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2019 DIGILAW 81 (GUJ)

Harjivanbhai Keshavlal Patel v. State Of Gujarat

2019-01-31

SONIA GOKANI

body2019
JUDGMENT : SONIA GOKANI, J. 1. Petitioner approaches this Court being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the refusal on part of the Police Inspector, Shahpur Police Station, Ahmedabad in taking cognizance of the complaint dated 02.03.2018 lodged by the petitioner. It is his grievance that the Officer concerned, instead of following the decision of Lalita Kumari vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors reported in, (2014) 2 SCC 1 has chosen to refuse the registration of an FIR and thereafter carried out investigation in serious offence alleged in the complaint. 2. Adverting to the facts in the instant case, Punjiben, widow of Shakraji Motiji, through the petitioner as power of attorney holder, had instituted Civil Suit No. 127 of 2018 in the Court of learned Principal Civil Judge, (Ahmedabad Rural) at Mirzapur, Ahmedabad. The same was taken against the three defendants viz. Jivatben Mangaji Thakor, Gabhaji Ghelaji Thakor and Babubhai Shakrabhai Thakor in praying for releasing specific performance of sale deed dated 24.06.2005 along with supplementary possession, agreement and, in the alternative, damages had been claimed from the defendants. It appears that on 03.08.2011, an application Exh 19 was moved by two persons viz. Govindbhai Pursottambhai Patel and Kantibhai Pursottambhai Patel, for being joined themselves as defendants and the trial Court, on 03.08.2011, granted said application and they were joined in the suit. On 22.08.2015, the original plaintiff through the petitioner as power of attorney holder preferred application Exh 5 praying for interim relief to the fact that during pendency of the Civil Suit that the defendants be restrained from dispossessing the plaintiff and the Court, after hearing both the sides, partially allowed and said application and directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the suit land. 3. On considering the rival pleadings, the Court had framed the issues on 30.06.2016 and the matter was adjourned to 10.03.2017. 4. On the next scheduled date i.e. on 10.03.2017, learned advocate for the petitioner herein remained present and submitted 92 documents vide Exh 49 and for recording of evidence of the plaintiff. The matter was adjourned on 07.04.2017. It appears that the defendant Jivatben Mangaji Thakor passed away. An application was moved on 07.04.2017 to bring her heirs on record vide Exh 50 where the Court issued the notice and matter was adjourned to 09.05.2017 for further hearing. 5. The matter was adjourned on 07.04.2017. It appears that the defendant Jivatben Mangaji Thakor passed away. An application was moved on 07.04.2017 to bring her heirs on record vide Exh 50 where the Court issued the notice and matter was adjourned to 09.05.2017 for further hearing. 5. On 09.05.2017, it was realized by the learned advocate for the petitioner on verifying the Court’s board that Civil Suit No. 127 of 2008 was not listed. Then the grievance was raised before the learned Presiding Officer. The Presiding Officer inquired with the bench clerk and it was informed that the said civil suit was already dismissed on 19.04.2017 due to absence of plaintiff and as no evidence had been produced by the plaintiff. 6. Attention of the Presiding Officer was drawn by the learned advocate for the petitioner to the chronology of events which emphasized that after production of the documents, the matter had been scheduled on 09.05.2017. The date of 19.04.2017 was never fixed for hearing the Civil Suit No. 127 of 2008. Learned Presiding Officer directed the bench clerk to provide her the details and when he fumbled, she suspected the foul play and warned the bench clerk once again to look into the record and find out the documents failing which, a serious view was taken against him. 7. It is the say of the petitioner that after a search for sometime at several places, the bench clerk concerned had brought before the Presiding Officer a plastic bag containing the documents and other papers. It was also realized that the two rojnama had been preferred. The second rojnama had fixed the date of 19.04.2017 instead of the original scheduled date of 09.05.2017. 8. The petitioner-plaintiff, on the very day, had moved an application for restoration of Civil Suit No. 127 of 2008 which was numbered as Criminal Misc. Application No. 59 of 2017 and prayed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 19.04.2017 of dismissal. He also urged for continuation of interim injuction granted on 27.08.2015 and after preliminary hearing, the notice had been issued on the restoration application. The Court also directed the restoration of interim relief granted earlier during the pendency of restoration application. 9. Application No. 59 of 2017 and prayed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 19.04.2017 of dismissal. He also urged for continuation of interim injuction granted on 27.08.2015 and after preliminary hearing, the notice had been issued on the restoration application. The Court also directed the restoration of interim relief granted earlier during the pendency of restoration application. 9. It is claimed by the petitioner that on 02.04.2017, the petitioner came to know that Govindbhai Patel and Kantibhai Patel, who were newly impleaded as party defendants, on the very next day of the dismissal of the suit on 20.04.2017, obtained certified copy of the order and within one week i.e. on 27.04.2017, the registered sale deed in respect of the suit land was executed by Kantibhai Patel through his power of attorney holder viz. Mahendrabhai in favour of Shri Mahendrabhai Patel. 