ORDER: T.V.ANILKUMAR J. The only two questions that arise in this revision filed by the landlords are whether (i) the need set up by them is bona fide and (ii) Whether the respondent/tenant is entitled to protection from eviction under first Proviso to Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'the Act'). No other points were argued by the learned counsel on either side. 2. The revision petitioners are the mother and two children. In the eviction proceeding instituted before the courts below, she represented her son who is the 2nd petitioner through a power of attorney executed on 27.03.2012 in her favour. The subject matter of eviction proceeding consists of two shop rooms bearing door Nos.KMC-I-1113 and I-1106 situated in Kanhangad Municipality. The respondent is conducting an ice-cream parlour cum bakery in these two shop rooms under a tenancy arrangement with the landlords. The mother, the 3rd revision petitioner was the previous owner of the shop rooms and later on, under Ext.A3 settlement deed dated 06.11.2010, she transferred the ownership and possession of the rooms in favour of her children, who are revision petitioners 1 and 2, after reserving with her a limited right to receive rent of the premises. 3. The 2nd revision petitioner-son is an Accountant serving in U.A.E. He is living abroad with his family. While so, he suffered a cardiac arrest on 01.02.2012 and consequently, he was taken for treatment to Pariyaram Medical College in Kerala where he is said to have undergone angioplasty and received allied treatments for one month. He claims to have thereafter, taken a firm decision to shift from abroad and settle in the native place with family, on account of his alleged deteriorating ill-health as well as the work pressure which he found difficult to cope with. He, therefore, needed to run a bakery cum fruit shop in the tenanted premises after evicting the respondent. He claimed that there were no other suitable shop rooms in the possession of revision petitioners for conducting the proposed business. 4. The tenant/respondent denied the bona fide need on behalf of the second revision petitioner and asserted that the eviction proceeding was nothing, but a mere ruse to evict him. He claimed that there were no other suitable shop rooms in the possession of revision petitioners for conducting the proposed business. 4. The tenant/respondent denied the bona fide need on behalf of the second revision petitioner and asserted that the eviction proceeding was nothing, but a mere ruse to evict him. He also denied the 2nd revision petitioner to be in any state of ill-health or being disabled from doing his sedentary work at U.A.E. According to him, the 2nd revision petitioner is gainfully employed and drawing handsome salary from his permanent employment, which has a fixed term till the completion of 60 years of age and further his family is also permanently settled at U.A.E. He has no intention at all to start any business in the schedule shop rooms. Referring to Ext.B2 eviction order dated 10.03.1998 passed by the Rent Control Court, Hosdurg in R.C.P. No.16 of 1996, the tenant contended that the 2nd revision petitioner sought eviction of previous tenant from these rooms, urging bona fide need through his mother, who was the then previous landlord and on taking delivery of the premises in the year 2004, he left for U.A.E. in search of job, after inducting the present respondent. This conduct, according to respondent, would indicate that the present eviction proceedings are also the result of the mala fide intention to drive him out. He has also contended that the revision petitioners have sufficient number of buildings in their possession for satisfying the alleged business need set up on behalf of the 2nd revision petitioner. 5. As regards the benefit claimed by the respondent under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, both courts below concluded on evidence that the respondent did not depend mainly on the income derived from the business carried on in the tenanted shop rooms and further failed to prove that alternative buildings were not available in the locality for shifting his business. This concurrent finding does not suffer from any illegality, impropriety or irregularity and therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the above finding in the revision. 6. This concurrent finding does not suffer from any illegality, impropriety or irregularity and therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the above finding in the revision. 6. As regards the first proviso also, both the courts below have concurrently found that the revision petitioners have no alternative buildings to start the proposed business and the documents produced by the respondent before the lower court did not refer to any vacant building in the alleged possession of the revision petitioners. But, as regards the need under Section 11(3) projected by the revision petitioners is concerned, there is divergent finding between the Rent Control Court upholding landlord's claim to be bona fide and the Rent Control Appellate Authority rejecting the said claim as untenable. 