JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. The appellants are the legal representatives of late Shri Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh, who aggrieved by the award passed by the learned District Judge in petitions filed under Section 30 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the 'Act'), have filed the instant appeal(s). Likewise, the cross-objections have been filed by the private respondents whereby their claim(s) of having acquired the property by way of adverse possession has been dismissed. 2. The Government of Himachal Pradesh in the Department of MPP and Power vide notification dated 05.03.1988, published in H.P. State Gazette on 01.07.1989 under Section 4 of the Act had notified the acquisition of land in dispute situate at Jhakri for construction of residential accommodation for staff of Nathpa Jhakri Power Project. In the books of the Collector, original petitioners Raj Kumar and Rajinder Singh (since deceased) stood recorded as owner in possession of the land in dispute. However, at the time of last settlement in 1982-83, private respondents stood recorded in possession of the land in dispute without any status. The Collector Land Acquisition had determined the compensation payable for acquisition of the land, however, he observed that the amount of compensation for acquisition of the land could not be paid to the petitioner Raj Kumar and Rajinder Singh since a dispute about the title had arisen as a result of application of H.P. Abolition of Big Landed Estate and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the Land Reforms Act) and H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Ceiling Act). Accordingly the Collector referred the dispute under Section 30 of the Act for adjudication to the District Judge on 13.01.1993. 3. All the Reference Petitions were clubbed and consolidated together with Land Reference Petition No. 68-R/4 of 1995/93 vide order dated 21.05.2001. Evidence recorded in the aforesaid reference was ordered to be read in all the reference petitions as per the statements of the learned Counsel for the parties. 4. As observed above, the learned Reference Court dismissed the claim set up by the original petitioners as also the private respondents, constraining them to file the instant appeals and cross-objections. 5. Evidence recorded in the aforesaid reference was ordered to be read in all the reference petitions as per the statements of the learned Counsel for the parties. 4. As observed above, the learned Reference Court dismissed the claim set up by the original petitioners as also the private respondents, constraining them to file the instant appeals and cross-objections. 5. As regards the petitioners, they have no right or locus standi to maintain the instant appeals in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam vs. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh (dead) through his LRs and others, 2018 (11) SCI 383 (for short the 'Judgment'), wherein it has been categorically held that after the proceedings under the Abolition Act, the original petitioner Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh was found to be under personal cultivation of only 13 bighas 12 biswas whereas the other land in village Jhakri of 393 khasra numbers admeasuring 1011 bighas, 6 biswas was declared to have vested in the State under Section 27 of the Act. Even though as per order dated 14.11.1962 Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh was permitted to retain only 64.12 bighas of land which was under his personal cultivation, however, the said order was modified on 19.09.1964 whereby he was given 13 bighas 12 biswas of land comprised in Khatauni No. 1 out of 14 Khasra numbers i.e. 14, 122, 125, 142, 143, 165, 212, 238, 241, 288, 423, 494, 511 and 512, which is clearly evident from para-5 of the judgment and reads as under: "5. The land in village 'Jhakri' of 393 khasra numbers admeasuring 1011 bighas, 6 biswas was declared to have vested in the State under Section 27 of the Abolition Act and the intermediary Rajinder Singh as per order dated 14.11.1962 was permitted to retain only 64.12 bighas of land which was under his personal cultivation. In Himachal Pradesh, one acre comprises 5 bighas of land. Vide order dated 19.09.1964 passed by the Assistant Collector, the order of vesting was modified to the extent that he was given 13 bighas, 12 Biswas of land comprised in Khatauni No. 1 out of 14 Khasra numbers, i.e. 14, 122, 125, 142, 143, 165, 212, 238, 241, 288, 423, 494, 511 and 512. Some of the aforesaid survey numbers were unmeasured. Some of the aforesaid survey numbers were unmeasured. However, the fact remains that the total area which was found to be under personal cultivation, was 13 big has, 12 Biswas." 6. It is not in dispute that none of the aforesaid khasra numbers measuring 13 bighas, 12 biswas form the subject matter of acquisition and, therefore, the original petitioner and now his LRs have no right to claim any compensation for the land which form the subject matter of the instant appeal. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in all these appeals. 7. However, learned Counsel for the petitioners, at this stage, would submit that since the petitioner was not paid any compensation under either of the Acts i.e. Abolition or Ceiling Act, therefore, respondents be directed to pay the requisite compensation. However, even this plea appears to be contrary to record inasmuch as the Compensation Officer Mahasu vide order dated 12.04.1966 had determined the compensation of Rs. 28,019.45 under the Abolition Act. But, since the original petitioner had already received an amount of Rs. 1703.25 in excess from the tenants who had acquired propriety right under Section 11 of the Abolition Act, the same was deducted from the amount and the amount payable was found to be Rs. 26316.20 and the same was actually paid to him on 06.05.1966. The appeal was filed against the order of the Compensation Officer and the same was partly allowed by the learned District Judge, Mahasu and directions with respect to the deduction of Rs. 1703.25 were set aside and the payment of entire amount of Rs. 28,019.45 was ordered to be paid to the original petitioner without aforesaid deduction. This fact is duly noted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 7 and 8 of the judgment, which reads as under :- "7. Pursuant to the order of vesting, the competent authority under the Abolition Act i.e. Compensation Officer, Mahasu, vide order dated 12.04.1966 determined the compensation of Rs. 28,019.45. Since the Zamindar had already received an amount of Rs. 1,703.25 in excess from the tenants who had acquired proprietary rights under Section 11 of the Abolition Act, same was deducted from the amount and the amount payable was found to be Rs. 26,316.20 and it was actually paid on 6.5.1966. 8. 28,019.45. Since the Zamindar had already received an amount of Rs. 1,703.25 in excess from the tenants who had acquired proprietary rights under Section 11 of the Abolition Act, same was deducted from the amount and the amount payable was found to be Rs. 26,316.20 and it was actually paid on 6.5.1966. 8. As against the order passed by the Compensation Officer dated 12.4.1966, the appeal was preferred before the District Judge, Mahasu. The appeal was partly allowed and the direction which was made of deduction of Rs. 1703.25 was set aside and the payment of entire Rs. 28,019.45 was ordered without aforesaid deduction." 8. Apart from above, compensation of Rs. 57,988/- had also been received by the original petitioner in the year 1980-81 under the Ceiling Act, 1972, as has been taken note of by Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-26 of the judgment, which reads thus:- "26. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the respondent Rajinder Singh has received compensation 3 times with respect to the same land. Firstly, in 1966-67 he had received a sum of Rs. 28,019/- as compensation due to the vesting of entire land in the State Government and the Compensation Officer had determined the same under the Abolition Act. The land, in any event, had vested in the State. The second time the compensation of Rs. 57,388/- had been received in the year 1980-81 under the Ceiling Act, 1972. For the third time, the respondent has received compensation in a sum of Rs. 60 lakhs. The respondent has committed a serious fraud. It was also urged that Rajinder Singh has filed W.P. No. 256/1979, the High Court dismissed the writ petition and observed that the respondent has acted unfairly knowing fully well that the land had already vested in the State and made other observations regarding successive litigations preferred by the respondent and the withdrawal of RFA No. 9/1973. 9. Now, adverting to the cross objections and the claims set up by the private respondents before the learned Reference Court, it is vehemently contended by learned counsel that apart from the Cross-Objections the private respondents otherwise are entitled to assail the impugned award under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the 'Code'), which read as under:- "33. Power of court of Appeal.- The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised In favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection, and may, where there have been decrees in cross suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees: Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order." 