JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing Memo dated 22.12.2009 issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Government of Bihar, Patna, whereby and where under the claim of the petitioner for grant of promotion on the post of Inspector of Police has been rejected. It has been further prayed that the respondents be directed to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion on the post of Inspector of Police from the date when his juniors Ram Pravesh Rai and Jogindra Prasad etc. were granted promotion on the said post. 2. The brief facts of the case according to the petitioner is that he was appointed as L.C. Operator (Wireless Operator) and joined the said post on 12.05.1967. The petitioner is stated to have been allowed to officiate on the post of Second Grade Operator in the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police with effect from 01.09.1973 vide office order dated 14.09.1973. The services of the petitioner is stated to have been absorbed in the General Police Cadre in the year 1975. The petitioner was then confirmed on the post of A.S.I. with effect from 01.07.1978 and thereafter he is stated to have been granted promotion to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police with effect from 30.11.1981 on an officiating basis and was confirmed on the post of S.I. of Police with effect from 01.08.1983. It is the case of the petitioner that the meeting of the Central Selection Board had taken place in between 14.07.1987 to 16.07.1987 for the purposes of granting confirmation to the incumbents on the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police and the petitioner’s case was found fit for confirmation on the post of Sub-Inspector of Police, whereafter a letter dated 26.07.1988 was sent by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Administrative), Patna to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, North Chhotanagpur, Hazaribagh dated 26.08.1988 stating therein that the petitioner has been confirmed on the post of Assistant Inspector of Police with effect from 01.07.1978, hence his date of confirmation in the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police has been fixed as 01.08.1983. The Departmental Promotion Committee is said to have held a meeting in the year 2007 for considering the case of Sub-Inspector of Police for promotion to the post of Inspector of Police wherein many juniors to the petitioner were granted promotion on the post of Inspector of Police, however, the case of the petitioner was not considered though he had been confirmed as Sub-Inspector of Police on 01.08.1983. Thereafter, the petitioner had submitted his representation for grant of promotion on the post of Inspector of Police but to no avail and the petitioner, in the meantime, superannuated on 30.06.2008. Lastly, it has been stated in the writ petition that the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Bihar, Patna has rejected the case of the petitioner vide letter dated 22.12.2009 without considering the case of the petitioner in the right perspective. 3. The learned senior counsel Shri Ram Suresh Singh, appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been granted regular promotion on the post of Sub-Inspector of Police with effect from the year 1977 and on the post of Inspector of Police with effect from the year 1981, however, in the impugned order dated 22.12.2009, it has been wrongly stated that the same were ad hoc. The learned senior counsel has also referred to the letter of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Administration), Bihar, Patna dated 26.08.1988, whereby and where under it has been observed that the name of the petitioner has been left out on account of mistake in the Central Selection Board’s meeting held in between the period 14.07.1987 to 16.07.1987 wherein the case of the petitioner (Sub-Inspector) was considered and he was declared fit for confirmation. In the said letter it was further mentioned that the date of confirmation of the petitioner on the post of Sub- Inspector has been fixed as 01.08.1983. In such view of the matter, it is submitted that the petitioner was required to be granted promotion on the post of Inspector of Police especially in view of the fact that the juniors to the petitioner, namely, Ram Pravesh Rai and Yogendra Prasad have been granted promotion. 4. In such view of the matter, it is submitted that the petitioner was required to be granted promotion on the post of Inspector of Police especially in view of the fact that the juniors to the petitioner, namely, Ram Pravesh Rai and Yogendra Prasad have been granted promotion. 4. The respondents have filed a counter affidavit wherein it has been stated that the petitioner was appointed on 12.05.1969 in the Police Wireless where after he was reverted in the main stream of Bihar Police on 01.08.1975 and thereafter he was promoted as A.S.I. on 05.05.1977 and as Sub-Inspector on 27.02.1981 on ad hoc basis by the then D.I.G., South Chhotanagpur. It has been submitted that an officer of the rank of D.I.G. is not the competent authority to grant regular promotion inasmuch as the promotion in the rank of A.S.I./S.I. has to be made as per the provisions prescribed in Rule 659(a), 659(c) and 659(e) of the Bihar Police Manual, 1978, which are reproduced herein below:- “659. Promotion of Assistant Sub-Inspectors.