JUDGMENT : S. MANIKUMAR, J. 1. Aggrieved by the judgment in W.P.(C) No.12206/2019 dated 9th August, 2019, the writ petitioners have preferred instant Writ Appeal No.2125/2019. 2. Short facts as deduced from the material on record are that a notification under Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956(for short, 'the Act') was published in a local daily dated 15.02.2018. The first appellant raised objection on 19.03.2018. 3. According to the petitioners, the said objection was not considered in terms of Section 3C of the Act, as it was stated to have been made beyond the time prescribed under Section 3C of the Act. 4. Before the authority, the second appellant raised objection on 27.12.2018. According to him, the alignment was fixed without adverting to the fact that the land can be acquired from both sides of the existing road. According to the second appellant, taking land from one side alone was discriminatory and legally not sustainable. 5. Before the writ court, reliance was placed on the judgment of this court in W.P.(C) No.16393/2018 in which, he was one of the petitioners. Argument was also made before the writ court that without adverting to the directions of this court in W.P.(C) No.16393/2018, the competent authority has passed an order. 6. Before the writ court, learned counsel for the Project Director, National Highways Authority of India, Project Implementation Unit, Thiruvananthapuram has produced the proceedings of the Special Deputy Collector(LA-NH) Thiruvananthapuram No.376/19 dated 20.06.2019, wherein the Special Deputy Collector, Thiruvananthapuram has considered the objections of the writ petitioners. 7. Taking note of the above said proceedings, pleadings, submissions, and a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Dr. Kushala Shetty & others [ (2011) 12 SCC 69 ] the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. 8. Decision of the writ court is assailed on the following grounds: “A. The learned single judge went wrong in holding that the objection submitted by the 1st respondent is a belated one and the same cannot be considered as an objection in terms of Section 3C of the Act. It is submitted that Ext.P6 objection was preferred by the 1st appellant on 19.03.2018 against the notification under Section 3A of the Act which was published on 09.03.2018 in Malayala Manorama Daily. It is submitted that Ext.P6 objection was preferred by the 1st appellant on 19.03.2018 against the notification under Section 3A of the Act which was published on 09.03.2018 in Malayala Manorama Daily. Thus, considering the mandate under Section 3C of the Act, the competent authority is bound to hear objections raised by the land owners within 21 days from the last date of notification under Section 3A of the Act. Thus the finding regarding the above is erroneous and is liable to be interfered with. B. It is submitted that even though the National Highway Authority of India is the competent authority to fix the alignment they are bound to follow the well-established principles of natural justice and are not supposed to act in favour of any interested persons. Here in this case the stand taken by the competent authority and the 4th respondent is only with a view to frustrate the granting of relief in favour of the appellants. For that they have misled the court by stating that the uneven acquisition from the eastern side of the road has happened in order to straighten a curve in that stretch of the Highway. It is submitted that the disputed stretch of Highway is lying on a straight line. The learned single judge went wrong in relying on such an erroneous order without heeding to the request of the appellate for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner. C. It is submitted that the 1st appellant is running a hardware shop in his property which is proposed to be acquired and he will be deprived of his sole source of livelihood. The 2nd appellant is also having a commercial building in his property and the same would be demolished in the event of the proposed acquisition. By taking equal land from the western and eastern side of the road will certainly reduce the gravity of damage which may sustain by appellants in the event of present acquisition. The learned single judge has not taken into consideration these aspects by passing impugned judgment.” 9. By taking equal land from the western and eastern side of the road will certainly reduce the gravity of damage which may sustain by appellants in the event of present acquisition. The learned single judge has not taken into consideration these aspects by passing impugned judgment.” 9. Further, attention of this court is invited to an order dated 12th April, 2019 in W.P.(C) No.12206/2019 wherein, on the basis of Ext.P9 [True copy of letter issued by second respondent dated 04.02.2019], this court directed the Project Director, National Highways Authority of India, Project Implementation Unit, Thiruvananthapuram, respondent No.4 to hear the petitioner in regard to the objection raised on the alignment and until then directed the Land Acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector(LA), Collectorate, Thiruvananthapuram, respondent No.2 to await the decision of the 4th respondent-Project Officer, for passing final orders. 10. Inviting the attention of this court to the memo dated 20.06.2019 and the Google Map enclosed, Mr. Ramesh Chand, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there is mala fide on the part of the Special Deputy Collector(LA-NH) Thiruvananthapuram in stating that there is a small curve which according to the learned counsel for the appellants does not exist. 11. Per contra, Smt. I. Sheeladevi, learned counsel for National Highways Authority of India submitted that as per the direction of this court dated 12th April, 2019 in W.P.(C) No.12206/2019, an opportunity of hearing was given to the writ petitioners on 16.05.2019, report of the Project Officer was considered and thereafter, the Special Deputy Collector(LA-NH) Thiruvananthapuram, respondent No.2, vide order dated 20.06.2019 has informed that the writ petitioners' complaint against the alignment cannot be considered. Thus, she has prayed to sustain the order impugned in this appeal. