Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 819 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Rameshbhai Bhikhubhai Dabhi

2019-09-20

A.P.THAKER

body2019
JUDGMENT : A.P. THAKER, J. 1. The appellant-State has preferred the present appeal under Section 378 (1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment and order dated 10.01.2006 passed by the Principal Special Judge, Surendranagar (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court”) in Special (A.C.B.) Case No. 2 of 2001 whereby the Trial Court has acquitted the original accused-respondent herein for the charges leveled against him for the offences under Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter be referred to as “the Act”). 2. Brief facts of the prosecution case is that the complainant-Anilkumar Chhelshanker Jani resident of Village: Bhrugpur, Taluka: Chuda approached the ACB on the allegation that one of his supporters, Koli Valji Vithalbhai came to him and informed that the quarrel has taken place between his son Thobhan and daughter-inlaw of one Vaghari Bhikha and to this effect a complaint came to be registered before Chuda Police Station by said Vaghari Bhikha. It is alleged that the son of Koli Valji Vithalbhai namely Pitamber went to Village: Kera, District: Kutchchh and his name was appeared in the FIR and the Investigating Officer has come to his house and asked for Rs. 3,000/-. It is alleged that the complainant along with Valji went to Chuda Police Station where the accused was present and demanded Rs. 3,000/- for defending and not to beat up two sons of Valji namely Thobhan and Pitamber. 2.1 It is alleged that the complainant in turn asked the accused that Valji was a poor man and name of his son is falsely given and requested him to reduce the amount. At that time accused denied to do so and told that whatever the complainant speaks is truth and no change is to be made. It is alleged that accused has told that for defending his son and for not beating, something should be done. Thereafter, after negotiation, the amount reduced to Rs. 1,000/- which was to be given to the accused. Thereafter, on 27.11.2000, the complainant along with Valji went to Chuda Police Station and kept Thobhan present and, thereafter, he was sent to Limbdi Court and as decided earlier, the accused demanded Rs. 1000/-. However, some expenditure was incurred and only Rs. 500/- was given to the accused and it was decided that remaining amount of Rs. Thereafter, on 27.11.2000, the complainant along with Valji went to Chuda Police Station and kept Thobhan present and, thereafter, he was sent to Limbdi Court and as decided earlier, the accused demanded Rs. 1000/-. However, some expenditure was incurred and only Rs. 500/- was given to the accused and it was decided that remaining amount of Rs. 500/- would be given when Pitamber would be surrendered. 2.2 It is alleged that as the complainant was not willing to give bribe amount, he registered the complaint before the ACB Police Station, Surendranagar being Crime Register No. 4 of 2000. That, after, initial part of smearing the currency notes in anthrecene powder and preparing first part of panchnama, the raiding party went to Chuda Police Station. Thereafter, the complainant and panch witness No. 1 went inside the Police Station and at that time, accused was not present and, therefore, the other police personnel called him. Therefore, the accused came to the Police Station and complainant informed him that they were producing Pitamber and, therefore, to keep ready his paper and not to beat him. At that point of time, accused asked Pitamber to sit on staircase outside the Police Station and further asked the complainant about the money. At that point of time, the complainant tendered the amount to the accused and accused, after calculating, put it in his right side pocket of his trouser. On signal being given by the complainant, the raiding party, panch witness No. 2 along with other members of the ACB came there and arrested the accused and, thereafter, the second part of panchnama was prepared thereof. The Investigating Officer has carried out investigation and after completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet came to be led before the concerned Court. 2.3 On filing of the charge-sheet, the charge was framed against the accused by the Trial Court at the relevant time and the accused has pleaded not guilty and pleaded for trial. Therefore, the prosecution has examined eight witnesses and produced nine documentary evidence. After closure of the evidence of the prosecution, a statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded wherein the accused has denied of having committed any such offence and has stated that he is innocent. He has neither examined himself on oath nor examined any defence witness thereof. After closure of the evidence of the prosecution, a statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded wherein the accused has denied of having committed any such offence and has stated that he is innocent. He has neither examined himself on oath nor examined any defence witness thereof. 2.4 After perusing and considering the evidence on record and after hearing both the sides, the Trial Court has, ultimately, acquitted the accused-respondent from the charges leveled against him. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, the State has preferred the present appeal. 4. Heard Mr. Dharmesh Devnani, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant- State at length and Mr. J.M. Panchal, learned senior advocate with Ms. Amrita Ajmera, learned advocate for the respondent-accused. Perused the material placed on record. 