JUDGMENT : HARSHA DEVANI, J. 1. By this petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order dated 26.8.2019 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Surat in Commercial Appeal No.1 of 2019 whereby the appeal preferred by the respondents against the order dated 31.10.2018 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on the application made by the applicant under section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Arbitration Act') has been rejected and the application made by the respondents under section 37(2) thereof has been allowed. 2. Shortly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner is a partner in the respondent No.1 Valencia Corporation, a partnership firm and has 50% share in the partnership firm. The petitioner came to be admitted into the partnership vide a retirement-cum-admission deed executed between the petitioner, the respondents No.2 to 7, and the erstwhile partners, on 18.2.2015 at Surat. Clause (11) of the deed provides thus: “11. General : That for the purpose of signing legal documents in relation to the business i.e. purchase and sale of land/building/units & signing documents in relation to various government offices, sub-registrar office, administration of day to day activities, procuring loan from banks or financial institutions all the partners have authorize Mr. Kumaresh Kishorbhai Agarbattiwala and Mr. Kiritkumar Futarmal Jain. Their acts and deed will bind on all other partners”. It is the case of the petitioner that all the day to day transactions of the firm were required to be done jointly by the petitioner and the second respondent and that in furtherance of clause (11) of the agreement, initially the business of the firm was conducted with the signatures of both the parties and various agreements in favour of the buyers also came to be executed with the signatures of both the parties. 3. According to the petitioner, the respondents No.2 to 7 started taking advantage of their numerical majority and started conducting the affairs of the firm in a manner that was prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner as well as the first respondent firm. The petitioner also learnt that the respondents No.2 to 7 have accepted various payments in cash which were not accounted for in the accounts of the firm. The petitioner also learnt that the respondents No.2 to 7 have accepted various payments in cash which were not accounted for in the accounts of the firm. He, therefore, demanded true and correct accounts of the firm which were not provided to him despite making various requests. The petitioner has alleged that the respondents No.2 to 7 have avoided providing fair accounts to the petitioner and that they have also pocketed various cash consideration. The petitioner has further alleged that to avoid giving actual and true accounts and to deprive the petitioner from the legitimate proceeds of the firm, the respondents No.2 to 7 have started executing documents unilaterally and the petitioner has been kept out of all the dealings of the firm. 4. It is further the case of the petitioner that the second respondent had executed five sale deeds/agreements to sell in favour of various buyers and that the petitioner was not given any details about the transactions that the firm was undertaking. The petitioner has alleged that the respondents No.2 to 7 have resorted to such steps since they wanted to gain undue advantage by accepting unaccounted cash from the buyers and not showing the same in the books of the firm, thereby causing loss to the firm as well as the petitioner. The petitioner has also alleged that the sale consideration received from the buyers was also directly transferred to the accounts of third parties thereby not showing the true and correct financial picture and that the respondents No.2 to 7 had interpolated the accounts of the first respondent firm solely with a view to gain financial advantage and deprive the petitioner from the legitimate proceeds that he is entitled out of the business of the first respondent firm. According to the petitioner, the respondents have made various mala fide financial dealings that have occasioned loss to the business of the partnership firm and the petitioner has also been kept out of the day to day business of the firm. 5. The petitioner, therefore, approached the Commercial Court Vadodara by way of an application under section 9 of the Arbitration Act being Commercial Civil Miscellaneous Application No.1 of 2018 praying that the respondents No.2 to 7 be restrained from transferring or alienating the properties of the firm or creating any right in favour of any third party or in any manner disturbing the petitioner’s ownership rights. While the reliefs claimed are from paragraphs (A) to (F), vide para (A), the petitioner has prayed for an adinterim order covering more or less all the reliefs claimed from paragraphs (B) to (E), whereas the reliefs claimed vide paragraphs (B) to (E) have been restricted till the constitution of the Arbitration Tribunal. The relief claimed vide paragraph (F) is a general relief. 6. By a judgment and order dated 16.4.2018, the learned Judge, Commercial Court, Vadodara, recorded the statement of the learned counsel for the respondents to the effect that the respondent No.2 is ready to join the petitioner herein as a seller on behalf of the partnership firm and that the petitioner alone can also execute the sale deed in favour of the purchaser of the flat. On the other hand, on behalf of the petitioner, his learned counsel made a statement that the petitioner is ready and willing to join as a seller on behalf of the partnership firm, subject to verification of accounts and participation in negotiations. In view of the statement made at the bar, the Commercial Court observed that nothing survives in the application and disposed of the application with a direction that in future the sale deed/deeds in respect of the partnership firm’s property be executed in favour of the purchaser jointly by the petitioner and the respondent No.2. 7. Since according to the respondents, the direction issued by the Commercial Court amounted to allowing the application made by the petitioner without the same having been argued on merits, the respondents challenged the judgment and order 16.4.2018 before this court by way of an appeal being First Appeal No.1470 of 2016, which came to be disposed of by judgment and order dated 26.4.2018. Before this court, the learned counsel for the respondents expressed the apprehension that though the petitioner had agreed before the Commercial Court that he is ready and willing to join as a seller on behalf of the partnership firm, the petitioner may not sign the documents and nothing has been provided by the Commercial Court in case the petitioner does not sign the documents. On behalf of the petitioner, the learned counsel had submitted that such apprehension was not well founded. On behalf of the petitioner, the learned counsel had submitted that such apprehension was not well founded. It was further submitted that on behalf of the petitioner a categorical statement has been made that he is ready and willing to join as a seller on behalf of the partnership firm and that the petitioner stands by the said statement and the stand taken before the Commercial Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner also stated that the petitioner shall sign the documents with respect to the remaining flats for which the sale deeds are not executed, as and when called upon to sign. However, it be observed that even the original opponent No.2 (the respondent No.2 herein) also shall sign the documents of transfer as a seller along with the petitioner. It was further submitted that so far as the petitioner is concerned, he shall sign the documents without any demur at the earliest and within a period of fifteen days from the date of communication by which the petitioner is called upon to sign the documents. At this stage, the learned counsel for the respondents had submitted that out of 60 flats, 58 flats are already booked and that out of the aforesaid 58 flats, sale deeds have been already executed with respect to 28 flats and for the rest either they are at the agreement to sell stage and/or at the stage of booking. The learned counsel had, therefore, submitted that the petitioner is also required to sign as one of the sellers, either the agreement to sell and/or the final sale deeds with respect to the remaining flats (except two flats which are yet to be booked and/or sale deed). In response thereto, the learned counsel for the petitioner had stated that the petitioner will/shall sign whatever documents required to be signed either on agreement to sell and/or sale deed. However, the same shall be subject to verification of accounts and participation and negotiations and/or arbitration proceedings, in case they are initiated. It was also agreed between the learned counsel for the respective parties that whatever sale consideration is received on sale of the aforesaid flats shall be deposited in the bank account of the partnership firm. 8. In light of the above statement made by the learned counsel for the respective parties, the court observed thus : “5.0. It was also agreed between the learned counsel for the respective parties that whatever sale consideration is received on sale of the aforesaid flats shall be deposited in the bank account of the partnership firm. 8. In light of the above statement made by the learned counsel for the respective parties, the court observed thus : “5.0. In view of the above and now the stand taken by the learned counsel for the parties recorded herein above, the present appeal is disposed of with an observations that as and when called upon to sign the document with respect to remaining 30 flats (except 2 flats which are yet to be booked / sold), either may be agreement to sell or sale deed, the original applicant to sign the same as seller / one of the seller on behalf of the partnership firm at the earliest but within a period of 15 days from the date on which, the original applicant is called upon to sign such document (to be intimated by Email and / or RPAD). At the same time, appellant no.2 herein – original opponent no.2 shall also sign such document as a seller / one of the coseller on behalf of the partnership firm. However, it is made clear and as agreed by the learned advocates for the respective parties that on execution of the sale deeds in favour of the respective purchasers their title shall be clear and there shall not be any cloud over their sale deeds. With this, present First Appeal is disposed of. In view of the disposal of First Appeal, Interlocutory Application stands disposed of.” 9. It appears that pursuant to the above judgment and order dated 26.4.2018, certain communications ensued between the petitioner and the respondents. By a communication dated 3.5.2018, the petitioner called upon the second respondent to share the details of the transactions for sale of flats stating that they should act in the best interest of the firm and the partners and fetch the best price. It was inter alia stated therein that the petitioner has initiated steps to defreeze the bank account of partnership firm; however, he suggested that they may open another account of the firm so that all amounts are deposited in the said account henceforth. It was inter alia stated therein that the petitioner has initiated steps to defreeze the bank account of partnership firm; however, he suggested that they may open another account of the firm so that all amounts are deposited in the said account henceforth. The second respondent gave his response to the said communication by a letter dated 6.5.2018 clarifying that as on date, 58 units of their Scheme were already sold and/or booked. Sale deeds and/or agreement(s) to sell have already been executed in relation to 40 of those and booking receipts have been issued in relation to balance 18 units. Therefore, nothing remains to be done in relation to those units save and except the formal execution of the necessary documents at agreed prices. However, insofar as the two unsold units are concerned, they may exchange details of the inquiries received by either of them and thereafter proceed with the negotiations with the client found to be the most suitable. As regards the suggestion of the petitioner to open a new bank account of the firm, it has stated that he was not inclined towards opening a new back account in the name of the partnership firm as it will not serve any fruitful purpose. 