JUDGMENT Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. - This writ appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Single Judge by which the appellant's substantive writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing of Criminal Case No.833/2006 between Shri Prakash Choubey v. Mohd. Arshad Khan pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, including the order framing charge for offence punishable under Section 501 of the IPC, has been dismissed finding no merit. 2. Respondent No.5 herein filed a writ petition seeking quashment of the order framing charge for offence under Section 501 of the IPC against the appellant herein before the jurisdictional criminal court by which the criminal court has taken cognizance of the commission of offence punishable under Section 501 of the IPC stating that the appellant herein has filed W.P.No.3333/2003 before this Court against respondent No.6 and made a defamatory statement in para 6 of the said writ petition that criminal case for offence punishable under Section 395 of the IPC is pending against him which is absolutely false and which is defamatory and on the said writ petition being filed and notice having been issued to him, respondent No.6 has suffered damage of his reputation among the public at large, therefore, the appellant is liable to be punished. The learned Single Judge after considering the submissions of the parties came to the conclusion that from the allegations of the complaint, prima facie, ingredients for framing charge under Section 501 of the IPC are made out and held that the defence which has been taken by the appellant herein in the said writ petition can be taken conveniently at the time of trial and in such a situation, the said defence can be considered during the course of trial. 3. Mr. V.G. Tamaskar, learned counsel for the appellant / petitioner, would submit that the learned Single Judge has fallen under a grave error by holding that prima facie case for charging offence under Section 501 of the IPC is made out. The writ petition filed is still pending consideration before this Court and in the said writ petition in the description of respondent No.7 it has only been mentioned that this Court can summon the record including the record of sessions trial pending since 1987 against respondent No.10. The writ petition filed is still pending consideration before this Court and in the said writ petition in the description of respondent No.7 it has only been mentioned that this Court can summon the record including the record of sessions trial pending since 1987 against respondent No.10. The case of the complainant is covered against him under clauses (1) and (7) of paragraph 102 of the decision rendered by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, (1992) Supp1 SCC 335 , as immediately after receipt of notice of W.P.No.3333/2003, the complaint was lodged as a counter-blast and even otherwise, no offence under Section 501 of the IPC is made out being covered by the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the IPC. 4. Mr. B.N. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5, would submit that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that prima facie, ingredients for framing charge under Section 501 of the IPC are available in the complaint and all the pleas raised are matter of defence which can be appropriately taken during the course of trial. The writ appeal as framed and filed is not maintainable in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana and others, (2017) 5 SCC 533 . The writ appeal deserves to be dismissed. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the record with utmost circumspection. 6. A Division Bench of this Court on 22-2-2011 doubted the maintainability of this writ appeal and referred the matter to Full Bench, as to whether writ appeal is maintainable or not. The Full Bench by order dated 31-8-2017 held the writ appeal to be maintainable. Since, in the instant case, between the same parties, the Full Bench had already held the writ appeal to be maintainable, the objection raised qua the maintainability of writ appeal by respondent No.5 is hereby overruled. 7. Now, the question is, whether the learned Single Judge is right in holding that prima facie offence under Section 501 of the IPC is made out against the appellant? 8. Section 499 of the IPC defines defamation which reads as under: - "499. 7. Now, the question is, whether the learned Single Judge is right in holding that prima facie offence under Section 501 of the IPC is made out against the appellant? 8. Section 499 of the IPC defines defamation which reads as under: - "499. Defamation.-Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person. Explanation 1.-It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives. Explanation 2.-It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. Explanation 3.-An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to defamation. Explanation 4.-No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful." 9. Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the IPC, which is relevant to the present case, is quoted herein-below: - "Ninth Exception.-Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other's interests.-It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good." 10. In order to attract the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the IPC, the imputation must be shown to have been made (i) in good faith; and (ii) for the protection of person making it or for any other person or for public good. 11. In order to attract the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the IPC, the imputation must be shown to have been made (i) in good faith; and (ii) for the protection of person making it or for any other person or for public good. 11. Section 501 of the IPC deals with printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory, which reads as follows: - "501. Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory.-Whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both." 12. "To publish" means to make known to others or to communicate to a third person. (See Webster's Comprehensive dictionary - International Edition). Publication will be complete if after making or printing the defamatory statement, it is made available to the public. (Vide Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Company and others, (1998) 8 SCC 250 ). Publication includes pleadings, affidavits etc. which are filed in Courts. ( In Re Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, (1998) 7 Supreme 473 ). The Kerala High Court also in the matter of Prabhakaran v. Gangadharan, (2006) 2 KerLT 122 has held that once a statement is filed in a Court of law such statement can be taken as published. 