5. While referring to the evidence of the complainant-Anilkumar Jani, panch witness Laxmanbhai Kanjibbhai Bhuva and witness Pitamberbhai Valjibhai as well as witness Valjibhai Vithalbhai and Thobhanbhai Valjibhai and other police witnesses, Mr. Dharmesh Devnani, learned APP for the appellant has vehemently submitted that the Trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and though the ingredients of demand, acceptance and recovery are proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the Trial Court has materially erred in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against him. He has submitted that the complainant has specifically narrated in his deposition that at the time of raid, the accused has asked for amount by making sign and, thereafter, he has tendered the currency note to the accused which he has accepted and put it in his right side pocket of trouser. While referring to the evidence of the panch witness, he has submitted that the panch witness has also supported the case of the prosecution that the accused has demanded the amount from the complainant and he put it in his right side pocket of trouser. According to him, from the evidence of both the witnesses, the ingredients of demand and acceptance is proved. While referring to the evidence of other witnesses and documentary evidence, he has submitted that the recovery has been made from pocket of the accused and, therefore, the third ingredient is also proved. He has submitted that the entire evidence on record is completely misread by the Trial Court. While referring to the evidence of other witnesses and documentary evidence, he has submitted that the recovery has been made from pocket of the accused and, therefore, the third ingredient is also proved. He has submitted that the entire evidence on record is completely misread by the Trial Court. According to him, the evidence on record is sufficient cogent, legal and reliable and it ought to have been believed by the Trial Court and the accused should have been convicted for the alleged offence and necessary punishment ought to have been inflicted upon him. He has prayed to allow the present appeal by reversing the acquittal order and to convict accused and to pass necessary order of punishment of the accused. 6. Mr. J.M. Panchal, learned senior advocate with Ms. Amrita Ajmera, learned advocate for the respondent-accused has vehemently submitted that the evidence on record is not cogent, legal and reliable regarding demand and acceptance. According to him, in the case of Prevention of Corruption Act, the basic ingredient is demand. According to him, the demand is not proved for the alleged offence. He has also referred to the evidence of panch witness and the FIR and has submitted that in the complaint, the amount has been shown to Rs. 3,000/- whereas, in the deposition, the complainant has stated that the amount of Rs. 2500/- was demanded by the accused and, thus, from the very beginning, the complainant has diverted from his FIR and though he has not been declared hostile by the prosecution. He has also submitted that regarding demand, there is contradiction in the FIR as well as in the deposition of the complainant and panch witnesses. According to him, as per the prosecution evidence, other two police personnel were also present in the Police Station, at the time of raid, but none has been examined by the prosecution. While referring to the evidence of the complainant as well as panch witnesses, he has submitted that the complainant has made improvement in his evidence which has been proved by the evidence of the Investigating Officer. According to him, the accused was discharging his duty as there was a complaint against the sons of Veljibhai and, therefore, he has insisted for arrest of Pitamber and he is duty bound to arrest him and while he was discharging official duty, it was not liked by the complainant. According to him, the accused was discharging his duty as there was a complaint against the sons of Veljibhai and, therefore, he has insisted for arrest of Pitamber and he is duty bound to arrest him and while he was discharging official duty, it was not liked by the complainant. He has submitted that as per the evidence of Pitamber, he was present at the time of demand and acceptance of the amount. But in his evidence, he has not clearly stated regarding happening of such incident and yet, he has not been declared hostile by the prosecution. According to him, the version of demand is not supported by the very witness as he was main person for whom the bribe amount was alleged to be paid. 6.1 According to Mr. Panchal, learned senior advocate, the Trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence and has not committed any serious error of law and facts. He has prayed to dismiss the appeal. 6.2 For his legal submissions regarding demand and acceptance as well as sanction, Mr. Panchal, learned senior counsel has relied on the following decisions: 1. In the case of B. Jayaraj vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55 2. In the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy vs. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, (2015) 10 SCC 152 3. In the case of V. Sejappa vs. State by Police Inspector, Lokayukta, (2016) 12 SCC 150 4. In the case of Hakeem Khan and Others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 5 SCC 719 7. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 8. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 8. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 9. It is well settled by catena of decisions that in the cases of the Prevention of Corruption Act three essential ingredients namely (i) demand, (ii) acceptance and (iii) recovery are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. If any of them is not proved, being the vital part, the offence cannot be said to have constituted and, therefore, in absence of any one of them, the conviction cannot be imposed. In this case, the question which is required to be determined is whether the prosecution has successfully established acceptance as well as recovery is duly proved from the fact that the amount was lying on the table and it is recovered from the top of the table. 10. In the case of B. Jayaraj (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in paras 7, 8 and 9 as under:- 7. 10. In the case of B. Jayaraj (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in paras 7, 8 and 9 as under:- 7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. 8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case inso- far as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Exbt.P-11) before LW-9 and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW-1 and the contents of Exhibit P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the Act. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand.” 11. In the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in paras 20, 21, 22, 23 and 26 as under:- 20. This Court in A. Subair v. State of Kerala, while dwelling on the purport of the statutory prescription of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act ruled that (at SCC p. 593, para 28) the prosecution has to prove the charge thereunder beyond reasonable doubt like any other criminal offence and that the accused should be considered to be innocent till it is established otherwise by proper proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, which are vital ingredients necessary to be proved to record a conviction. 