JUDGMENT : Arun, J. The Union of India and its officers, who were the respondents in O.A.No.712 of 2011 filed by the 1st respondent before the CAT, Ernakulam Bench, have filed this original application aggrieved by Exhibit P4 order of the Tribunal. The short facts which led up to Exhibit P4 order are as follows: 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties and the exhibits are referred to as in the original application. The applicant, while working as Tax Assistant in the Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax Department, Cochin Division, became eligible for promotion as Senior Tax Assistant by successfully clearing the mandatory departmental test on 5.10.2004. On 19.11.2004, the applicant was placed under suspension pursuant to his conviction in C.C.No.779/02 of JFCM-I, Kochi. The order of suspension was revoked on 4.1.2005, on the execution of sentence imposed by the trial court being suspended by the appellate court. While so, the Departmental Promotion Committee considered the Senior Inspectors eligible for promotion, including the applicant, and promotions were granted on 11.2.2005. Even though persons junior to the applicant were promoted as Senior Tax Assistants, the DPC did not recommend the applicant's name for promotion and instead, kept aside its recommendation regarding the applicant in a sealed cover, in view of the criminal case pending against him. By Annexure A5 judgment dated 28.2.2005, Crl.A.No.1093 of 2004 filed by the appellant and the other two accused was partly allowed by the appellate court maintaining the conviction of the appellants, but at the same time setting aside the sentence of imprisonment and fine imposed by the trial court and instead directing the appellants to be released under Sections 3 and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act. According to the applicant, the setting aside of imprisonment and fine imposed by the trial court and his release under Sections 3 and 5 amounted to acquittal as per Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Hence, the applicant requested the respondents to consider him for promotion but the request was not heeded to. In the meanwhile, further promotion to the post of Deputy Office Superintendent was granted to his juniors and thereupon, the applicant filed Annexure A8 representation dated 11.3.2010 requiring the authorities to promote him to the post of Deputy Office Superintendent with effect from 01.08.2009, the date on which his immediate junior was promoted. 3. In the meanwhile, further promotion to the post of Deputy Office Superintendent was granted to his juniors and thereupon, the applicant filed Annexure A8 representation dated 11.3.2010 requiring the authorities to promote him to the post of Deputy Office Superintendent with effect from 01.08.2009, the date on which his immediate junior was promoted. 3. The respondents having failed to consider Annexure A8 representation, the applicant filed O.A. No.378 of 2010, which culminated in Annexure A9 order of the CAT, directing consideration of the applicant's representation within 60 days. In purported compliance of Annexure A9 order, the 2nd respondent passed Annexure A10, rejecting the applicant's request on the ground that the conviction against him having been confirmed in appeal and the applicant having filed criminal revision petition before the High Court, appropriate action could be taken only on decision being rendered by the High Court in the criminal revision petition. Annexure A10 was challenged by the applicant in O. A. No.694 of 2010 and by Annexure A11 order the Tribunal held that, going by Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, if an accused in a criminal case is convicted and thereafter released under the provisions of Sections 3 and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, no disqualification is attached to the conviction as per Section 12 of the Act, which means that the stigma attached to such conviction does not subsist any more as far as the indicted persons are concerned. Based on the said finding, the respondents were directed to reconsider the applicant's request and pass fresh orders. Accordingly, Annexures A13 and A14 were issued, notionally promoting the applicant to the cadre of Senior Tax Assistant with effect from 11.2.2005 and as Deputy Office Superintendent with effect from 1.10.2009. Immediately thereafter, Annexure A1 was issued clarifying that only the benefits of fixation of pay on notional promotion need be given to the applicant and arrears of pay should not be granted. Being aggrieved by Annexure A1 order, O.A.No.712 of 2011 was filed by the applicant, which culminated in Exhibit P4 order by which the Tribunal set aside Annexure A1 to the extent it denies salary to the applicant and limited the payment of salary to a period of three years prior to 17.5.2010, the date on which the first original application was filed. 4. 4. The main ground of challenge is based on the principle of 'no work no pay'. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India v. B.M.Jha [ (2007) 11 SCC 632 ] to buttress the argument and to canvass the position that notional promotion from a retrospective date cannot entitle the employee for arrears of salary. Annexure A1 is attempted to be justified on the ground that the conviction of the applicant being in force, in spite of release under the Probation of Offenders Act, a decision on the applicant's claim for promotion would depend upon the outcome of the criminal revision petition pending before this Court. Attention is drawn to O.M.No.22011/4/91-Estt.(A) dated 14.9.1992 which is the guidelines to be followed in the matter of promotion of Government servants against whom disciplinary/court proceedings are pending or whose conduct is under investigation. Placing reliance on Clause 3 of the O.M., it is contended that discretion is vested with the appointing authority to decide, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution, as to whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion and if so, to what extent. It is hence contended that, such discretion having been exercised by the appointing authority, there was no warrant for the Tribunal to have set aside Annexure A1 and directed payment of salary for a period of three years. Finally it is contended that the inordinate delay in filing the original application by itself was a ground for denying the relief. 