JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar Medhi, J. This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree dated 23.08.2007 passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 1, Kamrup in T.A. No. 89/2005 confirming the judgment and decree dated 30.08.2005 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Kamrup in T.S. No. 256/2002. 2. The brief facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows: (i). The appellants were the defendants in the Title Suit. The Suit was instituted for declaration of right, title, interest, recovery of possession and for permanent injunction. Pleaded case of the plaintiff was that the suit land was gifted to a Trust by the original owners vide a registered deed No. 3784/1959, dated 14.07.1959. The said Trust, namely, Sarvodaya Trust took resolution to sell the entire land and pursuant, thereto, the plaintiff had purchased 1(one) Bigha of land Vide registered Sale Deed dated 25.09.1992, followed by mutation in his name and was handed over vacant possession, thereof. The plaintiff raised boundary fencing and subsequently, dug a fishery in the northern part and filled the rest with earth. (ii). However, the defendant Nos. 1 & 2 encroached about 1 Katha 7 Lechas of land belonging to the plaintiff by constructing a boundary wall, leading the plaintiff to institute the present suit. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement and the principal defense was that of adverse possession. The defendants claimed that a plot of land adjacent to the suit land was purchased by them from the original owner vide a registered Sale Deed dated 04.12.1990 which was preceded by an agreement to sale dated 21.08.1990, on which date the defendants had taken possession of the land and as on the date of Execution of the Sale Deed i.e. 04.12.1990, the defendants were already in possession. It is the case of the defendant that taking into consideration the date of coming into possession of the land which according to them is the date of agreement i.e. 21.08.1990, the right to claim adverse possession would accrue and by virtue thereof, the defendants cannot be evicted. (iii). The learned trial Court after consideration of the pleadings, had framed 9(nine) numbers of issues, out of which issue numbers 3, 5 & 7 are relevant which are extracted herein below: (i) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (iii). The learned trial Court after consideration of the pleadings, had framed 9(nine) numbers of issues, out of which issue numbers 3, 5 & 7 are relevant which are extracted herein below: (i) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (ii) Whether the plaintiff took over possession of the suit land on 25.09.92. (iii) Whether the defendant No. 1, 2, 3 have acquired right over the suit land by way of adverse possession? (iv). While the plaintiff examined 5(five) numbers of witnesses, the defendants had examined 3(three) numbers of witnesses. The issues which are relevant for the purpose of determination of this case, namely, 3, 5 & 7 were answered by clubbing the same together. The learned trial Court after discussing the pleadings, evidences both documentary and oral, came to the conclusion that the defense of adverse possession could not be proved by the defendants. Accordingly, the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. (v). Aggrieved, by the same, the defendants had preferred an appeal before the Court of the learned Civil Judge No. 1, Kamrup being Title Appeal No. 89/2005. The learned First Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 23.08.2007 had dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings of fact and the learned trial Court. While answering the relevant issue numbers 3, 5 & 7, the First Appellate Court took into consideration the evidence of the plaintiff as who deposed as PW-1, the Mandal of the Guwahati Revenue Circle (PW-5) and other witnesses. The findings of the defendant No. 1 who deposed as DW-1 has also been taken into consideration. The learned Court affirmed the findings that the encroachment was from 04.12.1990 and the suit being instituted on 03.10.2002, the defense of adverse possession would not be available to the defendants and accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. (vi). Aggrieved, by the aforesaid 2 judgments, the present appeal has been preferred. 3. I have heard Shri B. C. Das, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Shri D. N. Bhattacharyya for the appellants. I have also heard Shri P. K. Kalita, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Ms. N. Dutta, learned counsel for all the respondents. 4. The LCR which have been received have also been carefully examined. 5. Adverse possession is a finding of fact. counsel assisted by Shri D. N. Bhattacharyya for the appellants. I have also heard Shri P. K. Kalita, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Ms. N. Dutta, learned counsel for all the respondents. 4. The LCR which have been received have also been carefully examined. 5. Adverse possession is a finding of fact. As laid down by a catena of judicial pronouncements, the said principle can be used as a defense in a suit for evicting and has been equated to a shield and not a sword. In the instant case it is seen that two dates would play a vital role in calculating the period of adverse possession of 12(twelve) years. The first date is 21.08.1990 i.e the date of entering into the agreement by the defendants for purchase of land adjacent to the land of the plaintiff which is Ext. A and from which date the defendant claims to have come into possession of the suit land. The second date is 04.12.1990 i.e. the date of execution of the Sale Deed by the defendants with his vendor (Ext. B). Though the defendant claimed to have come into possession from the date of entering into the agreement with the vendor i.e. 21.08.1990, both the learned Courts below discarded the said claim and has come to a finding of fact that coming into possession from the said date by the defendant could not be proved. The said finding has been arrived at by taking into consideration the pleadings, materials on record and the findings including the cross-examination. This Court does not find any perversity in arriving at the aforesaid finding by the learned Court below which is a finding of fact. 6. Another point is also required to be taken into consideration while deciding this appeal. There is no challenge or even dispute to the respective Sale Deeds of the plaintiff and the defendants and the land in question of both the Sale Deeds are mutually exclusive. 7. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that both the dates may not be relevant for determination of the lis before this Court as adverse possession is a fact to be proved by oral evidence and there can hardly be any case where such point can be proved by documentary evidence. 7. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that both the dates may not be relevant for determination of the lis before this Court as adverse possession is a fact to be proved by oral evidence and there can hardly be any case where such point can be proved by documentary evidence. In the instant case, though in paragraphs 16 & 17 of the written statement, an averment has been made of coming into possession of 12 Lechas of land before purchase by the plaintiff from the Sarvodaya Trust, the same is not supported by any evidence, rather, there is evidence that after purchase of the land by the plaintiff from the Trust on 25.09.1992, the peaceful possession was handed over to the plaintiff followed by mutation of the land. 8. This Court while admitting the appeal had formulated the following substantial question of law: "Whether the oral evidence adduced by the defendant-appellant relating to the date of taking over possession of the suit land can be excluded in view of the written document being Exts. A & B." 9. While Ext. A. is dated 21.08.1990, Ext. B is dated 04.12.1990 and both the Exhibits cannot be taken together as the issue may hinge upon which date has to be taken into consideration. Learned Sr. counsels were accordingly requested to address the issue as to whether under Section 100 of the CPC there is any provision to recast/reformulate the substantial questions of law. Shri B. C. Das, learned Sr. counsel submits that a harmonious interpretation of the statute holding the field, would allow reframing of the substantial questions of law. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has relied upon the following discussions: (i). Umer khan v. Bismillabi alias Babulal Shaikh and Ors., (2011) 9 SCC 684 . (ii). K. G. Shivalingappa(Dead)by Lrs. and Others. v. G. S. Eswarappa and Ors., (2004) 12 SCC 189 . (iii). Late Kamlabai through L. Rs. and Ors v. Rajesh Kalal and Anr., (2008) AIR M.P. 125. 10. For a proper understanding and interpretation, it would be useful to quote the relevant provisions of law before making any opinion about the same: (i). K. G. Shivalingappa(Dead)by Lrs. and Others. v. G. S. Eswarappa and Ors., (2004) 12 SCC 189 . (iii). Late Kamlabai through L. Rs. and Ors v. Rajesh Kalal and Anr., (2008) AIR M.P. 125. 10. For a proper understanding and interpretation, it would be useful to quote the relevant provisions of law before making any opinion about the same: (i). Section 100 of the CPC reads as follows: "100.Second appeal.-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question." (ii). Section 101 of the Code provides that: "101. Second appeal on no other grounds- No second appeal shall lie except on the ground mentioned in section 100." (iii). Section 103 of the Code provides that: "103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact - In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,- (a) which has not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower Appellate Court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in section 100." 11. A combined reading of the aforesaid provisions of the CPC and by following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that involvement and formulating a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for invoking the powers under Section 100 of the CPC and such powers cannot be entertained without formulating a substantial question of law. As has been held, a Second Appeal is entertainable by the High Court only upon a satisfaction that a substantial question of law is involved in the matter and its formulation, thereof. It is further been held that it would be open for the High Court to reframe the substantial question of law or frame substantial question of law afresh or hold that no substantial question of law is involved at the time of hearing the second appeal. This Court is further of the opinion that to bring out the controversy on the forefront, slight modification in the substantial questions of law framed is permissible. The Apex Court has also laid down that a High Court can interfere with the findings recorded by the Courts below only on the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal or reframe or substitute later at the time of arguments. 12. It appears that though Ext. A & B have both been mentioned while framing the substantial question of law, by following the law laid down by the Apex Court, the same has to be read to mean only Ext. A, which is dated 21.08.1990, inasmuch as, if Ext. B is taken into consideration it is dated 04.12.1990, there would be nothing left for the determination. 13. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and discussions made above, this Court is of the opinion that no case for interference is made out and this appeal is accordingly, dismissed. The substantial question of law stands answered in terms of the discussions made above. 14. Registry to transmit back the records, forthwith.