21. In State of Kerala and Another vs. C.P. Rao, this Court, reiterating its earlier dictum, vis-a-vis the same offences, held that mere recovery by itself, would not prove the charge against the accused and in absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused had voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe, conviction cannot be sustained. 22. In a recent enunciation by this Court to discern the imperative pre-requisites of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it has been underlined in B. Jayaraj in unequivocal terms, that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Sections 7 as well as 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. It has been propounded that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. It has been propounded that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand, thus, has been held to be an indispensable essentiality and of permeating mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged therein, it has been held that while it is extendable only to an offence under Section 7 and not to those under Section 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal gratification, it was emphasized, could follow only if there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was held that in absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise. 23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. 25. In reiteration of the golden principle which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases, this Court in Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam had held that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution cannot afford to rest its case in the realm of “may be” true but has to upgrade it in the domain of “must be” true in order to steer clear of any possible surmise or conjecture. It was held, that the Court must ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if in the facts and circumstances, two views are plausible, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. 12. It was held, that the Court must ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if in the facts and circumstances, two views are plausible, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. 12. In the case of V. Sejappa (supra), regarding presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the principles are required to be followed by the Appellate Court in the case of appeal against the order of acquittal under Section 378(1)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Apex Court has held and observed in paras 18, 21 and 23 as under:- 18. It is well settled that the initial burden of proving that the accused accepted or obtained the amount other than legal remuneration is upon the prosecution. It is only when this initial burden regarding demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is successfully discharged by the prosecution, then the burden of proving the defence shifts upon the accused and a presumption would arise under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In the case at hand, all that is established by the prosecution was the recovery of money from the appellant and mere recovery of money was not enough to draw the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. 21. While dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it illegal gratification and that the prosecution has a further duty to prove that what was paid was an illegal gratification, reference can be made to the following observation in Mukut Bihari vs. State of Rajasthan, wherein it was held as under: “11. The law on the issue is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the 1988 Act. Mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused, when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the money was taken voluntarily as bribe. Mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused, when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the money was taken voluntarily as bribe. Mere receipt of amount by the accused is not sufficient to fasten the guilt, in the absence of any evidence with regard to demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification, but the burden rests on the accused to displace the statutory presumption raise under Section 20 of the 1988 Act, by bringing on record evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish with reasonable probability, that the money was accepted by him, other than as a motive or reward as referred to in Section 7 of the 1988 Act. While invoking the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, the court is required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any, only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. However, before the accused is called upon to explain as to how the amount in question was found in his possession, the foundational facts must be established by the prosecution. The complainant is an interested and partisan witness concerned with the success of the trap and his evidence must be tested in the same way as that of any other interested witness and in a proper case the court may look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused person.” 23. In Muralidhar vs. State of Karnataka, this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in para 12 held as under: (SCC pp. 735-36): “12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu, Madan Mohan Singh, Atley, Aher Raja Khima, Balbir Singh, M.G. Agarwal, Noor Khan, Khedu Mohton, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade, Lekha Yadav, Khem Karan, Bishan Singh, Umedbhai Jadavbhai, K. Gopal Reddy, Tota Sing, Ram Kumar, Madan Lal, Sambasivan, Bhagwan Singh, Harijana Thirupala, C. Antony, K. Gopalakrishna, Sanjay Thakran and Chandrappa. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellant court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court. (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal. (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part o the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified. (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 13. In the case of Hakeem Khan (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in para 12 as under:- 12. For all these reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court clearly fell in grave error in setting aside the acquittal in the present case. We have to remind ourselves that the law on reversal of acquittals is well settled and is stated in many judgments, but one of them needs to be quoted here. In Murugesan vs. State, this court went into the meaning of different expressions - erroneous, wrong and possible and has stated the law as follows:- “33. We have to remind ourselves that the law on reversal of acquittals is well settled and is stated in many judgments, but one of them needs to be quoted here. In Murugesan vs. State, this court went into the meaning of different expressions - erroneous, wrong and possible and has stated the law as follows:- “33. The expressions erroneous, wrong and possible are defined in Oxford English Dictionary in the following terms: “erroneous - wrong, incorrect. Wrong:- (1) not correct or true, mistaken. (2) unjust, dishonest, or immoral. Possible:- (1) capable of existing, happening, or being achieved. (2) that may exist or happen, but that is not certain or probable.” “34. It will be necessary for us to emphasise that a possible view denotes an opinion which can exist or be formed irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of such an opinion. A view taken by a court lower in the hierarchical structure may be termed as erroneous or wrong by a superior court upon a mere disagreement. But such a conclusion of the higher court would not take the view rendered by the subordinate court outside the arena of a possible view. The correctness or otherwise of any conclusion reached by a court has to be tested on the basis of what the superior judicial authority perceives to be the correct conclusion. A possible view, on the other hand, denotes a conclusion which can reasonably be arrived at regardless of the fact whether it is agreed upon or not by the higher court. The fundamental distinction between the two situations have to be kept in mind. So long as the view taken by the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, the view taken by the trial court cannot be interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over and above the view of the trial court.” 14. In the case of Satvir Singh vs. State of Delhi, 2014 (13) SCC 143 , the Apex Court has held and observed that mere demand by itself is not sufficient to establish the offence under the Act. It was further held and observed therein that if there is failure on part of prosecution to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by accused from complainant then no conviction can be imposed on the accused. It was further held and observed therein that if there is failure on part of prosecution to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by accused from complainant then no conviction can be imposed on the accused. In that case, the amount was put in a black rexine bag with a broken zip which was put on a steel cot. Under these circumstances, it was held and observed that acceptance of illegal gratification was not proved as contents of bag were not within the knowledge of the accused. It was further held and observed that as recovery of illegal gratification from the accused was not proved, no presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act would be attracted. 15. On perusal of the evidence on record, it clearly transpires that the complainant Anilkumar Chhelshanker Jani, PW-2 at Exhibit 29 has made improvement in his evidence regarding conversation with accused Rameshbhai. The entire complaint is based on the averments to show leniency towards the alleged complainant against the sons of Valjibhai namely Thobhan and Pitamber and not to beat them, the accused has demanded Rs. 3,000/- at initial stage and, thereafter, it was agreed to pay Rs. 1,000/- and Rs. 500/- was paid by Valjibhai and remaining amount of Rs. 500/- was to be paid at the time of production of Pitamber. Against this averments, on perusal of the evidence of the complainant Anilkumar Jani, it is found that he has stated that initially, the demand was of Rs.2,500/- and it was for not beating Thobhan and Pitamber and to ensure that Thobhan gets bail from the concerned Court and, thereafter, it was reduced to Rs. 2,000/- and ultimately, it was agreed to pay Rs. 1,000/- only and at that time, Valjibhai has only Rs. 600/- and out of which, Valjibhai has given Rs. 500/- to the accused and, thereafter, Thobhan was sent to Limbdi Court and he got necessary bail from the Court and at that time, was asked them to produce Pitamber to Police Station. Regarding demand at the time of raid, the complainant has stated that the accused has demanded the amount by gesture. 500/- to the accused and, thereafter, Thobhan was sent to Limbdi Court and he got necessary bail from the Court and at that time, was asked them to produce Pitamber to Police Station. Regarding demand at the time of raid, the complainant has stated that the accused has demanded the amount by gesture. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that as per the evidence of panch witness Laxmanbhai Kanjibbhai Bhuva, PW-6 at Exhibit 41, it reveals that though he was present with the complainant at the time of raid, he has stated that the accused has verbally asked the amount and, thereafter, the amount was paid. Thus, the mode of demand is not identical as stated by both the witnesses who are material witnesses of the prosecution. Had the accused verbally demanded the amount by speaking words then this fact might not be lost sight by the complainant himself. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that as per the prosecution case, at the time of tendering the amount, Pitamber was also present there. Therefore, he could have seen and heard the same. On perusal of the evidence of Pitamberbhai Valjibhai, PW-5 at Exhibit 40, it appears that according to him, Janibhai has given amount of Rs. 500/- in the Police Station and, thereafter, Janibhai has left the Police Station. On perusal of the evidence of this witness, it also appears that he was told by Janibhai that if any false complaint is lodged against him, he could also lodge false complaint and, therefore, at his instance, Janibhai has filed the false complaint. According to him, he was accompanied with Janibhai in ACB Police Station. But during the cross-examination, it is turned out that he has not stated this thing before the police. It also appears from the evidence of this witness that whatever conversation happened between Janibhai and Police Constable, was happened in the Police Station. 