- (a) 50 per cent of the vacancies in the rank of Sub-Inspector shall be filled by selection from the rank of Assistant Sub- Inspector who have at least done a minimum of five years service [Rule 653- (b)]. Only selected officers who have shown exceptional merit while serving as Assistant Sub-Inspector will be promoted. (c) At least 14 days before nominations are sent to the Deputy Inspector the names of the nominees shall be published by district order so that those who are not nominated may have an opportunity of representing their cases before the nominations are actually submitted. Officers having such representations to make should be given interviews and their cases examined with them. In forwarding the nominations a certificate must be given of the dates on which the lists were published and intimations sent to those not nominated. Those not nominated, may submit representation within 14 days to the Deputy Inspector-General which shall be considered by him as early as possible so that in case of necessity, additional nominations may be sent. In selecting Assistant Sub-Inspectors for promotion, preference should be given to those who have received special commendation for integrity of character and good detective work. (e) The Central Selection Board [Appendix 72(2)], if necessary, interview the candidates nominated by the Range Deputy Inspector-General’s Board and prepare a list of selected candidates for promotion. In selecting Assistant Sub-Inspectors for promotion, preference should be given to those who have received special commendation for integrity of character and good detective work. (e) The Central Selection Board [Appendix 72(2)], if necessary, interview the candidates nominated by the Range Deputy Inspector-General’s Board and prepare a list of selected candidates for promotion. Names on this list should be ordinarily be in order of seniority. If an officer is placed higher in the list than his seniority warrants the reasons for such special nomination shall be recorded. Promotion shall be confined to the selected list framed by the Central Selection Board [Appendix 72(2)] but vacancies shall be filled up range wise according to seniority in the list by the Range Deputy Inspector- General.” 5. It is further submitted that apparently the petitioner has been granted promotion in the rank of A.S.I. and S.I. by an authority not competent to grant such promotions as also without following the proper norms prescribed in the Bihar Police Manual. The learned counsel for the respondents has further referred to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court dated 27.04.2000 in S.L.P. (C) No. 12013 of 1998, converted into Civil Appeal No. 3006 of 2000, (State of Bihar vs. Brij Bihari Prasad Singh), relevant paragraphs whereof are reproduced herein below:- “This Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Aghore Nath Dey and Ors., etc. [ 1993 (2) SCR 919 ] held that to enable seniority to be counted from the date of initial appointment and not according to the date of promotion, the incumbent of the post has to be initially appointed "according to the rules". Where the initial appointment is only adhoc and not according to the rules and made as a stop gap arrangements, the officiation on such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. In that case the Court relied upon the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Association and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [ 1990 (2) SCR 900 ] wherein it was held that: "(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [ 1990 (2) SCR 900 ] wherein it was held that: "(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only adhoc and not according to rules and made as a stop gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. (B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularization of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted. (C) When appointments are made from more than one source, it is permissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from the different sources, and if rules are framed in this regard they must ordinarily be followed strictly. (D) If it becomes impossible to adhere to the existing quota rule, it should be substituted by an appropriate rule to meet the needs of the situation. In case, however, the quota rule is not followed continuously for a number of years because it was impossible to do so the inference is irresistible that the quota rule had broken down. (E) Where the quota rule has broken down and the appointments are made from one source in excess of the quota, but are made after following the procedure prescribed by the rules for the appointment, the appointees should not be pushed down below the appointees from the other source inducted in the service at a later date. (F) Where the rule permits the authorities to relax the provisions relating to the quota, ordinarily a presumption should be raised that there was such relaxation when there is a