10. Thereafter, there were various communications between the petitioner and the respondents. Ultimately, the petitioner issued a notice dated 21.5.2018 to the respondents No.2 to 7 for rendering of accounts and resolution of differences between the parties and stating that in case the respondents fail to do so, he would have no option but to invoke the arbitration clause as stated in the partnership agreement to settle the dispute and differences that have arisen amongst them. In response to the above notice, the second respondent gave a reply dated 1.6.2018 wherein he has mentioned that the price of each unit of the scheme was agreed by all the partners. The second respondent has referred to a written submission filed by the present petitioner in Special Civil Application No.85 of 2016 filed by Majula Rajeshbhai Patel v. Valencia Corporation wherein the petitioner had categorically stated on affidavit that the sale price of flats in Towers A and B in their Scheme was fixed at Rs.1,05,00,000/- and price of flats in Tower C was different owing to different carpet area. The second respondent further stated that the example of booking sought to be relied upon by the petitioner was the same referred to above and that the petitioner as a party respondent to the said proceedings had stated on oath that the booking receipt produced by Ms. Majula Patel is false and therefore, it was neither legal nor befitting of the petitioner to rely upon the said booking of Ms. Majula Patel. Reference was also made to sale deeds executed in favour of specific parties for a sum of Rs.1,05,00,000/- on 30.1.2017. 11. It appears that thereafter further communications ensued between the petitioner and the second respondent. Since the bank accounts of the first respondent firm were not being defrozen, the respondents filed an application before this court being Miscellaneous Civil Application No.2 of 2018 in First Appeal No.1470 of 2018. By an order dated 25.6.2018, this court recorded the statement of the learned counsel for the petitioner has stated at the bar that the petitioner shall see to it that in fact the bank account of the partnership firm is defreezed without any condition and he has no objection if the concerned bank defreezes the bank account of the partnership firm. He, however, had requested to make suitable observation that the issue/question that the bank account of the partnership firm is required to be operated by the concerned partners jointly or otherwise be kept open to be considered by the Arbitral Tribunal. The learned counsel for the respondents stated at the bar that the respondents have no objection if suitable observations are made, however, the same shall be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the respondents to be raised before the Arbitral Tribunal. In view of the above, the court disposed of the application by directing the petitioner to act and abide by the statement made by his learned counsel as recorded hereinabove. It was further directed that the concerned bank shall defreeze the bank account of the partnership firm so that ultimately the directions issued by the court in the earlier order dated 26.4.2018 in First Appeal No.1470 of 2018 with Civil Application No.1 of 2018 is complied with and the amount towards the sale consideration of the concerned flats be deposited in the bank account of the partnership firm. The court observed that, however, the same shall be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the respective parties and the question/issue whether the bank account of the partnership firm is required to be operated jointly with the respondent or otherwise and/or as per the prevailing position as on date to be considered by the Arbitral Tribunal as and when raised for which the court has not expressed anything in favour of the either parties. 12. It is the case of the petitioner that since the second respondent was not providing the details of the booking done and no information with regard to the prospective buyers was supplied and the second respondent was pressurizing the petitioner to execute the sale deeds, the petitioner made an application under section 17 of the Arbitration Act before the Arbitral Tribunal. By an order dated 31.10.2018, the Arbitral Tribunal granted interim relief to the petitioner in terms of paragraph 31(B) of the application. It, however, held that the petitioner is not entitled to interim relief in terms of paragraph 31(A). 13. Paragraph 31(A) and 31(B) of the application read as under : “31(A) Your Lordships be pleased to allow this application and be pleased to restrain the respondents and their agents from managing the Bank Account of the firm unilaterally and be further pleased to direct that the Bank Account operated with Bank of Baroda bearing A/C No.41900200000053 in the name of Respondent No.1 partnership firm be operated jointly with the signature of claimant and respondent No.2 as per clause 4 and 11 of the Deed. 31(B) Your Lordships be further pleased to restrain the respondents from proceedings/executing any document, sale deed/agreement to sell or creating any third party interest with respect to balance 28 units of flats of Respondent No.1 without the prior consent and participation of the claimant in all and every respect and matters.” 14. Against the above order dated 31.10.2018, passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, the respondents preferred an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act before the learned District Judge, Surat being Commercial Appeal No.1 of 2019. By the impugned judgment and order dated 26.8.2019 the learned Principal District Judge, Surat allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on the application made by the petitioner under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present petition. By the impugned judgment and order dated 26.8.2019 the learned Principal District Judge, Surat allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on the application made by the petitioner under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present petition. 15. Mr. Anshin Desai, Senior Advocate, learned counsel with Mr. Aditya Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner, invited the attention of the court to the facts of the case as noted hereinabove and narrated in detail in the memorandum of petition. It was submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Judge is without jurisdiction inasmuch as the learned Principal District Judge did not have the power to entertain such application under section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The attention of the court was invited to the provisions of section 37 of the Arbitration Act, to submit that an appeal lies against the orders referred to therein to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order. Reference was made to the provisions of section 10 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 which provides the jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters and lays down the courts which would have jurisdiction to decide applications and appeals in the matters referred to therein. Reference was made to subsection (3) section of 10 of the Commercial Courts Act which provides that if such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that would ordinarily lie before any principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district (not being a High Court) shall be filed in, and heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over such arbitration where such Commercial Court has been constituted. The attention of the court was invited to the definition of “Commercial Court” as defined in clause (b) of section 2 of the Commercial Courts Act which provides that “Commercial Court” means the Commercial Court constituted under subsection (1) of section 3 thereof. The attention of the court was invited to the definition of “Commercial Court” as defined in clause (b) of section 2 of the Commercial Courts Act which provides that “Commercial Court” means the Commercial Court constituted under subsection (1) of section 3 thereof. It was pointed out that subsection (1) of section 3 provides that the State Government, may after consultation with the concerned High Court, by notification, constitute such number of Commercial Courts at District level, as it may deem necessary for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on those Courts under the Act. It was pointed out that in exercise of powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 3 read with subsection (1A) of section 3 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the Government of Gujarat has issued a notification after consultation with the High Court specifying the courts shown in column 2 of the Schedule appended thereto in the area of local limits of jurisdiction specified in column 3 of the said Schedule for dealing with disputes of commercial nature having valuation of not less than rupees three lakhs. It was pointed out that insofar as the District of Surat is concerned, the Principal Senior Civil Judge and Second Senior Civil Judges have been designated as Commercial Courts. It was submitted that therefore, the Principal District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. 15.1 It was submitted that insofar as the order passed by the High Court on the application made by the petitioner under section 9 of the Arbitration Act was concerned, the interim measure ended with the two orders passed by this High Court. According to the learned counsel, the relief claimed by the petitioner in the application under section 9 of the Arbitration Act was restricted till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and hence, it was only permissible for the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under section 17 of the Arbitration Act after the Arbitral Tribunal came to be constituted. 15.2 It was emphatically argued that in the present case, the petitioner has 50% share in the partnership firm; however, he is kept out of all the transactions. 15.2 It was emphatically argued that in the present case, the petitioner has 50% share in the partnership firm; however, he is kept out of all the transactions. It was submitted that the respondents have not furnished the details of the parties in whose favour the sale deeds are to be executed as well as the sale consideration, despite various requests having been made by the petitioner. It was submitted that with the passage of time, the price of the flats has escalated, despite which, the respondents are selling the same at a lower price, which indicates that the correct price is not shown in the sale deeds and that cash amounts have been received by them. It was, accordingly, urged that the order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, being without jurisdiction, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 16. Vehemently opposing the petition Mr. Dhaval Dave, Senior Advocate, learned counsel with Mr. Udit Vyas, learned advocate for the respondents, submitted that the present petition though titled as a petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, in effect and substance is a petition under article 227, and hence, the petitioner cannot request the court to second view of the matter if the view taken by the learned Principal District Judge is otherwise a plausible view. 16.1 Insofar as the jurisdiction of the learned Principal District Judge to entertain the appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act is concerned, the learned counsel invited the attention of the court to subsection (2) of section 37 of the Arbitration Act to submit that the appeal in the present case is preferred under clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 37, which provides for an appeal to a court from an order of an Arbitral Tribunal granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17 of that Act. It was submitted that the expression employed in subsection (2) of section 37 is “court”. It was submitted that the expression employed in subsection (2) of section 37 is “court”. Reference was made to clause (e) of section 2 of the Arbitration Act, which defines “court” to mean, in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. It was submitted that therefore clause (e) of section 2 of the Arbitration Act lays down that “court” shall mean the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and specifically excludes any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court or any court of Small Causes. 