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 13. Before adverting to the rival submissions, this court deems it fit to consider few decisions relating to challenge made to the acquisition proceedings initiated under the National Highways Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another v. State of Maharashtra & others ( 1997 (1) SCC 134 ) held as follows: “Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with china economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as "Asian tigers", e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernisation. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are generally in shape of writ petitions filed on High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power or grant in stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 -indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lumpsum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lumpsum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings. 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Dr. Kushala Shetty & others reported in 2011(2) SCC 69, at paragraph 24, held as follows: “Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the field of development and maintenance of National Highways. The projects involving construction of new highways and widening and development of the existing highways, which are vital for development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating to development and maintenance of National Highways after thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project reports are prepared keeping in view the relative factors including intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The Courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular alignment would subserve the larger public interest. In such matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The Court can nullify the acquisition of land and, in rarest of rare cases, the particular project, if it is found to be ex-facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides. In the case in hand, neither any violation of mandate of the 1956 Act has been established nor the charge of malice in fact has been proved. Therefore, the order under challenge cannot be sustained.” 15. In the case in hand, neither any violation of mandate of the 1956 Act has been established nor the charge of malice in fact has been proved. Therefore, the order under challenge cannot be sustained.” 15. In P.G. Purushothaman Pillai and Others v. Union of India and others[W.A. No.1553/2019], a Hon'ble Division Bench of Madras High Court held that the correctness of the order of a learned Single Judge, on the facts and circumstances, held thus: “After having heard all the parties concerned in extenso and after going the factual aspects raised by the 3rd respondent-NHAI in their written statement filed with the above W.P.(C) have not been effectively rebutted or controverted by the petitioners, on the basis of any objective materials of unimpeachable credibility. It is well settled that this court exercising powers of judicial review in public law proceedings, has got only limited role to gauge and assess the factual aspects, more particularly, to adjudge as to whether the impugned alignment adopted by the respondents after multilevel consultations and expert preparation and finalization, could be branded as faulty by this court. The sum and substance of the case of the petitioners is that this court should venture into the fact finding field to assess the pros and cons of the impugned alignment adopted and finalised by the respondents through their expertise and competence, with the alternate proposal and factual versions projected by the petitioners. The Apex Court in the dictum laid down in the case in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory, reported in (2005) 13 SCC 477 : 2006 KHC 156, has held that the right to raise objections conferred by Sec. 3C(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956, is extremely limited in character and that it is not for the writ court to decide on the alignment for acquisition since such alignment is to be fixed after due scientific and technical studies. So also, it has been held by the Apex Court in a series of cases as in State of Punjab & Anr. v. Gurdial Singh & Ors., reported in (1980) 2 SCC 471 and Shukla V.S. & Ors., v. NHAI & Ors., reported in 2013 KHC 2619, that a writ court exercising public law remedy of judicial review may not be justified in considering the feasibility of alternative elements in the absence of any established plea of manifest mala fides etc. v. Gurdial Singh & Ors., reported in (1980) 2 SCC 471 and Shukla V.S. & Ors., v. NHAI & Ors., reported in 2013 KHC 2619, that a writ court exercising public law remedy of judicial review may not be justified in considering the feasibility of alternative elements in the absence of any established plea of manifest mala fides etc. It has also been held in the judgment of Apex Court in UOI v. Kushala Shetty & Ors. Reported in (2011) 12 SCC 69 , that a writ court cannot decide upon the viability and feasibility of a particular project unless it is ex-facie found to be contrary to law or is tainted due to palpable mala fide etc. In the light of the above well settled legal position and in view of the indisputable facts and circumstances emerging in this case, this court is of the view that it is not right and proper for this court to invoke the extraordinary remedy of judicial review to interdict the impugned land acquisition proceedings in this case. Moreover the 2nd respondent NHAI has clearly stated in their pleadings that though the impugned land acquisition proceedings have been set in motion under the National Highways Act, 1956, the petitioners and other similar persons affected by the said acquisition proceedings will be given compensation under the new enactment of 2013, viz., The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 as amended. So the petitioners cannot urge that any discrimination is shown to them who are subjected to the acquisition under the National Highway Act, 1956, vis-A-vis, acquisition under the 2013 Act, etc.” 16. Giving due consideration to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, a Hon'ble Division Bench of the Madras High Court, in P.G. Purushothaman Pillai(cited supra), concurred thus: “We have applied our mind to the above reasoning which led to dismissal of the Writ Petition. No infirmity is however seen in the impugned judgment. Besides, the limited scope for objection under Section 3C of The National Highways Act, 1956 has to be noticed and also the well merited decision of the competent authority on the objection raised by the land owners.” 