JUDGMENT : KRISHNA S. DIXIT, J. 1. In both these writ petitions, in substance, the petitioner has laid a challenge to the orders of the respondent-University whereby he has been terminated from service with retrospective effect and strangely, the entire salary earned by him during the service is sought to be recovered on the assumption that his appointment to the post of Assistant Librarian vide order dated 08.05.2006 at Annexure-B was void ab initio. 2. After service of notice respondents have entered appearance; the University is represented by its panel counsel, Sri Rajashekar R. Gunjalli, the respondent-State is represented by learned Additional Government Advocate Mr. A.R. Rodrigues. The University has filed its objections. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri J.S. Shetty submits that, although it is true that the appointment of the petitioner to the post of Assistant Librarian with regular pay-scale as prescribed by the University Grants Commission was subject to a condition-subsequent that he would pass the National Eligibility Test within two years, the said requirement was liable to be dispensed with in view of UGC decision to the effect that those who hold M.Phil degree need not have NET. That being the legal position, the respondent-University is not justified in invalidating petitioner's appointment that too with retrospective effect and further with a direction to recover the salary, which he had drawn from the day one, since the same is violative of Article 23(1) and Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 4. Learned panel counsel for the respondent-University, per contra, submits that, admittedly, petitioner's appointment order dated 08.05.2006 was conditional i.e. he was required to pass the National Eligibility Test, which he has not done; the UGC decision to dispense with this requirement being a post-appointment decision would not dilute the condition in the appointment order; once a condition-subsequent is not complied with, the same dates back to the date of appointment and thus, the contract of employment having become null and void ab inceptio, the petitioner cannot retain salary or any benefit of such employment at all and therefore, the action of the University cannot be faltered. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned panel counsel for the respondent-University. I have perused the writ petitions and Statement of Objections filed by the University. I have also adverted to the decisions cited at the Bar. 6. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned panel counsel for the respondent-University. I have perused the writ petitions and Statement of Objections filed by the University. I have also adverted to the decisions cited at the Bar. 6. AS TO PASSING OF NATIONAL ELIGIBILITY TEST (a) Petitioner was selected and appointed to the post of Assistant Librarian in the UGC pay-scale of Rs. 8000-13500 vide appointment order dated 08.05.2006. The relevant portion reads as under: xxx xxx xxx (b) The appointment order, true it is, required the petitioner to pass the National Eligibility Test within a period of two years as required by the UGC vide letter No. F-1-1/2005(PS) dated January, 2006; this period of two years would expire on 07.05.2008 and thus within that period petitioner was to pass the NET which, admittedly, he has not. The UGC vide decision taken in its Meeting held on 25.08.2006 had exempted inter alia M.Phil degree holders from passing the NET; this decision was conveyed to all the Registrars of the Universities in the country vide letter dated 22.09.2006 (Annexure-X1 to W.P. No. 101519/2014) relevant portion of which reads as under: "The Registrar (All Central/State/Deemed University) State Education Secretaries of All States/UTs Sir/Madam In continuation of this office D.O. No. F.1- 1/2002(PS) Exemp dated 14.06.06, I am to inform you that the Commission in its meeting held on 25th August, 2006 approved exemption from NET to M.Phil and Ph.D Degree holders for appointment to the post of Assistant Librarian & Assistant Director of Physical Education." (c) Apparently, the decision of the UGC is dated 25.08.2006 conveyed to all the Universities in the country vide letter dated 22.09.2006 i.e., hardly less than four months after the petitioner was appointed. The said decision specifically dispenses with the requirement of passing NET if the appointee inter alia to the post of Assistant Librarian holds M.Phil degree, which apparently is superior to NET. Going by the text and context of this letter, this exemption necessarily has to be ex post facto as well. An argument to the contrary would defeat the very purpose of such a decision of the UGC, which the respondent-University could have ascertained simply by seeking a clarification from the UGC, which has not struck to the fertile mind of it's Registrar. An argument to the contrary would defeat the very purpose of such a decision of the UGC, which the respondent-University could have ascertained simply by seeking a clarification from the UGC, which has not struck to the fertile mind of it's Registrar. Therefore, invalidation of petitioner's appointment that too with