JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant criminal appeal under S.378 CrPC, having been filed by the appellant-State, lays challenge to judgment dated 23.6.2009 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh in Crl. Appeal No. 24-P/2007, reversing judgment of conviction dated 26.10.2007 passed in Cr. Case No. 232-II/04/2K by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. II, Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, whereby learned trial Court, while holding the respondent-accused (hereinafter, ‘accused’) guilty of having committed offences punishable under Ss. 279, 337 and 338 IPC, convicted and sentenced him as under:- Section Sentence In default of payment of fine 279 IPC Simple imprisonment for two months and fine of Rs.500/- Simple imprisonment for ten days 337 IPC Do Do 338 IPC Do Do 2. Precisely, the facts as emerges from the record are that the complainant, Phullan Devi, got her statement recorded under S.154 CrPC, alleging therein that on 4.5.1999, at about 7 pm, at Village Kandbari, accused while driving Tempo bearing registration No. HP-37-5837, in a rash and negligent manner on a public highway, crushed the foot of her granddaughter, Babita, who was standing on the roadside. As per complainant, she alongwith her granddaughter Babita had gone to fetch water from Bowli. Accused, who was driving the offending vehicle, lost control over the same and struck the Tempo against her minor granddaughter, as a consequence of which, her leg was crushed. In the said accident, Babita sustained simple and grievous injuries. On the basis of aforesaid statement under S.154 CrPC, a formal FIR, Ext. PW-7/A came to be lodged against the accused. After completion of investigation, Police presented Challan before Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No.II, Palampur, who on being satisfied that a prima facie case exists against the accused, put notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of the offences punishable under Ss. 279, 337 and 338 IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 3. Prosecution, with a view to prove its case against the accused, examined as many as seven witnesses, whereas, accused in his statement recorded under S.313 CrPC, denied the case of the prosecution in toto and claimed that at the time of alleged incident, he was not driving the vehicle in question. 3. Prosecution, with a view to prove its case against the accused, examined as many as seven witnesses, whereas, accused in his statement recorded under S.313 CrPC, denied the case of the prosecution in toto and claimed that at the time of alleged incident, he was not driving the vehicle in question. He further denied that he was driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, on the relevant date, time and place. However, he did not lead any evidence in his defence. 4. Vide judgment dated 26.10.2007, learned trial Court held accused guilty of having committed offences punishable under the aforesaid provisions of law. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment of conviction passed by learned trial Court, accused filed an appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Kangra at Dharamshala, who vide judgment dated 23.6.2009, set aside the judgment of conviction passed by learned trial Court, consequently acquitting the accused. In the aforesaid backdrop, appellant-State has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by learned first appellate Court and restoring the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record, vis-à-vis reasoning assigned by the learned first appellate Court in the impugned judgment of acquittal, while reversing judgment of conviction passed by learned trial Court, this court finds no illegality or infirmity in the judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, rather, perusal of the same clearly reveals that it is based upon proper appreciation of the evidence. After having gone through the evidence led on record by the prosecution, be it ocular or documentary, this court is not persuaded to agree with Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, learned Additional Advocate General that learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), while recording the findings that the prosecution was not able to prove the identity of the accused, has fallen in error, because bare perusal of the statements having been made by material prosecution witnesses nowhere suggests that the identification parade of accused ever came to be conducted prior to putting up Challan in the competent Court of law. Leaving everything aside, if statement of PW-2 Phullan Devi, who happened to be the complainant, is perused in its entirety, it itself creates serious doubt with regard to presence of the accused on the spot as well as his driving of offending vehicle. In her statement recorded under S.154 CrPC, complainant stated that at the time of accident, she was fetching water from the Bowli, whereas her granddaughter Babita was standing on the roadside and suddenly one Tempo came at a high speed and crushed leg of her granddaughter, Babita. She further alleged that thereafter alarm was raised by the persons present on the spot and Tempo was intercepted. Most importantly, in her statement recorded under S.154 CrPC, complainant Phullan Devi specifically stated that she did not know the driver, however, he (driver) was a resident of her village. If aforesaid version of Phullan Devi is examined in light of her subsequent statement given in the court, as PW-2, it completely belies the story of the prosecution. Phullan Devi, while deposing as PW-2, stated that the vehicle bearing Registration No. HP-37-5837 was being driven by the accused, Baishakhi Ram present in the court, but, she was unable to explain how she came to know about the name of the accused. In her cross-examination, she admitted that she is resident of Village Kandbari but she admitted that the accused is the resident of Village Sapedu. In her cross-examination, complainant stated that her Village and the Village of accused are two different Villages and they fall in two different Panchayats. In her statement under S.154 CrPC, she had stated that the driver was resident of her village and she did not know his name, whereas, in the court, she named the accused and stated him to be a resident of other Village, Sapedu. 