16.2 Reference was made to section 12 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005, which provides for jurisdiction of a court of District Judge and postulates that a court of District Judge shall be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction. It was submitted that the word “court” used under section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act is the District Court. Moreover, section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act, specifically excludes any court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court or any Court of Small Causes from the ambit of the expression “court”. It was submitted that source of appeal in this case is under section 37 of the Arbitration Act and the right flows from section 37. It was submitted that access to such appeal can be channelised through the concerned section of the Commercial Courts Act, but the right to appeal does not flow from the Commercial Courts Act. 16.3 The learned counsel next drew that attention of the court to section 10 of the Commercial Courts Act, to submit that Commercial Court contemplated under subsection (3) of section 10 can never be a court other than a District Court; as otherwise there would be a direct conflict between the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act. It was submitted that if the submission of the petitioner were to be accepted, section 10(3) of the Commercial Courts Act would have the effect of taking away the right to appeal before the principal Civil Court, namely the District Court, under section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act which is not permissible in law. It was submitted that insofar as the notification dated 15.4.2019 issued by the State Government under section 3((1) read with section 3(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act is concerned, it would not have an effect of taking away the right flowing under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, inasmuch as a notification cannot take away the statutory right of appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act. 16.4 Reference was also made to section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act, which provides for bar of jurisdiction of Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions, to submit that same provide that notwithstanding anything contained in that Act, a Commercial Court or a Commercial Division shall not entertain or decide any suit, application or proceedings relating to any commercial dispute in respect of which the jurisdiction of the civil court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any other law for the time being in force. It was pointed out that section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act clearly excludes any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes from the meaning of the expression “court”, to submit that, therefore, in view of section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act, a Commercial Court other than the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district, would have no jurisdiction to decide an appeal under section 37 of the Act. It was submitted that, therefore, the appeal was rightly transferred to the District Court which is otherwise the concerned appellate court. 16.5 Alternatively, the learned counsel submitted that if the contention of the petitioner is right, then section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act is directly in conflict with section 10(2) of the Commercial Courts Act. It was submitted that while in case of a direct conflict between two statutes, ordinarily the later one is to be followed, insofar as the provisions of the Arbitration Act read with the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act are concerned, the Supreme Court has taken a different view. It was submitted that while in case of a direct conflict between two statutes, ordinarily the later one is to be followed, insofar as the provisions of the Arbitration Act read with the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act are concerned, the Supreme Court has taken a different view. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kandla Export Corporation and Anr. vs. OCI Corporation and Another, (2018) 14 SCC 715 , wherein the court has held thus, “27. The matter can be looked at from a slightly different angle. Given the objects of both the statutes, it is clear that arbitration itself is meant to be a speedy resolution of disputes between parties. Equally, enforcement of foreign awards should take place as soon as possible if India is to remain as an equal partner, commercially speaking, in the international community. In point of fact, the raison d’être for the enactment of the Commercial Courts Act is that commercial disputes involving high amounts of money should be speedily decided. Given the objects of both the enactments, if we were to provide an additional appeal, when Section 50 does away with an appeal so as to speedily enforce foreign awards, we would be turning the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act on their heads. Admittedly, if the amount contained in a foreign award to be enforced in India were less than Rs. one crore, and a Single Judge of a High Court were to enforce such award, no appeal would lie, in keeping with the object of speedy enforcement of foreign awards. However, if, in the same fact circumstance, a foreign award were to be for Rs.one crore or more, if the Appellants are correct, enforcement of such award would be further delayed by providing an appeal under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. Any such interpretation would lead to absurdity, and would be directly contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the Commercial Courts Act, viz., speedy resolution of disputes of a commercial nature involving a sum of Rs.1 crore and over. For this reason also, we feel that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act must be construed in accordance with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. For this reason also, we feel that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act must be construed in accordance with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Any construction of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, which would lead to further delay, instead of an expeditious enforcement of a foreign award must, therefore, be eschewed. Even on applying the doctrine of harmonious construction of both statutes, it is clear that they are best harmonized by giving effect to the special statute i.e. the Arbitration Act, visàvis the more general statute, namely the Commercial Courts Act, being left to operate in spheres other than arbitration.” 16.6 Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of A. P. Rajappan v. High Court of Judicature, Madras, 20044 L.W. 122, wherein the court has held that the definition of ‘Court’ under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 indicates that the ‘Court’ means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. The court held that a comparison of the two definitions makes it clear that in the new Act not only there is reference to “Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district” but also there is an exclusionary clause which excludes any civil court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court. The court held that whatever doubt could have been there, has been dispelled by a specific clause to the effect “it does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to Principal Civil Court”. The court further held that if any administrative instruction or circular or clarification is contrary to the provisions of the Act, such administrative instruction or circular or clarification would be void ab initio. The learned counsel submitted that against the order of a civil court an appeal has to lie before the court of higher jurisdiction and hence also, in the facts of the present case the appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act was rightly preferred before the District Court. The learned counsel submitted that against the order of a civil court an appeal has to lie before the court of higher jurisdiction and hence also, in the facts of the present case the appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act was rightly preferred before the District Court. 16.7 Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal and Others, v. Associated Contractors, (2015) 1 SCC 32 , wherein it has been held that section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act contains an exhaustive definition marking out only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district or a High Court having original civil jurisdiction in the State, and no other court as ‘Court’ for the purpose of Part 1 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. 16.8 As regards section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act which bears the heading “Act to have overriding effect” and lays down that, save as otherwise provided, the provisions of that Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law for the time being in force other than that Act; it was submitted that such overriding effect is referable to procedural law. It was further pointed out that in any case, in view of section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act which provides for bar of jurisdiction of a Commercial Court where the jurisdiction of the civil court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any other law for the time being in force, there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts inasmuch as section 37 of the Arbitration Act read with section 2(e) thereof clearly excludes the jurisdiction of courts other than the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district. 16.9 Next, it was submitted that in a petition under article 227 of the Constitution, the findings recorded by the District Court upon appreciation of the relevant evidence before it, cannot be gone into any detail. It was submitted that even if on the same set of facts another view is possible, the conclusion recorded by the District Court cannot be upset. In support of such submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Modh. It was submitted that even if on the same set of facts another view is possible, the conclusion recorded by the District Court cannot be upset. In support of such submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Modh. Mustaqim and Other., (1983) 4 SCC 566 , wherein the court held that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under article 277 is limited “to seeing that an inferior court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority”, and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In the facts of the said, the court was of the opinion that there was no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard to the principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. The court held that in exercising the supervisory power under article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision. 