7. The Rent Control court held that the 2nd revision petitioner's need for starting the business was genuine, since he was reduced to a state of ill-health, after he suffered a cardiac arrest in the year 2012 and further his decision to shift his family from U.A.E. was convincing and reasonable. Other contentions based on the previous conduct of the second petitioner with respect to Ext.B2 eviction proceeding were rejected. On the other hand, the Appellate Authority disagreed with the finding that the 2nd revision petitioner's need was genuine and went to the extent of holding that what he conceived as his need was only a mere wish or a desire, which was yet to blossom into a genuine need to attract eviction under Section 11(3). The bona fides of the need set up was doubted mainly for the reason that second petitioner did not exhibit the genuineness of the need by giving up the job abroad and settling down at native place with family till date. 8. We heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and the respondent. 9. The 2nd revision petitioner, who was the sole witness examined in the case said that he was still continuing his employment abroad and children were also being educated there. He conceded that he could continue his employment abroad till the retirement age of 60 years. He himself admitted that he was drawing monthly salary of Rs.65,000/-. When he was asked to count the probable income which he could reasonably expect from the proposed business in the tenanted rooms, he said that it might not exceed Rs.35,000/-per month. He conceded that he could continue his employment abroad till the retirement age of 60 years. He himself admitted that he was drawing monthly salary of Rs.65,000/-. When he was asked to count the probable income which he could reasonably expect from the proposed business in the tenanted rooms, he said that it might not exceed Rs.35,000/-per month. The learned counsel for the respondent pointing out the contents in the power of attorney executed by second petitioner in favour of the mother on 27.03.2012 contended that the son had conceived very early the idea of evicting the tenant without specific reasons even before he happened to suffer a cardiac arrest and therefore itself, the ground of ill-health taken as a reason for eviction was, without any bona fides. 10. On going through the evidence on record, we find that the 2nd revision petitioner had angioplasty in the month of December, 2012 and was treated in the native land for about one month. This is proved by the medical records and the tenant, who is sole witness examined as RW.1 on his side also did not dispute this. Even assuming that the 2nd revision petitioner did not suffer from any ill-health, still it is no reason to doubt the bona fides of his need since he is a non resident Indian liable to return to India at some point of time. 11. The Appellate Authority after marshalling the evidence, agreed with the trial court that the alleged lack of experience of the 2nd revision petitioner was no reason to deny the eviction sought on bona fide need for starting business. It also agreed with the finding of the Rent Control Court that the previous conduct of the 2nd revision petitioner leaving for abroad, after eviction of the previous tenant from the rooms in the year 2004 did not in anyway affect his bona fide need. The only reason by which the bona fides was doubted by the Rent Control Appellate Authority is that the 2nd revision petitioner did not go ahead with any tangible steps for shifting his family to his native place all these years, despite his alleged need for starting business arose in 2012 after he suffered cardiac arrest. The only reason by which the bona fides was doubted by the Rent Control Appellate Authority is that the 2nd revision petitioner did not go ahead with any tangible steps for shifting his family to his native place all these years, despite his alleged need for starting business arose in 2012 after he suffered cardiac arrest. The Rent Control Appellate Authority assumed that he was earning handsome income and naturally desired to continue his employment which was permanent and therefore his need was nothing but a camouflage for eviction. We, on re-appreciating the evidence, find our way difficult to agree to the above view taken by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. 12. If the view taken by the Appellate Authority is given effect to, it would rather place the second petitioner in great prejudice and hardship. If he is to resign the employment abroad to prove his need as genuine, it would only reduce him to unstable and difficult economic situation since there could be no assurance for eviction of the tenant from the shop rooms in near future. He and his family would have to suffer in the midst of uncertainties if they were to return from abroad in the meantime to their homeland after giving up current means of livelihood there. The intention of the landlord as to whether it is bona fide or otherwise could be elicited only from his own testimony tested by the probabilities of the case and also circumstances around. In the present case, the oral evidence of PW.1 sufficiently indicates that his need is genuine when contrasted with the oral evidence adduced by RW.1. No circumstance does indicate that the intention of revision petitioners is a pretext for eviction. Only because early intention to initiate eviction proceedings was expressed in the Power of Attorney executed in 2012, subsequent need of PW1 for eviction on the ground of ill-health cannot be doubted or disbelieved. In the present case, we are satisfied that the 2nd revision petitioner's need is genuine and his reluctance to terminate the employment abroad and join the native land cannot be regarded as a circumstance doubting his genuine intention to start business in the tenanted premises. The contrary finding of the Appellate Authority disbelieving the need of the 2nd revision petitioner as not genuine, is liable to be interfered. 