JUDGMENT : H.C. MISHRA, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the contesting defendant petitioner and learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party No.1. 2. This revision is directed against the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 15th December, 2017, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.)-VI, Jamshedpur, in Eviction Case No. 03 of 2004, filed by the plaintiff under Section 11(1)(c), r/w Section 14 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, (hereinafter referred to as the "Act”), for eviction of the contesting defendant No.1 from the suit premises, on the ground of personal necessity, whereby the suit was decreed on contest, directing the contesting defendant to hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff within the period of one month from the date of Decree. 3. The plaintiff M/s Narbheram Leasing Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., filed the eviction suit, for evicting the contesting defendant No.1, the New Bombay Stores, who is a tenant of the two shops Nos. 8 and 9, measuring in all approximately 1595 sq. ft., fully described in the schedule to the plaint, as being part and parcel of 'Narbheram Building', situated at Sakchi Boulevard Road, Bistupur Main Road, at Jamshedpur. According to the plaintiff's case, the proforma defendant No.2 M/s Narbheram & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., had leased the suit property along with other adjoining premises, measuring about 15207 sq.ft., through the registered lease deed dated 30.10.1998, on the monthly rental of Rs. 1100/- per month. In the said lease deed, it had specifically been stipulated that the plaintiff, from the date of lease, shall be entitled to realise the rent from the respective tenants in occupation of the different portions of the leased premises, and also to evict the tenant/tenants. It is stated in the plaint that after the suit property was leased in favour of the plaintiff by the proforma defendant No.2, the contesting defendant No.1, who was the tenant inducted in two shops Nos. 8 and 9, being the suit property, started to pay the rent to the plaintiff, which at the time of filing of the suit was Rs. 4180/- per month. Thus, the plaintiff claimed to be the 'landlord' of the suit property within the meaning of the Act. 8 and 9, being the suit property, started to pay the rent to the plaintiff, which at the time of filing of the suit was Rs. 4180/- per month. Thus, the plaintiff claimed to be the 'landlord' of the suit property within the meaning of the Act. The personal necessity to the suit property arose to the plaintiff, as a Malasiya based company, namely, Kamdar Stores, agreed to give franchise to the plaintiff for opening a departmental store, vide its letter dated 29.11.2003, and as per the requirement mentioned in the said letter, the total space required for the business was 15000 sq.ft., with frontage of 150 feet, and for that purpose, the suit property was required. Stating that the requirement of the plaintiff was bona fide, the suit for eviction of the tenant defendant No.1 was filed under Section 11(1)(c) read with Section 14 of the said Act. 4. Written statement was filed by the contesting defendant No.1, in which, the cause of action was denied. It was stated inter alia, in the written statement filed by the contesting defendant that originally the entire premises, including the suit property, was leased in favour of the proforma defendant M/s Narbheram & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., by M/s TISCO Ltd. Thereafter the proforma defendant inducted the contesting defendant as tenant with respect to the suit property, and also used to collect the rent from the contesting defendant. The contesting defendant questioned the status of the plaintiff, being the 'landlord' of the premises within the meaning of the Act, stating that the alleged lease deed executed in favour of the plaintiff, by the proforma defendant was not a legal transaction, and was never shown to the contesting defendant, but it is admitted in the written statement that upon the request made by the proforma defendant No.2, which had leased the property in its favour, the defendant started to pay rent to the plaintiff with effect from the month of June, 1999. It is also stated that initially the rent of the suit property was Rs. 400/- per month, but the same was enhanced by the plaintiff to Rs. 4180/- per month, with effect from June 1999, and the same was being paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. It is also stated that initially the rent of the suit property was Rs. 400/- per month, but the same was enhanced by the plaintiff to Rs. 4180/- per month, with effect from June 1999, and the same was being paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. The contesting defendant also questioned the correctness of the story of offering the franchise by Kamdar stores, and stated that this story was invented by the plaintiff for creating a false cause of action. By way of an amendment in the plaint, which was allowed by order dated 3.4.2008 passed by the Court below, it is also stated that during the pendency of the suit, the contesting defendant had received a letter from the proforma defendant to make the payment of the monthly rent to M/s Narbheram Autos (Pvt.) Ltd., in whose favour the lease deed was executed by it on 4.10.2007. The defendant also received a letter from M/s Narbheram Autos (Pvt.) Ltd., demanding the rent with effect from November, 2007. The defendant, accordingly, questioning the status of the plaintiff, being the 'landlord' of the suit property, prayed for dismissing the suit. 5. At this stage, it may be stated that the fact that the entire premises, namely, 'Narbheram Building' was leased to M/s Narbheram & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., by M/s TISCO Ltd., is not in