13. It is now well settled that if a party to a judicial proceeding is prosecuted for the criminal offence of defamation in respect of a statement made in such judicial proceeding either on oath or otherwise, his criminal liability must be determined by reference to the provisions of Section 499 of the IPC alone. The doctrine of absolute privilege is not recognised by the Indian Penal Code as applicable in the English common law beyond the limits of the Exceptions engraved in Section 499 of the IPC. Every defamatory statement not coming within any of the 10 Exceptions carved out under Section 499 of the IPC is punishable under Section 500 of the IPC. The doctrine of absolute privilege is not recognised by the Indian Penal Code as applicable in the English common law beyond the limits of the Exceptions engraved in Section 499 of the IPC. Every defamatory statement not coming within any of the 10 Exceptions carved out under Section 499 of the IPC is punishable under Section 500 of the IPC. The question as to whether the statement in a given case falls under any of the ten Exceptions to Section 499 of the IPC will have to be decided only after trial and the burden to bring the libel or slander under any of those Exceptions is, by virtue of Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, on the accused. 14. In cases of qualified privilege, it is not enough if the plaintiff demonstrates that the offending statement was false and defamatory, but the plaintiff will have to further prove that the statement was made with express malice. 15. In view of the aforesaid analysis, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that the appellant herein has filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before this Court on 14-1-2003 against respondent No.6 seeking quashment of his enrollment issued by the Bar Council of Delhi and also sought a direction to conduct a detailed investigation in relation to impersonation by respondent No.6 and in that case, notice was issued by this Court on 6-12-2003 to respondent No.6 herein. In the writ petition, in para 2, the appellant herein had stated about the particulars of the respondents. The High Court of Chhattisgarh has also been impleaded as a party respondent No.7 in which record of sessions trial under Section 395 of the IPC pending since 1987 against respondent No.10 therein before the Fast Track Court, Durg, has been sought to be called. 16. The aforesaid details of the record sought to be called in the writ petition in para 2 i.e. the particulars of the respondents has been made basis for filing complaint under Section 501 of the IPC. The copy of the writ petition was, according to respondent No.6, received on 18-12-2003 and he immediately filed a complaint stating as under: - 17. The copy of the writ petition was, according to respondent No.6, received on 18-12-2003 and he immediately filed a complaint stating as under: - 17. A careful perusal of the aforesaid averments in the complaint would show that the appellant herein only stated about the description of record while giving particulars of the respondents. In fact, in the entire body of the writ petition, no statement has been made on oath that respondent No.6 is standing and facing trial for offence under Section 395 of the IPC. Merely giving description of record to be pending against respondent No.10 would not per se amount to making any defamatory statement against the complainant / writ petitioner. 18. As it has already been stated above, absolute privilege is not applicable to cases under the Penal Code in India but qualified privilege applies. Thus if in a pleading of a party certain matters are alleged which may not strictly be correct but fire made in good faith and are made to protect the interest of the maker they are privileged and the person making them cannot be prosecuted nor convicted for defamation. 19. In the matter of Baija v. Babu,1918 AIR Nagpur 221 (1) it has been laid down that a statement made by a party to a suit in good faith and for the protection of his interests, and which is relevant to the matter in issue, falls under Exception 9 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and is privileged. In order to take such a statement out of the exception express malice must be proved. 20. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Bai Shanta v. Umrao Amir Malik, (1926) AIR Bombay 141 followed the decision of a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the matter of Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De, (1921) AIR Calcutta 1 in which the Calcutta High Court has clarified the distinction between the position obtaining with regard to criminal prosecutions and the position obtaining with regard to civil actions as under: - "Our conclusions then may be summarized as follows: (i) If a party to a judicial proceeding is prosecuted for defamation in respect of a statement made therein on oath or otherwise, his liability must be determined by reference to the provisions of Section 499, Indian Penal Code. Under the Letters Patent, the question must be solved by the application of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and not otherwise. The Court cannot engraft thereupon exceptions derived from the Common Law of England or based on grounds of public policy. Consequently, a person in such a position is entitled only to the benefit of the qualified privilege mentioned in Section 499, Indian Penal Code. (ii) If a party to a judicial proceeding is sued in a civil Court for damages for defamation in respect of a statement made therein on oath or otherwise, his liability, in the absence of statutory rules applicable to the subject must be determined with reference to principles of justice, equity and good conscience. There is a large preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of the view that the principles of justice, equity and good conscience applicable in such circumstances should be identical with the corresponding relevant rules of the Common Law of England. ..." 21. There is a large preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of the view that the principles of justice, equity and good conscience applicable in such circumstances should be identical with the corresponding relevant rules of the Common Law of England. ..." 21. Thus, considering the legal position, the submissions of the parties and the facts noticed herein-above, it is quite vivid that there is no clear cut statement made on oath before the writ court in a writ petition filed by the appellant herein that respondent No.6 was standing trial for offence under Section 395 of the IPC and only some prayer has been made for requisitioning the record pertaining to respondent No.6, and particularly considering the fact that writ petition was pending on that day and is now being disposed of along this writ appeal, though by a separate order, it cannot be ruled out that the complaint is manifestly attended by mala fides and it can be said to be maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance as held by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in clause (7) of paragraph 102 of Bhajan Lal's case (supra) in which Their Lordships held that extra-ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and one of the categories pointed by Their Lordships is where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and / or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the allegation made in the first complaint even if it is taken at its face value and accepted in its entirety, does not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the appellant under Section 501 of the IPC. 22. Concludingly, the writ appeal is allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The appellant herein would stand discharged and Criminal Case No.833/2006 (Shri Prakash Choubey v. Mohd. Arshad Khan) pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, including the order framing charge is hereby quashed.