6. PW-1 Thola Ram deposed that in his presence, accused came driving one Tempo, which subsequently hit one girl namely Babita, who had come to the Bowli alongwith her grandmother but, in his cross-examination, this witness admitted that after the accident, driver of the Tempo had fled away from the spot and second driver had come. 7. PW-3 Jai Kishan, who happened to be the father of the injured girl, stated that he reached the spot after having heard noise of the accident. 7. PW-3 Jai Kishan, who happened to be the father of the injured girl, stated that he reached the spot after having heard noise of the accident. He further deposed that he saw that the Tempo bearing registration No. HP-37-5837 had crushed the foot of his daughter, Babita. This witness further stated that he took the injured in the same Tempo to the Hospital. He further stated that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the accused. The statement having been made by this witness may not be relevant because he had no occasion to witness the alleged accident with his own eyes, rather, as per his own version, he reached the spot after having heard noise of the accident. 8. If the statements of the material prosecution witnesses, PW-1 to PW-3 are read in conjunction and juxtaposing each other, same create doubt with regard to correctness of the story put forth by the prosecution. As has been pointed out, complainant, Phullan Devi (PW-2), who was the first person to see the accident, was not aware with regard to the name of the accused, because, in her statement made under S.154 CrPC, she categorically stated that though the accused belonged to her village, but she did not know his name, whereas, in her statement made before the Court, she identified the accused present in the court and stated that his name was Baishakhi Ram. Aforesaid version put forth by this witness is in total contradiction with the version put forth by PW-1 Thola Ram, who categorically stated that the driver of the offending vehicle fled away from the spot after the accident and second driver had come. PW-3 Jai Kishan, who had no occasion to see the accident with his own eyes, nowhere stated that the accused was driving the offending vehicle, in which he took his daughter to the hospital. It has only come in his statement that his daughter was taken to the hospital in Tempo bearing registration No. HP-37-5837, but he nowhere stated that at that time, vehicle was being driven by accused. 9. It has only come in his statement that his daughter was taken to the hospital in Tempo bearing registration No. HP-37-5837, but he nowhere stated that at that time, vehicle was being driven by accused. 9. Leaving everything aside, all these material prosecution witnesses have admitted that during investigation no identification parade of accused was got conducted by the police as such, learned Additional Sessions Judge, while reversing the judgment of conviction passed by learned trial Court, rightly held that the identify of the accused is highly doubtful. 10. Prosecution also examined owner of the vehicle Desh Raj (PW-5), who categorically stated that the accused Baishakhi Ram was not his driver. Though this witness was declared hostile, but careful perusal of the cross-examination conducted on this witness, nowhere suggests that the prosecution was able to extract anything advantageous to its case. This witness in his cross-examination stated that the log book of the vehicle was not taken into possession by the Police. He further stated in his cross-examination that the accused never remained his driver and on the date of accident, accused was not driving his vehicle. 11. Aforesaid version put forth by this material prosecution witness came to be disbelieved by the learned trial Court on the ground that this witness has deposed falsely. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, has rightly recorded that no cogent and convincing reasoning has been assigned by the learned trial Court for disbelieving the version put forth by PW-5, Desh Raj, who happened to be the owner of the offending vehicle. 12. PW-4 Subhash Chand deposed that he was driver of Tempo bearing registration No. HP-37-5837 and on 4.5.1999, he was on leave and owner of the Tempo had engaged some other person as a driver in the Tempo. He stated that he does not know, who was the driving the Tempo on the relevant day, when the alleged accident took place. This witness was declared hostile. In his cross-examination done by the learned A.P.P., this witness denied that his statement was recorded by the Police. He denied that the owner Desh Raj had employed the accused as a driver in the Tempo. He admitted that when marriage party of his brother was going, he heard the noise that foot of the child has been crushed by the Tempo. 13. He denied that the owner Desh Raj had employed the accused as a driver in the Tempo. He admitted that when marriage party of his brother was going, he heard the noise that foot of the child has been crushed by the Tempo. 13. PW-7 SI Om Prakash, Investigating Officer of the case deposed that on 4.5.1999, he received an information from the SDH, Palampur that some accident had taken place and accordingly he recorded statement of PW2 Phullan Devi under S.154 CrPC. During cross-examination, this witness admitted that the complainant had not disclosed to him name of the accused but self stated that the accused Baisakhi Ram was got identified, which version is in total contradiction to the statements of other witnesses i.e. PW2, PW-3 and PW-4. In his cross-examination, this witness further stated that the name of the accused was supplied by the witnesses. He stated that he has not taken into possession log book of the vehicle, meaning thereby, no effective steps were ever taken by the Investigating Officer to identity the accused, who allegedly at the relevant time, was driving the vehicle in question. No doubt, MLC, X-ray Films and discharge slip of the injured Exts. PX1 to PX4, reveal that Babita received simple as well as grievous injuries but, that may not be sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused, especially when prosecution has not been able to connect the accused with the commission of the offences alleged to have been committed by him. 14. Close scrutiny of statements of the material prosecution witnesses compels this court to conclude that no reliance, if any, could be placed by the learned Court below on the same, being contradictory and inconsistent with each other, as such, learned Court below rightly did not place reliance upon the same, while ascertaining guilt, if any, of the accused. 