JUDGMENT : The following are the reliefs sought for by the petitioners in the writ petition: “(a). Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction directing the respondents to repay to the 1st petitioner Rs.5,00,000/- covered by Ext.P6 receipts, received as security deposit as the same is discriminatory and contrary to the terms of allotment in Ext.P2; (b). Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction directing the 2nd respondent to adjust Rs.5,00,000/- covered by Ext.P6 receipts as security deposit for allotment of Bunk 182A to the 2nd petitioner and re-allot the above bunk to the 2nd petitioner; and (c). Such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant in the nature of this case”. 2. Material facts for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows: 3. Father of the petitioners was having one cent land and two rooms of 500 sq. metres in the heart of Perintalmanna town. One cent lying adjacent to the above land was taken on lease by the 1st petitioner. Petitioners were running a tea shop and a cassette and Xerox shop in the rooms for the last more than 29 years. However, the entire land was surrendered for widening the roads and development of the town. In reward, a room on the western side of the proposed High Tech Shopping Complex was agreed to be allotted to the petitioners' father, without conducting auction, as per Ext.P2. Further, the traders were agreed to be rehabilitated in temporary bunks till completion of the shopping complex. According to the petitioners, the roads are widened, but the additional space are occupied by unauthorized auto-rickshaws and taxi cars. 4. In accordance with the agreement specified above, petitioners were rehabilitated in temporary sheds bearing Nos.182A and 182E. But, contrary to the terms in Ext.P2, later the Municipality allotted a room on the northern side of the new building, which is not commercially important. Later, petitioners were directed to vacate the temporary bunks and to occupy the rooms allotted. Thereupon, petitioners approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.19837 of 2012, and 'status quo' was directed to be maintained. During the pendency, Municipality allotted yet another room to the petitioners, however, an amount of Rs.5 lakhs was demanded as security deposit. Later, petitioners were directed to vacate the temporary bunks and to occupy the rooms allotted. Thereupon, petitioners approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.19837 of 2012, and 'status quo' was directed to be maintained. During the pendency, Municipality allotted yet another room to the petitioners, however, an amount of Rs.5 lakhs was demanded as security deposit. The case of the petitioners is that, under pressure and threat of losing a better room, they deposited the amount under protest. It is also pointed out that, the Municipality is showing a discriminatory attitude, since no security deposit is demanded from other persons in Ext.P2. Later, the writ petition specified above was disposed of by this Court as per Ext.P7 judgment dated 12.06.2014, granting the following reliefs : “1. The petitioners are given time to vacate the temporary sheds occupied by them till 31.10.2014. They shall surrender temporary sheds to the Municipality on or before 31.10.2014. 2. The room allotted to the petitioners, shall be handed over to them on deposit of Rs.5 lakhs. The amount shall be paid by the petitioners within a period of two months from today.” 5. According to the petitioners, the challenge with respect to the security deposit was left open. Anyhow, later, a review of Ext.P7 judgment was sought and Ext.P9 judgment is rendered thereunder, clarifying that, in the judgment itself, liberty has been given to the petitioners to challenge any demand of security deposit. Therefore, according to the petitioners, the security deposit collected from the petitioners is arbitrary and illegal, and since such a deposit was secured from the petitioners alone, the action is discriminatory also. 6. A detailed counter affidavit is filed by the respondents, refuting the allegations and claims and demands raised by the petitioners. Among other contentions, it is stated that, petitioners have filed the writ petition specified above, alleging that the room allotted was not having commercial importance. Thereafter, a conciliation meeting was held on 30.07.2014 in the chamber of the Municipal Chairperson, and as demanded by the petitioners, room No.F28/A was allotted instead of F20. Therefore, according to the respondents, consequent to the allotment of room, as requested by the petitioner, there was no grievance left behind for consideration. 7. Thereafter, a conciliation meeting was held on 30.07.2014 in the chamber of the Municipal Chairperson, and as demanded by the petitioners, room No.F28/A was allotted instead of F20. Therefore, according to the respondents, consequent to the allotment of room, as requested by the petitioner, there was no grievance left behind for consideration. 7. It is also submitted that, petitioners voluntarily accepted the above allotment and they agreed to abide by the terms of the settlement including the payment of Rs.5 lakhs as deposit for allotment, being satisfied with the space to be of commercial importance. So much so, the Municipality has constructed the high-tech Shopping Complex after availing Rs.2.5 crores loan at the rate of 12.5% from the Kerala Urban Rural Development Financial Corporation, and in fact, there were many others ready to take room No.F28/A. Since the Municipality has to repay the loan amount, it had no other option than to receive deposit amount for allotment. 