17. On the aspect of judicial review on administrative decision, we deem it to consider few decisions. “(i) In Council of Civil Service Unions Vs. On the aspect of judicial review on administrative decision, we deem it to consider few decisions. “(i) In Council of Civil Service Unions Vs. Minister for the Civil Service, reported in (1984) 3 All ER 935 Lord Diplock enunciated three grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review, viz. (i) illegality (ii) irrationality and (iii) procedural impropriety, as follows: “By "illegality" he means that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it, and whether he has or has not, is a justiciable question; by "irrationality" he means "Wednesbury unreasonableness". It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided, could have arrived at it; and by "procedural impropriety" he means not only failure to observe the basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness, but also failure to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which the tribunal's jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice." (ii) The principle of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" or irrationality, classified by Lord Diplock as one of the grounds for intervention in judicial review, was lucidly summarised by Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. Vs. Wednesbury Corpn., reported in (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 as follows: "...the court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view of seeing whether it has taken into account matters which it ought not to take into account, or conversely, has refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which it ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that the local authority, nevertheless, have come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere." (iii) In State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that the local authority, nevertheless, have come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere." (iii) In State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Johri Mal, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 714 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: "The scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of the omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law or do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court." (iv) In Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. (VI) v. Union of India & Anr., reported in (2006) 2 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus, "A person entrusted with discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his attention to matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules he may truly be said to be acting unreasonably. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. It is an unwritten rule of law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to be subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote." (v) In Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel v. Anilbhai Jayanitbhai Patel and Ors., reported in 2006 (8) SCC 200 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para 18 observed as under:- "18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. In other words, when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision." The following passage from Professor Bernard Schwartz's book Administrative Law (Third Edition) aptly echo's our thoughts on the scope of judicial review: "Reviewing courts, the cases are now insisting, may not simply renounce their responsibility by mumbling an indiscriminate litany of deference to expertise. Due deference to the agency does not mean abdication of the duty of judicial review and rubber-stamping of agency action : [W]e must accord the agency considerable, but not too much deference; it is entitled to exercise its discretion, but only so far and no further." Quoting Judge Leventhal from Greater Boston Television Corp. Vs. FCC, 444 F. 2d 841 (D.C.Cir. 1970), he further says: "...the reviewing court must intervene if it “becomes aware...that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making..." (vi) In Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad Ltd. and others Vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 645 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paras 50 and 51 observed as under:- "50. There should be judicial restraint while making judicial review in administrative matters. Union of India and others, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 645 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paras 50 and 51 observed as under:- "50. There should be judicial restraint while making judicial review in administrative matters. Where irrelevant aspects have been eschewed from consideration and no relevant aspect has been ignored and the administrative decisions have nexus with the facts on record, there is no scope for interference. The duty of the court is (a) to confine itself to the question of legality; (b) to decide whether the decision making authority exceeded its powers (c) committed an error of law (d) committed breach of the rules of natural justice and (e) reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached or (f) abused its powers. Administrative action is subject to control by judicial review in the following manner: (i) Illegality.