ORDER : This petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner in the case S.T. No. 4415/2016 on the file of the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate -II, Thrissur. 2. The petitioner is the second accused in the case. The allegation against him is that he committed an offence punishable under Section 20 of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 3. The case against the petitioner is based on a complaint filed before the Magistrate's Court by the Health Inspector, Community Health Centre, Triprayar. As per the complaint filed by him, when he conducted inspection on 13.06.2016, of the shop run by the first accused, tobacco products manufactured by the petitioner were found stored there. It is alleged that the tobacco products had no proper statutory warning labels on them. 4. The proceedings against the petitioner are sought to be quashed on the ground that the petitioner is shown as an accused in the case not by his name but by his official capacity in a company. It is also stated that the complaint filed, without impleading the company who produced or manufactured the tobacco products as an accused, is not maintainable. 5. Heard Sri. Bechu Kurian Thomas, learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the petitioner and also the learned Public Prosecutor. 6. The offence allegedly committed by the accused in the case is under Section 20 of the Act. Section 20(1) of the Act states that any person who produces or manufactures cigarettes or tobacco products, which do not contain, either on the package or on their label, the specified warning and the nicotine and tar contents, shall be liable for punishment. Section 20(2) of the Act states that any person who sells or distributes cigarettes or tobacco products, which do not contain, either on the package or on their label, the specified warning and the nicotine and tar contents, shall be liable for punishment. 7. Section 20(2) of the Act states that any person who sells or distributes cigarettes or tobacco products, which do not contain, either on the package or on their label, the specified warning and the nicotine and tar contents, shall be liable for punishment. 7. Section 26(1) of the Act provides that where an offence under the Act has been committed by a company, every person, who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Section 26(2) of the Act states that, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under the Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 8. The complaint against the second accused is not maintainable for more than one reason. In the first place, the petitioner, who is the second accused in the case, is described in the complaint as "the Divisional Chief Executive, Tobacco Division, ITC Ltd." The name of the second accused is nowhere mentioned in the complaint. The offence was detected on 13.06.2016. The complaint is dated 31.08.2016. The person holding the post of the divisional chief executive of the company at the time of commission of the alleged offence may not be the person holding that post or office at the time of filing the complaint or at the time of the trial of the case. Only that particular individual, who has allegedly committed the offence, can be prosecuted. The proceedings against the second accused are liable to be quashed on this ground alone. 9. In the second place, the complaint lacks necessary averments to make the second accused liable for an offence committed by the company of which he/she is the Divisional Chief Executive. Only that particular individual, who has allegedly committed the offence, can be prosecuted. The proceedings against the second accused are liable to be quashed on this ground alone. 9. In the second place, the complaint lacks necessary averments to make the second accused liable for an offence committed by the company of which he/she is the Divisional Chief Executive. As per Section 26(1) of the Act, in order to make any person liable for an offence committed by a company, that person should have been, at the time the offence was committed, in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company. In the instant case, there is no averment in the complaint that the second accused was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, at the time of commission of the offence by the company. There is also no averment in the complaint that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of the second accused. 10. In the third place, the company, which has allegedly committed the offence and of which the second accused is the Divisional Chief Executive, is not arrayed as an accused in the complaint. In Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited : (2012) 5 SCC 661 , the Apex Court has held that unless the company is made an accused, there cannot be a valid prosecution against an officer of it who has got only vicarious liability. Arraigning of the company as an accused is imperative to make the officers of the company liable. True, this decision was rendered by the Apex Court in the context of the provision contained in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. But, the provisions contained in Section 26 of the Act are almost in pari materia with the provisions contained in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, the dictum laid down in the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case. On this ground also, the proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be quashed. 11. Consequently, the petition is allowed. Therefore, the dictum laid down in the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case. On this ground also, the proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be quashed. 11. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The proceedings as against the petitioner in the case S.T No. 4415/2016 on the file of the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate-II, Thrissur are hereby quashed.