dispute in the present suit, rather, this is an admitted fact. 6. It may be stated that a written statement was also filed by the proforma defendant No.2 M/s Narbheram & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., supporting the case of the plaintiff, but by an amendment, which was allowed by order dated 3.4.2008 passed by the Court below, it was stated that proforma defendant No.2 terminated the lease with the plaintiff for violation of the condition of the lease deed and also filed an Eviction Suit No. 64/2007 in the Court of Munsif, Jamshepur, for eviction of the plaintiff company from the entire leased premises, including the suit premises. By way of amendment, it was stated that the plaintiff company was no more a lessee under the proforma defendant No.2, and had lost its status of 'landlord' of defendant No.1, with respect to the suit premises, and hence, it had got no right to sue for the property. By way of amendment, it was stated that the plaintiff company was no more a lessee under the proforma defendant No.2, and had lost its status of 'landlord' of defendant No.1, with respect to the suit premises, and hence, it had got no right to sue for the property. It was also stated that the proforma defendant No.2 had leased the entire premises including the suit premises to M/s Narbheram Autos (Pvt.) Ltd., by a registered lease deed dated 4.1.2007. It however, appears that thereafter again the proforma defendant No.1 supported the cause of the plaintiff company, as the differences between them might have resolved, as no evidence was adduced by the proforma defendant in the case. The amendment in the written statement, however, was not amended again, nor was it brought on record whether the lease deed dated 4.1.2007 executed in favour of M/s Narbheram Autos (Pvt.) Ltd., was ever cancelled, and the fresh lease deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff by the proforma defendant. 7. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court below, framed the issues as follows:- (I) Is the suit maintainable in its present form? (II) Whether the plaintiff has any cause of action for bringing the suit? (III) Whether the suit is barred under the provision of any specific Act? (IV) Whether the suit is barred under the provision of Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control, Act? (V) Whether there is any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties? (VI) Whether the defendant defaulted in making payment of rent? (VII) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for? 8. In support of his claim, the plaintiff examined three witnesses including the plaintiff itself, represented through its Director and Authorized Representative, namely, Rajen P. Kamani, who was examined as P.W.-3. The plaintiff also adduced documentary evidence, in which, Exhibit-1 is the deed of lease dated 30.10.1998 executed in its favour, Exhibit-2 is the letter dated 29.11.2003 and Exhibit-2/B is the letter dated 12.4.2004, both written to the plaintiff by the Executive Director of Kamdar Stores, namely, Kishore Kamdar. A letter dated 5.4.2004 written by the plaintiff to Kamdar Stores was proved as Exhibit-2/A. The contesting defendant also examined one witness, i.e., the defendant himself and also adduced some documents in evidence. A letter dated 5.4.2004 written by the plaintiff to Kamdar Stores was proved as Exhibit-2/A. The contesting defendant also examined one witness, i.e., the defendant himself and also adduced some documents in evidence. On the basis of the materials brought on record, the Trial Court below had decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, deciding all the aforesaid issues, except issue No.(VI), in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant, directing the defendant No.1 to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property within the period of one month from the date of Decree. Aggrieved thereby, the present revision has been filed by contesting defendant No.1 petitioner. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken three points in support of his contention that the impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court below cannot be sustained in the eye of law. His first contention is that the plaintiff is not the landlord of the suit property within the meaning of Explanation No.1 of Section 11(1)(c) of the Act, being only an agent of the proforma defendant No.2 and as such, the plaintiff was not entitled to bring the suit in its present form and the suit itself was not maintainable. The other point taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the documents, which have been marked as Exhibits-2 and 2/B, are only the photostat copies, and their respective originals were neither produced nor proved. As such, these documents could not have been taken into evidence. It is pointed out by learned counsel from the LCR, that these documents were marked in the Court below with objection on 11.7.2007, and subsequently an application was also filed by the contesting defendant for recalling the order by which these documents were taken into evidence, but by order dated 23.8.2007, the order was passed by the Trial Court below, that the admissibility of those documents shall be considered at the time of passing the Judgment. It is submitted by learned counsel that without considering the admissibility of those documents, the impugned Judgment has been passed by the Trial Court below. It is submitted by learned counsel that without considering the admissibility of those documents, the impugned Judgment has been passed by the Trial Court below. Lastly, learned counsel has submitted that cause of action, if any, was not surviving on the date of Judgment, and for this learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court towards the evidence of plaintiff, P.W.