JUDGMENT : Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J. Heard Sri Gyan Prakash Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Manuvalkya Upadhyaya, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 and Sri Nagendra Kumar Pandey, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos.2, 3 and 4. 2. The petitioners, through the present writ petition, have come to this Court seeking a direction to respondent no.2 to pay compensation to the petitioners with interest in respect of gata nos.345Kha/0.877, 346/0.022, 346/0.036, 362Ka/0.106, 382/0.017, 384/0.010, 393Chha/0.191, 993Ga/0.038, 993Ga/0.186, 998/0.167, 1002/0.029, 1003/0.160, 1003/0.160 and 1006/0.019 hectares situate in Village Khadiya, Pargana Singrauli, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonebhadra, said to have been acquired some time in the year 1991. No particulars with regard to the acquisition proceedings have either been referred to in the pleadings nor any material has been placed on record to show as to when the land was notified for acquisition. The revenue records in the form of certain khatauni extracts have been placed on record which indicate that the plots in question were recorded in the name of NCL (National Coal Field Ltd.) some time in the year 1992. 3. The sole contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that a representation had been sent by the petitioners claiming compensation in respect of the said plots on 21.03.2017, and thereafter another representation dated 23.01.2019 has also been sent. There is no explanation in the writ petition for the long delay of more than 26 years in raising a claim with regard to compensation in respect of land said to have been acquired in the year 1991-92. Despite repeated queries counsel for the petitioners has not been able to submit any explanation for the inordinate delay by the petitioners in raising their claim for compensation and also the delay/laches in filing of the writ petition. 4. Learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 and also learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent nos.2 to 4 have contended that the writ petition suffers from inordinate delay and laches having been filed after a lapse of more than 26 years without any explanation for the long delay, and as such the same was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone. 5. 5. Upon a perusal of the records in the case it is more than apparent that apart from the two representations said to have been submitted in the year 2017 and 2019 there is no other material which has either been referred in the pleadings nor has been placed on record to demonstrate as to when the land was acquired, and no particulars/details in respect thereof have been referred to. 6. The question of delay/laches in raising a challenge to land acquisition proceedings was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai Vs. M. Meiyappan & Ors., (2010) 14 SCC 309 and it was held as follows:- "13. At the outset, we must state that on the facts of this case, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition. In our opinion, the writ petition must fail on the short ground that the writ petition had been filed 16 years after the award was announced by the Collector. It is trite law that delay and laches is one of the important factors which the High Court must bear in mind while exercising discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. If there is such negligence or omission on the part of the petitioner to assert his right which, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party, the High Court must refuse to invoke its extra-ordinary jurisdiction and grant relief to the writ petitioner." 7. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case referred to its earlier judgment in Durga Prashad Vs. Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185 wherein it had been held that relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India3 being discretionary, one ground for refusing relief under Article 226 would be that the petitioner had filed a petition after a delay for which there was no satisfactory explanation. 8. The judgment in the case of Narayani Debi Khaitan Vs. 8. The judgment in the case of Narayani Debi Khaitan Vs. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No.140 of 1964, decided on 22.09.1964 may also be referred to for the proposition that the power of the High Court under Article 226 to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary and if the petitioner is guilty of laches it may be inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner and ends of justice may require that the High Court should refuse to issue a writ. The observations made in the case of Narayani Debi Khaitan (supra), as referred to in the judgment of Tamil Nadu Housing Board (supra) are as follows:- "It is well settled that under Article 226, the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary. There can be no doubt that if a citizen moves the High Court under Article 226 and contends that his fundamental rights have been contravened by any executive action, the High Court would naturally like to give relief to him; but even in such a case, if the petitioner has been guilty of laches, and there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner, ends of justice may require that the High Court should refuse to issue a writ. There can be little doubt that if it is shown that a party moving the High Court under Art. 226 for a writ is, in substance, claiming a relief which under the law of limitation was barred at the time when the writ petition was filed, the High Court would refuse to grant any relief in its writ jurisdiction. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, in this matter too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably." 9. The question of delay in the context of Article 32 of the Constitution was considered in the case of Rabindranath Bose Vs. That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, in this matter too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably." 9. The question of delay in the context of Article 32 of the Constitution was considered in the case of Rabindranath Bose Vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84 and the following observations were made:- "32. ...we are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given Original Jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay." 10. Referring to the aforementioned observations in the case of Rabindranath Bose (supra) which were related to Article 32 it was held in the case of Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. & Anr. Vs. K. Thangappan & Anr., (2006) 4 SCC 322 that a fortiori, they would apply to writ petitions filed under Article 226 as well. 11. The judgment in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal Vs. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC 768 may also be referred to wherein it was held that if a petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity and inordinate delay in making the motion for writ will be a good ground for refusing to exercise discretionary jurisdiction. The observations made in the judgment are as follows:- "56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing relief’s under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime." 12. In the context of land acquisition proceedings, in the case of P. Chinnanna & Ors. Vs. State of A.P. & Ors., (1994) 5 SCC 486 it was held that in proceedings involving acquisition of land for public purposes the court concerned must be averse to entertain writ petitions involving challenge to such acquisition where there is avoidable delay or laches since such acquisition, if set aside, would not only involve enormous loss of public money but also cause undue delay in carrying out projects meant for general public good. The observations as made in the aforementioned judgment in this regard are as follows:- "11. ...In fact, in relation to acquisition proceeding involving acquisition of land for public purposes, the court concerned must be averse to entertain writ petitions involving the challenge to such acquisition where there is avoidable delay or laches since such acquisition, if set aside, would not only involve enormous loss of public money but also cause undue delay in carrying out projects meant for general public good. When a fresh ground of attack to acquisition proceedings, even if it involves purely a question of law, its entertainment cannot be governed by a principle different from that which governs entertainment of writ petitions before the High Court or proceedings arising there from before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution." 13. The question as to whether mere making of representations would be sufficient to justify filing of a belated writ petition, was considered in the case of Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. & Anr. Vs. K. Thangappan & Anr., (2006) 4 SCC 322 and it was held that mere making of representations to the authority concerned cannot justify a belated approach and the courts may refuse to invoke their extraordinary powers if there was negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right within a reasonable time. The judgment in the case of Durga Prashad (supra) and Rabindranath Bose (supra) were also referred to and it was also held that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay and there was a limit to the time which could be considered reasonable for making of representations. It was observed as follows:- "5. The factual position as noted above clearly shows that for nearly two decades Respondent 1 workman had remained silent. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants even in the representations made in 1997 and 1998 there was no reference to the representations claimed to have been made in 1982 and/or 1989. Even if that would have been made, there was considerable delay even in making the representations. There is no dispute that mere making of representations cannot justify a belated approach. 6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769 ]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, 1874 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, (1967) AIR SC 1450 and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329 ]. Sir Barnes had stated: "Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470 ] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. x x x x x 10. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore, (1967) 2 SCR 70 : AIR 1967 SC 993 ]. This was reiterated in Rabindranath Bose case, (1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470 ] by stating that there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray, (1977) 3 SCC 396 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 424 : AIR 1976 SC 2617 ] making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik, (1976) 3 SCC 579 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 468 : AIR 1976 SC 1639 ] also.)" 14. In the case of State of M.P. & Ors. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 566 it was held that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. The observations made in the aforementioned judgment are as follows:- "24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction..." 15. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction..." 15. As regards the relief claimed by the petitioners for a direction for consideration of their representation we may refer to the judgment in the case of C. Jacob Vs. Director of Geology and Mining & Anr., (2008) 10 SCC 115 where the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for "consideration" was emphasized and it was held that if the representation on the face of it is stale or does not contain particulars to show and it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing "consideration" of such claims. 16. The modus of "representation" adopted by claimants to get over the bar of delay and laches was taken note of, and it was observed as follows:- "8. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay (if the application is made before tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying to such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. 