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2019 DIGILAW 827 (GUJ)

Rajesh Chamanlal Tank v. Narmada Water Resource and Kalpsar Department

2019-09-30

N.V.ANJARIA

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JUDGMENT : N.V. ANJARIA, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. N.L. Ramnani for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Manan Mehta for the respondents, at length. 1.1. Learned advocates for the respective parties stated that pleadings were complete and they argued the petition finally. 2. What is prayed by the petitioner is to set aside chargesheet dated 17th October, 2011 as well as revised chargesheet dated 03rd June, 2014 issued to the petitioner. It is further prayed to set aside the Departmental Inquiry No. 141 of 2016 and to exonerate the petitioner from all the charges levelled against him. 3. The facts in the background are inter alia that the petitioner had been serving as Executive Engineer during the period from 1996 to 1999 under respondent No. 2 - Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited. He was in charge of the work of Minors Off-Taking from Aachhod Distributary Canal. The petitioner was served with chargesheet dated 17th October, 2011 under Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 by respondent No. 1 - Narmada Water Resources and Kalpsar Department. It was alleged against the petitioner that during the period from 23rd February, 1996 to 10th September, 1999, when the petitioner had been serving as above, petitioner had initiated proposal to sanction estimated additions in the earth work quantity and that he sanctioned the rate to be paid for the excess quantity above 130%. It was further alleged that the petitioner had shown the ground level below the full supply level to compare consultant's report and thereby contributed to cause a loss to the department to the tune of Rs. 01,53,05,010/-. It was alleged that the petitioner and other line officers were jointly responsible for the same. The petitioner filed reply dated 28th February, 2012 to the said chargesheet. 3.1. The petitioner retired from service on 31st July, 2013 upon attaining the age of superannuation. Till the date of retirement of the petitioner, inquiry officer was not appointed in relation to the aforesaid chargesheet. After the petitioner stood retired, a revised chargesheet dated 03rd June, 2014, being the second chargesheet, came to be issued to him. The petitioner filed reply to the second chargesheet on 19th August, 2014. It is the case of the petitioner that both the chargesheets were given to him without furnishing the supporting documents. Inquiry officer was appointed as late as on 21st May, 2016. 3.2. The petitioner filed reply to the second chargesheet on 19th August, 2014. It is the case of the petitioner that both the chargesheets were given to him without furnishing the supporting documents. Inquiry officer was appointed as late as on 21st May, 2016. 3.2. It is the case of the petitioner that on 29th August, 2016 first sitting in the inquiry proceedings was held and at that stage also, necessary documents in support of the allegations were not given. The inquiry took place on one or two dates but the documents were not given to him despite his request and demand. It is in light of the aforesaid basic facts that the present petition with the prayers above to set aside the chargesheet is filed. 4. The petition was contested by the respondents by filing affidavit-in-reply, in which it was stated that the chargesheet dated 17th October, 2011 was issued for two charges which included misconduct on part of the petitioner wherein he had allegedly caused loss to the department. It was stated that the second chargesheet was issued after due approval on 03rd June, 2014. It was submitted that the inquiry officer was set to examine the witness on 09th May, 2017. It was claimed that the petitioner's grievance about non-supply of documents was not justified. 5. The striking aspect of the case is that the first chargesheet against the petitioner was issued on 17th October, 2011 which was in relation to the alleged conduct on part of the petitioners which took place before 12 years. The chargesheet related to the period from 23rd February, 1996 to 12th September, 1999. The inquiry officer was not appointed till the petitioner retired on 31st July, 2013. The respondents proceeded to issue another chargesheet. Inquiry officer was appointed as late as on 21st May, 2016 which was after five years from the date of issuance of the chargesheet. 5.1. While the petitioner has relied on Circular of General Administration Department dated 25th February, 2011 which advocated expeditious disposal of the inquiry proceedings, even otherwise it was well settled that unreasonable delay in taking and completing the departmental action against the government servant would vitiate the whole proceedings. The courts have viewed the delay in the inquiry proceedings as a factor which by itself leads to prejudice to the rights of the delinquent. 5.2. The courts have viewed the delay in the inquiry proceedings as a factor which by itself leads to prejudice to the rights of the delinquent. 5.2. In Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society [ (2013) 6 SCC 515 ] the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 14 with regard to belated conduct of inquiry that whether the court would be inclined to quash the departmental proceedings on the ground of delay would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. It was observed that though ordinarily the court should not set aside the departmental inquiry or quashed the charges on the ground of delay in initiation in the proceedings, the test of prejudice caused by delay may be a overriding consideration. The court must weigh all the facts to finally make up its mind. 5.3. In M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [ (2006) 5 SCC 88 ] the issue of belated commencement of departmental inquiry was dealt with by the Apex Court to observe that the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and they continued for a period of seven years. It was stated that thus initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuation thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer. 5.4. The Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738] also leaned towards quashment of the proceedings on the ground of delay which, according to the Apex Court, occasioned prejudice. It was observed and held thus, "The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry are said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to thing that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to thing that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage." (Para 4) 5.5. In P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board [ (2005) 6 SCC 636 ] the Supreme Court considered the aspect of delay of 10 years in initiating the departmental inquiry against the appellant, where no convincing explanation was given for such delay. The Supreme Court took view that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings on such distance of time would be very prejudicial to the appellant. It was observed that the appellant already suffered enough on account of inordinate delay. 5.6. Quashing the charge memo, it was held that protracted action against government employee would operate prejudicial to him and has to be avoided, "Under the circumstances, allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer." (Para 12) 5.7. In Kiritbhai Shankar Patel v. State of Gujarat [ 2019 (2) GLR 1079 ] same question was examined by this Court. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer." (Para 12) 5.7. In Kiritbhai Shankar Patel v. State of Gujarat [ 2019 (2) GLR 1079 ] same question was examined by this Court. Inquiry was initiated against the petitioner after gap of 10 years from the incident. Petitioner was found to be not guilty by the inquiry officer. Disciplinary authority took seven years in expressing its disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer. The Court considered the provisions of law laid down in Anant R. Kulkarni (supra), M.V. Bijlani (supra) and Bani Singh (supra) to come to the conclusion that delay was fatal for the department and resulted into prejudice to the petitioner-delinquent. 6. Reverting to the facts of the present case, chargesheet to the petitioner was issued after gap of 12 years from the time of the incident alleged. Inquiry officer was not appointed for the period of more than four years. In the meantime, petitioner retired in the year 2013. The chargesheet was revised and issued for the second time soon after petitioner's retirement. Thus, the delay, lethargy and apathy on part of the department was manifest at every stage. In the aforesaid view, the inquiry proceedings after such unreasonable and gross delay could not be allowed to sustain against the petitioner, as allowing the inquiry proceedings to proceed after such delay would be harsh, inequitable arbitrary and against the principles of fairness. The factor of delay itself has to be held to be the cause of prejudice to the petitioner in defending the charges. 7. In light of the foregoing discussion and reasons, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in respect of its substantive prayer. The chargesheet dated 17th October, 2011 and the revised chargesheet dated 03rd June, 2014 given to the petitioner are hereby set aside and the Departmental Inquiry No. 141 of 2016 stands quashed on the ground of gross delay. Petition is allowed. Direct service is permitted.