JUDGMENT : 1. The writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, wherein the award dated 26.02.2016 passed in Reference Case No.20 of 2002, is under challenge, whereby and where under reference has been made to the effect “whether the dismissal of Shri P.B. Lal, (petitioner) Personal No.146373, Senior Conductor Tisco Ltd. Jamshedpur by the management is justified? If what relief he is entitled to? The same has been answered against the petitioner/workman, against that this writ petition has been filed. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner is that he was selected for Trade Apprentice Trainee Session 1988-1991 and thereafter, he was employed, subsequently his services were confirmed, while in service a memorandum of charge dated 24th May, 1999 has been served upon him on 29.05.1999 alleging therein the following allegations:- “You are hereby asked to show-cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for following act which amounts to misconduct within the meaning of standing orders no-23 for which you are liable to be punished under standing order no.-24 of the works Standing Orders. You are either on approved leave or absented from the duty for the following periods. Month Approved leave Absent from duty October-98 26th 13th, 14th, 22nd December-98 7th-13th (7days), 28th-31st (4days) 2nd, 3rd, 17th January-99 18th-21st (4days) 14th, 30th Feb.-99 8th-11th (4days), 16th-28th (13days) March-99 1st-25th (25days) (Co As for 22 days) It has been reported that even though you were on leave/absent during the above periods. You has obtained your attendance by raising certificate of attendance for the above periods and forging signature of authorized signatories and the rubber stamp of the Sr. Divisional Manager Coke plant-2. The above act on your part amounts to dishonesty and forgery with the company, which is a serious misconduct per the order no.-23 of the Company’s Standing Orders. You are allowed 48 hours from the date of receipt to give your explanations. Any representation that you may make in this connection will be taken into consideration before passing orders”. 3. The above act on your part amounts to dishonesty and forgery with the company, which is a serious misconduct per the order no.-23 of the Company’s Standing Orders. You are allowed 48 hours from the date of receipt to give your explanations. Any representation that you may make in this connection will be taken into consideration before passing orders”. 3. The petitioner has submitted his reply partially admitting the guilt and partially denying it thereafter, he was subjected to domestic inquiry, in which, he has been provided with an opportunity of hearing, he has been allowed to cross-examine the witnesses as also the witnesses of the management and the domestic inquiry has been concluded by submitting a report proving the charge against him, the disciplinary authority as per the power conferred under certifying order applicable to the petitioner has passed the order of punishment for dismissal which has been disputed by the petitioner by making appropriate application before the appropriate government for raising the dispute under the provision of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which ultimately has been resulted into a reference by virtue of notification issued by the appropriate government as contained in notification no.1731 dated 30.05.2002 which has been answered against the workman which is under challenge in this writ petition. 4. The petitioner has taken the ground that the domestic inquiry conducted by the management is not fair, finding contained in the aforesaid domestic inquiry is perverse and the authority who has imposed the punishment of dismissal was having no jurisdiction but according to the petitioner, the Labour Court without appreciating these aspects of the matter has answered the reference against him, therefore, the same requires interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. Per contra, Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Management has submitted that there is no infirmity in the award impugned as because the domestic inquiry has been found to be fair and the said order by which the domestic inquiry has been said to be fair by the Labour Court has never been questioned by the petitioner. Per contra, Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Management has submitted that there is no infirmity in the award impugned as because the domestic inquiry has been found to be fair and the said order by which the domestic inquiry has been said to be fair by the Labour Court has never been questioned by the petitioner. There is no perversity in the finding since it is the admission on the part of the petitioner that he has committed some of the fault and therefore, when there is an admission even no inquiry is required, since the inquiry is required only in a case where the fact is in dispute but where the fact is not in dispute, there is no necessity to conduct an inquiry but even then the inquiry has been conducted in which the charge, as has been levelled against the petitioner, has been found to be proved in the domestic inquiry. His further submission is that the authority who has imposed the punishment of dismissal has got jurisdiction as per the provision of certified standing order and therefore the award requires no interference by this Court. His additional ground is that this writ petition is not maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, since the petitioner has not invoked the jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India along with Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after appreciating their rival submissions the factual aspect which is not in dispute in the case is that the petitioner has been appointed as Trade Apprentice under the respondent Management and after having confirmed in service, a memorandum of charge dated 24.05.1999 has been issued upon him alleging therein the allegation as indicated hereinabove. It has been submitted vide reply dated 29.05.1999, wherein he has disputed some part of allegation but has admitted the part by which he has been shown to be unauthorized absent since, he has not discharged his duty by remaining absent from duty for the period i.e. Leave on 26.10.1998 and was absent on 13th, 14th and 22nd October, 1998. He was also on approved leave from 7th to 13th and 28th to 31st December, 1998 total 11 days and was absent on 2nd, 3rd and 17th December, 1998. He was also on approved leave from 7th to 13th and 28th to 31st December, 1998 total 11 days and was absent on 2nd, 3rd and 17th December, 1998. He was on approved leave from 18th to 21st January, 1999 for 4 days and was absent on 14th, 30th in January, 1999. He was on approved leave from 8th to 11th and 16th to 28th total 17 days February. 