundamental Rights including Article 14. However, when an Article 12 authority does so in breach of Article 14, section 14 of the Act cannot have the effect of overriding Article 14. An Article 12 authority cannot legitimately contend that in matters of employment, it would have the liberty of acting contrary to the Fundamental Rights including Article 14. The net of judicial review can, in an appropriate case, be spread wide and high to cover all authorities which are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution; therefore, any arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair and highhanded action of an Article 12 authority in terminating the service of an employee in blatant disregard of Article 14 or by not complying with the principles of natural justice would not attract the bar created by section 14 of the Act and, therefore, the relief of reinstatement, in our view, ought to follow, quite justifiably, as a consequential relief upon an illegal order of termination being held bad and set aside. The view that we take here, finds support from the decision in K. K. Saksena (supra). 43. Nonetheless, the question under consideration requires an answer also in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in [Life Insurance Corporation of India v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 ]. It has been held there that once the Court sets aside an order of punishment on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the Court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the case to the disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from the point it stood vitiated and conclude the same. In our view, relief of reinstatement in service upon quashing of an order of penalty is not automatic in all cases. If the Court directs enquiry to be resumed from a particular stage, the reinstatement could be for the purpose of concluding the enquiry. Much would depend, in such a case, upon the gravity of delinquency involved. Considering the gravity of the allegations levelled against the writ petitioner, it was indeed proper on the part of the learned Judge to direct an enquiry being conducted into the conduct of the writ petitioner but the employer ought to have been left free to decide, in case the project has not been discontinued, whether it was willing to accept the service of the writ petitioner or not. Needless to observe, if the appellants were to accept the writ petitioner s service, she would be entitled to payment in terms of the contract of service. Should the writ petitioner s service be not required during the period the enquiry continues and till such time it reaches a logical end, the employer s obligation to pay her would arise only if she is entitled to any sum, in accordance with law. We have noted that the learned Judge did not expressly grant the relief of reinstatement but used a different language in granting similar relief. The appellants shall, therefore, be under an obligation to decide whether to accept service from the writ petitioner and pay her for such service, or, not to accept service till the conclusion of the enquiry and not pay on the principle of no work no pay. 44. The second question is thus answered. 45. The third question would now exercise our consideration. 46. We have considered all the decisions relied on by Mr. Ghosh. Our appreciation of the law laid down therein has to be in the light of the circumstance that the learned Judge granted relief in the nature of back wages without there being a prayer in that behalf. However, we shall consider that aspect of the matter a little later. 47. Condition No. 2 of the offer of appointment stipulated that the project is of five years duration. As noticed above, appointment of the writ petitioner was coterminous with the currency of the project. At the time of acceptance of the offer of appointment, the writ petitioner may not have had reason to believe that the project would continue beyond five years. It was within such period of five years that the writ petitioner s service was terminated. Had the project not been continued beyond five years, question of reinstatement would not have arisen. It is only a fortuitous circumstance that the project has continued beyond five years. The writ petitioner had no security of service, as such, from day one. Being a contractual employee, she must have been aware that since her appointment was on contract she runs the risk of facing termination at any time for just and sufficient reasons. These circumstances have to be weighed while considering whether the writ petitioner was entitled to full remuneration for the period she could not discharge her duty. Being a contractual employee, she must have been aware that since her appointment was on contract she runs the risk of facing termination at any time for just and sufficient reasons. These circumstances have to be weighed while considering whether the writ petitioner was entitled to full remuneration for the period she could not discharge her duty. In Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) it was held that payment of back wages is the normal rule upon an order of termination from service being held to be wrongful. However, considering the status of the writ petitioner that she was a contractual and not a permanent employee, we are of also of the view that the principles laid down in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) may not have application qua contractual employees. 48. The other weighty reason for declining back wages to the writ petitioner, touching upon the aspect we have referred to briefly in paragraph 46 (supra) is this. In the writ petition, there was no prayer to the effect that the employer of the writ petitioner should be directed to pay back wages to her during the period she could not discharge duty without any fault on her part. Even without such prayer, the learned Judge proceeded to grant her relief of back wages. 49. The Supreme Court in its decision reported in [Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, (2010) 1 SCC 234 ] held as follows: 29. The approach of the High Court in granting relief not prayed for cannot be approved by this Court. Every petition under Article 226 of the Constitution must contain a relief clause. Whenever the petitioner is entitled to or is claiming more than one relief, he must pray for all the reliefs. Under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if the plaintiff omits, except with the leave of the court, to sue for any particular relief which he is entitled to get, he will not afterwards be allowed to sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. 30. Though the provisions of the Code are not made applicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, the general principles made in the Civil Procedure Code will apply even to writ petitions. It is, therefore, incumbent on the petitioner to claim all reliefs he seeks from the court. 30. Though the provisions of the Code are not made applicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, the general principles made in the Civil Procedure Code will apply even to writ petitions. It is, therefore, incumbent on the petitioner to claim all reliefs he seeks from the court. Normally, the court will grant only those reliefs specifically prayed for by the petitioner. Though the court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner. 31. In Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow, (1984) AIR SC 186, overlooking the rule relating to grant of admission to postgraduate course in Medical College, the High Court in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution directed the Medical Council to grant provisional admission to the petitioner. This Court set aside the order passed by the High Court observing that: 26. in his own petition in the High Court, the respondent had merely prayed for a writ directing the State or the college to consider his case for admission yet the High Court went a step further and straightaway issued a writ of mandamus directing the college to admit him to the MS course and thus granted a relief to the respondent which he himself never prayed for and could not have prayed for. 32. Again, in Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar, (1991) AIR SC 409, this Court observed: 4. A party cannot be granted a relief which is not claimed, if the circumstances of the case are such that the granting of such relief would result in serious prejudice to the interested party and deprive him of the valuable rights under the statute. 33. Though a High Court has power to mould relief’s to meet the requirements of each case, that does not mean that the draftsman of a writ petition should not apply his mind to the proper relief which should be asked for and throw the entire burden of it upon the court. 50. In view of the above dicta, it is the law that a writ court cannot grant a relief that the party invoking its jurisdiction has not specifically prayed for. 51. 50. In view of the above dicta, it is the law that a writ court cannot grant a relief that the party invoking its jurisdiction has not specifically prayed for. 51. Having given our anxious consideration to the problem at hand, we feel that the answer to the third question has to be in the negative. Interest of justice does not warrant the order of the learned Judge granting back wages to be retained. We, thus, set aside the direction for back wages. 52. This answers the third question. 53. We have now reached the stage to answer the last question. The liberty granted by the learned Judge to the appellants to proceed against the writ petitioner by granting her opportunity of defence upon holding an enquiry is maintained. The proceedings may be completed as early as possible, in accordance with law, but preferably within 6 (six) months from date. The observations made in paragraph 43 (supra), however, shall be borne in mind in this regard. 54. The appeals stand disposed of together with C.A.N. 2588 of 2018 by modifying the judgment and order under challenge to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no order as to costs. Photocopy of this judgment and order, duly countersigned by the Assistant Court Officer, shall be retained with the records of M.A.T. 343 of 2018. Photostat certified copy of the order, if applied for, be furnished expeditiously.