10. It cannot be disputed that the object of the aforesaid rule is to empower the Appellate Court to do complete justice between the parties. This rule gives the Court ample power to make an order appropriate to meet the ends of justice. It enables the Appellate Court to pass any decree or order which ought to have been made and to make such further order or decree, as the case may be, in favour of all or any of the parties even though the appeal is as to part only of the decree; and such party or parties may not have filed an appeal. The necessary condition for exercising the power under the rule is that the parties to the proceedings are before the Court and the question raised properly arises out of the judgments of the lower Court. In that event, the Appellate Court can consider any objection to any part of the order or decree of the Court and set it right. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances under which the power can be exercised and each case therefore must depend upon its own facts. Although, the general principle is that a decree is binding on the parties to it, until it is set aside in appropriate proceedings. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances under which the power can be exercised and each case therefore must depend upon its own facts. Although, the general principle is that a decree is binding on the parties to it, until it is set aside in appropriate proceedings. Ordinarily, the Appellate Court must not vary or reverse a decree/order in favour of a party who has not preferred any appeal. But in exceptional cases, the rule enables the Appellate Court to pass such decree or order as sought to have been passed even if such decree or order would be in favour of parties who have not filed any appeal. 11. The scope of the rule has repeatedly come up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but I need only refer to the judgment rendered in Pralhad and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2010) 10 SCC 458 wherein it was held: "18. The provision of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC is clearly an enabling provision, whereby the appellate Court is empowered to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed or made, and to pass, or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. Therefore, the power is very wide and in this enabling provisions, the crucial words are that the appellate court is empowered to pass any order which ought to have been made as the case may require. The expression "order ought to have been made" would obviously mean an order which justice of the case requires to be made. This is made clear from the expression used in the said Rule by saying "the court may pass such further or other order as the case may require". This expression "case" would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law. 19. In fact, the ambit of this provision has come up for consideration in several decisions of this Court. Commenting on this power, Mulla (Civil Procedure Code, 15th Edn., p. 2647) observed that this Rule is modeled on Order 59 Rule 10 (4) of the Supreme Court of Judicature of England, and Mulla further opined that the purpose of this Rule is to do complete justice between the parties. 20. Commenting on this power, Mulla (Civil Procedure Code, 15th Edn., p. 2647) observed that this Rule is modeled on Order 59 Rule 10 (4) of the Supreme Court of Judicature of England, and Mulla further opined that the purpose of this Rule is to do complete justice between the parties. 20. In Banarsi vs. Ram Phal (2003) 9 SCC 606 , this Court construing the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC held that this provision confers powers of the widest amplitude on the appellate Court so as to do complete justice between the parties. This Court further held that such power is unfettered by considerations as to what is the subject matter of the appeal or who has filed the appeal or whether the appeal is being dismissed, allowed or disposed of while modifying the judgments appealed against. The learned Judges held that one of the objects in conferring such power is to avoid inconsistency, inequity and inequality in granting reliefs and the overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. The learned Judges also held that the power can be exercised subject to three limitations: firstly, this power cannot be exercised to the prejudice of a person who is not a party before the Court; secondly, this power cannot be exercised in favour of a claim which has been given up or lost; and thirdly, the power cannot be exercised when such part of the decree which has been permitted to become final by a party is reversed to the advantage of that party. (See SCC p. 619, para 15 : AIR para 15 at p. 1997). It has also been held by this Court in Samundra Devi vs. Narendra Kaur (2008) 9 SCC 100 SCC (para 21), that this power under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict. 22. In view of the aforesaid interpretation given to Order 41 Rule 33 CPC by this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court denied the relief to the appellants to which they are entitled in view of the Constitution Bench decision in K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala, (1994) 5 SCC 593 by taking a rather restricted and narrow view of the scope of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC and also on a misconstruction of the ratio in Paripoornan." 