JUDGMENT : V.G. ARUN, J. 1. The appellant, a Grade-III Officer in the rank of Senior Manager in the 1st respondent Bank, had filed the writ petition challenging his transfer from Thrissur to Delhi. The challenge was on the ground that the transfer was punitive in nature and a vindictive action taken against the appellant, who was the Vice President of the Catholic Syrian Bank Officers Association. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge found the writ petition to be not maintainable, the 1st respondent being a scheduled bank, registered as a Company under the Companies Act. For the purpose of deciding the question of maintainability, the learned Single Judge referred to the decisions in Marwari Balika Vidyalaya vs. Asha Srivastava, 2019 (2) KHC 929 (SC), Ramesh Ahuluwalia vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331, Federal Bank Ltd. vs. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733 , Binny Ltd. and Another vs. Sadasivan and Others, (2005) 6 SCC 657 and Ramakrishna Mission and Others vs. Kago Kunya and Others, 2019 (5) SCALE 559. 2. The appeal is filed contending that the functions of the 1st respondent Bank are similar to that of nationalised banks, and in that sense the 1st respondent Bank is discharging public function. It is also contended that the employees of the Bank are dealing with public money and hence the duty discharged by them would fall within the definition of public duty. It is hence contended that the reliance placed on the decision in Sagar Thomas's case (Supra) is misplaced and that the writ petition was maintainable inasmuch as the appellant was transferred in violation of the principles of the natural justice. 3. In the nature of the challenge made, it would be appropriate to consider the dictum laid down in Sagar Thomas's case (supra). The issue therein pertained to the dismissal of one Sagar Thomas, who was working as Branch Manager in the Federal Bank. Like the 1st respondent herein, the Federal Bank is also a scheduled Bank and a Company registered under the Companies Act. Sagar Thomas challenged his dismissal by filing writ petition before the High Court. The Federal Bank raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition. Like the 1st respondent herein, the Federal Bank is also a scheduled Bank and a Company registered under the Companies Act. Sagar Thomas challenged his dismissal by filing writ petition before the High Court. The Federal Bank raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition. The learned Single Judge found that the Federal Bank performs public duty and as such, it comes under the definition of other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such, the writ petition is maintainable. The Bank went in appeal and the Division Bench dismissed the appeal referring to a decision of the Apex Court in U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. vs. Chandra Ban Dubey and Others, AIR 1999 SC 753 . The Division Bench observed that in Chandra Ban Dubey's case (supra), the Apex Court had, under identical fact situation, held that writ application would be maintainable and that in spite of minor distinction on facts in the case under consideration and the decision in Chandra Ban Dubey's case (supra), the dictum was applicable to scheduled banks also. Aggrieved, the Bank went in appeal before the Supreme Court, which culminated in the decision in Sagar Thomas's case (supra). After an elaborate precedential survey and on consideration of the relevant provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act and the Banking Regulation Act, the Apex Court held as follows: “32. Merely because Reserve Bank of India lays the banking policy in the interest of the banking system or in the interest of monetary stability or sound economic growth having due regard to the interests of the depositors etc. as provided under Section 5(c)(a) of the Banking Regulation Act does not mean that the private companies carrying on the business or commercial activity of banking, discharge any public function or public duty. These are all regulatory measures applicable to those carrying on commercial activity in banking and these companies are to act according to these provisions failing which certain consequences follow as indicated in the Act itself. As to the provision regarding acquisition of a banking company by the Government, it may be pointed out that any private property can be acquired by the Government in public interest. It is now a judicially accepted norm that private interest has to give way to the public interest. As to the provision regarding acquisition of a banking company by the Government, it may be pointed out that any private property can be acquired by the Government in public interest. It is now a judicially accepted norm that private interest has to give way to the public interest. If a private property is acquired in public interest it does not mean that the party whose property is acquired is performing or discharging any function or duty of public character though it would be so for the acquiring authority. 33. For the discussion held above, in our view, a private company carrying on banking business as a scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an institution or a company carrying on any statutory or public duty. A private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. We don’t find such conditions are fulfilled in respect of a private company carrying on a commercial activity of banking. Merely regulatory provisions to ensure such activity carried on by private bodies work within a discipline, do not confer any such status upon the company nor put any such obligation upon it which may be enforced through issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Present is a case of disciplinary action being taken against its employee by the appellant Bank. The respondent’s service with the Bank stands terminated. The action of the Bank was challenged by the respondent by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The respondent is not trying to enforce any statutory duty on the part of the Bank. That being the position, the appeal deserves to be allowed.” 4. In the light of the categoric finding in the Sagar Thomas's case (supra), the contention of the appellant that even though the respondent is a scheduled bank, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, since the bank is carrying out statutory and public duties, is liable to be rejected in limine. 5. Marwari Balika Vidyalaya (supra) was a case pertaining to termination of a teacher from a private school. 5. Marwari Balika Vidyalaya (supra) was a case pertaining to termination of a teacher from a private school. The appointment of teachers in private schools required approval from the Government as per the provisions of the extant education rules of West Bengal and hence it was contended by the delinquent teacher as well as the Government that since approval for appointment was necessary, approval was required for removal also, which was not obtained in that case. After specifically taking into consideration the fact that Government approval was necessary for appointment as well as termination of the teacher, the Honourable Supreme Court held that the writ application challenging termination of the teacher was maintainable. 6. Ramesh Ahlwalia's case (supra) also pertains to disciplinary action culminating in dismissal of an Administrative Officer in a public school. Therein, after referring to the decisions in Pradeep Kumar Viswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Others, (2002) 5 SCC 111 and Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudani and Others, (1989) 2 SCC 691 the Apex Court held that a private body can be held to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 when it preforms public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State or its authorities. 