-3 Rajen P. Kamani, wherein he has admitted in his cross-examination that according to the letter dated 29.11.2003(Exhibit-2), issued by Kamdar Stores, showroom had to be inaugurated by 31st May, 2004. He has stated that since the opening of the showroom was not possible due to the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff wrote a letter to Kamdar Stores on 5.4.2004 (Exhibit-2/A), for extension of the time, and by another letter dated 12.4.2004 (Exhibit-2/B), the time for inauguration of the showroom was extended till 31.12.2006. The plaintiff has admitted in his cross-examination that thereafter there was no correspondence with Kamdar Stores, and he has also admitted that Kishore Kamdar had died. Learned counsel submitted that the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff on 15.12.2017, but even according to the evidence of the plaintiff, the cause of action had extinguished on 31.12.2006 itself, and there was no correspondence with Kamdar Stores thereafter. 10. In support of his first contention that the plaintiff is not the 'landlord' within the meaning of Explanation-1 of Section 11(1)(c) of the Act, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the entire property including the suit property was leased to the proforma defendant by M/s TISCO Ltd., and it was the proforma defendant, who had inducted the defendant petitioner in the suit property as tenant. The rent was also being paid to the proforma defendant. Learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff claims to be the landlord of the suit property on the basis of the lease deed dated 30.10.1998 executed in its favour by the proforma defendant, but there is no denial of the fact that the said lease deed was itself cancelled by the proforma defendant for violation of the condition of the lease and the suit property was leased out to another company, namely, M/s Narbheram Autos Pvt. Ltd., by a registered lease dated 4.1.2007, and a suit was also filed in the competent Court for eviction of the plaintiff from the entire property. Learned counsel accordingly, submitted that in any event, the plaintiff was only an agent of the landlord and it could not claim the suit property for its own occupation for the personal requirement and as such, the suit was not at all maintainable. In this connection, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in M.M. Quasim Vs. Monohar Lal Sharma & Ors., reported in (1981) 3 SCC 36 , wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court, taking into consideration the definition of 'landlord', and Section 11(1)(c) of this very Act, has laid down the law as follows:- "14. The expression landlord has been defined in Section 2(d) of the Rent Act which reads as under: “‘landlord’ includes the persons who for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf or for the benefit, of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant. The inclusive definition is couched in very wide language. However, this wide amplitude of the expression has been cut down by the explanation appended to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 which reads as under: 11. The inclusive definition is couched in very wide language. However, this wide amplitude of the expression has been cut down by the explanation appended to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 which reads as under: 11. Eviction of tenants.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and to those of Section 12, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction there from except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the following grounds: (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord: Provided that where the court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall thenceforth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (aa) of Section 2, and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under Section 5; Explanation.—In this clause the word ‘landlord’ shall not include an agent referred to in clause (d) of Section 2.” Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in Section 11(1)(c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression “landlord” in its wide amplitude, cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of Section 11(1)(c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the clause. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression “landlord” in its wide amplitude, cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of Section 11(1)(c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the clause. By restricting the meaning of expression “landlord” for the purpose of Section 11(1)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the building for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The second clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cesti que trust but when the case is governed by the first part of clause ( c ) of sub-section (1) of Section 11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such as an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of Section 11(1)( c ) the expression ‘landlord’ could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation. That can be the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of clause (c) of Section 11(1) which reads: “Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation ...” Assuming that the expression “landlord” has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition clause, even a rent collector or a receiver of the property appointed by the court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that he wants the building for his own occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to clause (c) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression “landlord” would unmistakably show that for the purposes of clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the word ‘owner’ is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation." (Emphasis supplied). 