retrospective effect is not only unjust, arbitrary and unreasonable, but without competence. (d) The reliance of the University's panel counsel on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of P. Susheela vs. University Grants Commission, (2015) 8 SCC 129 , in support of his contention that the UGC decision to exempt M.Phil degree holders from passing in NET is prospective appears to be shaky inasmuch as the litigant in that case did not have any vested right since she was not yet appointed to the post unlike the petitioner in this case who admittedly had served for two years. This becomes apparent by looking to the observation of the Apex Court at para 16 as under: "16. Similar is the case on facts here. A vested right would arise only if any of the appellants before us had actually been appointed to the post of Lecturer/Assistant Professors. Till that date, there is no vested right in any of the appellants. At the highest, the appellants could only contend that they have a right to be considered for the post of Lecturer/Assistant Professor. This right is always subject to minimum eligibility conditions and till such time as the appellants are appointed, different conditions may be laid down at different times. Merely because an additional eligibility condition in the form of a NET test is laid down, it does not mean that any vested right of the appellants is affected, nor does it mean that the regulation laying down such minimum eligibility condition would be retrospective in operation. Such condition would only be prospective as it would apply only at the stage of appointment. It is clear, therefore, that the contentions of the private appellants before us must fail." 7. AS TO INVALIDATION OF APPOINTMENT WITH RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT (a) Petitioner was appointed, admittedly, after selection vide order dated 08.05.2006 to the post of Assistant Librarian with the admissible UGC pay-scale; he had joined the duty within the prescribed period and having performed the duties of his post has drawn the salary as well. AS TO INVALIDATION OF APPOINTMENT WITH RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT (a) Petitioner was appointed, admittedly, after selection vide order dated 08.05.2006 to the post of Assistant Librarian with the admissible UGC pay-scale; he had joined the duty within the prescribed period and having performed the duties of his post has drawn the salary as well. The appointment order had stipulated a condition-subsequent that within two years he should pass NET; it did not stipulate that, if the petitioner failed to pass the NET, his appointment would become null and void ab initio and that he would be liable to refund all the amount drawn by way of salary; it is not the case of the respondent-University that the petitioner had obtained the appointment by playing fraud or duplicity. That being so, it sounds quite strange to this Court that petitioner's appointment could be set at naught ab inceptio. This is a classic case which exhibits rank arbitrariness and unreasonableness attributable to respondent-University, which falls within the definition of State vide Smt. Ujjam Bai vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (1962) AIR SC 1621. 8. AS TO RECOVERY OF ENTIRE SALARY FROM THE DATE OF APPOINTMENT (a) Admittedly, petitioner having been appointed vide order dated 08.05.2006 has worked as Assistant Librarian in the post with the admissible UGC pay-scale; he has drawn the salary which constitutes his property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. The learned author Sri. D.D. Basu in his "Shorter Constitution of India" Fourth Edition, at Page Nos. 1808 & 1809 commenting on Article 300A states as under: "Property 1 - Property, in this Article, means only that which can by itself be acquired, disposed of or taken possession of. Subject to this limitation, it is designed to include private property in all its forms and "must be understood both in a corporeal sense as having reference to those specific things that are susceptible of private appropriation and enjoyment as well as in its judicial or legal sense of a bundle of rights which the owner can exercise under the municipal law with respect to the user and enjoyment of those things to the exclusion of all others." 4. "Property" includes not only real and personal property but also incorporeal rights such as patents, copyrights, leases, chooses in action and every other thing of exchangeable value which a person may have, profit a prendre, such as a right to catch fish in another's tank, the carcass of an animal belonging to a person. 