9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any "decision" on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to "consider". 9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any "decision" on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to "consider". If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to "consider". If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. 10. Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 11. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of "acknowledgement of a jural relationship" to give rise to a fresh cause of action. x x x x x 14. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of "acknowledgement of a jural relationship" to give rise to a fresh cause of action. x x x x x 14. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the issue only to emphasise the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for "consideration". If the representation on the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing "consideration" of such claims." 17. Following the judgment in the case of C. Jacob (supra) the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 has reiterated that before directing "consideration" of a claim or representation the court should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a live issue or whether it is with reference to "dead" or "stale" issue. The observations made in this regard are as follows:- "15. When a belated representation in regard to a "stale" or "dead" issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the "dead" issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. 16. A court or tribunal, before directing "consideration" of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a "live" issue or whether it is with reference to a "dead" or "stale" issue. If it is with reference to a "dead" or "stale" issue or dispute, the court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If it is with reference to a "dead" or "stale" issue or dispute, the court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or tribunal deciding to direct "consideration" without itself examining the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect." 18. In the present case, it is in terms of the representations filed in the year 2017 and 2019 that relief’s are sought to be claimed with regard to payment of compensation in respect of the dispossession said to have been made in the year 1991-92. No material has been placed on record to show that the land was taken over in terms of the land acquisition proceedings. 19. In this regard we may refer to the case of Syed Maqbool Ali Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2011) 15 SCC 383 wherein a note of caution was sounded with regard to entertaining writ petitions filed decades after the dispossession and seeking directions for payment of compensation, and it was held that belated writ petitions without proper explanation for the delay were liable to be dismissed. Notice was taken of the fact that it was not uncommon for villagers to offer some parts of their lands voluntarily for a public purpose which would benefit them or the community, and when the land is offered for such public purpose the same may be of little or negligible value; however decades later, when the value of the land increases the landholders come up with belated claims alleging that their lands were taken without acquisition and without their consent, and such claims being raised after several decades the State Authorities would be at a disadvantage to contest the claim in the absence of the relevant records being available. The facts of the case at hand are somewhat similar. The observations made in this regard in the case of Syed Maqbool Ali (supra) are as follows:- "12. The High Courts should also be cautious in entertaining writ petitions filed decades after the dispossession, seeking directions for acquisition and payment of compensation. The facts of the case at hand are somewhat similar. The observations made in this regard in the case of Syed Maqbool Ali (supra) are as follows:- "12. The High Courts should also be cautious in entertaining writ petitions filed decades after the dispossession, seeking directions for acquisition and payment of compensation. It is not uncommon for villagers to offer/donate some part of their lands voluntarily for a public purpose which would benefit them or the community as for example, construction of an access road to the village or their property, or construction of a village tank or a bund to prevent flooding/erosion. When they offer their land for such public purpose, the land would be of little or negligible value. But decades later, when land values increase, either on account of passage of time or on account of developments or improvements carried out by the State, the landholders come up with belated claims alleging that their lands were taken without acquisition and without their consent. When such claims are made after several decades, the State would be at a disadvantage to contest the claim, as it may not have the records to show in what circumstances the lands were given/donated and whether the land was given voluntarily. Therefore, belated writ petitions, without proper explanation for the delay, are liable to be dismissed. Be that as it may." 20. In view of the aforementioned discussion and taking into consideration the fact that in the case at hand, representations which are said to have been submitted by the petitioners are of the year 2017 and 2019 respectively, and the pleadings in the writ petition indicate that the petitioners were allegedly dispossessed more than quarter of a century ago, some time in the year 1991-92, we are of the considered view that the present writ petition seeking a direction for consideration of the representations, is grossly barred by delay and laches, and accordingly we are not inclined to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 21. No reasons having been given for the inordinate delay in filing the writ petition, the same is dismissed on the ground of laches.