11. It is submitted that the aforesaid decision was followed by this Court also in Ram Awtar Singh Vs. Santosh Kumar Gupta, reported in 2015 (1) JCR 220 Jhr, wherein, the fact of that case was quite similar to this case, as in that case, the admitted case of the plaintiff was that he was holding the suit premises on lease from Hazaribag Municipality. Following the law laid down in M.M. Quasim's case (supra), this Court held that the plaintiff in that case was not a landlord within the meaning of Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act. 12. Following the law laid down in M.M. Quasim's case (supra), this Court held that the plaintiff in that case was not a landlord within the meaning of Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act. 12. In support of his second contention that Exhibits-2 and 2/B, being the photostat copies of the documents, could not have been taken into evidence, learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H. Siddiqui Vs. A. Ramalingam, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 240 , wherein, the law has been laid down follows:- "12. The provisions of Section 65 of the 1872 Act provide for permitting the parties to adduce secondary evidence. However, such a course is subject to a large number of limitations. In a case where the original documents are not produced at any time, nor has any factual foundation been laid for giving secondary evidence, it is not permissible for the court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. Thus, secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non-production of the original is accounted for, so as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved in accordance with law. The court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. -------- ." 13. In support of his last contention that the suit was fit to be dismissed as the cause of action was not existing and had extinguished on the date of Decree, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai & Anr. Vs. Raghunath Prasad, reported in (1981) 3 SCC 103 , wherein, it has been held as follows:- "14. -------------. Therefore when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher court deals with the matter. -------------. Therefore when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher court deals with the matter. ---------------." Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon a decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Shri Chhedi Ram Vs. Smt. Pano Devi & Ors, reported in 1990 (1) PLJR 240 , wherein also, following the decision in Hasmat Rai's case (supra), it has been held that such requirement must exist on the date of passing of decree. Placing reliance on these decisions, learned counsel concluded that in the case in hand also, the cause of action was not subsisting on the date of the impugned Judgment and the requirement of personal necessity had already extinguished, which must exist on the date of Decree, which means the Decree of final Court. As such, the suit itself was not at all maintainable and the Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court below, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 14. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court below, and the suit premises is the genuine requirement of the plaintiff for opening of the showroom, upon getting the franchise from a Malasiya based company, Kamdar Stores, for which, letters were also sent by Kamdar Stores and have been marked as Exhibits-2 and 2/B respectively. Learned counsel submitted that once the suit has been decreed by the Trial Court below, giving the findings on the issues, the scope of revisional Court is very limited and the revisional Court cannot interfere into the findings of facts recorded by the Trial Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.A. Anthappai Vs. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.A. Anthappai Vs. C. Ahammed, reported in (1992) 3 SCC 277 , wherein the law has been laid down that "the revisional Court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted of and supported the one reached by the Court below." Learned counsel has also placed reliance in this connection upon a decision of this Court in the case of Alpana Choudhary Vs. Alok Kumar Banerjee, reported in 2011 (2) JLJR 364 , wherein, it has been held that the findings of facts like relationship of landlord and tenant and bona fide and reasonable requirement may not be interfered, unless the findings are perverse. Further reliance has been placed in this context upon a decision of the Patna High Court (Ranchi Bench), in Md. Khalil @ Md. Khalil Ansari & Anr. Vs. Md. Majid Ansary & Ors., reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 187 , wherein, again the same view has been taken. Learned counsel further relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhupender Singh Bawa Vs. Asha Devi, reported in AIR 2016 SC 5258 , wherein, it has been held that once the personal necessity is established by the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot be dictated by the tenant as to from which shop, he would start his business. It is perfectly open to the landlord to choose a more suitable premises for carrying on the business and the same cannot be dictated by the tenant. Further reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Akhileshwar Kumar & Ors. Vs. Mustaqim & Ors, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 462 , wherein, also the similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court, holding that alternative accommodations cannot be thrust by the Court. The choice has to be exercised by the landlord, though reasonably and not whimsically. 15. Vs. Mustaqim & Ors, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 462 , wherein, also the similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court, holding that alternative accommodations cannot be thrust by the Court. The choice has to be exercised by the landlord, though reasonably and not whimsically. 