15. By now it is well settled that in a criminal trial evidence of eyewitness requires careful assessment and needs to be evaluated for its creditability. Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that since fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon well established principle that “no man is guilty until proved so”, utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with the situation where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the Court. Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that since fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon well established principle that “no man is guilty until proved so”, utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with the situation where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the Court. Most importantly, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that there must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses thereby satisfying the test of consistency in evidence amongst all the witnesses. In nutshell, it can be said that evidence in criminal cases needs to be evaluated on the touchstone of consistency. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in C. Magesh and others Versus State of Karnataka (2010) 5 SCC 645 , wherein it has been held as under:- “45. It may be mentioned herein that in criminal jurisprudence, evidence has to be evaluated on the touchstone of consistency. Needless to emphasis, consistency is the keyword for upholding the conviction of an accused. In this regard it is to be noted that this Court in the case titled Surja Singh v. State of U.P. (2008) 16 SCC 686 : 2008 (11) SCR 286 has held:( SCC p.704, para 14) “14. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witness is held to be creditworthy; ..the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 16. In a criminal trial, evidence of the eye witness requires a careful assessment and must be evaluated for its creditability. Since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the stated principle that “no man is guilty until proven so,” hence utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with situation where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the Court. There must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistence in evidence amongst all the witnesses. 17. Apart from above, this court finds that there is no specific evidence led on record by the prosecution to prove rash and negligent driving, if any, on the part of the accused. There must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistence in evidence amongst all the witnesses. 17. Apart from above, this court finds that there is no specific evidence led on record by the prosecution to prove rash and negligent driving, if any, on the part of the accused. While holding accused guilty under S.279 IPC, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove rash and negligent driving. By now, it is well settled that rashness cannot be presumed, rather, onus is heavy upon the prosecution to prove rash and negligent driving. In the case at hand, if the statements made by material prosecution witnesses, are read in their entirety, same clearly suggest that none of the prosecution witnesses have specifically stated anything with regard to rash and negligent driving. High speed alone cannot be the sole criteria to determine rashness and negligence. 18. In the instant case, this Court was unable to lay its hand to specific evidence, if any, led on record by the prosecution suggestive of the fact that the vehicle at that relevant time was being driven rashly and negligently. In this regard, reliance is placed on judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 406, which reads as under:- “6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no evidence on record to show any negligence. It has not been brought on record as to how the accused-appellant was negligent in any way. On the contrary what has been stated is that one person had gone to the roof top and driver started the vehicle while he was there. There was no evidence to show that the driver had knowledge that any passenger was on the roof top of the bus. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that PW1 had stated that the conductor had told the driver that one passenger was still on the roof of the bus and the driver started the bus. 8. Section 279 deals with rash driving or riding on a public way. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that PW1 had stated that the conductor had told the driver that one passenger was still on the roof of the bus and the driver started the bus. 8. Section 279 deals with rash driving or riding on a public way. A bare reading of the provision makes it clear that it must be established that the accused was driving any vehicle on a public way in a manner which endangered human life or was likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Obviously the foundation in accusations under Section 279 IPC is not negligence. Similarly in Section 304 A the stress is on causing death by negligence or rashness. Therefore, for bringing in application of either Section 279 or 304 A it must be established that there was an element of rashness or negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto, there was no evidence led to show that any negligence was involved.” 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled State of Karnataka v. Satish, 1998 (8) SCC 493 , has also observed as under:- “1. Truck No. MYE-3236 being driven by the respondent turned turtle while crossing a "nalla" on 25-11-1982 at about 8.30 a.m. The accident resulted in the death of 15 persons and receipt of injuries by about 18 persons, who were travelling in the fully loaded truck. The respondent was chargesheeted and tried. The learned trial court held that the respondent drove the vehicle at a high speed and it was on that account that the accident took place. The respondent was convicted for offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A IPC and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The respondent challenged his conviction and sentence before the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum. While the conviction and sentence imposed upon the respondent for the offence under Section 279 IPC was set aside, the appellate court confirmed the conviction and sentenced the respondent for offences under Sections 304A, 337 and 338 IPC. On a criminal revision petition being filed by the respondent before the High Court of Karnataka, the conviction and sentence of the respondent for all the offences were set aside and the respondent was acquitted. This appeal by special leave is directed against the said judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court of Karnataka. 