deviation from the quota rule. (G) The quota for recruitment from the different sources may be prescribed by executive instructions, if the rules are silent on the subject. (H) If the quota rule is prescribed by an executive instruction, and is not followed continuously for a number of years, the inference is that the executive instruction has ceased to remain operative. (G) The quota for recruitment from the different sources may be prescribed by executive instructions, if the rules are silent on the subject. (H) If the quota rule is prescribed by an executive instruction, and is not followed continuously for a number of years, the inference is that the executive instruction has ceased to remain operative. (I) The posts held by the permanent Deputy Engineers as well as the officiating Deputy Engineers under the State of Maharashtra belonged to the single cadre of Deputy Engineers. (J) The decision dealing with important questions concerning a particular service given after careful consideration should be respected rather than scrutinized for finding out any possible error. It is not in the interest of service to unsettle a settled position." It is thus evident that Brij Bihari Prasad Singh having been promoted on officiating basis with a clear stipulation that he will not get seniority in the rank of Inspector till finally selected could not have preferred a claim regarding his seniority on the basis of promotion of Ramjas Singh, though initially junior to him yet substantively promoted in accordance with Rule 660C on 8.7.1972 whereas Brij Bihari Prasad Singh was promoted after selection under Rule 649 in 1978. The High Court totally ignored the basic principles governing the service rules and the mandate of law. There was, therefore, no justification of issuing the directions to direct the promotion of Brij Bihari Prasad Singh while deciding the writ petition No.697 of 1995 and dismissing the LPA No.1018/95 vide the judgment impugned in this appeal filed against Brij Bihari Prasad Singh. It appears that the High Court totally lost sight of the fact that in his petitions filed from time to time Brij Bihari Prasad Singh had not impleaded any of his seniors as party respondents. In the absence of persons likely to be affected by the relief prayed for, the writ petitions should have normally been dismissed unless there existed specific reasons for non impleadment of the affected persons. Neither any reason was assigned by the writ petitioner nor the court felt it necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter. Ignoring such a basic principle of law has resulted in the super session of 168 Inspectors and 407 Dy.SPs. Neither any reason was assigned by the writ petitioner nor the court felt it necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter. Ignoring such a basic principle of law has resulted in the super session of 168 Inspectors and 407 Dy.SPs. The writ petition filed by Brij Bihari Prasad Singh being totally misconceived, devoid of any legal force and prayers made being in contravention of the rules applicable in the case deserved dismissal, which was unfortunately not done with the result that the interests of many seniors have been threatened, endangered and adversely affected. The appeal of the State has, therefore, to be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment. The State also submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High Court had committed a mistake of law by not considering all aspects of the matter before allowing the writ petition on 26th July, 1975 which required to be interfered with by the Division Bench of the High Court in the LPA. When specific plea regarding facts and law had been raised in the LPA, the arguments of the respondents cannot be accepted that such a plea had been raised by the appellant for the first time in this Court. It is further contended that as the respondent was, in the meantime, appointed/promoted in the IPS Cadre and as per requirements of the State Government he has already submitted his resignation from the State Service, the acceptance of the appeal and setting aside the directions of the High Court would result in great hardship to him and amount to unsettling his settled service rights particularly when his promotion/appointment to the IPS cadre has not been challenged and is not in dispute. Such a plea by itself cannot be accepted as a ground to dismiss the appeal filed against an order which we have held to be illegal being contrary to law and the Service Rules applicable in the case. Once the judgment is set aside, the consequences have to follow and a person taking advantage or benefit of the wrong orders is to suffer for his own faults which cannot be attributed to anybody-else. However, in appropriate cases this Court can mould the relief to safeguard the interests of a person wherever required. Once the judgment is set aside, the consequences have to follow and a person taking advantage or benefit of the wrong orders is to suffer for his own faults which cannot be attributed to anybody-else. However, in appropriate cases this Court can mould the relief to safeguard the interests of a person wherever required. For