1999 and he was again on approved leave for 25 days in March, 1999 from 1st to 25th March, 1999 and therefore, it was alleged that even though he was on leave or was absent as stated above, he obtained his attendance by raising certificate of attendance for the above period by forging signature and seal of authorized signatory of Sr. Divisional Manager of Coke Plant 2. 7. It is evident from the reply submitted by the petitioner on 29.05.1999, he has admitted to have committed some misconduct for which, he apologized for the same but denied having forged any signature or rubber stamp. He has begged and assured that this type of mistake will never happen in future and desired that his case be considered sympathetically. 8. In view of such response given by the petitioner, a domestic inquiry was commenced on 16.06.1999 and concluded on 29.06.1999 in which, he has participated all through in the inquiry without making any grievance or complaint that he was prevailed upon and persuaded by the officials of the Management to use to the work to the effect by which he has accepted the commission of mistake and begged apology for the same, upon this, domestic inquiry has been concluded by proving the charge against the petitioner which having been accepted by the disciplinary authority, the order of punishment of dismissal has been imposed. 9. The submission which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in assailing the aforesaid award is the ground of perversity, violation of principle of natural justice, jurisdiction of the authority, who has passed the order of dismissal. So far as the issue pertaining to perversity, it is not in dispute that perversity denotes the non-consideration or no proper appreciation of the factual aspect, if raised by the party. 10. So far as the issue pertaining to perversity, it is not in dispute that perversity denotes the non-consideration or no proper appreciation of the factual aspect, if raised by the party. 10. In the light of this definition of perversity, this Court has examined the finding of the Labour Court and has found that the petitioner has admitted some part of the mistake while the other has been disputed by him. This Court has perused his reply more particularly the response as has been submitted by the petitioner found mentioned in page no.35 (annexure-1) of the brief, which is the part of the cross-examination of one Mr. R.C. Singh, Management Representative, the same is being referred herein below:- “During cross-examination of Mr. R.C. Singh, Management Representative by Mr. P.B. Lall, charge-sheeted employee, Mr. R.C. Singh stated the following: A. Handwriting Expert had not verified the signatures on the tracks. But circumstantial evidence indicates that Mr. P.B. Lall has done it. B. Even though there is no proof of rubber stamp being forged by Mr. P.B. Lall, but circumstantial evidence indicate that he has done it. C. Out of 7 nos. of tracks which were sent to Handwriting Expert, 5 nos. were found to be having handwriting of Mr. P.B. Lall and partial handwriting in remaining 2 nos. D. Shift Officer is responsible for attendance of employees. E. Since Mr. P.B. Lall has not reported about the discrepancies about his leave balance and attendance also indicates that he had forged the signature for attendance. F. Mr. P.B. Lall has not received payment for the period from 16.02.99 to 28.02.99. During that period only the discrepancies in attendance came to light.” 11. It is evident from the deposition of Mr. R.C. Singh, as quoted above that in paragraph-B thereof, it has been recorded that “Even though there is no proof of rubber stamp being forged by Mr. P.B. Lall. But circumstantial evidence indicate that he has done it. While in paragraph-C, out of 7 nos. of tracks which were sent to Handwriting Expert, 5 nos. were found to be having Handwriting of Mr. P.B. Lall. But circumstantial evidence indicate that he has done it. While in paragraph-C, out of 7 nos. of tracks which were sent to Handwriting Expert, 5 nos. were found to be having Handwriting of Mr. P.B. Lall and partial handwriting in remaining 2 nos.” If the recording made in these two paragraphs of the domestic inquiry would be read together, it would be apparent that out of 7 signatures found to be mentioned in the track having been signed by the petitioner, 5 have been found to be the handwriting of the petitioner and in view thereof, the domestic inquiry has come to the conclusive finding of proving the charge against the petitioner. It is further evident that in course of domestic inquiry the petitioner has been allowed opportunity to rebut the deposition recorded by the Management Representative-In-Chief and the petitioner has never complained that he has been deprived of opportunity of hearing in the domestic inquiry and taking into consideration these aspects of the matter, the Labour court has come to the finding that the domestic inquiry was fair, the said order has been accepted by the petitioner, since he has not assailed the aforesaid order before any higher Forum. 12. It is thus evident that the charge as has been levelled has been found to be conclusive in the domestic inquiry and the petitioner has admitted to that effect, his mistake, however with the request before the authority that he will not repeat the same in future so that sympathetic consideration may be given which means that the ground urged by the petitioner regarding perversity cannot be said to be the perversity in the finding, since according to this Court the Labour Court has appreciated the entire evidence which was led by the domestic inquiry, since the Labour Court has gone to the extent that the petitioner since has raised the issue of fairness of domestic inquiry, the petitioner has been given liberty to raise this issue and the Labour Court has appreciated that aspect of the matter and thereafter, has come to the conclusive finding that domestic inquiry has been conducted with all fairness and transparency that is by giving sufficient opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. In view thereof, the ground of perversity as has been raised by the petitioner is having no foundation, accordingly, rejected. In view thereof, the ground of perversity as has been raised by the petitioner is having no foundation, accordingly, rejected. So far as the issue of violation of principle of nature justice is concerned, it is evident from the domestic inquiry that the petitioner has not raised this issue before it that he has not been provided with the opportunity of hearing rather he has been allowed all due opportunity to rebut the witness which has been produced by the Management and they have been cross-examined. The documents have been sent before the handwriting expert that has also been perused by the petitioner and therefore, domestic inquiry cannot be said to be in violation of principle of natural justice. So