16.10 The next submission advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents was that it was not open for the Arbitral Tribunal to entertain the application under section 17(2) of the Arbitration Act, once the petitioner had exhausted the remedy under section 9 thereof. It was submitted that before the Arbitral Tribunal, it had been contended by the respondents that once the High Court has decided the application under section 9 of the Arbitration Act, it is not open for the petitioner to reagitate the point and that the Tribunal has no power to take a view contrary or inconsistent with the view taken by the High Court. It was submitted that the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is, therefore, without jurisdiction. It was submitted that the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is, therefore, without jurisdiction. Referring to the provisions of section 9 of the Arbitration Act, it was submitted that under subsection (3), once the Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted, the court cannot entertain an application under subsection (1) unless the court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under section 17 efficacious. It was submitted that section 17 of the Arbitration Act is more or less identically worded to section 9 thereof except that the court can entertain an application under section 9 of the Arbitration Act before or during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36; whereas under section 17 of the Arbitration Act, an application can be made to the arbitral tribunal during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36. It was submitted that when during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, it is permissible to apply both, to the court under section 9 of the Arbitration Act or to the arbitral tribunal under section 17 of that Act, it is not permissible for a party to seek the same interim measures before those two forums. It was submitted that an application under section 17 of the Arbitration Act is by way of second stage, but is not meant as second inning. According to the learned counsel, once the remedy under section 9 of the Arbitration Act has been exhausted in respect of certain interim measures, it is not permissible for the petitioner to make an application under section 17 of that Act before the arbitral tribunal seeking the same interim measures, inasmuch as, the same issue cannot be agitated before two forums discharging the same function. It was submitted that despite above position, the arbitral tribunal has entertained the application under section 17 of the Act seeking similar relief which amounts to a second innings before the arbitral tribunal. It was submitted that despite above position, the arbitral tribunal has entertained the application under section 17 of the Act seeking similar relief which amounts to a second innings before the arbitral tribunal. 16.11 In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Velugubanti Hari Babu v. Parvathini Narasinmha Rao and Another, 2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 469, wherein it was contended before the court that under subsection (2) of section 9 of the Arbitration Act, the order granting interim measure would automatically come to an end if arbitral proceedings are not commenced within 90 days and the court granting such order has not extended time for such commencement. The court held that the submission that the interim order granted by the civil court would automatically come to an end once an arbitrator is appointed and thereafter the party has to seek interim relief before the arbitrator, is without any merit. The court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sundaram Finance Ltd., and held that as the language of section 9(2) of the Arbitration Act does not limit the operation of the interim measures till appointment of arbitrator only. The court observed that on the contrary, a party can seek interim measures at three stages, viz., before, during the pendency of arbitral proceedings and after passing of the award, but before it is enforced under section 36 of the Arbitration Act and held that the fact that a party can approach the court even during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings and seek interim measures, clearly shows that the legislature clearly intended to empower the court to grant interim measures to last till the arbitral proceedings conclude and an award is passed. 16.12 Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Tuticorin Coal Terminal Private Ltd., v. Gelguera Gruas India Private Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1268, wherein disputes arose between the parties and at some stage the petitioner invoked the bank guarantees. The petition under section 9 of the Arbitration Act came to be rejected and the respondent therein failed before the Supreme Court. The petition under section 9 of the Arbitration Act came to be rejected and the respondent therein failed before the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application under section 17 of the Arbitration Act seeking a direction to allow the application and pass necessary directions directing that the amounts under the bank guarantees, be not appropriated/utilised by the petitioner, by keeping it in a separate account/fixed deposit, subject to the arbitral award. The application came to be allowed in terms of the relief claimed as referred to hereinabove. Thus, effectively the petitioner was restrained from utilization of the amount recovered by it by directing that the same be placed in a fixed deposit. The court held that a unique situation has arisen whereby an order of the High Court under section 9 which was confirmed in appeal and in the SLP by virtue of its dismissal, a fresh order affecting the rights of the petitioner has been passed. The court held that by virtue of the deeming provision of section 17(2), the order has to be treated as an order of the court “for all purposes and shall be enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it were order of the Court.” This results in a rather incongruous situation which certainly could not have been permitted since the highest court had already confirmed the order passed by the Division Bench of that court approving the order passed under section 9. The court held that an order under section 17 which shall be deemed to be an order of court cannot result in setting the clock back to prevent the petitioners from utilizing the funds received under the guarantees encashment of which has been permitted. The learned counsel submitted that this decision is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 16.13 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Srei Equipment Finance Ltd., v. Touch Stoen Sand & Aggregates Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 15717, wherein the court held thus: “6. I have considered the materials on record as well as arguments advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties. I have considered the materials on record as well as arguments advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties. After considering the provisions contained in subsections (2) and (3) of Section 9 of the Act of 1996 in the case of Toofan Chatterjee (supra), the Division Bench of this Court held that after the disputes between the parties have been referred to an arbitrator, the Court would be denuded of its power to grant interim relief unless the Court is satisfied that circumstances exist, which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious. In the present case, by the order dated October 24, 2017, a learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the respondent to pay to the petitioner the monthly instalment for the month of October, 2017 and Rs. 15 lakhs within November 9, 2017. By the said order it was made clear that in default of the respondent to pay the monthly instalment for the month of October,2017 and Rs.15 lakhs to the petitioner, the Joint Receivers would take actual physical possession of the hypothecated asset and effect its sale. In view of the specific direction passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in the said order dated Order 24, 2017, I do not find that there is anything left for exercise of 5 power by the Arbitrator under Section 17 of the Act of 1996. Accordingly, the Division Bench decision in the case of Toofan Chatterjee (supra) does not render any assistance to the respondent.” It was submitted that the effect of the order passed by the arbitral tribunal is to set at naught what was agreed before the High Court in the proceedings under section 9 of the Arbitration Act. 16.14 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Adhunik Steels Ltd., vs. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 125 , wherein the court held thus: “10. It is true that Section 9 of the Act speaks of the court by way of an interim measure passing an order for protection, for the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods, which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement and such interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to be just and convenient. It is true that Section 9 of the Act speaks of the court by way of an interim measure passing an order for protection, for the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods, which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement and such interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to be just and convenient. The grant of an interim prohibitory injunction or an interim mandatory injunction are governed by well known rules and it is difficult to imagine that the legislature while enacting Section 9 of the Act intended to make a provision which was dehors the accepted principles that governed the grant of an interim injunction. Same is the position regarding the appointment of a receiver since the Section itself brings in, the concept of just and convenient while speaking of passing any interim measure of protection. The concluding words of the Section, and the court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it" also suggest that the normal rules that govern the court in the grant of interim orders is not sought to be jettisoned by the provision. Moreover, when a party is given a right to approach an ordinary court of the country without providing a special procedure or a special set of rules in that behalf, the ordinary rules followed by that court would govern the exercise of power conferred by the Act. On that basis also, it is not possible to keep out the concept of balance of convenience, prima facie case, irreparable injury and the concept of just and convenient while passing interim measures under Section 9 of the Act.” 16.15 It was further submitted that only contention raised in the applications made by the petitioner under section 9 and under section 17 of the Arbitration Act is regarding irreparable loss. It was submitted that in terms of the order of this court, every transaction was to be made by way of banking transactions. If the petitioner ultimately succeeds, he can be compensated in terms of money. It was urged that the firm had made certain commitments to the customers and now as the respondents are not able to fulfil the commitments as the sale transactions are blocked, the customers are issuing notices. If the petitioner ultimately succeeds, he can be compensated in terms of money. It was urged that the firm had made certain commitments to the customers and now as the respondents are not able to fulfil the commitments as the sale transactions are blocked, the customers are issuing notices. It was submitted that the buildings are ready for occupation and the building use permission has also been granted. The balance of convenience is in favour of the respondents and not in favour of the petitioner. It was submitted that all the flats are booked at the same time and price of all the flats is uniform. It was submitted that on the basis of an apprehension on the part of the petitioner, the entire sale transactions should not be blocked. It was also submitted that if it is the case of the petitioner that earlier also there were unaccounted transactions, then the burden lies upon the petitioner to prove that there are unaccounted transactions, which is a matter of accounting. It was submitted that there is no case of irreparable loss caused to the petitioner as it is a matter of pure accounting and he can claim damages and compensation. 16.16 In conclusion, it was urged that the impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, is just, legal and proper and does not warrant any interference by this court and that the petition being bereft of any merit or substance, deserves to be dismissed. 