10. Realizing that it is an extremely serious matter, to prepare a second set of rojnama and thereby facilitating one of the parties to transfer the land, this being a clear case of overreaching the process of law, the present petitioner approached Police Inspector, Shahpur Police Station and lodged a complaint. It is his grievance that FIR has not been lodged and the same has been rejected by an order No. LA/296/18 on the ground that the incident has taken place within the Court premise and therefore, appropriate leave is required to be obtained from the Court. 11. This refusal had led the petitioner to approach this Court and prayed the following reliefs: “5(A) Directing Respondent No.3 to register FIR in respect of the offences alleged in the complaint Annexure-A and further be pleased to direct investigation of the offences as per complaint Annexure-A by State CID Crime Branch under direct supervision of the officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. (B) Penidng hearing and final disposal of the petition, the Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass interim order directing either learned District Judge of the Ahmedabad (Rural) Court at Mirzapur, Ahmedabad or the Registrar of this Hon’ble Court to seize and take custody of the entire record of civil suit no. 127/2008 from the court of learned 6th Additional Sr. Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, Ahmedabad with appropriate direction to keep certified Xerox copies of the entire record so that the case can proceed further. 127/2008 from the court of learned 6th Additional Sr. Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, Ahmedabad with appropriate direction to keep certified Xerox copies of the entire record so that the case can proceed further. (C) Any other relief deemed fit to meet the ends of justice may be granted.” 12. This Court, on 26.04.2018, after recording the chronology of events, gave the following direction: “8. Be that as it may, having regard to the nature of the allegations, I expect the Principal District Judge of the Ahmedabad Rural, Ahmedabad to initiate an appropriate inquiry in this regard at the earliest. Let an appropriate inquiry be conducted and a report in this regard be prepared and forwarded to this Court. Further orders shall be passed after the report of the Principal District is received by this Court. 9 Post this matter on 20th June 2018. Direct service is permitted. 10 The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the learned Principal District Judge, Ahmedabad Rural, Ahmedabd at the earliest.” 13. It appears that the first report which has been received by the learned Principal District Judge dated 23.04.2018 merely indicates that the status report of Special Civil Suit No. 127 of 2008 as per the computer system is of dismissal under Order 9 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as per the report of Court of Senior Civil Judge dated 19.04.2017. It does not state beyond that anything. 14. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 19.06.2018 learned Principal District Judge communicated that he has obtained a confidential remark from the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ahmdabad, who is also Additional Civil Judge and her say has been that “it appears from the say of the concerned Judicial Officer that due to bulkiness of the record, the entire record has to be separated in two different sets and therefore, due to bona fide mistake, the two different sets were assigned separate dates on the record of he case. This bona fide mistake appears to have been occurred due to over burden of the work and prima facie it does not appear that any staff members did the some collusion with the defendant.” Learned Principal District Judge also concurs with the concerned Judicial Officer and accordingly has made a request for placing the same before this Court. This bona fide mistake appears to have been occurred due to over burden of the work and prima facie it does not appear that any staff members did the some collusion with the defendant.” Learned Principal District Judge also concurs with the concerned Judicial Officer and accordingly has made a request for placing the same before this Court. It is thus quite clear that the learned Principal District Judge, instead of initiating the appropriate inquiry at his level, as directed by this Court, had relied upon the report submitted by the learned Senior Civil Judge and has opined in the communication that he concurs with the said report. At the outset, it is needed to be stated that the order of this Court passed on 26.04.2018 more particularly referring to para 8 of the said order is amply clear and is as clear as broad day light which does not require any further amplification wherein the Court had expected Ld. Principal District Judge himself to initiate the appropriate inquiry in this regard. Having regard to the nature of allegation and after appropriate inquiry to be conducted, a report was necessary to be prepared and forwarded to this Court. This has not happened. However, this chronology of events is unequivocally prima facie reflecting that there is a clear attempt on part of the parties, who are arraigned as accused, to overreach the process of law. The continuation of interim relief in favour of the plaintiff was a major hampering ground for any transfer which was contemplated by the defendants and therefore the two of the newly impleaded defendants have chosen to transfer the land within one week of dismissal of the suit on the strength of the rojnama which is a second set where instead of the scheduled date of 19.05.2017, the date mentioned is 09.04.2017 and on 09.04.2017, the Court dismissed the suit for non-prosecution. Had there been one set of rojnama one, can understand that in 2300 civil matters, there could be a reason for the Court to justify the action which is not the case. Had there been one set of rojnama one, can understand that in 2300 civil matters, there could be a reason for the Court to justify the action which is not the case. In the instant matter where two sets of rojnama have been made and it is also averred by the petitioner that first time, when they realized dismissal of the suit and made a request to the Court to consider their production of list of documentary evidence on 07.04.2017, the concerned bench clerk had presented the same from the plastic bag with another papers. The manner, in which, the events have been unfolded this Court is unable to accept the report of the learned Senior Civil Judge protecting the Court officer. 