15. Confronted with the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that cause of action was not subsisting on the date of Judgment and the requirement of personal necessity must exist on the date of Decree, which means the Decree of final Court, leaned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party, on the date of argument in this revision, produced one document in the Court, which is again an e-mail communication made to the plaintiff on the date of arguments itself, by the son of Kishore Kamdar, stating that they are still prepared to go ahead with the franchise arrangement. Learned counsel gave much insistence for taking this document on record, which was received on the date of argument itself. The submission of learned counsel cannot be accepted in view of the fact that this document was not made available to other side and this is only an e-mail copy, and not the original of the document. Producing the said document, the submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff was that cause of action is still existing and this document must be taken as additional evidence. In any view of the matter, learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that a fresh opportunity be given to both the parties to amend their respective pleadings and also to permit them to adduce additional evidence in respect thereof. In this context, learned counsel has placed reliance upon an observation made in Shri Chhedi Ram's case (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, wherein in the facts of that case, it was observed that it was obligatory on the part of the trial Court to give an opportunity to both the parties to amend their respective pleadings with regard to the subsequent event and also to permit them to adduce additional evidence. Further reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in Pratap Rai Tanwani & Anr. Vs. Further reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in Pratap Rai Tanwani & Anr. Vs. Uttam Chand & Anr., reported in AIR 2005 SC 1274 , wherein, where the son of landlord for whom the personal necessity was pleaded, during the pendency of eviction proceeding went abroad temporarily for employment, but he was having intention to come back, it was held by the Supreme Court that it cannot be said that bona fide need of landlord had been totally eclipsed by subsequent event. Learned counsel has submitted that with getting fresh offer, it could be said that the requirement of the plaintiff, which had only been eclipsed, has survived again. Placing reliance on these decisions, learned counsel submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court below, decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff, and with its limited scope in revisional jurisdiction, this Court cannot interfere into the findings of fact that the plaintiff is the landlord of the contesting defendant and that suit premises was required for the bona fide personal necessity of the plaintiff. 16. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the materials on record, I find that admittedly the suit premises was originally leased in favour of contesting defendant petitioner by the proforma defendant No.1 M/s Narbheram & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. Admittedly, the plaintiff claims to become the landlord on the basis of the lease deed executed in its favour by M/s Narbheram & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. on 30.10.1998. Prior to that, admittedly, the proforma defendant was the landlord of the contesting defendant and not the plaintiff. It is the case of the petitioner that even the proforma defendant is the lessee of M/s TISCO Ltd., with respect to the entire property, including the suit property, and this fact is not disputed. The proforma defendant has made the amendment in its written statement, stating that the lease deed dated 30.10.1998 with the plaintiff was terminated by it for violation of the condition of the lease deed and an eviction suit was also filed, being Suit No. 64 of 2007 for eviction of the plaintiff from the suit property. The proforma defendant has made the amendment in its written statement, stating that the lease deed dated 30.10.1998 with the plaintiff was terminated by it for violation of the condition of the lease deed and an eviction suit was also filed, being Suit No. 64 of 2007 for eviction of the plaintiff from the suit property. This fact is admitted by the plaintiff P.W.-3 Rajen P. Kamani, in his evidence, but he has stated that he did not remember whether the suit property was the subject matter of the suit or not. By way of amendment in the written statement, it has been stated by the defendant that another registered lease deed has been executed on 4.1.2007 leasing the entire property in favour of M/s Narbheram Autos (Pvt.) Ltd. All these companies are only the family companies of the same person, as it is apparent from lease deed dated 30.10.1998, which has been proved as Ext.