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Rajasthan High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 805 (RAJ)

Chaini Devi v. General Public

2019-03-11

P.K. LOHRA

body2019
JUDGMENT 1. By the instant appeal, under Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC, petitioners have challenged order dated 6th of July, 2018, passed by District Judge, Sirohi (for short, learned Court below). By the order impugned, learned Court below, while considering application of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 under Section 151 CPC allowed the same and directed the respondent Life Insurance Corporation of India not to disburse the claim of insurance flowing from the life insurance policy in the name of Late Ghanshyam Nagora. 2. The application aforesaid is filed by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 inter-alia alleging therein that they are wife, daughter and son of deceased Ghanshyam Nagora and as such are entitled to receive his insurance claim as Class-I legal heirs. Although before the learned Court below legitimacy of matrimony between Ghanshyam Nagora and second respondent Smt. Jyoti Nagora is seriously disputed by the appellants but the learned Court below, while refraining to make any observations about legality of marriage, granted indulgence to them by stating that validity of marriage too cannot defeat the right of children in accordance with law of inheritance. The learned Court below has observed that while it is true that decree for dissolution of marriage between Ghanshyam and respondent No. 6 is sub-judice before this Court in appeal but this fact can simply have ramification on the legality of marriage of Ghanshaym with second respondent without disturbing rights of inheritance from his estate available to the children. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 4. Mr. Vishal Singhal, learned counsel for the appellants in support of his arguments has placed reliance on Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 as amended w.e.f. 20th March 2015 under caption "The Insurance Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015". His contention is that appellant No. 1 being nominee is entitled for the insurance claim. 5. Per contra, Mr. Shreyansh Mardia, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that mere nomination in the insurance policy cannot change the course of succession and therefore being wife and children of Late Ghanshyam Nagora, they are entitled to receive proceeds of life insurance policy. Counsel for respondent No. 6 too has supported the impugned order. 6. 5. Per contra, Mr. Shreyansh Mardia, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that mere nomination in the insurance policy cannot change the course of succession and therefore being wife and children of Late Ghanshyam Nagora, they are entitled to receive proceeds of life insurance policy. Counsel for respondent No. 6 too has supported the impugned order. 6. At the outset, it may be observed that essentially the order passed by the learned Court below is an injunctory order but then in passing the same, learned Court below has invoked Section 151 CPC and therefore maintainability of this appeal itself under Order 43 Rule 1(r) is seriously questionable. Under Order 43 Rule 1(r), any order passed under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC is appealable. 7. There remains no quarrel that in appropriate cases Court can exercise its inherent powers to meet the ends of justice and render justice between parties and further it can also pass an order in the nature of injunctory relief. Reliance in this behalf can be placed on a decision of Supreme Court in Tanusree Basu & Ors. v. Ishani Prasad Basu & Ors. [ (2008) 4 SCC 791 ] . 8. If the impugned order is examined critically, then it can very well be said that it is a very short order without discussing facts in detail. However, in the backdrop of lis involved in the petition under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, if the entire amount of proceeds of insurance policy are disbursed to the appellants, the whole purpose of the petition would be defeated. Therefore, the learned Court below has rightly issued direction to the respondent Life Insurance Corporation not to disburse the amount of insurance policy to the appellants solely on the ground that appellant No. 1 is nominee. Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi & Ors. v. Usha Devi [ (1984) 1 SCC 424 ] , while analyzing unamended Section 39 of the Insurance Act discussed right of a nominee threadbare and clarified that Section 39 is not intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the statute. The Court held: "We shall now proceed to analyse the provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The Court held: "We shall now proceed to analyse the provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The said Section provides that a holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death. If the nominee is a minor, the policy holder may appoint any person to receive the money in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. That means that if the policy holder is alive when the policy matures for payment he alone will receive payment of the money due under the policy and not the nominee. Any such nomination may at any time before the policy matures for payment be cancelled or changed, but before such cancellation or change is notified to the insurer if he makes the payment bona fide to the nominee already registered with him, the insurer gets a valid discharge. Such power of cancellation of or effecting a change in the nomination implies that the nominee has no right to the amount during the lifetime of the assured. If the policy is transferred or assigned Under Section 38 of the Act, the nomination automatically lapses. If the nominee or where there are nominees more than one all the nominees die before the policy matures for payment the money due under the policy is payable to the heirs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate. It is not necessary to refer to Sub-section (7) of Section 39 of the Act here. But the summary of the relevant provisions of Section 39 given above establishes clearly that the policy holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy holder. If that is so, on the death of the policy holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. If that is so, on the death of the policy holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that Section 39 of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a statutory testament in paragraph 16 of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Mrs. Uma Sehgals case (supra). If Section 39 of the Act is contrasted with Section 38 of the Act which provides for transfer or assignment of the rights under a policy, the tenuous character of the right of a nominee would become more pronounced. It is difficult to hold that Section 39 of the Act was intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the statute. The provision in Sub-section (6) of Section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills, which have the effect of diverting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not relaxed even where wills are registered." 9. The Allahabad High Court in Javitri Devi v. Smt. Meera Devi & Ors. 2016 (116) ALR 358 has also reiterated the same principle. The Court held: It is settled legal position that if a person under insurance of any employee nominates any nominee to receive benefits or insurance or service or retiral benefits after his death, then in such case legal heirs of person insured or employee nominating, will also have legal rights to receive those benefits; and the act of nomination does not confer or clothe the nominee with any beneficial interest in the amount payable in such a case. If insurer or employer (as the case may be)has paid such amount to the nominee, then he will be absolved from his legal obligation of payment. If insurer or employer (as the case may be)has paid such amount to the nominee, then he will be absolved from his legal obligation of payment. But if the dispute arises between nominee and legal heir/ successor in interest of the deceased, then only such legal heir/ successor will have right to receive such amount of pension or retiral benefits or the amount ensured. In such a case the claim of nominee, having no other legal right, will not prevail over the rights of legal heirs. In light of discussion as above, the first substantial question of law is decided in favour of plaintiff-respondent and against the defendant- appellant. 10. In view of foregoing discussion, even on merits, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. 11. Consequently, the appeal fails and same is hereby dismissed. However, before parting, it may be observed that considering the lis involved in the petition under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, the learned Court below is expected to proceed with the trial expeditiously and decide the same as early as possible, preferably within a period of six months from today.