16. As per the evidence of panch witness and the complainant, Pitamber was directed to sit on staircase outside the Police Station. It also reveals from the evidence that there were other two Police Personnels in the Police Station, but none has been examined in this case by the prosecution. It also reveals from the evidence of the complainant, it does not transpires that the amount was demanded by the accused at the time of raid. It also reveals from the evidence that there were other two Police Personnels in the Police Station, but none has been examined in this case by the prosecution. It also reveals from the evidence of the complainant, it does not transpires that the amount was demanded by the accused at the time of raid. According to the evidence of the panch witness, when they reached to the Police Station, accused was not present and accused was called by the police personnel, who were present in the Police Station through one child and at that time, the accused was standing near the Police Station and at that time, the complainant has told the accused that he has produced Pitamber and, therefore, complete all the papers immediately and do not beat him and at that time, accused has asked the complainant that what has happened regarding earlier talk with him and at that time, the complainant has handed over Rs. 500/- from his pocket and given it to the accused, who, after calculating, it put it in his pant pocket. It also reveals from the evidence that at the time of recovery of the amount, along with currency note, other papers were also found from the same pocket of the accused. It also reveals from the evidence of the prosecution that when experiment of ultra violate lamp was carried out, the anthrecene powder was found on the hands of the accused, but no such sign was found on other papers, which were in the right side pocket of the accused. It also reveals from the evidence that as per the version of the complainant, the accused has put the currency note in the same condition in his pocket, whereas, according to the panch witness, the accused has counted it. Thus, regarding the same facts, both the persons are telling different fact at a time. It creates doubt as to accepting the amount and putting it in the pocket and also regarding the presence of either of one of them and creates doubt in the case of the prosecution. It also reveals from the record that as per the version of the panch witness, from the right side pocket of the trouser, the handkerchief was found, whereas, in the second pocket, the currency note along with the papers were found and, therefore, even the recovery itself is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It also reveals from the record that as per the version of the panch witness, from the right side pocket of the trouser, the handkerchief was found, whereas, in the second pocket, the currency note along with the papers were found and, therefore, even the recovery itself is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It also reveals from the evidence of Valjibhai that by whom the amount was paid to the accused, he has not supported the version of the prosecution regarding payment made by him and, therefore, he has been declared hostile by the prosecution and he was confronted with his earlier police statement. In such cross-examination on behalf of the defence he has accepted that there was no money transaction carried out in his presence by anybody. 17. It also appears from the evidence of Thobhanbhai Valjibhai, PW-4 at Exhibit 37 that he has not supported the version of the prosecution regarding demand of Rs. 1,000/- by the accused and payment of Rs. 500/-. However, he has put up new story that the accused has used abusive language in the Police Station and demanded Rs. 1,000/- for release and at that time, his father has paid Rs. 500/- to the police and, thereafter, he was released from the Police Station by the accused. As such, he has been declared hostile by the prosecution and he has thoroughly been cross-examined regarding the previous statement made before the police. But in that cross-examination also, he has not supported the basic version of the prosecution. During his cross-examination on behalf of the defence, he has admitted that he has not narrated in police statement that the accused has used abusive language against him in the Police Station and has demanded Rs. 1,000/- in the Police Station and the accused has released him from the Police Station. Of course, he has admitted that at the instance of Janibhai, his father has paid Rs. 500/- for engaging advocate for him. 18. On re-appreciation of entire evidence on record, it clearly transpires that there is no cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence regarding demand and acceptance of the amount of bribe by the accused from the complainant side. The basic ingredients of demand is doubtful so as to acceptance thereof. 500/- for engaging advocate for him. 18. On re-appreciation of entire evidence on record, it clearly transpires that there is no cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence regarding demand and acceptance of the amount of bribe by the accused from the complainant side. The basic ingredients of demand is doubtful so as to acceptance thereof. Even if the amount is recovered from the pocket of the accused is believed then in that case, the absence of anthrecene powder on the other papers which were found from the same pocket of the accused from which currency notes were found is lacking and creates doubt as to recovery also. In view of the various decisions of the Apex Court, in this case also, it is impossible to raise any presumption under Section 20 of the Act against the accused as basic requirement of Section 7 of the Act is not fulfilled by the prosecution. Further, on perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court and on perusal of the evidence available on record, the view taken by the Trial Court is possible and, therefore, this being acquittal appeal, no any interference is warranted. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated 10.01.2006 passed by the Principal Special Judge, Surendranagar in Special (A.C.B.) Case No. 2 of 2001 is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith. Appeal dismissed.