2. On a criminal revision petition being filed by the respondent before the High Court of Karnataka, the conviction and sentence of the respondent for all the offences were set aside and the respondent was acquitted. This appeal by special leave is directed against the said judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court of Karnataka. 2. We have examined the record and heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. Both the trial court and the appellate court held the respondent guilty for offences under Sections 337, 338 and 304A IPC after recording a finding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed". No specific finding has been recorded either by the trial court or by the first appellate court to the effect that the respondent was driving the truck either negligently or rashly. After holding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed", both the courts pressed into aid the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to hold the respondent guilty. 4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur". There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. That report is not forthcoming from the record and the Inspector was not examined for reasons best known to the prosecution. This is a serious infirmity and lacuna in the prosecution case. 5. There being no evidence on the record to establish "negligence" or "rashness" in driving the truck on the part of the respondent, it cannot be said that the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the respondent is a perverse view. To us it appears that the view of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, is a reasonably possible view. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the order of acquittal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged. Appeal dismissed.” 20. Careful perusal of aforesaid judgment clearly suggests that there cannot be any presumption of rashness or negligence, rather, onus is always upon the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently. In the aforesaid judgment, it has been specifically held that in the absence of any material on record, no presumption of rashness or negligence can be drawn by invoking maxim res ipsa loquitur. 21. Reliance is also placed on judgment this Court in State of H.P. Vs. Manpreet Singh, 2008 (HP) 538, relevant para whereof is as under:- “4. Legally, in a case of rash and negligent act, if the prosecution is able to prove the essential ingredients of the offence, the onus to disprove it shifts upon the respondent to show that he had taken due care and caution to avoid the accident. It is an admitted fact that said Shri Daya Ram had died in the accident caused by the respondent but still it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that it was the rash and negligent act of driving to conclude the rash and negligent driving of the respondent. It is an admitted fact that said Shri Daya Ram had died in the accident caused by the respondent but still it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that it was the rash and negligent act of driving to conclude the rash and negligent driving of the respondent. In other words, it must be proved that the rash or negligent act of the accused was causa causans and not causa sin qua non (cause of the proximate cause). There must be some nexus between the death of a person with rash or negligent act of the accused. According to Rupinder Parkash (PW4) deceased was hit by the motor cycle which was in a high speed but the speed is not criteria to hold the act as rash or negligent. The respondent in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has explained that on seeing the deceased, he had blown the horn and he (deceased) stopped on the road. As soon as he reached near him, he immediately tried to cross the road and got hit. His version has been duly corroborated by Hardeep Singh (DW1) who was a pillion rider with him. Ajay Kumar (PW1) has admitted this version that the respondent had blown the horn and Daya Ram on hearing it, had stopped for a while. In these circumstances, if a person suddenly crosses the road, without taking note of the approaching vehicle and its driver may not be in a position to save the accident, it will not be possible to hold the Driver guilty of the offence. In the instant case, the deceased knowing fully well at least the approaching vehicle stopped on hearing the horn while crossing the road but when the motor cycle reached near him, he darted before it and the accident took place. Thus in my opinion the prosecution could not prove the offence charged against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was driving the vehicle rashly or negligently. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned trial Court had rightly acquitted the respondent of the charges framed against him. As such, no interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal is called for. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. The respondent is discharged of his bail bounds entered upon by him at any stage of the trial.” 22. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned trial Court had rightly acquitted the respondent of the charges framed against him. As such, no interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal is called for. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. The respondent is discharged of his bail bounds entered upon by him at any stage of the trial.” 22. This Court is also fully conscious of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab Versus Saurabh Bakshi 2015 (5) SCC 182 , wherein it has been held that no leniency should be shown to reckless drivers. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:- “25. Before parting with the case we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving where the other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty and the civilized persons drive in constant fear but still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such obtaining circumstances, we are bound to observe that the law-makers should scrutinize, re-look and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC, so with immense anguish.” 23. There can not be any disagreement with the concern expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment with regard to carelessness /recklessness of the drivers especially under the influence of alcohol. But in the instant case, as has been discussed above, prosecution is not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the ill fated vehicle was being driven by accused rashly and negligently, rather, version put forth by prosecution appears to be untrustworthy in view of material contradictions in the statements of the alleged eye witnesses, and as such, this Court sees no application of aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court in the instant case. 24. This court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Dilwar Singh 2017 (3) Him. L.R. 1938, has held as under:- “11. After having carefully perused statements of PW-4 and PW-7, conclusion can be safely drawn by this Court that even PW-6 and PW-8, had no occasion to witness the accident with their eyes, rather, they came at the spot after noise made by PW-7. L.R. 1938, has held as under:- “11. After having carefully perused statements of PW-4 and PW-7, conclusion can be safely drawn by this Court that even PW-6 and PW-8, had no occasion to witness the accident with their eyes, rather, they came at the spot after noise made by PW-7. It is not understood when PW-6 and PW-8 had not witnessed the accident, with their eyes, how they could chase offending vehicle allegedly being driven by respondent, because, at the relevant time, none of the prosecution witnesses have stated that they had disclosed registration number of offending vehicle to PW-6 and PW-8. Even PW-1 and PW-5 nowhere stated that PW-6 and PW-8 were informed by them with regard to accident especially about registration number of offending vehicle, as such, story put forth by the prosecution does not appear to be trustworthy. 12. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that it has nowhere come in the statement of any of the prosecution witnesses, who had an occasion to see the accident with their eyes, that immediately after accident, they informed PW-6 and PW-8 with regard to registration number of offending vehicle as well as accused, as such, story of accused being apprehended by PW-6 and PW-8, is not worth lending any credence, because, admittedly, they had no prior knowledge with regard to involvement of offending vehicle as well as accused in the accident. 13. Leaving everything aside, this Court was unable to find anything in the statements of prosecution witnesses, from where it could be inferred that vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently that too at high speed, by the respondent, as such, this Court sees substantial force in the defence taken by the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC that he had not struck vehicle against Shri Milkhi Ram and Kurpal Ram. 14. Evidence discussed herein above is sufficient to hold that in given facts and circumstances, two views are possible in the present case and as such present, accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. In the present case, prosecution story does not appear to be plausible/ trustworthy and as such same cannot be relied upon. 14. Evidence discussed herein above is sufficient to hold that in given facts and circumstances, two views are possible in the present case and as such present, accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. In the present case, prosecution story does not appear to be plausible/ trustworthy and as such same cannot be relied upon. In this regard, I may refer to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in State of U.P. Versus Ghambhir Singh, AIR 2005 (92) SCC 2440, where Hon’ble Apex Court has held that if on the same evidence, two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused must be preferred. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under:- “6. So far as Hori Lal, PW-1 is concerned, he had been sent to fetch a basket from the village and it was only a matter of coincidence that while he was returning he witnessed the entire incident. The High Court did not consider it safe to rely on his testimony because he evidence clearly shows that he had an animus against the appellants. Moreover, he evidence was not corroborated by objective circumstances. Though it was his categorical case that all of them fired, no injury caused by rifle was found, and, only two wounds were found on the person of the deceased. Apart from this PW-3 did not mention the presence of either PW-1 or PW-2 at the time of occurrence. All these circumstances do create doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution case. The presence of these three witnesses becomes doubtful if their evidence is critically scrutinized. May be it is also possible to take a view in favour of the prosecution, but since the High Court, on an appreciation of the evidence on record, has recorded a finding in favour of the accused, we do not feel persuaded to interfere with the order of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. It is well settled that if on the same evidence two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused must be preferred.”” 25. Thus, in view of the above judgment, if on the same evidence two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused must be preferred. It is well settled that if on the same evidence two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused must be preferred.”” 25. Thus, in view of the above judgment, if on the same evidence two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused must be preferred. In the case at hand, when identity of the accused as driver of the offending vehicle at the time of accident has not been established, he deserves to be extended benefit of doubt. 26. In view of above, this Court finds no reason to interfere with judgment dated 23.6.2009 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh in Crl. Appeal No. 24-P/2007, which is accordingly upheld. In result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by accused are discharged. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of.