-This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. (vii) Professor De Smith in his classical work "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" 4th Edition at pages 285-287 states the legal position in his own terse language that the relevant principles formulated by the Courts may be broadly summarized as follows. The authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorized to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (I) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (I) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. (viii) The court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above; like illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety." (vii) In Bank of India v. T.Jogram reported in 2007 (7) SCC 236 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is well settled principle of law that Judicial review is not against the decision, but is against the decision making process. (viii) In State of Maharashtra v. Prakash Prahland Patil reported in 2009 (12) SCC 159 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 5 and 6, held as follows: “5. The scope for judicial review has been examined by this court in several cases. It has been consistently held that the power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the supreme lex to other organs of the State. A mere wrong decision, without anything more, in most of the cases will not be sufficient to attract the power of judicial review. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon a court is limited to see that the authority concerned functions within its limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice. 6. The courts cannot be called upon to undertake governmental duties and functions. Courts should not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. While exercising power of judicial review the court is more concerned with the decision making process than the merit of the decision itself.” (ix) In All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K.Shyam Kumar reported in 2010 (6) SCC 614 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows: “22. Judicial review conventionally is concerned with the question of jurisdiction and natural justice and the Court is not much concerned with the merits of the decision but how the decision was reached. Judicial review conventionally is concerned with the question of jurisdiction and natural justice and the Court is not much concerned with the merits of the decision but how the decision was reached. In Council of Civil Service Unions Vs. Minister of State for Civil Service (1984) 3 All ER 935 the (GCHQ Case) the House of Lords rationalized the grounds of judicial review and ruled that the basis of judicial review could be highlighted under three principal heads, namely, illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. Illegality as a ground of judicial review means that the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making powers and must give effect to it. Grounds such as acting ultra vires, errors of law and/or fact, onerous conditions, improper purpose, relevant and irrelevant factors, acting in bad faith, fettering discretion, unauthorized delegation, failure to act etc., fall under the heading "illegality". Procedural impropriety may be due to the failure to comply with the mandatory procedures such as breach of natural justice, such as audi alteram partem, absence of bias, the duty to act fairly, legitimate expectations, failure to give reasons etc. 23. Ground of irrationality takes in Wednesbury unreasonableness propounded in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947)2 All ER 680, Lord Greene MR alluded to the grounds of attack which could be made against the decision, citing unreasonableness as an `umbrella concept' which covers the major heads of review and pointed out that the court can interfere with a decision if it is so absurd that no reasonable decision maker would in law come to it. In GCHQ Case (supra) Lord Diplock fashioned the principle of unreasonableness and preferred to use the term irrationality as follows: "By `irrationality' I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as "Wednesbury's unreasonableness", ....... It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it." 24. In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind (1991) 1 All ER 720, the House of Lords re-examined the reasonableness of the exercise of the Home Secretary's discretion to issue a notice banning the transmission of speech by representatives of the Irish Republican Army and its political party, Sinn Fein. In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind (1991) 1 All ER 720, the House of Lords re-examined the reasonableness of the exercise of the Home Secretary's discretion to issue a notice banning the transmission of speech by representatives of the Irish Republican Army and its political party, Sinn Fein. Court ruled that the exercise of the Home Secretary's power did not amount to an unreasonable exercise of discretion despite the issue involving a denial of freedom of expression. House of Lords however, stressed that in all cases raising a human rights issue proportionality is the appropriate standard of review. 25. The House of Lords in R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001) 2 AC 532 demonstrated how the traditional test of Wednesbury unreasonableness has moved towards the doctrine of necessity and proportionality. Lord Steyn noted that the criteria of proportionality are more precise and more sophisticated than traditional grounds of review and went on to outline three concrete differences between the two:- (1) Proportionality may require the reviewing Court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions. (2) Proportionality test may go further than the traditional grounds of review in as much as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations. (3) Even the heightened scrutiny test is not necessarily appropriate to the protection of human rights. Lord Steyn also felt most cases would be decided in the same way whatever approach is adopted, though conceded for human right cases proportionality is the appropriate test. 26. The question arose as to whether doctrine of proportionality applies only where fundamental human rights are in issue or whether it will come to provide all aspects of judicial review. Lord Steyn in R. (Alconbury Development Limited) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2001) 2 All ER 929 stated as follows:- "I consider that even without reference to the Human Rights Act, 1998 the time has come to recognize that this principle (proportionality) is part of English administrative law not only when Judges are dealing with Community acts but also when they are dealing with acts subject to domestic law. Trying to keep the Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate compartments seems to me to be unnecessary and confusing". Lord Steyn was of the opinion that the difference between both the principles was in practice much less than it was sometimes suggested and whatever principle was applied the result in the case was the same. 27. Whether the proportionality will ultimately supersede the concept of reasonableness or rationality was also considered by Dyson Lord Justice in R. (Association of British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of State for Defence [2003] QB 1397 and stated as follows:- "We have difficulty in seeing what justification there now is for retaining Wednesbury test ..... but we consider that it is not for this Court to perform burial rights. The continuing existence of the Wednesbury test has been acknowledged by House of Lords on more than one occasion. A survey of the various judgments of House of Lords, Court of Appeals, etc. would reveal for the time being both the tests continued to co-exist." 