doing complete justice between the parties, appropriate directions can be given to protect the interests of a person who is found to have been conferred the benefits on the basis of judicial pronouncements made in his favour. As the appellant-State has been found to be careless and negligent in defending its cases, we feel and are inclined to protect the interests of Brij Bihari Prasad Singh, respondent. We are convinced that the interests of justice would be served by holding that despite setting aside the judgments of the High Court his interests be protected by not disturbing his promotions made from time to time. However, judgments passed in his favour cannot be permitted to be made a basis for conferment of similar rights upon other persons who are shown to have filed writ petitions or representations which, if accepted, are likely to adversely affect the interests of more than 150 Inspectors and 400 Officers in the rank of Dy.SP. Similarly, if any benefit has been conferred upon any other person who has superannuated, no useful purpose would be served by directing his demotion retrospectively and recovery of the excess emoluments paid to him. Under the circumstances, the appeals are allowed/disposed of with the @@ JJJ directions that: (1) Judgments of the learned Single Judge and of the LPA Bench passed in the case of Brij Bihari Prasad Singh impugned in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.12013 of 1998 are set aside. (2) Similarly the judgments passed in Kameshwar Prasad Singh's case by the Single Judge and the LPA Bench which are impugned in this appeal arising out of SLP (C) NO.10653/98 are also set aside. (3) In view of setting aside the judgments in both the appeals mentioned above no orders are required to passed in Civil Appeal arising out SLP (C) NO.16740/98. (3) In view of setting aside the judgments in both the appeals mentioned above no orders are required to passed in Civil Appeal arising out SLP (C) NO.16740/98. (4) It is, however, made clear that despite setting aside of the impugned judgments the service benefits conferred upon Brij Bihari Prasad Singh consequent upon the judgments of the High Court shall not be withdrawn and his appointment/promotion in the IPS cadre not disturbed. (5) Consequent upon this judgment the appellant-State shall also not take any action against a person conferred with similar benefits as were conferred upon Brij Bihari Prasad Singh if that person has retired and is no more in service. Parties to bear their own costs.” 6. Thus the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that seniority cannot be reckoned on the basis of ad hoc promotion. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to a judgment dated 21.06.2010 rendered by a learned Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 540 of 2006, L.P.A. No. 504 of 2008; paragraph nos. 15, 15.1, 16, 17 and 18 whereof are reproduced herein below:- 15. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Another set of similarly circumstanced employees challenged similar or identical decisions in parallel proceedings before this Court and were similarly allowed. The State Government challenged the same by preferring the aforesaid appeals before the Supreme Court, namely, State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Pd. Singh and State of Bihar Vs. Brij Bihari Prasad Singh, which were allowed by a common judgment dated 27.4.2000, reported in [2000 (3) PLJR (SC) 81]. The Supreme Court has observed that the judgments of the High Court were passed in violation of the provisions of law and rules and is adversely affecting the interest of a large number of officers in the department. Dismissing the appeals under such situation, on technical grounds of delay, would result in failure of justice. 15.1 The Supreme Court examined a large number of judgments including the judgment in the Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers? Association and others Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, as well as rule 649 of the Manual, and came to the conclusion that ignoring such a basic principle of law by the High Court has resulted in separation of a large number of officers in the police department. Association and others Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, as well as rule 649 of the Manual, and came to the conclusion that ignoring such a basic principle of law by the High Court has resulted in separation of a large number of officers in the police department. Therefore, no benefit can accrue to the employee who has been considered for ad hoc/officiating promotion on a local level, touching a portion of the cadre, to the exclusion and grave prejudice of the remaining members of the cadre. Therefore, the appeals were allowed, judgments of the High Court were set aside, and it was directed that such candidates are not entitled to the benefit of continuous officiation who had worked on ad hoc/officiating basis. 