17. In rejoinder, Mr. Anshin Desai, learned counsel for the petitioner, referred to clause (11) of the Retirement-cum-Admission Deed dated 18.2.2015 to submit that the same authorises the second respondent and the petitioner to execute the documents referred to therein. It was submitted that the expression used is “Mr. Kumaresh Kishorbhai Agarbattiwala and Mr. Kirtikumar Futarmal Jain”. It was submitted that the word “and” means it is cumulative and, therefore, any document is required to be executed both, by the petitioner as well as the second respondent. Reference was made to the definition of the expression “and” in P. Ramnatha Aiyer’s Advanced Law Lexicon, Third Edition, wherein it has been stated that the word “and” has generally a cumulative sense requiring the fulfillment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of “or”. Sometimes, however, even in such connection, it is by force of context, read as “or”. Sometimes, however, even in such connection, it is by force of context, read as “or”. It was submitted that the deeds and documents have to be interpreted as they are. 17.1 Insofar as the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that once the remedy under section 9 of the Arbitration Act has been exhausted, an application under section 17 of the Act would not be maintainable, it was submitted that insofar as the application made by the petitioner under section 9 of the Arbitration Act is concerned, both the orders passed by the High Court are based on consensus between the parties. It was submitted that after the orders came to be passed by the High Court, the petitioner approached the respondents. Referring to the communications between the petitioner and the second respondent, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner has specifically given names of parties who are ready and willing to purchase the flats at a higher rate; however, the respondents have completely excluded him from all transactions and do not call him for the negotiations and that it is difficult to comprehend as to why the respondents are shy of including the petitioner in the negotiations and are raising technicalities. It was emphatically argued that no details of the transactions have been provided to the petitioner and that the petitioner who has a 50% share in the partnership firm cannot be excluded and told to stand outside the transactions. It was submitted that the petitioner has reportedly told the respondents that they can get more money for the flats in question; however, the respondents are contending that 58 flats have already been agreed/booked. It was submitted that even after the impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, the respondents have proceeded with undue haste in executing the sale deed with smacks of mala fides on their part. 17.2 The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that language of sections 9 and 17 of the Arbitration Act is very different, inasmuch as, section 9 employs the expression 'before and during' whereas section 17 employs the expression 'during'. It was submitted that the application made by the petitioner under section 9 of the Arbitration Act culminated into a consensus order which was not worked out. It was submitted that the application made by the petitioner under section 9 of the Arbitration Act culminated into a consensus order which was not worked out. It was submitted that on a plain reading of section 17 of the Arbitration Act with sections 3 and 9 thereof, it is evident that the remedy under section 17 of that Act is available to the petitioner under the law. 17.3 Reference was made to section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act, to submit that the same provides for an overriding effect of the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act as against any other law for the time being in force. It was submitted that, therefore, the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act would prevail over the provisions of the Arbitration Act, and hence, in view of the provisions of subsection (3) of section 10 of the Commercial Courts Act, the Learned Principal District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act. 17.4 It was argued that as to how the petitioner will prove the black and white component of the consideration received by the respondent is for the petitioner to see and such issue does not arise for consideration at this stage. 17.5 Dealing with the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, it was submitted that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. (supra), has been rendered prior to the notification issued by the State Government under sections 3(1) and 3(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, and hence, the said decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. It was submitted that the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Tuticorin Coal Terminal Private Ltd. (supra), has been rendered in the context of a different set of facts and the issue in that case was totally different, and hence, the said decision would also not be applicable to the facts of the present case. It was submitted that similarly the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Velugubanti Hari Babu (supra), was a decision rendered in the context of section 9(2) of the Arbitration Act, and has no relevance to the facts of the present case. It was submitted that similarly the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Velugubanti Hari Babu (supra), was a decision rendered in the context of section 9(2) of the Arbitration Act, and has no relevance to the facts of the present case. 17.6 It was submitted that the order dated 26.4.2018 passed by the High Court in the first appeal is required to be read as a whole and that when the court, in paragraph 5 thereof, has observed that “in view of the above”, it means what is stated above the said paragraph. It was submitted that therefore the statements made by the learned counsel for the respective parties would form part of the said order. 17.7 Referring to the communication dated 28.8.2019 of the second respondent which was issued after two days of the order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, it was submitted that the same cannot be said to be in consonance with the order of the High Court. It was submitted that the respondents may, therefore, be directed to stay their hands till the proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal are concluded and that whatever amount is stated in the documents be deposited in the separate account. 18. In rejoinder to the last contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Dhaval Dave, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that for the purpose of depositing the amount in a separate account, the petitioner is required to file a separate application under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. It was further submitted that in case of noncompliance of the order passed by the High Court, the petitioner could have moved the High Court and sought a clarification; however, the application made under section 17(2) of the Arbitration Act could not have been filed seeking similar relief as prayed for in the application made under section 9 of that Act. 19. In the backdrop of the contentions noted hereinabove, two fundamental questions have been raised which touch the jurisdiction of the learned Principal District Judge to entertain the appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act; and the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to entertain an application under section 17 of the Arbitration Act after the remedy under section 9 of that Act has been exhausted. The first question has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner; whereas the second question has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. Since both these issues are jurisdictional issues, they are required to be decided first. 20. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the learned Principal District Judge had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal preferred by the respondents under section 37 of the Arbitration Act against the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal under section 17 of that Act. In this regard, it may be germane to refer to the provisions of section 37 of the Arbitration Act which read as under: “37. Appealable orders. (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order, namely: (a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9; (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34. (2) An appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal (a) accepting the plea referred to in subsection (2) or subsection (3) of section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.” 20.1 In the present case, the appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act has been preferred by the respondents before the Commercial Court at Vadodara, against an order granting interim measures under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the respondents was under clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 37 of the Arbitration Act. In this regard it may be noted that subsection (1) of section 37 deals with orders passed by courts and postulates that an appeal shall lie to the court authorized by law to hear appeal from original decrees of the court passing the order; subsection (2) which deals with orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal provides that an appeal shall lie to a court from the order of the Arbitral Tribunal. 20.2 The expression ‘court’ has been defined under clause (e) of section 2 of the Arbitration Act, which to the extent the same is relevant for the present purpose, reads as under : “(e) "Court" means (i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.” Thus, in case of arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the expression “court” means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district. 20.3 As to which is the principal Civil Court, has been provided under section 12 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005 which lays down that a court of the District Judge shall be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction. Thus, prima facie, it would appear that an application under section 37(2)(b) would lie to a court of the District Judge. However, on behalf of the petitioner, reliance has been placed upon various provisions of the Commercial Courts Act. It may, therefore, be germane to refer to the provisions of sections 2 (b), 3 and 10 of the Commercial Courts Act, which read thus: “2.(b) “Commercial Court” means the Commercial Court constituted under subsection (1) of section 3;” “3. Constitution of Commercial Courts - (1) The State Government, may after consultation with the concerned High Court, by notification, constitute such number of Commercial Courts at District level, as it may deem necessary for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on those courts under this Act: Provided that no Commercial Court shall be constituted for the territory over which the High Court has ordinary original civil jurisdiction. (2) The State Government shall, after consultation with the concerned High Court specify, by notification, the local limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of a Commercial Court shall extend and may, from time to time, increase, reduce or alter such limits. (2) The State Government shall, after consultation with the concerned High Court specify, by notification, the local limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of a Commercial Court shall extend and may, from time to time, increase, reduce or alter such limits. (3)The State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court appoint one or more persons having experience in dealing with commercial disputes to be the Judge or Judges, of a Commercial Court, from amongst the cadre of Higher Judicial Service in the State.” “10. Jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters.— Where the subject matter of an arbitration is a commercial dispute of a specified value and–– (1)If such arbitration is an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that have been filed in a High Court, shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division where such Commercial Division has been constituted in such High Court. (2) If such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that have been filed on the original side of the High Court, shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division where such Commercial Division has been constituted in such High Court. (3) If such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that would ordinarily lie before any principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district (not being a High Court) shall be filed in, and heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over such arbitration where such Commercial Court has been constituted.” 20.4 The learned counsel for the petitioner had also placed reliance upon a notification dated 15.4.2019 issued by the State Government in exercise of powers under subsection (1) of section 3 and subsection (1A) of section 3 of the Commercial Courts Act, whereby the courts specified therein have been notified for dealing with disputes of commercial nature having a value of not less than rupees three lakhs and the courts specified in case of Surat District are the Principal Senior Civil Judge and 2nd Senior Civil Judges. It was submitted that in view of subsection (3) of section 10 of the Commercial Courts Act, all applications arising under the provisions of the Arbitration Act shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising jurisdiction over such arbitration, which in this case would be the Principal Senior Civil Judge and 2nd Senior Civil Judges in terms of the above notification issued by the State Government. Reference is also made to section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act to submit that the provisions of the Commercial Court Act would have an overriding effect over the provisions of the Arbitration Act and, accordingly, would override the provisions of section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act. 20.5 In this regard it may be noted that section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act provides that a Commercial Court or a Commercial Division shall not entertain or decide any suit, application or proceedings relating to any commercial dispute in respect of which the jurisdiction of the civil court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any law for the time being in force. Clause (i) of section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act which defines the expression ‘court’ not only vests jurisdiction in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, including the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but it expressly excludes any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. 20.6 Thus, section 2(e)(i) of the Arbitration Act expressly excludes any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. Therefore, in view of section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act, which bars a Commercial Court from deciding any suit application or proceedings relating to any commercial dispute in respect of which the jurisdiction of the civil court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any other law for the time being in force; read with the provisions of section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act, any Commercial Court which is a civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court or any Court of Small causes, would be barred from exercising jurisdiction under section 37(2) (b) of the Act. The Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (supra), has held that section 2(1)(e) contains an exhaustive definition marking out only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district or a High Court having original civil jurisdiction in the State, and no other court as ‘court’ for the purpose of Part 1 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. 20.7 The Madras High Court in the case of A. P. Rajappan v. High Court of Judicature, Madras (supra), has held thus: “12. In the above context, it has to be remembered under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the expression 'Court' had been defined differently under the definition clause Court means a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of the reference if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under Section 21 include a Small Cause Court. The definition 'Court' under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 indicates that the 'Court' means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. A comparison of the two definitions makes it clear that in the new Act not only there is reference to “Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district” but also there is an exclusionary clause which excludes any civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court. Whatever doubt could have been there, has been dispelled by a specific clause to the effect “it does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to Principal Civil Court.” 20.8 The Supreme Court in Kandla Export Corporation and Anr. vs. OCI Corporation (supra), has held thus: “27. The matter can be looked at from a slightly different angle. Given the objects of both the statutes, it is clear that arbitration itself is meant to be a speedy resolution of disputes between parties. Equally, enforcement of foreign awards should take place as soon as possible if India is to remain as an equal partner, commercially speaking, in the international community. In point of fact, the raison d’être for the enactment of the Commercial Courts Act is that commercial disputes involving high amounts of money should be speedily decided. Given the objects of both the enactments, if we were to provide an additional appeal, when Section 50 does away with an appeal so as to speedily enforce foreign awards, we would be turning the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act on their heads. Admittedly, if the amount contained in a foreign award to be enforced in India were less than Rs. one crore, and a Single Judge of a High Court were to enforce such award, no appeal would lie, in keeping with the object of speedy enforcement of foreign awards. Admittedly, if the amount contained in a foreign award to be enforced in India were less than Rs. one crore, and a Single Judge of a High Court were to enforce such award, no appeal would lie, in keeping with the object of speedy enforcement of foreign awards. However, if, in the same fact circumstance, a foreign award were to be for Rs.one crore or more, if the Appellants are correct, enforcement of such award would be further delayed by providing an appeal under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. Any such interpretation would lead to absurdity, and would be directly contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the Commercial Courts Act, viz., speedy resolution of disputes of a commercial nature involving a sum of Rs.1 crore and over. For this reason also, we feel that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act must be construed in accordance with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Any construction of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, which would lead to further delay, instead of an expeditious enforcement of a foreign award must, therefore, be eschewed. Even on applying the doctrine of harmonious construction of both statutes, it is clear that they are best harmonized by giving effect to the special statute i.e. the Arbitration Act, visàvis the more general statute, namely the Commercial Courts Act, being left to operate in spheres other than arbitration.” Thus, the Supreme Court has held that even on applying the doctrine of harmonious construction of both statutes, it is clear that they are best harmonized by giving effect to the special statute, that is, the Arbitration Act, visàvis the more general statute, namely, the Commercial Courts Act being left to operate in spheres other than arbitration. The overriding provisions of section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act, would, therefore, not be attracted to the facts of the present case. Accordingly the notification issued by the State Government specifying the Principal Senior Civil Judge and 2nd Senior Civil Judges as Commercial Courts for Surat District for deciding disputes of commercial nature having valuation of not less than rupees three lakhs, would have no applicability to the facts of the present case as section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act ousts their jurisdiction to decide appeals under the Arbitration Act. The first question is, therefore, required to be decided in favour of the respondents, namely that the learned Principal District Judge had the jurisdiction to decide the appeal under section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act. 21. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the arbitral tribunal was justified in entertaining and deciding the application made by the petitioner under section 17(2) of the Arbitration Act despite the fact that the petitioner had already approached this court under section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking similar interim measures and the court had entertained and decided such application. 21.1 In this regard reference may be made to sections 9 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, which read as under : “9. Interim measures etc. by Court.-(1) A party may, before, or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, apply to a Court (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely : (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party or authorising any samples, to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it. (2) Where, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, a Court passes an order for any interim measure of protection under subsection (1), the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within a period of ninety days from the date of such order or within such further time as the Court may determine. (3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under subsection (1), unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under section 17 efficacious. 17. Interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunal.—(1) A party may, during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, apply to the arbitral tribunal( i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:— (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken, or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the arbitral tribunal to be just and convenient, and the arbitral tribunal shall have the same power for making orders, as the court has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it. (2)Subject to any orders passed in an appeal under section 37, any order issued by the arbitral tribunal under this section shall be deemed to be an order of the Court for all purposes and shall be enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in the same manner as if it were an order of the Court.” 21.2 On a plain reading of section 9 of the Arbitration Act, it is evident that it can be invoked at any time before or during or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36; whereas section 17 of the Arbitration Act can be invoked at any time during or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36. Thus prior to the commencement of arbitral proceedings, it is only a court which has the power to grant any interim measure, but once arbitration proceedings commence, the court as well as the arbitral tribunal both have the power to provide interim measures. However, insofar as invocation of section 9 of the Arbitration Act after the commencement of arbitral proceedings is concerned, the same is qualified by subsection (3) thereof, which provides that once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the court shall not entertain an application under subsection (1), unless the court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under section 17 efficacious. 