7. It may be worthwhile to mention that in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust's case (supra), a public trust was running a College which was affiliated to the Gujarat University, a body governed by the State Legislation. The dispute in regard to the closure of the college and the consequent non-payment of salaries to the staff, which was the bone of contention in the writ petition, squarely fell within the regulatory provisions of the University Ordinances and it was on that factual basis that the decision was rendered. 8. In Pradeep Kumar's case (supra), the seven bench decision of the Honourable Supreme Court, while considering the correctness of the decision in Sabhajit Tewari vs. Union of India, 1975 (1) SCC 485 rendered by a five judge bench, revisited the various decisions rendered by the Apex Court on the amplitude of the words 'State' and 'other authorities' in Article 12 of the Constitution of India and summed up its conclusions in the following manner: “98. We sum up our conclusions as under: (1) Simply by holding a legal entity to be an instrumentality or agency of the State it does not necessarily become an authority within the meaning of “other authorities” in Article 12. To be an authority, the entity should have been created by a statute or under a statute and functioning with liability and obligations to the public. Further, the statute creating the entity should have vested that entity with power to make law or issue binding directions amounting to law within the meaning of Article 13(2) governing its relationship with other people or the affairs of other people - their rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations. If created under a statute, then there must exist some other statute conferring on the entity such powers. In either case, it should have been entrusted with such functions as are governmental or closely associated therewith by being of public importance or being fundamental to the life of the people and hence governmental. Such authority would be the State, for, one who enjoys the powers or privileges of the State must also be subjected to limitations and obligations of the State. It is this strong statutory flavour and clear indicia of power - constitutional or statutory, and its potential or capability to act to the detriment of fundamental rights of the people, which makes it an authority; though in a given case, depending on the facts and circumstances, an authority may also be found to be an instrumentality or agency of the State and to that extent they may overlap. Tests 1, 2 and 4 in Ajay Hasia (1981)1 SCC 722 enable determination of governmental ownership or control. Tests 3, 5 and 6 are “functional” tests. The propounder of the tests himself has used the words suggesting relevancy of those tests for finding out if an entity was instrumentality or agency of the State. Unfortunately thereafter the tests were considered relevant for testing if an authority is the State and this fallacy has occurred because of difference between “instrumentality and agency” of the State and an “authority” having been lost sight of sub silentio, unconsciously and undeliberated. In our opinion, and keeping in view the meaning which “authority” carries, the question whether an entity is an “authority” cannot be answered by applying Ajay Hasia (1981) 1 SCC 722 tests. In our opinion, and keeping in view the meaning which “authority” carries, the question whether an entity is an “authority” cannot be answered by applying Ajay Hasia (1981) 1 SCC 722 tests. (2) The tests laid down in Ajay Hasia case (1981) 1 SCC 722 are relevant for the purpose of determining whether an entity is an instrumentality or agency of the State. Neither all the tests are required to be answered in the positive nor a positive answer to one or two tests would suffice. It will depend upon a combination of one or more of the relevant factors depending upon the essentiality and overwhelming nature of such factors in identifying the real source of governing power, if need be by removing the mask or piercing the veil disguising the entity concerned. When an entity has an independent legal existence, before it is held to be the State, the person alleging it to be so must satisfy the court of brooding presence of the Government or deep and pervasive control of the Government so as to hold it to be an instrumentality or agency of the State.” 9. In view of the specific reference to Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, 1981 (1) SCC 722 in Pradeep Kumar Biswas's case (supra), it is necessary to state the principles laid down in Ajay Hasia's case (supra) which are as follows: “(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by the Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor........whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of the Government. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of the Government. (6) ‘Specifically, if a department of the Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference’ of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of the Government.” 10. Ramakrishna Mission's case (supra) is the latest among the decisions in which the Honourable Supreme Court has enunciated the jurisdictional contours of Article 226 vis-a-vis Article 12. After detailed analysis of the precedents, it was held that even if a body discharges a public function in a wider sense, a writ will not be issued for enforcement of a private contract of service, since there is no public law element involved. That, contract of a purely private nature would not be subject to writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by statutory provisions and that the only exception to this principle arises in a situation where the contract of service is governed or regulated by a statutory provision. For arriving at this conclusion, reliance was placed on the decision in K.K. Saksena vs. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage and Others, 2015 (4) SCC 670 . In Saksena's case (supra), the Apex Court was called upon to consider as to whether the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage is 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution and whether the organisation was discharging public function. After detailed consideration of the precedents, it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court that even if a body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction, all its decisions are not subject to judicial review. Only those decisions which have public element can be judicially reviewed under writ jurisdiction. With respect to contract of personal service, which is generally not amenable to writ jurisdiction, the Apex Court carved out three exceptions: (i) when the employee is a public servant working under the Union of India or State. (ii) when such an employee is employed by an authority/body which is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. (ii) when such an employee is employed by an authority/body which is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. (iii) when such an employee is 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and raises a dispute regarding his termination by invoking the machinery under the said Act. 11. The legal position emerging from the expositions in the aforementioned judgments lead to the irresistible conclusion that the Catholic Syrian Bank, which is a scheduled bank and registered as a Company under the Companies Act does not fall within the definition of 'State' or 'other authorities' in Article 12 and the Bank cannot be termed as an institution or company performing any public function/duty, and the dispute arising out of the contract of personal service between the Bank and the appellant is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. Resultantly, we affirm the finding of the learned Single Judge that the writ petition is not maintainable and dismiss the writ appeal.