15. It would be apt to refer the decision rendered in case of Iqbal Singh Marwah and anr vs. Meenakshi Marwah and anr reported in, (2005) 4 SCC 370 which was a case of alleged commission of forgery in respect of all documents produced or given in evidence in proceeding in any court. The Apex Court held that bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) that no Court shall take cognizance of any such offence except on the complaint in writing of the Court concerned would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in section 195(1)(b)(ii) have been committed with respect to the documents after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court. That is during the time when the document was in custodia legis. If such an offence is committed prior to its production or giving in evidence in Court, no complaint by Court would be necessary and a private complaint would be maintainable. Relevant findings and observations of the Apex Court are as under: “25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in Court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh, after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh, after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the Court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would he highly detrimental to the interest of society at large. 21. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the Courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non- filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (Third ed.) para 313, the principle has been stated in the following manner : “The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong. 33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1) (b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. 34. Section 195(1) (b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. 34. In the present case, the will has been produced in the Court subsequently. It is nobody’s case that any offence as enumerated in Section 195(b)(ii) was committed in respect to the said will after it had been produced or filed in the Court of District Judge. Therefore, the bar created by Section 195(1)(b) (ii) Cr.P.C. would not come into play and there is no embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint filed by the respondents. The view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court is perfectly correct and calls for no interference. 16. This has been subsequently reiterated by the Apex Court in case of Central Bureau of Investigation vs. M. Shivamani reported in, (2017) 14 SCC 855 . The Apex Court observed as under: “7. Section 195(1) CrPC is as follows: “195. 16. This has been subsequently reiterated by the Apex Court in case of Central Bureau of Investigation vs. M. Shivamani reported in, (2017) 14 SCC 855 . The Apex Court observed as under: “7. Section 195(1) CrPC is as follows: “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.-(1) No court shall take cognizance- (a)(i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate; (b)(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, or (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub- clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that court, or of some other court to which that court is subordinate.” (Emphasis added) 8. Contention raised on behalf of the appellant-CBI is that the object and purpose of the bar created under the law against taking cognizance in respect of the specified offences is to control frivolous or vexatious proceedings by private parties. In State of U. P. versus Mata Bhikh, (1994) 4 SCC 95 it was observed : ‘ “6. The object of this section is to protect persons from being vexatiously prosecuted upon inadequate materials or insufficient grounds by person actuated by malice or ill-will or frivolity of disposition at the instance of private individuals for the offences specified therein. In State of U. P. versus Mata Bhikh, (1994) 4 SCC 95 it was observed : ‘ “6. The object of this section is to protect persons from being vexatiously prosecuted upon inadequate materials or insufficient grounds by person actuated by malice or ill-will or frivolity of disposition at the instance of private individuals for the offences specified therein. The provisions of this section, no doubt, are mandatory and the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless there is a complaint in writing of ‘the public servant concerned’ as required by the section without which the trial under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code becomes void ab initio. See Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab, (1962) AIR SC 1206. “ 9. It is submitted that the scheme of the provision shows that the specified offences in respect of whom the bar is created have direct impact on administration of public justice. As against a private party, it is only the public servant or his superior to whom he is administratively subordinate is permitted to file a complaint. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah versus Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 laying down that interpretation of the provision which leads to a situation where victim of crime is rendered remediless has to be discarded and interpretation should advance the object Para 23 & 25. The Constitution Bench of this Court interpreted the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) to be limited to a document where forgery was committed after it was produced or given in evidence before the court. It was held that if forgery was committed before the document was produced before the court, the bar under the said provision was not applicable. In Perumal versus Janakai4 it was held that bar under the provision will not apply if a High Court, as a superior court, directs a complaint to be filed in respect of offence covered by Section 195(1)(b)(i). It was, thus, submitted that in the present case protection under Section 195(1)(a)(i) cannot apply as it was not at the instance of any private party but at the instance of the High Court that CBI investigation was directed to be conducted. “Other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate” should not exclude the High Court. 10. It was, thus, submitted that in the present case protection under Section 195(1)(a)(i) cannot apply as it was not at the instance of any private party but at the instance of the High Court that CBI investigation was directed to be conducted. “Other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate” should not exclude the High Court. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent however supported the view taken by the High Court. It was submitted that there was no reason to ignore the statutory bar against taking cognizance of an offence under Section 182 except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or who is administrative superior to whom which expression could not include the High Court. It was submitted that though on failure to perform a public duty, the public servant or his superior may be directed by the High Court by a mandamus to file a complaint, direction of the High Court to conduct investigation was not enough to exclude the statutory bar against taking of cognizance. Reliance has been placed on M.S. Ahlawat versus State of Haryana 5 laying down as follows: “5. Chapter XI IPC deals with “false evidence and offences against public justice” and Section 193 occurring therein provides for punishment for giving or fabricating false evidence in a judicial proceeding. Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) provides that where an act amounts to an offence of contempt of the lawful authority of public servants or to an offence against public justice such as giving false evidence under Section 193 IPC etc. or to an offence relating to documents actually used in a court, private prosecutions are barred absolutely and only the court in relation to which the offence was committed may initiate proceedings. Provisions of Section 195 CrPC are mandatory and no court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless there is a complaint in writing as required under that section. It is settled law that every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent upon the court to order prosecution, but (sic) to exercise judicial discretion to order prosecution only in the larger interest of the administration of justice.” 11. We have considered the rival submissions. We find merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. It is settled law that every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent upon the court to order prosecution, but (sic) to exercise judicial discretion to order prosecution only in the larger interest of the administration of justice.” 11. We have considered the rival submissions. We find merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. While the bar against cognizance of a specified offence is mandatory, the same has to be understood in the context of the purpose for which such a bar is created. The bar is not intended to take away remedy against a crime but only to protect an innocent person against false or frivolous proceedings by a private person. The expression “the public servant or his administrative superior” cannot exclude the High Court. It is clearly implicit in the direction of the High Court quoted above that it was necessary in the interest of justice to take cognizance of the offence in question. Direction of the High Court is at par with the direction of an administrative superior public servant to file a complaint in writing in terms of the statutory requirement. The protection intended by the Section against a private person filing a frivolous complaint is taken care of when the High Court finds that the matter was required to be gone into in public interest. Such direction cannot be rendered futile by invoking Section 195 to such a situation. Once the High Court directs investigation into a specified offence mentioned in Section 195, bar under Section 195(1)(a) cannot be pressed into service. The view taken by the High Court will frustrate the object of law and cannot be sustained. 17. This Court in case of Sejalben Tejashbai Chovatia vs. State of Gujarat reported in, (2017) 3 RCR(Criminal) 477 also has followed the decision in case of Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra) and observed as under: “15. The Apex Court in the case of Pritish vs. State of Maharashtra reported in, (2002) 1 SCC 253 was considering section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to hold that the hub of this provision is formation of an opinion by the court(before which proceedings were to be held) that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence which appears to have been committed. In order to form such opinion the Court is empowered to hold a preliminary inquiry. It is not peremptory that such preliminary inquiry should be held. Even without such preliminary inquiry the Court can form such an opinion when it appears to the Court that an offence has been committed in relation to a proceeding in that Court. It is important to notice that even when the Court forms such an opinion, it is not mandatory that the court should make a complaint. This subsection has conferred a power in the Court to do so. It does not mean that the Court should, as a matter of