5. The word property connotes everything which is subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate or status." This being the legal position, recovering the salary earned by the petitioner amounts to acquisition of his property without compensation which the blood, bone and flesh of Article 300A of the Constitution shun. Therefore, the University is not justified in resorting to proceedings for recovery of the salary duly earned by the petitioner. (b) Article 23(1) of the Constitution enacts a prohibition against begar with the following text: "Art. 23(1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law." The word "Begar" has not been defined in the Constitution, but it has been defined by Molseworth as 'labour or service exacted by Government or a person in power without giving remuneration for it. Wilson's Glossary defines "Begar" as forced labour, one pressed to carry burden for individuals or public without remuneration as told by Mr. Seervai, at para 11.487 of his commentary "Constitutional Law of India" Fourth Edition. The High Courts of Bombay and Madhya Pradesh have adopted Molseworth's definition: vide Vasudevan S. vs. Mittal S.D. (1962) AIR Bombay 53, Suraj Narain vs. State of M.P. (1960) AIR M.P. 303. The Apex Court in Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1982) AIR SC 1473 has held that where a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage fixed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, he renders forced service which is "Begar" within the meaning of Article 23 of the Constitution. (c) Our constitutional jurisprudence, subject to all just exceptions, does not allow even a convict of offence serving the jail terms to work without some remuneration regardless of it's quantum. (c) Our constitutional jurisprudence, subject to all just exceptions, does not allow even a convict of offence serving the jail terms to work without some remuneration regardless of it's quantum. The Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat and Another vs. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, (1998) 7 SCC 392 has recognized even the right of convicts serving the sentence to the payment of reasonable wages observing that non payment amounts to Begar prohibited by Article 23 of the Constitution. The Apex Court in the case of Col. B.J. Akkara vs. Government of India, (2006) 11 SCC 709 , at paragraph 28 observed: "28. Such relief, restraining back recovery of excess payment, is granted by courts not because of any right in the employees, but in equity, in exercise of judicial discretion to relieve the employees from the hardship that will be caused if recovery is implemented. A government servant, particularly one in the lower rungs of service would spend whatever emoluments he receives for the upkeep of his family. If he receives an excess payment for a long period, he would spend it, genuinely believing that he is entitled to it. As any subsequent action to recover the excess payment will cause undue hardship to him, relief is granted in that behalf........." That being so, it is un-understandable as to how a statutory body like the University can coerce the petitioner to pay back entire salary which he has duly earned during the course of employment or withholding whatever amount is due to him under the contract of employment. Therefore, the impugned action is liable to be struck down, as being unconstitutional. 9. AS TO PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES ON REINSTATEMENT: Learned counsel for the Petitioner contends that, but for the illegal termination, Petitioner would have earned a huge salary with all increments that would fall periodically due and therefore, his termination if found to be unsustainable, the University should be directed to pay full back wages. Learned Panel Counsel for the University submits that, acceding to the prayer of the Petitioner would result into public fund going into the hands of the private citizen even when no work is rendered by him and therefore, such a prayer should not be granted. Learned Panel Counsel for the University submits that, acceding to the prayer of the Petitioner would result into public fund going into the hands of the private citizen even when no work is rendered by him and therefore, such a prayer should not be granted. He further submits that, the Petitioner has been employed although in a lower post in connection with the library itself and therefore, he cannot plead the hardship and injustice. On the suggestion of the Court, Petitioner's counsel gracefully agreed and accordingly has filed a memo giving up his claim for differential of the backwages, however, subject to the rider that, Petitioner should have continuity of service with increments sans any monetary benefit during the interregnum between the impugned order of termination and his reinstatement. This is a fair gesture and therefore, the same is accepted. In the above circumstances, these writ petitions succeed, a Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the impugned orders dated 10.01.2014, 16.12.2014, 29.05.2015 and 25.06.2015 issued by the 1st Respondent-University, whereby, Petitioner was terminated from service and consequently recovery was directed; a writ of mandamus issues to the Respondent- University to reinstate the Petitioner with continuity of service in the post of Assistant Librarian with admissible pay scales as revised from time to time and with all increments/allowances that would have fallen due otherwise but without any monitory benefits such as back wages and the like. Time for compliance is eight weeks. No costs. Pending applications, if any, pale into insignificance since the main matter itself is disposed off.