JUDGMENT : A.M. Bujor Barua, J. 1. Heard Mr. P Kataki, learned counsel for the accused appellant. Also heard Mr. J. Hassan, learned Senior Public Prosecutor of National Investigation Agency, for the respondent. 2. The appellant herein was arrested on 27.6.2011 and consequent thereof, an FIR dated 28.6.2011 was lodged by the Officer-in-Charge of Basistha Police Station in Assam resulting in registration of Basistha PS Case No.412/2011 under Sections 120B/121/121A of the IPC read with Section 10/13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The said investigation being handed over to the National Investigation Agency (‘NIA’ for short), the case was reregistered as NIA Case RC 03/2011/NIA-GHW also under Sections 120 B/121/121A of the IPC read with Section 10/13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. In the course of event, the appellant was released on bail on 9.7.2012 as per the bail order dated 16.6.2012. In the meantime, NIA filed charge-sheet against the appellant on 7.12.2012 and the charge order was passed on 27.5.2014 under Sections 120B/121/121A of the IPC read with Section 10/13/18/18A/20/38(2) and 39(2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. As the appellant did not re-appear before the Court, non-bailable warrant of arrest was issued on 28.11.2014 and thereafter, the trial Court had declared the appellant to be an absconder on 2.6.2015. In execution of the warrant issued against him, the appellant was produced before the NIA Court on 27.11.2015 and since then he is in jail. While the appellant was on bail, a further FIR was lodged against him on the allegation of killing two of his cadres in the designated camp at Imphal and accordingly, FIR No.50(5)/2014 under Sections 302/34 of IPC was registered at Sekmai Police Station, Imphal West on 1.5.2014. 3. In the aforesaid circumstance, the appellant moved an application for bail before the learned Special Judge’s Court, NIA, Assam Guwahati. The bail application of the applicant was rejected by order dated 6.10.2016 passed in Misc. Case No.10/2016 arising out of NIA Case No.02/2012. The order dated 6.10.2016 has been assailed in this appeal. 4. We have perused the order dated 6.10.2016. The bail application of the applicant was rejected by order dated 6.10.2016 passed in Misc. Case No.10/2016 arising out of NIA Case No.02/2012. The order dated 6.10.2016 has been assailed in this appeal. 4. We have perused the order dated 6.10.2016. In the order dated 6.10.2016, the bail application of the appellant had been rejected amongst others by providing as follows; “………….He further stated that the conduct of the accused in this case has been such that if released on bail he is most likely to jump the bail again resulting in unnecessary delay of the trial. The ld. PP further attracted my attention to the provisions of Sec. 43 D(5) of the UA(P) Act wherein it has been provided that bail shall not be granted to an accused if there appear a reasonable ground to believe that accusation under any of the offences falling under Chapter IV &/or VI of the UA(P) Act is prima facie true. On perusal of the report submitted by the IO U/S 173 Cr.P.C. it appeared to me that there is a prima facie material against the accused Kh. Gopendra Singh U/S 18, 20, 38(2), 18A, 39(2) of the UA (P) Act inter-alia other sections of the UA (P) Act and of the Indian Penal Code. The embargo of Sec. 43-D(5) of the UA (P), therefore, appears to be applicable in respect of this accused.” 5. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions in the order of 6.10.2016 shows that the learned NIA Court had perused the report submitted by the Investigating Officer under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and upon such perusal, it appeared to the Court that there is prima facie material against the accused appellant under Sections 18/20/38(2)/18A/39(2) of the UA (P) Act. Accordingly, the learned Court arrived at the conclusion that the embargo of Section 43 D(5) of the UA (P) Act, 1967 would be applicable in the present case. 6. Section 43 D(5) of the UA (P) Act, 1967 provides as follows; “43D.………………….. Accordingly, the learned Court arrived at the conclusion that the embargo of Section 43 D(5) of the UA (P) Act, 1967 would be applicable in the present case. 6. Section 43 D(5) of the UA (P) Act, 1967 provides as follows; “43D.………………….. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or in his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.” 7. Section 43 D(5) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the UA(P) Act, 1967 shall, if in custody, be released on bail or in his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release. 8. Section 43 D(5) begins with a non-obstante clause to be interpreted that inspite of any other provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the UA (P) Act, be released on bail only upon giving an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to be heard on the application for such release. 9. But again, Section 43 D(5) provides for an explanation in the form of a proviso that such accused person shall not be released on bail if the Court on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the CrPC, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. In other words, no bail can be granted to a person accused of an offence under Chapters IV and VI of the UA (P) Act if the Court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation is prima facie true. 10. In other words, no bail can be granted to a person accused of an offence under Chapters IV and VI of the UA (P) Act if the Court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation is prima facie true. 10. Accordingly, there is a requirement of forming an opinion by the Court that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true. When we examine the fulfilment of the requirement of the proviso to Section 43 D(5) in the order dated 6.10.2016, we find that the learned Court merely arrived at the conclusion that there is prima facie material against the accused appellant but, no such opinion had been formed that the material contains reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation against the accused appellant is prima facie true. Further, Section 43 D(6) provides that the restriction on granting of bail specified under sub-section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. 11. In the circumstances, we are of the view that a mere conclusion that there is prima facie material against the accused in the report of the Investigating Officer would be a little short of the requirement of the proviso to Section 43 D(5) where the Court is required to form an opinion that reasonable grounds exist for believing the accusation against the accused as true. 12. In view of the above, we send back the matter to the learned Special Judge’s Court, NIA, Assam for passing a further order upon perusal of the report submitted by the Investigating Officer as to whether on perusal of the report, the Court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation against the accused appellant is prima facie true. However, as the matter has been remanded back, not for a fresh consideration, but for passing appropriate orders as required under the proviso to Section 43 D(5), we do not interfere with the order of the NIA Court in any other manner including its formation of the view whereby the bail stood rejected. 13. The NIA Court upon doing the needful as indicated above, shall pass any order as it deems appropriate under the facts and circumstances as well as the law prevailing in the instant case. 13. The NIA Court upon doing the needful as indicated above, shall pass any order as it deems appropriate under the facts and circumstances as well as the law prevailing in the instant case. 14. It is further provided that in passing the order, no view has been expressed on the merits of the claim of the accused appellant for bail and no provisions of this order shall be construed as such. It is explicitly made clear that the order is passed merely for complying with the requirements of the proviso to Section 43 D(5) of the UA (P) Act, 1967. 15. In terms of the above, the bail application be now again placed before the learned Special Judge’s Court, NIA for doing the needful as indicated above. 16. The appeal stands considered and concluded as indicated above.