course, make a complaint. But once the Court decides to do so, then the Court should make a finding to the effect that on the fact situation it is expedient in the interest of justice that the offence should further be probed into. If the Court finds it necessary to conduct a preliminary inquiry to reach such a finding it is always open to the Court to do so, though absence of any such preliminary inquiry would not vitiate a finding reached by the Court regarding its opinion. The purpose of preliminary inquiry, even if the Court opts to conduct it, is only to decide whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed. 16. Likewise, in the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah and another vs. Meenakshi Marwah and another reported in, (2005) 4 SCC 370 , it has been emphasized that even when there is a case of forgery noticed by the Court and the Court forms the opinion that unless it is expedient in the interest of justice to prosecute a person, the Court is not to do it in a referred manner. The expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by the offence, but having regard to the effect or impact of that offence upon administration of justice. The Court also held that bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) that no Court shall take cognizance of any such offence except on the complaint in writing of such matter. The Court also held that bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) that no Court shall take cognizance of any such offence except on the complaint in writing of such matter. It also held that the bar would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in section 195(1) (b)(ii) have been committed with respect to a document, after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court. If said offence is committed or given in evidence in Court, no complaint by Court would be necessary and a private complaint would be maintainable. 17. The only aspect that needs to be considered by this Court is as to whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that such prosecution would be necessary. This expediency, as held by Apex Court, is not weighing the magnitude of the injury suffered by the person affected by it but having regard to the effect or impact that the offence would have on administration of justice and considering the factual scenario, the Court has formed a preliminary opinion to hold that it is a case of perjury.” 18. It can be considered from the discussion hereinabove that the decision rendered in case of Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra) clinches the issue and therefore, there will be a clear bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) and except on the complaint in writing of the Court concerned, the private complaint in respect of the document which have been forged after its production or given in the proceedings of the Court without the Court directing such complaint, is not maintainable. What is further necessary to be considered is whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to so direct initiating so direct initiation of prosecution. 19. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it can bee seen that the document viz rojnama has been prepared in the Court and it has been produced in the proceedings of Special Civil Application which chronology followed thereafter is quite clear that the two of the respondents who had obtained rojanma the very next day and within one week the property has been sold by one of those defendants. If the matter was otherwise scheduled in a routine before the Court on 09.05.2017, there was no reason as to how the defendants would be aware of the earlier date and also the order of dismissal on that day. If the matter was otherwise scheduled in a routine before the Court on 09.05.2017, there was no reason as to how the defendants would be aware of the earlier date and also the order of dismissal on that day. It is apparent from the record that the defendants called for the certified copy of such order of dismissal and have acted so promptly so as to make the matter infructuous. While overreaching the process of law. It is not the question of only appreciation of the document which can be tantamount to a creation of a second set with design the parties concerned have managed to derail the entire proceedings. For up-keeping the sanctity of the orders of the Court and also to ensure that common man does not loose its faith in the system which is attempted to be damaged from within, hence, it is found expedient for the Court to direct the lodgment of FIR. 20. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. Let the FIR be lodged by the Additional Registrar (Judicial) of this Court. 21. Instead of once again directing the preliminary inquiry and to file an FIR, the material that has been produced on record is sufficient for this Court to direct its officer, the Additional Registrar (Judicial) to lodge the FIR which is also permissible as directed in case of CBI vs M. Sivamani (supra). The direction of this Court is at par with superior public servant to file a written complaint as per the statutory requirement. The protection given tot he public servants against the private person filing the frivolous complaint is taken care of when the High Court finds such need and when it has gone into the aspect of expediency of public interest. This is surely is a case wherein the public interest deserves redressal by lodgment of FIR. 21.1 The Registry of Ahmedabad Rural Court, Mirzapur shall extend all possible assistance as needed by the officer concerned. Request for transfer of investigation to CID crime is not being acceded to at this stage. 22. Let the FIR be lodged and the matter be expeditiously investigated. 23. Resultantly, petition is allowed in the above terms and is disposed of. 24. In view of disposal petition, Civil Application will not survive and the same is dismissed.