21.3 It, however, may be noted that section 9 of the Arbitration Act does not limit the operation of any order passed by the court granting any relief thereunder by way of an interim measure till the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The order passed by a court under section 9 of the Arbitration Act would continue to remain in force till the arbitral proceedings come to an end. In this regard it may be apposite to cite with agreement the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Velugubanti Hari Babu v. Parvathini Narasinmha Rao (supra), the relevant part whereof has been extracted hereunder: “34. In this regard it may be apposite to cite with agreement the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Velugubanti Hari Babu v. Parvathini Narasinmha Rao (supra), the relevant part whereof has been extracted hereunder: “34. As regards the submission that the interim order granted by the Civil Court would automatically come to an end once an arbitrator is appointed and thereafter the party has to seek interim relief before the arbitrator, we find the same without any merit. In Sundaram Finance Ltd., (1999) 2 SCC 479 , the Supreme Court held at para13 as under: “Under the 1996 Act the Court can pass interim orders under Section 9. Arbitral proceedings, as we have seen, commence only when the request to refer the dispute is received by the respondent as per Section 21 of the Act. The material words occurring in Section 9 are “before or during the arbitral proceedings”. This clearly contemplates two stages when the Court can pass interim orders, i.e., during the arbitral proceedings or before the arbitral proceeedings....” 35. The language of Section 9(2) of the Act does not limit the operation of interim measure till appointment of arbitrator only. On the contrary, a party can seek interim measure at three stages, viz., before, during the pendency of arbitral proceedings and after passing of the award, but before it is enforced under Section 36 of the Act. The fact that a party can approach the Court even during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings and seek interim measure, clearly shows that the legislature clearly intended to empower the court to grant interim measure to last till the arbitral proceedings conclude and an award is passed. As noted above, the Court is empowered to grant such measures even after an award is passed, but before it is enforced.” 21.4 The Bombay High Court in the case of Tuticorin Coal Terminal Private Ltd., v. Gelguera Gruas India Private Ltd. (supra), was dealing with a case involving a similar set of facts wherein an application under section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking injunction restraining the petitioner from invoking any of the guarantees was prayed for and the petitioner lost up to the stage of the Supreme Court. Thereafter an application under section 17 of the Arbitration Act was made before the arbitral tribunal which directed that if the respondent encashes the bank guarantee, the said amount shall be kept in fixed deposit and the respondent shall not be permitted to utilize the said amount for any other purpose. The court held thus: “21. Furthermore we have to bear in mind that after the amendment of the act and substitution of Section 17 by virtue of Section 17(2) reads as follows : “...(2) Subject to any orders passed in an appeal under Section 37, any order issued by the Arbitral tribunal under this Section shall be deemed to be an order of the Court for all purposes and shall be enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in the same manner as if it were an order of the Court.” 22. In view of this amendment what we have here is rather a unique situation whereby despite an order of this Court under Section 9 being confirmed in appeal and in the SLP by virtue of its dismissal, a fresh order affecting rights of the petitioner has been passed. By virtue of the deeming provision of Section 17(2) this order is to be treated as order of the Court “for all purposes and shall be enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it were order of the Court.” This results in a rather incongruous situation which certainly could not have been permitted since the highest Court has already confirmed the order passed by the division Bench of this Court approving the order passed under Section 9. An order under Section 17 which shall be deemed to be an order of court cannot result in setting the clock back to prevent the petitioner from utilising the funds received under the guarantees encashment of which has been permitted. The funds are now at the disposal of the petitioners. In the light of the order under Section 9 attaining finality the impugned orders certainly cannot be expressed as order of the Court. For this reason also the order impugned cannot be enforced in law and hence cannot be sustained.” 21.5 A similar view was expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Srei Equipment (supra), wherein it was held thus: “6. For this reason also the order impugned cannot be enforced in law and hence cannot be sustained.” 21.5 A similar view was expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Srei Equipment (supra), wherein it was held thus: “6. I have considered the materials on record as well as arguments advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties. After considering the provisions contained in subsections (2) and (3) of Section 9 of the Act of 1996 in the case of Toofan Chatterjee (supra), the Division Bench of this Court held that after the disputes between the parties have been referred to an arbitrator, the Court would be denuded of its power to grant interim relief unless the Court is satisfied that circumstances exist, which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious. In the present case, by the order dated October 24, 2017, a learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the respondent to pay to the petitioner the monthly instalment for the month of October, 2017 and Rs. 15 lakhs within November 9, 2017. By the said order it was made clear that in default of the respondent to pay the monthly instalment for the month of October,2017 and Rs.15 lakhs to the petitioner, the Joint Receivers would take actual physical possession of the hypothecated asset and effect its sale. In view of the specific direction passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in the said order dated Order 24, 2017, I do not find that there is anything left for exercise of 5 power by the Arbitrator under Section 17 of the Act of 1996. In view of the specific direction passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in the said order dated Order 24, 2017, I do not find that there is anything left for exercise of 5 power by the Arbitrator under Section 17 of the Act of 1996. Accordingly, the Division Bench decision in the case of Toofan Chatterjee (supra) does not render any assistance to the respondent.” 21.6 In the considered opinion of this court, once the jurisdiction of the court is invoked under section 9 of the Arbitration Act for interim measures as contemplated therein, either before or during the pendency of arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36 of that Act and such remedy is exhausted, similar interim measures cannot be claimed before the arbitral tribunal under subsection (2) of section 17 of the Arbitration Act, inasmuch as, it would give rise to a situation where there would simultaneously be two orders in existence in respect of the same cause of action, one passed by the court and the other passed by the arbitral tribunal, which order is also required to be treated as an order of the court for all purposes, which could not have been the intention of the legislature. The second question, therefore, is also required to be answered in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. 22. The second question, therefore, is also required to be answered in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. 22. Adverting to the facts of the present case in context of the second question, a perusal of the order dated 26.4.2018 passed in First Appeal No.1470 of 2018 reveals that this court, in view of the stands adopted by the respective parties as recorded therein, had disposed of the appeal by observing thus: “In view of the above and now the stand taken by the learned counsel for the parties recorded herein above, the present appeal is disposed of with an observation that as and when called upon to sign the document with respect to remaining 30 flats (except 2 flats which are yet to be booked/sold), either may be agreement to sell or sale deed, the original applicant to sign the same as seller/ one of the seller on behalf of the partnership firm at the earliest but within a period of 15 days from the date on which, the original applicant is called upon to sign such document (to be intimated by Email and/or RPAD). At the same time, appellant no.2 herein – original opponent no.2 shall also sign such document as seller/one of the co-seller on behalf of the partnership firm. However, it is made clear and as agreed by the learned advocates for the respective parties that on execution of the sale deeds in favour of the respective purchasers their title shall be clear and there shall not be any cloud over their sale deeds. With this, present First Appeal is disposed of.” Thereafter the respondents moved a review application being Miscellaneous Civil Application No.2 of 2018 in the above first appeal, which came to be disposed of by an order dated 25.6.2018 recording the statement of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner shall see to it that in fact the bank account of the partnership firm is defreezed without any condition and he has no objection if the concerned bank defreezes the bank account of the partnership firm. However, the learned counsel requested to make suitable observation that the issue/question that the bank account of the partnership firm is required to be operated by the concerned partners jointly or otherwise to be kept open to be considered by the arbitral tribunal. However, the learned counsel requested to make suitable observation that the issue/question that the bank account of the partnership firm is required to be operated by the concerned partners jointly or otherwise to be kept open to be considered by the arbitral tribunal. The court, accordingly, disposed of the application by directing the petitioner to act and abide by the statement made by the learned counsel appearing on his behalf as recorded therein. It was further directed that the concerned bank shall defreeze the bank account of the partnership firm so that ultimately the direction issued by the court in the earlier order dated 26.4.2018 is complied with and the amount towards the sale consideration of the concerned flats be deposited in the bank account of the partnership firm. However, the same shall be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the respective parties and the question/issue whether the bank account of the partnership firm is required to be operated jointly with the respondent or otherwise and/or as per the prevailing position as on date, shall be considered by the arbitral tribunal as and when raised, for which the court had not expressed anything in favour of either parties. Thus the order on the miscellaneous civil application directing the bank to defreeze the account of the partnership firm was passed with a view to ensure compliance of the earlier order dated 26.4.2018 of this court; whereas the issue as regards whether the bank account of the firm is to be operated jointly with the petitioner was left for the consideration of the arbitral tribunal. 