JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition has been filed seeking quashing and setting aside the decision as contained in the letter dated 22.09.2004 of the Chief Executive Officer of the respondent confirming the order of punishment dated 08.06.2004. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a Mechanical Supervisor under the State Government with effect from 29.01.1973. He was subsequently transferred in 1981 to the respondent-Board, which is a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Thereafter, he was promoted as Deputy Executive Engineer, Class–II with effect from 28.04.1986 and was finally working at Vadodara in Public Health (Mechanical) Store Sub-division prior to dismissal from service in the afternoon of 09.06.2004. 2.1 Thereafter, the petitioner was suspended from service on the charge of misappropriation of the amount of Rs.63,418.30 during the period from January 1994 to July 1994 as also irregularities in the presence of daily wagers with effect from 13.08.1996. The petitioner was reinstated into service by the order dated 18.12.1998 on a review of his case as per the Government orders. On being reinstated from 22.12.1998, the petitioner was posted as P.A. to the Superintending Engineer, P.H. Mechanical Circle, Vadodara. 2.2 Thereafter, the petitioner was again suspended from service by the order dated 20.04.2000 of the Member Secretary of the Board with effect from 25.04.2000 and again reinstated on 28.04.2004. The Member Secretary of the respondent-Board by the memo dated 09.06.1998 served upon the petitioner as charge-sheet on a total fifteen counts relating to irregularities in maintenance of accounts of daily wagers engaged the repairing work of hand pumps. The charge-sheet has been issued in accordance with the provisions of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 adopted by the respondent-Board. 2.3 It is alleged that by the order dated 18.12.1998, the Chief Executive Officer of the respondent-Board appointed Shri S.K.Shah, Inquiry Officer, Unit–I of Gujarat Jal Seva Training Institution, Gandhinagar as Inquiry Officer. The said Inquiry Officer was by this order directed to conduct a joint inquiry against seven delinquents mentioned in the said order. It is pointed out that one of the delinquents was Shri P.G.Kishori, who was at the relevant time working as Senior Clerk in mechanical sub-division at Dahod; by this order, Shri P.G.Gadani, Superintending Engineer was appointed as Presenting Officer. 3. It is pointed out that one of the delinquents was Shri P.G.Kishori, who was at the relevant time working as Senior Clerk in mechanical sub-division at Dahod; by this order, Shri P.G.Gadani, Superintending Engineer was appointed as Presenting Officer. 3. Learned advocate Mr.Radhesh Vyas for the petitioner has submitted that the delinquents in the joint inquiry referred to above, included one Class–I Executive Engineer, two Deputy Executive Engineers of Class–II and four others of Class–III officers. He has submitted that the competent authority to impose punishment of dismissal from service upon Class–I and Class–II officers is Board while such authority for Class–III officers is a Member Secretary. These authorities have been decided by Circular dated 17.12.1998 of the respondent-Board. Thus, the Chief Executive Authority, who has issued order dated 18.12.1998 for joint inquiry against Class–I, Class-II and Class-III officers, has no authority to do so under Rule 13 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1971. 3.1 Learned advocate Mr.Vyas for the petitioner has submitted that although the order dated 18.12.1998 directed the Inquiry Officer to hold a joint inquiry, he conducted the inquiries individually but submitted his consolidated inquiry report on 24.08.1999 to the Board. The Chief Executive Officer of the Board forwarded copy of an extract of the aforesaid report, which related to the petitioner only by his letter dated 24.09.1999 to the petitioner. The letter dated 24.09.1999 does not indicate at what level the inquiry report was considered. The petitioner submitted his reply to the aforesaid letter and the inquiry report by his letter dated 26.10.1999, however, the reply has not been properly considered by the Disciplinary Authority, i.e., the Member Secretary of the Board. 3.2 Learned advocate Mr.Vyas for the petitioner has submitted that the Member Secretary of the Board by the order dated 08.06.2004 imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. It was also ordered that the period of suspension of the petitioner from 06.08.1996 to 18.12.1998 should be treated as suspension by way of penalty. He has submitted that the petitioner has not been paid the amount of General Provident Fund and contribution towards Group Insurance Scheme. 3.3 Learned advocate Mr.Chauhan for the petitioner has submitted that thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Chairman (Appellate Authority) of the Board on 18.07.2004. He has submitted that the petitioner has not been paid the amount of General Provident Fund and contribution towards Group Insurance Scheme. 3.3 Learned advocate Mr.Chauhan for the petitioner has submitted that thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Chairman (Appellate Authority) of the Board on 18.07.2004. The Chief Executive Officer of the Board by his letter dated 22.09.2004 informed the petitioner that his appeal against the order dated 08.06.2004 imposing punishment of dismissal from service and of treating the period of suspension as Suspension has not been accepted at the level of competent authority. 