16. Identical writ petitions came up before a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (S.K. Katriar, J.) was a member. Relying on rule 649 of the Manual and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers? Association and others Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others (Supra), State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Pd. Singh and State of Bihar Vs. Brij Bihari Prasad Singh (Supra), the appeals at the instance of the employees in Ashok Kumar Khare Vs. State of Bihar (Supra) were dismissed. The Division Bench did not grant to them the benefit of continuous, officiating promotion because they had been given the benefit without following the prescribed procedure, and at the local level. Paragraph 8 of the judgment is relevant in the present context and is reproduced herein below: “8. We do not find it possible to grant to the writ-petitioners the benefit of continuous officiation with effect from 10.7.1981, for various reasons. Clauses (A) and (B) of paragraph 44 of the judgment in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers? Association Vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra) are reproduced herein below:- “44. To sum up, we hold that:-(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. (B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rule but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularization of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted.” (Emphasis added) The two portions of the judgment have to be read harmoniously. The underlined portion completely prohibits us from showing such a liberal approach to the petitioner. “9. There is yet another difficulty in following such a course. The writ petition does not state that grant of the benefit of continuous officiation with effect from 10.7.1981shall not adversely affect persons senior to him in the cadre of Sub- Inspectors. The petitioner has also not impleaded the persons senior to him in the cadre of Sub-Inspectors. The issue is really covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh (Supra), Paragraph 25 and 26 of which are reproduced herein below for the facility of quick reference:- “25. It is thus evident that Brij Bihari Prasad Singh having been promoted on officiating basis with a clear stipulation that he will not get seniority in the rank of Inspector till finally selected could not have preferred a claim regarding his seniority on the basis of promotion of Ramjas Singh, though initially junior to him yet substantively promoted in accordance with Rule 660(c)on 8.7. 1972 whereas Brij Bihari Prasad Singh was promoted after selection under Rule 649 in 1978. The High Court totally ignored the basic principles governing the service rules and the mandate of law. There was, therefore, no justification of issuing the directions to direct the promotion of Brij Bihari Prasad Singh while deciding the Writ Petition No. 697 of 1995 and dismissing the L.P.A. No. 1018/95 vide the judgment impugned in this appeal filed against Brij Bihari Prasad Singh. 26. It appears that the High Court totally lost sight of the fact that in his petitions filed from time to time Brij Bihari Prasad Singh had not impleaded any of his seniors as party-respondents. 26. It appears that the High Court totally lost sight of the fact that in his petitions filed from time to time Brij Bihari Prasad Singh had not impleaded any of his seniors as party-respondents. In the absence of persons likely to be affected by the relief prayed for, the writ petitions should have normally been dismissed unless there existed specific reasons for non-impleadment of the affected persons. Neither any reason was assigned by the writ petitioner nor did the Court feel it necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter, ignoring such a basic principle of law has resulted in the super session of 168 Inspectors and 407 Dy. SPS. The writ petition filed Brij Bihari Prasad Singh being totally misconceived, devoid of any legal force and prayers made being in contravention of the rules applicable in the case deserved dismissal, which was unfortunately not done with the result that the interests of many seniors have been threatened, endangered and adversely affected. The appeal of the State has, therefore, to be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment.” 17. We are, therefore, of the view that giving the benefit of continuous officiation on the strength of the officiating/adhoc promotion as S.I. to a portion of the Cadre will act to the great detriment of the remaining members of the cadre,and will create an extremely unjust and anomalous situation. Persons senior to the writ petitioners and likely to be adversely affected have not been impleaded as party respondents. 18. In the result, the appeals are allowed. We disagree with the order dated 23.9.2005,passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2187 of 2004,and the order dated 29.8.2007,passed in C.W.J.C. No. 446 of 2006,and the writ petitions are dismissed. We wish to emphasise that, in view of the relevant observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad and State of Bihar Vs. Brij Bihari Prasad Singh (Supra), the writ petitioners shall only be deprived of their claims for seniority on the basis of continuous officiation as S.I., but shall not be deprived of the monetary benefits or such other benefits they have derived from such officiation. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.” 8. Brij Bihari Prasad Singh (Supra), the writ petitioners shall only be deprived of their claims for seniority on the basis of continuous officiation as S.I., but shall not be deprived of the monetary benefits or such other benefits they have derived from such officiation. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.” 8. Thus the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner cannot be granted seniority on the basis of continuous officiation on the post of Sub-Inspector of Police. It is further submitted that the petitioner was appointed on 12.05.1969 and the constables appointed on 12.05.1969 in General Category have been granted regular promotion in the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police on 20.08.1994, hence the seniority in the rank of S.I., as far as the petitioner is concerned, is liable to be reckoned with effect from 20.08.1994. It is further submitted that since petitioner has superannuated on 30.06.2008 and none of his juniors have been promoted to the rank of Inspector of Police till the date of his superannuation, the claim of the petitioner for promotion as Inspector of Police is not justified. As far as the cases of Ram Pravesh Rai and Yogendra Prasad are concerned, it has been submitted that the case of the petitioner cannot be equated with them inasmuch as the said two persons are direct recruits on the post of Sub- Inspector of Police of the year 1984 and 1981 batch respectively. Since the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been granted regular promotion on the post of Sub Inspector of Police with effect from the year 1977, and on the post of Inspector of Police with effect from 1981, however, in the impugned order dated 22.12.2009, it has been wrongly stated that the said promotions were on ad hoc basis, this Court by an order dated 27.08.2018 had directed the respondents to file further affidavit dealing with the said argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner by the learned senior counsel whereupon a supplementary counter affidavit dated 27.09.2018 has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 5 wherein it has been stated that the official respondent has perused the official records and service book of the writ petitioner and it is evident from the service book of the petitioner that the actual date of birth of the petitioner is 06.06.1948, he had joined as Literate Computer Operator (Wireless Department) on 12.05.1969 where after he was promoted in the wireless cadre with effect from 01.09.1973 and was officiating as A.S.I. It has been further submitted that the petitioner had filed an application on 28.10.1974 for change of his cadre from wireless cadre to general police cadre and thereafter the petitioner had joined as Literate Constable in the office of the Superintendent of Police, Jamshedpur on 11.08.1975. It is further submitted in paragraph no. 12 of the supplementary counter affidavit that the respondent has meticulously perused the service book of the petitioner and it is apparent that the petitioner had passed P.T.C. in the year 1977 where after the petitioner was promoted as A.S.I. on officiating basis and in fact he was promoted as regular A.S.I. only w.e.f. 15.01.1978, hence there is no occasion of the petitioner having been promoted as sub-Inspector in the year 1977. In paragraph no. 13 of the supplementary counter affidavit, it has been stated that the petitioner was promoted as ad hoc Sub-Inspector in the year 1981. Lastly, it is submitted that since the petitioner was never granted regular promotion on the post of Sub-Inspector of Police, he was not eligible for being considered for promotion to the rank of Inspector. 9. It may be pointed out that no reply has been filed by the petitioner to the aforesaid supplementary counter affidavit filed by the respondents, hence admittedly the petitioner does not deny the facts stated therein. 10. During the course of hearing, this Court had put a query to the learned senior counsel of the petitioner to show the order/letter issued by the respondents granting regular promotion to the petitioner on the post of Sub-Inspector of Police, however, no order granting promotion to the petitioner on the post of Sub-Inspector of Police on regular basis could be either shown or produced. 11. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record and this Court finds that the petitioner has never been granted promotion on a regular basis on the post of Sub-Inspector of Police, hence his claim for being granted promotion on the post of Inspector of Police has rightly been rejected by the impugned order dated 22.12.2009, especially in view of the law settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Brij Bihari Prasad Singh (supra) to the effect that the period of officiation on a post on purely ad hoc basis cannot be taken into account for considering seniority. 12. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed herein above in the preceding paragraphs and for the reasons mentioned herein above, I do not find any merit in the present writ petition, hence the same is dismissed.