28. Position in English Administrative Law is that both the tests that is. Wednesbury and proportionality continue to co-exist and the proportionality test is more and more applied, when there is violation of human rights, and fundamental freedom and the Wednesbury finds its presence more on the domestic law when there is violations of citizens ordinary rights. Proportionality principle has not so far replaced the Wednesbury principle and the time has not reached to say good bye to Wednesbury much less its burial. 29. In Huang case (2007) 4 All ER 15 (HL), the House of Lords was concerned with the question whether denial of asylum infringes Article 8 (Right to Respect Family Life) of the Human Rights Act, 1998. House of Lords ruled that it was the duty of the authorities when faced with individuals who did not qualify under the rules to consider whether the refusal of asylum status was unlawful on the ground that it violated the individual's right to family life. A structured proportionality test has emerged from that decision in the context of the violation of human rights. In R (Daly) (supra) the House of Lords considered both common law and Article 8 of the convention and ruled that the policy of excluding prisoners from their cells while prison officers conducted searches, which included scrutinizing privileged legal correspondence was unlawful. 30. In R (Daly) (supra) the House of Lords considered both common law and Article 8 of the convention and ruled that the policy of excluding prisoners from their cells while prison officers conducted searches, which included scrutinizing privileged legal correspondence was unlawful. 30. Both the above-mentioned cases, mainly concerned with the violation of human rights under the Human Rights Act, 1998 but demonstrated the movement away from the traditional test of Wednesbury unreasonableness towards the test of proportionality. But it is not safe to conclude that the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality. 31. Justice S.B. Sinha, as His Lordship then was, speaking for the Bench in State of U.P., v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava and Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 276 after referring to the judgment of the Court of appeal in Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2005) 3 All ER 435, R. v. Secretary of State of the Home Department, ex parte Daly (2001) 3 All ER 433 (HL) opined that Wednesbury principle may not now be held to be applicable in view of the development in constitutional law and held as follows:- "24. While saying so, we are not oblivious of the fact that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality. 25. It is interesting to note that the Wednesbury principles may not now be held to be applicable in view of the development in constitutional law in this behalf. See, for example, Huang v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt. wherein referring to R. v. Secretary of State of the Home Department, ex parte Daly, it was held that in certain cases, the adjudicator may require to conduct a judicial exercise which is not merely more intrusive than Wednesbury, but involves a full-blown merit judgment, which is yet more than ex p. Daly, requires on a judicial review where the court has to decide a proportionality issue." 32. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava case was later followed in Indian Airlines Ltd., v. Indian Airlines Ltd., v. Prabha D.Kanan (2006) 11 SCC 67 . Following the above mentioned two judgments in Jitendra Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Another (2008) 2 SCC 161 , the Bench has referred to a passage in HWR Wade and CF Forsyth on Administrative Law, 9th Edition. Following the above mentioned two judgments in Jitendra Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Another (2008) 2 SCC 161 , the Bench has referred to a passage in HWR Wade and CF Forsyth on Administrative Law, 9th Edition. (2004), pages 371-372 with the caption "Goodbye to Wednesbury" and quoted from the book which reads as follows:- "The Wednesbury doctrine is now in terminal decline but the coup de grace has not yet fallen, despite calls for it from very high authorities" and opined that in some jurisdictions the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to doctrine of proportionality." 33. Indian Airlines Ltd.'s case and Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava's case (supra) were again followed in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Hazarilal, (2008) 3 SCC 273 and the Bench opined as follows:- "Furthermore the legal parameters of judicial review have undergone a change. Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality.". 34. With due respect, we are unable to subscribe to that view, which is an overstatement of the English Administrative Law. 35. Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness as such has not been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality though that test is being applied more and more when violation of human rights is alleged. H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth in the 10th Edition of Administrative Law (2009), has omitted the passage quoted by this court in Jitender Kumar case and stated as follows: "Notwithstanding the apparent persuasiveness of these views the coup de grace has not yet fallen on Wednesbury unreasonableness. Where a matter falls outside the ambit of 1998 Act, the doctrine is regularly relied upon by the courts. Reports of its imminent demise are perhaps exaggerated." (emphasis applied). 