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2019 DIGILAW 806 (JHR)

Siddharth Jha @ Raman Jha v. State of Jharkhand

2019-04-03

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2019
ORDER : 1. The present petition has been filed for quashing the FIR registered as Chas (Sadar) SC/ST Beat No. IV P.S. Case No. 02 of 2011 dated 02.02.2011 corresponding to G.R. No. 148 of 2011 registered under Sections 341/323/385/448/34 of the IPC and sections 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short “the Act 1989”) and also to quash the entire investigation and criminal prosecution arising out of the aforesaid case. 2. An FIR being SC/ST Beat No. IV P.S. Case No. 02/2011 has been registered on the written report of informant-opposite party no. 2 against three persons including the petitioners alleging that on 02.02.2011 at about 9.30 am, the petitioners alongwith Chandan Kumar Singh entered his residential office and used abusive language. They called him as “PASI” and also snatched Rs. 1000/- from his packet. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the entire allegations made in the written report are false and concocted. The elder brother of the petitioners namely Parth Sarthi Jha is a registered contractor in Rural Work Department and when the informant joined the post of Executive Engineer at Rural Development Special Division Bokaro, his wife Asha Kumari executed a partnership deed with the petitioner no. 2 for doing various business. Prior to the execution of the partnership deed, the petitioner no. 1 had given friendly loan of Rs. 3,50,000/- by way of account payee cheque in favour of the wife of the informant, however she failed to return the same. Finding no way, the petitioner no. 1 sent legal notice through lawyer upon the wife of the informant by registered post on 30.01.2011 asking her to refund the said friendly amount of loan failing which the recourse of law would be taken against her and her husband. After receiving the legal notice, the informant lodged the present FIR on false allegations. It is further submitted that even if the allegations levelled against the petitioners are taken to be true, the offence under the Act, 1989 is not made out as the abusive word has not allegedly been uttered in public view. It is also submitted that the written report of the informant also lacks the ingredients of the offences under section 341, 323, 385 of IPC. It is also submitted that the written report of the informant also lacks the ingredients of the offences under section 341, 323, 385 of IPC. The learned counsel for the petitioners puts reliance on the judgment rendered by a Bench of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Choubey vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, 2010 (4) East Cr. C 27 (Jhr.). 4. The learned counsel for the informant/opposite party no. 2 submits that the wife of the opposite party no. 2 did no work pursuant to the partnership deed dated 27.01.2010. In fact, the informant helped the petitioners as they had taken loan from the Vijaya Bank and Bank of Baroda. The informant’s wife also helped the petitioners from time to time. Hence it cannot be said that the informant’s wife worked with the petitioners. On the contrary, the petitioners had taken the loan from the wife of the informant for that they refunded the amount. The petitioner no. 1 filed false Complaint Case No. 167 of 2011 in counterblast to the present case against the informant/opposite party no. 2 and his wife on 23.03.2011 which was referred to B.S City Police Station under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and B.S. City P.S. Case no. 118 of 2011 dated 01.04.2011 was instituted. The petitioners started pressurising the informant to withdraw the present case due to which the informant/ opposite party no. 2 also made an application before the S.P. Bokaro on 11.02.2011 in which he clearly stated the manner in which the petitioners were giving threatening to him. The informant/opposite party no. 2 also submitted an application dated 05.04.2011 before the S.P. Bokaro stating all the facts regarding the trouble being created by the petitioners. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The present FIR has been lodged on the written report of the informant/opposite party no. 2 alleging that the petitioners came to his house and called him as ‘PASI’. They also caught the collar of his shirt, scuffled with him and also torn the government papers. They also snatched Rs. 1000/- kept in the pocket of his shirt and also threatened with dire consequences. For the alleged incident, the FIR has been lodged under Sections 341/323/385/448/34 of the IPC and sections 3(1)(x) of The SC/ST Act, 1989. They also caught the collar of his shirt, scuffled with him and also torn the government papers. They also snatched Rs. 1000/- kept in the pocket of his shirt and also threatened with dire consequences. For the alleged incident, the FIR has been lodged under Sections 341/323/385/448/34 of the IPC and sections 3(1)(x) of The SC/ST Act, 1989. The thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, 1989 is not made out in the present case since the occurrence did not take place in the public view. 6. To appreciate the aforesaid contention, I have perused the case cited on behalf of the petitioners. In the case of Pradeep Kumar Choubey (supra), it has been held as under:- “13. In my view, there has been purpose to incorporate the words 'public view' which does suggests that if one is insulted or intimidated not in public view, then it would not be an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, rather the said offence would be attracted if a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is insulted or intimidated with a view to humiliate him within the public view or I can say within public hearing as even at a private place or a building, if a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is insulted or intimidated with a view to humiliate him, he can be brought within the mischief of the said provision provided such offence has been committed within the public view or within the public hearing. This view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of Swaran Singh and Others vs. State through Standing Counsel and Another, (2008) 8 SCC 435 wherein it has been observed at paragraph 28 as under: “........It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression, place within public view with the expression public place.....” 14. Thus, even if one makes remarks or utterances with a view to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe inside the building, he would be liable to be prosecuted provided such remarks or utterances be either visible or audible to the public. If such remarks or utterances are not audible to the public, one cannot be said to have insulted or intimidated within public view with a view to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste. The said view has already been expressed in a case of Bai alias Laxmibai W/o Nivratti Poul vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) All MR (Cri) 219 wherein it has been held that the expression within public view has specific meaning and in order to attract the provision of law under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the acts amounting to insult or humiliation to the member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe should be visible and audible to the public. Otherwise it would not amount to an offence under the said provision of law. Thus, the act amounting to insult or humiliation to the members of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe should be visible or audible to the public for constituting an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. 15. Coming to the fact of the case, whatever utterances were allegedly made, that were made in the official chamber where, according to the case of the prosecution, no other person was present. Even if such utterances have been made, it has not been stated to be audible to public and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to have insulted or intimidated the daughter of the informant within a public view.” 7. Since in the present case also, it is the admitted case of the opposite party no. Even if such utterances have been made, it has not been stated to be audible to public and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to have insulted or intimidated the daughter of the informant within a public view.” 7. Since in the present case also, it is the admitted case of the opposite party no. 2 that the alleged incident occurred in his house and it has not been specifically stated that at that time some other persons were also present there and they heard the alleged abusive/ derogatory word and as such I am of the considered view that the written report of the informant does not prima facie disclose any offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, 1989 and as such the FIR to the extent of the alleged commission of the offence under section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 cannot be sustained. 8. So far the rest part of the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioners is concerned, the FIR prima facie discloses the commission of the same. Though the petitioners and the opposite party no. 2 have made allegations against each other before this court, yet the same cannot be adjudicated in exercise of the power under section 482 of Cr.P.C. It is a settled proposition of law that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the court should not kill a stillborn child and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling reasons to do so. 9. Under the aforesaid circumstance, the FIR to the extent of the offence under section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 in connection with Chas (Sadar) SC/ST Beat No. IV P.S. Case No. 02 of 2011 is hereby quashed. 10. The present petition is, accordingly, allowed in part.