far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, the tribunal has taken note of this aspect of the matter in the award, whereby and where under, it has been recorded at paragraph-25 that the power of punishment has been conferred upon the Managing Director of the Company, the said document has been marked as Exhibit-M/10 and the Labour Court after going across the said document has found that the Managing Director was granted power of taking disciplinary action etc. as would be evident from serial no.11 of the aforesaid exhibit. Further at serial no.20, the Managing Director was granted power to sub-delegate his power to any officer of the Company, the said document has been marked as Exhibit-M/11 and therefore, the Labour Court has come to conclusive finding by going across the document marked as Exhibit-M/10 and Exhibit-M/11 that the Board of Directors has conferred power upon the Managing Director and the Managing Director in turn thereof, has delegated the power in view of Exhibit-M/10 as the Disciplinary Authority who can delegate the power to act as Disciplinary Authority either in favour of (i) Dy. General Managers/Asst. General managers and Executive of equivalent ranks. (ii) Sr. Divisional Manager, Division Managers and Executives of equivalent rank and therefore, the Labour Court after coming to conclusion that the charge-sheet was issued by the Sr. General Managers/Asst. General managers and Executive of equivalent ranks. (ii) Sr. Divisional Manager, Division Managers and Executives of equivalent rank and therefore, the Labour Court after coming to conclusion that the charge-sheet was issued by the Sr. Divisional Manager Coke Plant 2 and as such he is having power to act as Disciplinary Authority having been delegation of power of Managing Director in view of Exhibit-M/10 and hence the plea which has been taken by the petitioner that the entire domestic inquiry as also the order of punishment is vitiated in the eye of law for the lack of jurisdiction, is having no base, accordingly, rejected. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also raised the issue of punishment on the point of quantum but while dealing with the quantum of punishment, the nature of allegation, is to be tested. If the nature of allegation relates to moral turpitude or if the trust of the employee has sackned in the eye of the employer, it is discretion of the employer to get such employee in service and there cannot be any interference by the Court of law. The Allegation which has been levelled against the petitioner by the Management is of manipulating the official document by putting his forged signature along with seal of the competent authority that goes to the conduct of an employee and not only that he has also obtained salary for part of the period, therefore, it also relates to moral integrity and therefore, such type of employee against whom such a serious allegation has been levelled which has been found to be proved in the domestic inquiry, if allowed to be remain in service, it will amounts to giving premium to such type of employee to conduct such type of misconduct and that would not be proper for the writ Court to pass such direction. 14. In view thereof, there is no requirement to even interfere so far as quantum of punishment is concerned. Before parting with the order it also needs to refer, that this writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it is also not in dispute that under Article 227 of the Constitution of India confers power of superintendence. Before parting with the order it also needs to refer, that this writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it is also not in dispute that under Article 227 of the Constitution of India confers power of superintendence. After the amendment in the C.P.C., the power has been conferred to the High Court under Article 227 to exercise the power in the nature of revisable jurisdiction i.e., with respect to an order passed which is interlocutory in nature, in the matter pertaining to suit but the award which has been passed herein by the Labour Court cannot be said to be arising of a suit rather it is an adjudication made under the provision of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, if the petitioner has filed the writ petition presuming the power of Article 227 to Act under the revisable jurisdiction, the same is absolutely wrong notion as become, the power of superintendence can be exercised by the High Court against all the Tribunal or Courts subordinate within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court but what has been argued by the petitioner is now the question of superintendence rather it is the question to be tested by the High Court on the merit recorded by the Labour Court and as such the petitioner in gross error has not invoked the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Article 227 and therefore, this writ petition is also not fit to be entertained on this ground. 15. The position of law as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan, reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court, which deals with the power of High Court to interfere in the fact finding recorded by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal in case of adjudication made under the provision of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, reference may be made to the Judgment rendered in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court, wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard also may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. reported in 1955 Supreme Court 233 wherein at Paragraph-21, which is quoted herein below :- “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Heinz India (P) Ltd. Vrs. State of U.P. Reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordhsips have been please to hold at paragraph no.66 and 67 as under:- “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangahara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In the case of Thansingh Vrs. Supdt. of Taxes reported in A.I.R. 1964 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 16. In view of the settled position of law as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Judgments referred hereinabove and according to the considered view of this Court, since there is no perversity in the finding, the principle of nature justice has been followed and the finding has been recorded based upon the deposition made by the witnesses as also the documentary evidences, if any interference would be shown by this Court, it will amount to exercising the power of the appellate court by reappraisal of the evidence, which is not permissible as per the judgment referred hereinabove. 17. In view thereof, I find no reason to interfere in the impugned award, accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.