36. Wednesbury and Proportionality -Wednesbury applies to a decision which is so reprehensible in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral or ethical standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the issue to be decided could have arrived at it. Proportionality as a legal test is capable of being more precise and fastidious than a reasonableness test as well as requiring a more intrusive review of a decision made by a public authority which requires the courts to `assess the balance or equation' struck by the decision maker. Proportionality as a legal test is capable of being more precise and fastidious than a reasonableness test as well as requiring a more intrusive review of a decision made by a public authority which requires the courts to `assess the balance or equation' struck by the decision maker. Proportionality test in some jurisdictions is also described as the "least injurious means" or "minimal impairment" test so as to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens and to ensure a fair balance between individual rights and public interest. Suffice to say that there has been an overlapping of all these tests in its content and structure, it is difficult to compartmentalize or lay down a straight jacket formula and to say that Wednesbury has met with its death knell is too tall a statement. Let us, however, recognize the fact that the current trend seems to favour proportionality test but Wednesbury has not met with its judicial burial and a state burial, with full honours is surely not to happen in the near future. 37. Proportionality, requires the Court to judge whether action taken was really needed as well as whether it was within the range of courses of action which could reasonably be followed. Proportionality is more concerned with the aims and intention of the decision-maker and whether the decision-maker has achieved more or less the correct balance or equilibrium. Courts entrusted with the task of judicial review has to examine whether decision taken by the authority is proportionate, i.e. well balanced and harmonious, to this extent court may indulge in a merit review and if the court finds that the decision is proportionate, it seldom interferes with the decision taken and if it finds that the decision is disproportionate i.e. if the court feels that it is not well balanced or harmonious and does not stand to reason it may tend to interfere. 38. Leyland and Anthony on Textbook on Administrative Law (5th edn. OUP, 2005) at p.331 has amply put as follows: "Proportionality works on the assumption that administrative action ought not to go beyond what is necessary to achieve its desired results (in every day terms, that you should not use a sledgehammer to crack a nut) and in contrast to irrationality is often understood to bring the courts much closer to reviewing the merits of a decision". 39. 39. Courts have to develop an indefeasible and principled approach to proportionality till that is done there will always be an overlapping between the traditional grounds of review and the principle of proportionality and the cases would continue to be decided in the same manner whichever principle is adopted. Proportionality as the word indicates has reference to variables or comparison, it enables the Court to apply the principle with various degrees of intensity and offers a potentially deeper inquiry into the reasons, projected by the decision maker.” (x) In Union of India v. Rajasthan High Court reported in 2017 (2) SCC 599 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 13, while discussing the scope of judicial review, held as follows: “13. ........The powers under Article 226 are wide – wide enough to reach out to injustice wherever it may originate. These powers have been construed liberally and have been applied expansively where human rights have been violated. But, the notion of injustice is relatable to justice under the law. Justice should not be made to depend upon the individual perception of a decision maker on where a balance or solution should lie. Judges are expected to apply standards which are objective and well defined by law and founded upon constitutional principle. When they do so, judges walk the path on a road well-travelled. When judicial creativity leads judges to roads less travelled, in search of justice, they have yet to remain firmly rooted in law and the Constitution. The distinction between what lies within and what lies outside the power of judicial review is necessary to preserve the sanctity of judicial power. Judicial power is respected and adhered to in a system based on the rule of law precisely for its nuanced and restrained exercise. If these restraints are not maintained the court as an institution would invite a justifiable criticism of encroaching upon a terrain on which it singularly lacks expertise and which is entrusted for governance to the legislative and executive arms of government. Judgments are enforced, above all, because of the belief which society and arms of governance of a democratic society hold in the sanctity of the judicial process. This sanctity is based on institutional prestige. Institutional authority is established over long years, by a steadfast commitment to a calibrated exercise of judicial power. Judgments are enforced, above all, because of the belief which society and arms of governance of a democratic society hold in the sanctity of the judicial process. This sanctity is based on institutional prestige. Institutional authority is established over long years, by a steadfast commitment to a calibrated exercise of judicial power. Fear of consequences is one reason why citizens obey the law as well as judicial decisions. But there are far stronger reasons why they do so and the foundation for that must be carefully preserved. That is the rationale for the principle that judicial review is confined to cases where there is a breach of law or of the Constitution.” (xi) In Royal Medical Trust v. Union of India reported in 2017 (16) SCC 605 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the scope of judicial review, held as follows: “The principle of judicial review by the constitutional courts have been lucidly stated in many an authority of this Court. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, dealing with the concept of Judicial Review, the Court held:- “Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment proclaimed: ‘Judicial review’ is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficial power.” Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in their work Judicial Review (1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say: “If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a mere obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher judiciary of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the Law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Butcher v. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18-3-1991.” Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court’s ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court’s ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself.” 44. After so stating, reference was made to the law enunciated in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141 wherein, it has been ruled:- “Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. * * * Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power.” 45. In the said case, the Court also referred to R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex. P. Datafin plc (1987) 1 All ER 564 wherein Sir John Donaldson, M.R. Commented:- “An application for judicial review is not an appeal.” 46. The three Judge Bench further held:- “The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers.” 47. The Court further opined that in the process of judicial review, it is only concerned with the manner in which the decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty is to act fairly. It will vary from case to case. Explicating further, it ruled:- “Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. Explicating further, it ruled:- “Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind, Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, “consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention”. 48. Thereafter, the Court referred to the authorities in R. v. Askew, (1768) 4 Burr 2186 : 98 ER 139 and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, (1985) 1 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 and further expressed:- “At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice, 1993, Vol. 1, pp. 849-850, may be quoted: “4. Wednesbury principle.— A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., per Lord Greene, M.R.)” We may hasten to add, though the decision was rendered in the context of justification of grant of contract but the principles set out as regards the judicial review are of extreme significance. 49. Discussing at length, the principle of judicial review in many a decision, the two Judge Bench in Reliance Telecom Ltd. & Another v. Union of India & Another, (2017) 4 SCC 269 , has held:- “As we find, the decision taken by the Central Government is based upon certain norms and parameters. Though criticism has been advanced that it is perverse and irrational, yet we are disposed to think that it is a policy decision which subserves the consumers’ interest. Though criticism has been advanced that it is perverse and irrational, yet we are disposed to think that it is a policy decision which subserves the consumers’ interest. It is extremely difficult to say that the decision to conduct the auction in such a manner can be considered to be mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.” 50. Thus analysed, it is evincible that the exercise of power of judicial review and the extent to which it has to be done will vary from case to case. It is necessary to state with emphasis that it has its own complexity and would depend upon the factual projection. The broad principles have been laid down in Tata Cellular (supra) and other decisions make it absolutely clear that judicial review, by no stretch of imagination, can be equated with the power of appeal, for while exercising the power under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution, the constitutional courts do not exercise such power. The process of adjudication on merit by re-appreciation of the materials brought on record which is the duty of the appellate court is not permissible. 51. The duty of the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review to zealously guard the human rights, fundamental rights and the citizens’ right of life and liberty as also many non-statutory powers of governmental bodies as regards their control over property and assets of various kinds. (See : Union of India and Anr. v S.B. Vohra)” 19. A reading of the above judgments and the judgment impugned in this appeal, makes it clear that the writ court has considered the viability and feasibility of a particular project and whether the particular alignment would subserve larger public interest. Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Dr. Kushala Shetty(cited supra) has made it clear that in such matters the scope of judicial review is very limited. Further held that the court can nullify the acquisition of land and, a particular project, in rarest of rare cases, if it is found to be ex-facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides. 20. Kushala Shetty(cited supra) has made it clear that in such matters the scope of judicial review is very limited. Further held that the court can nullify the acquisition of land and, a particular project, in rarest of rare cases, if it is found to be ex-facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides. 20. Though Mr.Ramesh Chand, learned counsel for the appellants made a feeble attempt to contend that there is mala fides on the part of the Project Officer, in picturing that there is a small curve, which according to the learned counsel for the appellant is not there, such fact, even taken for granted as erroneous, would not enable the appellants to raise a ground on alignment. Keeping in mind the pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the view that there is no mala fides on the part of the project officer, respondent No.2. In the light of the above decision and discussion, we are of the view that the appellants have not made out a case for interference. Resultantly, writ appeal is dismissed. No costs.