13. The contrary finding of the Appellate Authority disbelieving the need of the 2nd revision petitioner as not genuine, is liable to be interfered. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the tenant is entitled to protection from eviction under the first proviso to Section 11(3), since the revision petitioners 1 and 2 have got vacant possession of the shop room under the same roof in the building gifted by the mother, the 3rd revision petitioner under Ext.A3 settlement deed for conducting the proposed business, without evicting the respondent. The property gifted shows that the subject matter of settlement deed was, in fact, a building consisting of three rooms which included Door No.KMC-I-1118 also besides the schedule shop rooms. Nowhere in the pleadings of the revision petitioners, existence of Door No. KMC-I-1118 was specifically disclosed, except a general denial that the revision petitioners have got any vacant room or building in their possession suited to carry out the proposed need. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that failure of landlords to specifically disclose existence of the vacant shop room and prove sufficient reasons for non-occupation thereof is fatal to landlords' claim and will dis-entitle him from seeking eviction. In this respect, the learned counsel cited two decisions, namely, Tara Chand Sharma v. Baij Nath and Ors. and Vasant Mahadeo Gujar and Ors. v. Baitulla Ismail Shaikh and Ors.. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the revision petitioners contended that the Act does not expect a landlord to disclose in the pleading the particulars of all premises in his ownership and possession since proof of special reasons under the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act for non-occupation of vacant building is, after all, a matter of evidence. In this respect, the learned counsel cited decisions in T.P.Kunju v. Fathima & Others [ 2014(3) KLT 563 ] and K.V. Kunhamina v. K.T. Aboobacker Haji[ 2016 (3) KLJ 247 ]. 14. It may be fair and reasonable, though not imperative, for a landlord to disclose in his pleadings specific details of any vacant building in his possession and explain the special reason, as to what prevented him from occupying the building for the purpose of satisfying his alleged bona fide need. 14. It may be fair and reasonable, though not imperative, for a landlord to disclose in his pleadings specific details of any vacant building in his possession and explain the special reason, as to what prevented him from occupying the building for the purpose of satisfying his alleged bona fide need. Such disclosure, if made, will certainly enable the tenant to meet the plea of the landlord by raising appropriate defence to the alleged special reason, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. But the mere failure of the landlord to disclose the possession of vacant building and plead special reason accounting for his non-occupation is no ground to throw over board the claim of the landlord for eviction, when there is evidence or otherwise convincing special reason on record for non-occupation. 15. The strict rules of pleading, applied to Civil Courts as provided by Order VI of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are not to be imported to a Rent Control Court, since the proceeding before it does not commence by presentation of a plaint. What could be then said as applying to the Rent Control Court are rules of fairness and principles of natural justice. Rule 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings(Rent Control) Rules, 1979 fortifies this view to a certain extent since as per the said provision decision of the Rent Control Court shall ultimately be governed by notions of justice, equity and good conscience. Paragraph No.10 of K.V. Kunhamina's case (supra) is extracted below: “10. Rule 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings(Rent Control) Rules, 1979 fortifies this view to a certain extent since as per the said provision decision of the Rent Control Court shall ultimately be governed by notions of justice, equity and good conscience. Paragraph No.10 of K.V. Kunhamina's case (supra) is extracted below: “10. In the decision reported in Jerry Joseph v. Selvaraj ( 2002(2) KLT 129 ) it has been held that: “It is now settled that even if the landlord failed to mention in the petition for eviction about the other premises belonging to him, if materials about those alternate accommodation have been placed before the Court and the matter has been adequately considered by the court without causing any prejudice to the tenant, the non disclosure of the availability of buildings in the petition is immaterial.” Such a finding was arrived at by the Division Bench of this Court after relying on the decision reported in M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal ( 2001(2) SCC 355 ), wherein it has been urged that there was suppression on the part of the landlord inasmuch as he did not disclose the premises which were available at No.16/57, Gali No.1, Joshi road as well as the premises which are available at Basant Road, Pahar Ganj. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent, Dr.Singhvi has submitted that the only requirement is to disclose such accommodation as is suitable for residence of the landlord. Dr.Singhvi submitted that if there is no other residential accommodation which is suitable then there is no duty to disclose. Dr. Singhvi relied upon the authority in the case of Ram Naarain Arora v. Asha Rani(1991(1) SCC 141), wherein it has been held that the question whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a question which is intermixed with the question regarding bonafide requirement. It is held that whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a defence for the tenant. It is held that whether the other accommodation is more suitable than the suit premises would not solely depend upon pleadings and non disclosure by the landlord. It was held that the landlord having another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed material before the court and case of neither party was prejudiced. It was held that the landlord having another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed material before the court and case of neither party was prejudiced. In this case even though the landlord has not mentioned about the other two premises, the material in respect of the other two premises was placed before the Rent Controller as well as before the High Court, thus no prejudice has been caused. The parties have squarely dealt with this question”. [emphaziz supplied] 16. In the light of the aforesaid decision, the contention of the respondent that non-disclosure of vacant room No.KMC-I-1118 in the possession of the revision petitioners in the pleadings cannot be held to be fatal to the claim for eviction. In fact, what Ext.A3 settlement deed discloses is that Door No. KMC I-1118 is a building co-owned by revision petitioners 1 and 2. The recitals in Ext.A3 clearly show that the said room jointly owned by the revision petitioners 1 and 2 is subject to the mother's right to hold life interest. When the room in question is joint property of two landlords, the first proviso to Section 11(3) could hardly apply, inasmuch as the first proviso refers only to a building exclusively owned by the landlord. If the building is in the co-ownership of the landlords, the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, has no application as held in P.K.Rajan v. Mohanraj & Others [ 2017(3) KLT 235 ] and Asher v. Hassankutty Hajee [ 2004(2) KLT 446 ]. This is so because the landlord for whose need the eviction is sought has no right to turn the co-owner away from the premises and reduce the site to his exclusive possession. In other words, since the Door No.KMC I-1118 is not a structure exclusively owned by the 2nd petitioner, first proviso does not cast any obligation on him to establish special reasons for non-occupation. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent therefore, fails. Thus the concurrent finding of both courts below that the respondent is not entitled to benefit of protection under Section 11(3) first proviso is upheld though for different reasons. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent therefore, fails. Thus the concurrent finding of both courts below that the respondent is not entitled to benefit of protection under Section 11(3) first proviso is upheld though for different reasons. In view of the discussion made above, we hold that the finding of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Kasargod rejecting the plea of bona fide need, is liable to be set aside and the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court, Hosdurg restored. 17. In the result, eviction petition in R.C.P. No.4 of 2013 is allowed, setting aside the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority dated 22.01.2018 in R.C.A. No.12 of 2016 and the respondent is ordered to be evicted under Section 11(3) of the Act. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to grant the respondent reasonable time to surrender vacant shop rooms subject to his observing the following conditions: (i) He shall file an unconditional undertaking in the form of affidavit before the execution court within two weeks agreeing to surrender the tenanted premises within a period of six months from today. (ii) He shall clear off all the arrears, if any, till date and continue to pay rent for subsequent periods also without fail till the last date of surrender. (iii) In the event of any of these conditions being breached, the execution court will proceed with execution, as if no period for surrender was fixed by this Court.