8. That apart, it is submitted that, the only undertaking at the time of surrendering of land was to allot one room on the first floor of the shopping complex and in fact, it was agreed by the Municipality and the 1st petitioner, evident from Ext.R1(a) minutes dated 30.07.2013. It is also submitted that, petitioner has no right to carry on any business in the temporary shed, since it was provided only as a stop-gap arrangement, and one shop functioning there is conducted by the “Kudumbasree” unit to sell agricultural products, which is being used by a group viz., “swanthanam” under the rehabilitation scheme of physically handicapped persons and yet another one allotted to the agricultural officer for farmers club. However, the said sheds also will be evicted on completion of the road construction work. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Municipality and perused the pleadings and the documents on record. 10. The discussion made above would make it clear that, an amount of Rs.5 lakhs was paid by the petitioners towards security deposit, however, it is contrary to the undertaking in Ext.P2. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Municipality and perused the pleadings and the documents on record. 10. The discussion made above would make it clear that, an amount of Rs.5 lakhs was paid by the petitioners towards security deposit, however, it is contrary to the undertaking in Ext.P2. The payment of the amount, according to the petitioners, was made under duress and coercion, which is quite clear and evident from the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, stating that, if the petitioner was not interested in the allotted building in question, there were other people willing to take the room on rent. Therefore, the amount of Rs.5 lakhs was paid by the petitioner under compelled circumstances. It is also submitted that, there is no much business in the area, as is expected by the petitioners and there is no rhyme or reason in securing security deposit at Rs.5 lakhs. 11. I have evaluated the rival submissions made across the Bar. In my considered view, it is an admitted fact that, petitioners have accepted the room allotted to them and they have paid the amount of Rs.5 lakhs and executed an agreement. However, the predominant contention advanced by the petitioners is that, the payment of Rs.5 lakhs was made under compelled circumstances, and therefore, the respondents are liable to return the said amount to the petitioners, since there is no services rendered by the respondents on account of the payment made by way of security deposit. 12. In my considered view, having paid the amount and executed the agreement, petitioners cannot turn around and contend that amount paid by them is liable to be returned. If the petitioners have a case that there is any adverse circumstance in the matter of payment of money or execution of agreement by and between the parties, or the contract arrangement entered into by and between the parties are void in nature, consequent to any compulsion, coercion or duress put forth by the respondents, on account of the respondents superiority in the matter of allotment of the rooms, the same will have to be proved by the petitioners in an appropriately constituted suit proceedings. When the petitioners themselves admitted that the amount was paid and agreement was executed, it can only be presumed at this stage of the proceedings that petitioners have done the same voluntarily. Be it noted, after all, it is a commercial contract entered into by and between the parties and unless and until grave illegalities or malafides are established, interfering with such contracts under writ jurisdiction is not possible. 13. In this context, Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is relevant, which read thus: “92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.--When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms: Proviso (1).--Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law: Proviso (2).--The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document: Proviso (3).--The existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved: Proviso (4).--The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents: Proviso (5).--Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved: Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract: Proviso (6).--Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts.” 14. Moreover, Section 91 of the Evidence Act dealing with evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of documents stipulates that, when the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions of the Evidence Act. However, exceptions and explanations are provided to the said provision, which read thus: “Exception 1.--When a public officer is required by law to be appointed in writing, and when it is shown that any particular person has acted as such officer, the writing by which he is appointed need not be proved. Exception 2.--Wills admitted to probate in India may be proved by the probate. Exception 2.--Wills admitted to probate in India may be proved by the probate. Explanation 1.--This section applies equally to cases in which the contracts, grants or dispositions of property referred to are contained in one document, and to cases in which they are contained in more documents than one. Explanation 2.--Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved. Explanation 3.--The statement, in any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact.” Therefore, on a conjoint reading of the provisions, it is explicit, if at all the petitioners have any case, it will have to be proved in accordance with law, and writ remedy cannot be invoked under such circumstances, ordinarily and normally. 15. Appreciating the factual circumstances put forth by the respective counsel across the Bar and the law discussed above, I am of the considered opinion that, petitioners have not made out any case, justifying interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Upshot of the above discussion is, petitioners are not entitled to get any relief as is sought for in the writ petition and the same will stand dismissed.