5. We have given our anxious consideration to the contentions. The first contention is that the conviction being in force, in spite of the applicant having been released under the Probation of Offenders Act, was sufficient reason for non-consideration of the applicant for promotion. This ground was urged before the Tribunal in O.A.No.694 of 2010 and rejected as per Annexure A11 order, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: “12..... This ground was urged before the Tribunal in O.A.No.694 of 2010 and rejected as per Annexure A11 order, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: “12..... In this context, we further order that as the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, is being a special law, it should be applicable to the persons who are released under section 3 and 4 of Probation of Offenders Act and there shall not be any stigma attached to conviction rendered by a Criminal Court if such convictees are released under sections 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. If so, the respondents have to re-consider the case of the applicant and pass appropriate orders within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” 6. Annexure A11 order having attained finality and the respondents having issued Annexures A13 and A14 in terms of that order, the challenge based on the subsisting conviction cannot be entertained. 7. The second contention urged relying on the decision in B.M.Jha's case (supra), is that the applicant is not entitled for arrears of salary based on the principle of 'no work no pay'. From a reading of the judgment in B.M.Jha's case (supra), it is clear that the finding was rendered based on the factual position that the employee had not worked in the promotional post during the period for which notional promotion is granted. In the instant case, the specific averment of the applicant is that, even though he was not promoted, he had been doing the work of Senior Tax Assistant and Deputy Office Superintendent. Moreover, the facts of the present case show that the delay in promoting the applicant was the result of official apathy and that the applicant was not in any manner responsible for the delay. As such, the principle of 'no work no pay', which is the basis for the dictum in B.M.Jha's case (supra), cannot be pressed into service for denying arrears of salary to the applicant. 8. In O.M No.22011/4/91-Estt.(A) dated 14.9.1992, it has been specifically stated at Clause 3 that the authority has to record its reasons for denying arrears of salary or part of it to an employee granted notional promotion. No such reason having been stated in Annexure A1, the Office Memorandum does not further the case of the respondents in any manner. 9. In O.M No.22011/4/91-Estt.(A) dated 14.9.1992, it has been specifically stated at Clause 3 that the authority has to record its reasons for denying arrears of salary or part of it to an employee granted notional promotion. No such reason having been stated in Annexure A1, the Office Memorandum does not further the case of the respondents in any manner. 9. With respect to the contention that the original application was filed belatedly, we notice that the specific contention in the original application was that the applicant had approached the authorities immediately after revocation of his suspension and that the consistent reply of the respondent was that his claim for promotion could be considered only after the criminal appeal attained finality. The applicant has also pleaded that on his junior being promoted to the post of Deputy Office Superintendent with effect from 1.8.2009, Annexure A8 representation was filed on 11.3.2010 and the first original application (O.A.No.378 of 2010) was filed immediately thereafter. The unmitigated grievance of the applicant regarding his claim for promotion amounted to a continuing wrong and subsisted as a recurring cause of action till the applicant retired from service. The legal position on recurring cause of action in service parlance has been succinctly laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in M.R.Gupta v. Union of India and Others [ (1995) 5 SCC 628 ], the relevant portion of which reads as follows: “...The claim to be paid the correct salary computed on the basis of proper pay fixation, is a right which subsists during the entire tenure of service and can be exercised at the time of each payment of the salary when the employee is entitled to salary computed correctly in accordance with the rules. This right of a Government servant to be paid the correct salary throughout his tenure according to computation made in accordance with rules, is akin to the right of redemption which is an incident of a subsisting mortgage and subsists so long as the mortgage itself subsists, unless the equity of redemption is extinguished. It is settled that the right of redemption is of this kind. It is settled that the right of redemption is of this kind. (See Thota China Subba Rao and Others vs. Mattapalli Raju and Others, AIR 1950 Federal Court 1).” The applicant having submitted a written request for promotion and having approached the Tribunal prior to his retirement, the contention of the respondents that the claim for promotion was belatedly made is hence liable to be rejected. Further, as per the direction in O.A.No.378 of 2010, Annexure A8 representation was considered and Annexure A9 order issued. O.A.No.694 of 2010 was thereafter filed challenging Annexure A9 order and the Tribunal directed reconsideration of the representation as per Annexure A10 order. Accordingly, the representation was reconsidered and Annexures A13 and A14 orders issued. In the above factual background, it is not open for the respondents to contend that the original application was filed belatedly. All the grounds of challenge in the original petition having thus been found unsustainable, we dismiss the original petition. No order as to costs.