4. Learned advocate Mr.Munshaw for the respondent while placing reliance on the affidavit-in-rejoinder by the Board, has submitted that the post of Deputy Executive Engineer, on which the petitioner is working is equivalent to Class–II post and appointing authority is a Member Secretary of the Board and hence, he can be dismissed by the order passed by the Board Secretary. 4.1 Further submission has been made that there were serious charges leveled against the petitioner pertaining to financial irregularities and it was decided by the Chairman of the Board to allow the Member Secretary of the Board to pass the order of dismissal as suggested subject to the approval of the Board of Members. He has submitted that noting in this regard put up before the Chairman of the Board through Member Secretary which was approved on 06.04.2004. 4.2 Learned advocate Mr.Munshaw has further submitted that accordingly the dismissal order was passed on 08.06.2004 by the Member Secretary and the same was approved retrospectively by the Board of Members in the meeting dated 08.06.2004 and hence, the impugned order cannot be said to have been passed illegally in defiance of the Circular dated 17.12.1998. 5. I have heard the learned advocates for the parties. The documents as pointed out by them are also perused. 6. A short issue which emanates from the present writ petition is whether the dismissal of the petitioner can be said to have been passed in defiance of the circular dated 17.12.1998 passed by the respondent-Board governing the penalty orders which are to be imposed on the various classes of employees by the Authorities specified therein. 6. A short issue which emanates from the present writ petition is whether the dismissal of the petitioner can be said to have been passed in defiance of the circular dated 17.12.1998 passed by the respondent-Board governing the penalty orders which are to be imposed on the various classes of employees by the Authorities specified therein. A perusal of the circular dated 17.12.1998, more particularly, the appendix specifies the powers conferred by the Board or Member Secretary of the Board with regard of imposition of penalty to various classes of employees working under the Board, reveals that in case of Class–I and Class–II employees, the competent authority or the authority to impose the punishment would be the Board. 7. Indubitably, the petitioner was Deputy Chief Engineer, who was a Class–II employee of the Board. The recitals of the circular dated 17.12.1998 stipulates reveal that the Board is the only competent authority to impose the punishment on Class-II employees. 8. In the present case, a perusal of the impugned order dated 8.6.2004 reveals that the same has been passed by the Member Secretary of the Board. The submission advanced by the respondent-Board that subsequently, since the dismissal was approved by the Board in the meeting held on 08.06.2004; the impugned order cannot be said to be without authority, does not merit acceptance, since no provision of any rule or regulations recommending/adopting such procedure is pointed out before this Court. The procedure adopted by the respondent-Board is in complete defiance of the Circular dated 17.12.1998. It is also not pointed out that such punishment can be approved retrospectively. 9. In this view of the matter, the impugned order requires to be set aside as the same is passed without jurisdiction as the Member Secretary of the Board was not empowered to pass such an order imposing a major punishment on the petitioner. The illegality committed by the Member Secretary of the Board in passing the impugned order cannot be subsequently rectified by the respondent Board by approving such order that too by giving retrospective effect in wake of the fact that such procedure is not supported by any rules or regulations. The impugned order cannot be sustained as the same is passed by an authority who is not authorized to issue the same. 10. The impugned order cannot be sustained as the same is passed by an authority who is not authorized to issue the same. 10. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court in case of Union of India v. Y.S. Sandhu- (2008) 12 SCC 30 , the Supreme Court has held that the proceedings are to be continued from the stage of defect where it stood before the alleged vulnerability surfaced. It is settled legal proposition that if the departmental inquiry is vitiated on the ground of technical defect or violation of principles of natural justice, the reinstatement is ordered for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of defect.Since the petitioner is now aged about 75 years and the issue of reinstatement would not arise. He has further submitted that the petitioner at the time of dismissal has rendered 31 years of service and he had only couple of years left for reaching the age of superannuation when the impugned order was passed. 11. Since the petitioner is already reached the age of 75 years and cannot be reinstated in the service and the remand of the matter for continuation of the proceedings is also not permissible, in the considered opinion of this Court in order to lay quietus to the entire dispute, the respondent is hereby directed to consider the case of the petitioner for voluntarily retirement from the service after completion of 30 years. Necessary orders in this regard treating him voluntary retired shall be passed and the consequent retirement benefits shall also be paid to the petitioner. It is clarified that the petitioner shall not be entitled to actual arrears from the date of dismissal till the date of retirement; however, the aforesaid period shall be counted notional for the purpose of fixation of retirement benefits. The entire exercise shall be carried out within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of the order of this Court. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.