23. It may be noted that before the arbitral tribunal, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that once the High Court had decided the application under section 9 of the Arbitration Act, it was not open to the claimant to reagitate the point, nor did the tribunal have the power to take a view contrary to or inconsistent with the view taken by the High Court. In support of such submission the learned counsel for the respondents had placed reliance upon the various decisions. In support of such submission the learned counsel for the respondents had placed reliance upon the various decisions. However, the arbitral tribunal, in its order dated 31.10.2018, reiterated that it does not want to enter into wider issues at this stage and has held thus: “As we have stated above, we do not wish to enter into wider issues at this stage, Suffice it to say that Clause (11) of the Partnership Deed allows the Claimant to sign such documents and, hence, in our opinion, the claimant is justified in seeking interim relief in terms of para 31(B) of the application. It is also in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience inasmuch as the Claimant has invested 50% amount while respondent Nos.2 to 7 all together have invested 50% amount in the partnership. But, so far as Bank Account is concerned, the claimant in para 31(A) has prayed that the Bank Account should be operated jointly with the signatures of the claimant and respondent No.2. It was also stated that, so far as Bank account is concerned, the Hon'ble High Court in the order dated 25.6.2018 has kept the question open “to be considered by the learned Arbitral Tribunal”. We have extracted Clause (4) of the Partnership Deed in the earlier part of this order. The said provision declares that Bank Accounts of the firm shall be operated by any two parties to the partnership and “any change in operation of accounts shall be by mutual consent of All Partners”. (emphasis supplied). Since all the partners are not agreeable to effect any change in operation of Bank Account, no such relief can be granted.” The arbitral tribunal, accordingly, granted relief in terms of paragraph 31(B) of the application which reads thus; “31(B) Your Lordships be further pleased to restrain the respondents from proceedings/executing any document, sale deed/agreement to sell or creating any third party interest with respect to balance 28 units of flats of Respondent No.1 without the prior consent and participation of the claimant in all and every respect and matters.” 24. It may be pertinent to note that the relief claimed in the application made by the petitioner under section 9 of the Arbitration Act was to prohibit/restrain from selling, alienating and/or in any way transferring/disposing of any of the units in the PIP in any manner whatsoever to any person and consequentially the opponents be restrained from transferring, alienating either the ownership or possession or creating any third party rights of any of the units of PIP to any person in any manner whatsoever and related reliefs. Thus, the interim measures prayed for in the application under section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the interim measure prayed for vide paragraph 31(B) of the application under section 17(2) of that Act is more or less identical. The application made under section 9 of the Arbitration Act came to be disposed of by the Commercial Court by an order dated 16.4.2018 in view of the statement made by the learned counsel for the parties, with a direction that in future the sale deed/deeds in respect of the partnership firm’s property be executed in favour of purchaser jointly by the petitioner and the respondent No.2. The respondents carried this order of the Commercial Court in appeal before this court in First Appeal No.1470 of 2018, wherein the above order dated 26.4.2018 came to be passed directing that as and when called upon to sign the document with respect to remaining 30 flats (except 2 flats which are yet to be booked/sold), either may be agreement to sell or sale deed, the original applicant (the petitioner herein) to sign the same as seller/ one of the seller on behalf of the partnership firm at the earliest but within a period of 15 days from the date on which, the original applicant is called upon to sign such document (to be intimated by Email and/or RPAD). At the same time, appellant No.2 herein – original opponent No.2 (the respondent No.2 herein) shall also sign such document as seller/one of the coseller on behalf of the partnership firm. Thus, by virtue of the order dated 26.4.2018, the petitioner was required to sign the documents with respect to the remaining thirty flats within a period of 15 days from the date on which he is called upon to sign such document. 25. Thus, by virtue of the order dated 26.4.2018, the petitioner was required to sign the documents with respect to the remaining thirty flats within a period of 15 days from the date on which he is called upon to sign such document. 25. The consequence of the order dated 31.10.2018 of the arbitral tribunal is that as on date there are two orders in operation, one of the High Court whereby the petitioner was required to sign the documents with respect to the remaining thirty flats within a period of 15 days from the date on which he is called upon to sign such document, and another of the arbitral tribunal restraining the respondents from proceeding/executing any document, sale/agreement to sell or creating any third party interest with respect to balance 28 units of flats of respondent No.1 without the prior consent and participation of the claimant (petitioner herein) in all and every aspect of the matter. Thus, in effect and substance the order of the arbitral tribunal sets at naught the order passed by the High Court, inasmuch as, while the order of the High Court requires the petitioner to sign the document within fifteen days of being called upon to sign the same, the order of the arbitral tribunal restrains the respondents from executing any document, sale/agreement to sell or creating any third party interest with respect of the balance 28 units without the consent and participation of the petitioner. Therefore, there is an apparent inconsistency in the orders passed by the High Court and the arbitral tribunal. The learned counsel for the respondents is therefore, justified in contending that the effect of the order dated 31.10.2018 passed by the arbitral tribunal would amount to setting at naught the order dated 26.4.2018 passed by this court. Moreover, an incongruous situation has arisen whereby two conflicting orders are operational at the same time. 26. On behalf of the petitioner, it has been contended that he has prayed for the interim measure only till the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. However, the order passed by the High Court does not limit its operation till the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, and hence, the said contention does not merit acceptance. The order passed by this court, may be on a consensus, has not been challenged by the petitioner and has attained finality and is, therefore, binding on the respective parties. However, the order passed by the High Court does not limit its operation till the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, and hence, the said contention does not merit acceptance. The order passed by this court, may be on a consensus, has not been challenged by the petitioner and has attained finality and is, therefore, binding on the respective parties. The petitioner having claimed similar interim measures before the High Court and having exhausted the remedy under section 9 of the Arbitration Act culminating into an order of the High Court is, therefore, precluded from seeking similar interim measures before the arbitral tribunal since it is not permissible for a party to seek the same relief from two different forums. 27. At this stage it may also be pertinent to refer to the following findings recorded by the learned Principal District Judge in the impugned judgment and order dated 26th August, 2019: “Further from the record it is clear that the Arbitration Clause was invoked by the respondent on 30.05.2018 and the Hon'ble High Court has passed the order in Misc. Civil Application No.2/18 in First Appeal No.1470/18 on 25.06.2018. Therefore at the time of passing the order by the Hon'ble High Court in Misc. Civil Application No.2/18, the arbitration clause was already invoked by the respondent. In the order dated 25.06.2018 passed in Misc. Civil Application No.2/18, the Hon'ble High Court has directed the concerned bank to defreeze the bank account of the partnership firm so that ultimately the direction issued by the order dated 26.04.2018 is complied with. Therefore, it is clear that the intention of the Hon'ble High Court was to make the interim arrangement till the final award is passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. Had it been the intention of the Hon'ble High Court to continue the interim order till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, the parties would have been left to approach the Arbitral Tribunal for passing the interim orders with respect to defreezing of the bank account of the partnership firm. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court dated 26.04.2018 was till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and it ceased to operate after the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.” 28. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court dated 26.04.2018 was till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and it ceased to operate after the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.” 28. It may be noted during the course of hearing of Miscellaneous Civil Application No.2 of 2018 in First Appeal No.1470 of 2018, the learned counsel for the petitioner had requested the court that the issue that the bank account of the partnership firm is required to be operated by the concerned partners jointly or otherwise be kept open to be considered by the arbitral tribunal. The High Court, in its order dated 25.6.2018, had specifically left this issue open to be considered by the arbitral tribunal as and when raised, and did not express any opinion on the issue. Therefore, insofar as this issue is concerned, it was permissible for the petitioner to move the application under section 17 of the Arbitration Act seeking interim measures in respect thereof as prayed for vide paragraph 31(A) of the application, but insofar as the interim measure prayed for vide paragraph 31(B) of the application is concerned, since the High Court had already considered the relief prayed for in this regard and had passed an order in connection therewith, the issue stood concluded and could not have been reagitated before the arbitral tribunal. The arbitral tribunal, however, on merits held that the relief claimed vide paragraph 31(A) cannot be granted but granted the relief prayed for vide paragraph 31(B) of the application. 29. On a perusal of the order dated 31.10.2018 passed by the arbitral tribunal, it appears that the respondents have raised a preliminary contention with regard to the maintainability of the application under section 17 of the Arbitration Act to the extent that the petitioner had claimed similar relief as claimed before the High Court in view of the order made by the High Court on the application under section 9 of the Arbitration Act. However, the arbitral Tribunal has not entered into the merits of the contention by stating that it does not wish to enter into wider issues at this stage. However, the arbitral Tribunal has not entered into the merits of the contention by stating that it does not wish to enter into wider issues at this stage. In the opinion of this court, the preliminary issue as to whether or not the application under section 17 of the Arbitration Act was maintainable was required to be decided first before considering the application on merits, and no relief could have been granted without deciding such preliminary issue. 30. In the above view of the matter, it is not necessary to enter into the merits of any of the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respective parties on the merits of the case, which even otherwise is subject matter of consideration by the arbitral tribunal. 31. A perusal of the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Principal District Judge shows that the learned Judge has given clear, cogent and sufficient reasons in support of the findings recorded by him and this court in exercise of powers under article 227 of the Constitution, does not find any reason to take a different view. 32. For the foregoing reasons, no case is made out so as to warrant interference. The petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.