-1, which shows that Mr. Rajen P. Kamani himself is the Director in both the companies described therein. This situation requires that the corporate veil be lifted to look into the reality, which is permissible under such circumstances, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several cases, including in S. Sukumar Vs. ICAI, reported in (2018) 14 SCC 360 and New Horizons Ltd. & Anr. Vs Union of India & Ors, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 478 . Lifting the veils of both these companies in the present case shows that it was the proforma defendant M/s Narbheram & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., which had leased the suit property to the defendant petitioner and thereafter for the reasons best known to it, the entire property had been leased to other family company. Whatever the reason could be, but it does not appear to be the very bona fide, which is apparent from the fact that Exhibit-1, the deed of lease dated 30.10.1998, executed in favour of the plaintiff shows that the entire property measuring 15207 sq. ft was leased out to the plaintiff company for a meager amount of Rs. 1100/- per month only, whereas admittedly the plaintiff is realising the amount of Rs. 4180/- per month for the part and parcel of that property, measuring only 1595 sq. ft approximately. ft was leased out to the plaintiff company for a meager amount of Rs. 1100/- per month only, whereas admittedly the plaintiff is realising the amount of Rs. 4180/- per month for the part and parcel of that property, measuring only 1595 sq. ft approximately. The expression 'family company' is not coined by this Court, rather this expression is used by the P.W.-3 Rajen P. Kamani himself, in his cross-examination. As Sri Rajen P. Kamani is the Director in both the companies, the amendment made in the written statement of the proforma defendant can be safely relied upon, as there is no denial of this fact. 17. In my considered view, even if the plaintiff company was described as landlord with respect to the suit property and had been authorised to realise the rent from the tenants and also to evict them, but the plaintiff company is only an agent of the original landlord within the meaning of Explanation-1 of Section 11(1)(c) of the Act. The case of plaintiff is fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in M.M. Quasim's case (supra), which has again been followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sheela & Ors. Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 375 . As such, the plaintiff could not claim itself to be landlord of the property for bringing the suit. This apart, there is nothing in the record to show that after the suit property was leased by the proforma defendant in favour of M/s Narbheram Autos (Pvt.) Ltd., by the registered lease deed dated 4.1.2007, whether the same was ever revoked and the lease was again executed in favour of the plaintiff company. As such the plaintiff has failed to prove that it is the landlord of the suit property within the meaning of Explanation-1 to Section 11(1)(c) of the Act. Accordingly, the finding of the Trial Court deciding the Issue No. (V), in favour of the plaintiff, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, and is hereby, reversed. 18. Coming to the other point taken by learned counsel for the petitioner that the documents, Exhibits-2 and 2/B have been wrongly taken into evidence and relied upon by the Trial Court, a bare perusal of these documents show that they are not the original documents. They are the photostat copies of the documents. 18. Coming to the other point taken by learned counsel for the petitioner that the documents, Exhibits-2 and 2/B have been wrongly taken into evidence and relied upon by the Trial Court, a bare perusal of these documents show that they are not the original documents. They are the photostat copies of the documents. In any event, they could not be taken into evidence without their original being produced, or in any event without satisfying the requirements of Section 65 of the Evidence Act, which has admittedly not been done in the present case. For the same reason, the document produced by learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party on 29.03.2019, during arguments in this revision, said to be sent on e-mail on the same date, also cannot be taken into consideration. In any event, this document may give a fresh cause of action, to the 'landlord' within the meaning of Explanation-1 to Section 11(1)(c) of the Act, if its original is proved. 19. The cause of action for the present suit extinguished on 31.12.2006 itself, in view of the admission of the plaintiff P.W.-3 Rajen P. Kamami in his evidence that by letter dated 12.6.2004, time for inauguration of showroom was extended till 31.12.2006, and there was no correspondence thereafter. It is even admitted that the original proprietor had died. Learned counsel for the plaintiff had tried to submit that though there was no correspondence, but they were in constant touch, but this cannot be accepted, as there is neither any pleading to that effect nor the proof. I find force in submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that cause of action did not survive on the date of Judgment, inasmuch the Judgment is dated 15.12.2017 and the cause of action had extinguished on 31.12.2006 itself. Accordingly, the findings of the Trial Court deciding the Issues No. (I), (II), (III) & (VII) in favour of the plaintiff, also cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, and are hereby, reversed. 20. For the foregoing reasons, I find that the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 15.12.2017, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Accordingly, the findings of the Trial Court deciding the Issues No. (I), (II), (III) & (VII) in favour of the plaintiff, also cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, and are hereby, reversed. 20. For the foregoing reasons, I find that the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 15.12.2017, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.)-VI, Jamshedpur, in Eviction Suit No. 3 of 2004, decreeing the suit in favour of plaintiff and directing the contesting defendant petitioner to hand over the vacant possession of the same to the plaintiff, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, and the same, are accordingly, set aside. Consequently, the eviction suit stands dismissed, on contest, with costs throughout. 21. In the result, this revision succeeds and is hereby, allowed. Let the Lower Court Record be sent back to the Court concerned forthwith, along with the copy of this Judgment.