12. In view of the law expounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I uphold the contentions of the Cross-Objectors 13. However, the moot question still remains as to whether the private respondents have been able to prove the plea of adverse possession set up by them. 14. The statements of all the claimants as recorded before the learned Reference Court are verbatim the same as that of Smt. Priyamani, who stated that the land was given by Late Maharaja Padam Singh father of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh to the predecessor-in-interest more than 50 years back and thereafter they had been in continuous, open, peaceful and hostile possession of the land under acquisition. It was further stated that the State of Himachal Pradesh was aware of the possession and, in turn, even treated themselves to be the complete owner thereof and thus, entitled to the compensation to the exclusion of the petitioner(s) and the State. 15. Adverting to the evidence on record, it would be noticed that the petitioner had examined one S.R. Jhingta, General Power of Attorney, as PW-1, who in his cross-examination categorically denied the possession of the private respondents. Apart from that, admittedly the private respondents have not been recorded in the possession of the land under acquisition prior to the last settlement 1980-82. 16. As a matter of fact, the learned Reference Court on the basis of the evidence has concluded and rightly so that the private respondents were rank trespassers, who had encroached upon the disputed land at the time of last settlement. 17. Moreover, the plea of adverse possession as also tenancy cannot be raised by the private respondents, because so long, as the relationship of landlord and tenant subsists, the tenant cannot set up any title by way of adverse possession, however, notoriously he may proclaim title in himself and deny the title of the landlord. The mere fact that the landlord takes no steps to contest the tenants hostile assertion improves in no way his position (See: Tulsiram vs. K.L. Pande AIR 1956 Nag 11). 18. It is in this background that Shri Vinay Kuthiala, learned Senior Advocate duly assisted by Ms. Vandana Kuthiala, Advocate, would vehemently argue that irrespective of the capacity, in case, the private respondents have been found in possession of the land, then on this ground alone they are entitled to the compensation as they have right in compensation. 19. 18. It is in this background that Shri Vinay Kuthiala, learned Senior Advocate duly assisted by Ms. Vandana Kuthiala, Advocate, would vehemently argue that irrespective of the capacity, in case, the private respondents have been found in possession of the land, then on this ground alone they are entitled to the compensation as they have right in compensation. 19. In support of such contention learned Counsels have placed reliance on the following judgments:- 1. Jagadishwar Sanyal vs. Collector of Goalpara and another AIR 1925 Calcutta 197(2). 2. Shanti Devi and another vs. Province of West Bengal, AIR 1954 Cal. 212 . 3. Puran vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 1976 HP 17. 4. S. Palani Velayutham and others vs. District Collector, Tirunelveli & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 664 . 20. In Jagadishwar Sanyal case (supra), the learned Division Bench of the Hon'ble Calcutta High held that a tenant or sub-tenant, even though his interest is not transferable except with the sanction of the superior landlord, has an interest which entitles him to be heard upon the question of adequacy of compensation : Godadhar Dass v. Dhunput Singh (1881) 7 Cal. 585, Jagat Chandra Dat v. Collector of Chittagong (1913) 40 Cal. 64. In a later case Sadhu Charan Roy Chowdhury v. Secretary of State (1920) 31 C.L.J. 63, it was further reiterated out that even a tenant with a precarious interest in land was entitled to compensation. Besides this the Judicial Committee in Perry v. Clissold (1907) A.C. 73 held, (confirming the decision of the High Court of Australia in Clissold v. Perry 1 Com.L.R. 363), that compensation was payable to every person deprived of the land resumed for public purposes even though his title was merely permissive and had not been perfected by adverse possession for the statutory period. Therein, the appellant was undoubtedly a tenant of the land and it was this background that the Court held it is not necessary to consider whether his tenancy was heritable or permanent or for life. Nor it is necessary to discuss whether the insertion, of the covenant against alienation, without a clause for re-entry, would entitle the grantor to terminate the lease and to re-enter on the ground of forfeiture. Nor it is necessary to discuss whether the insertion, of the covenant against alienation, without a clause for re-entry, would entitle the grantor to terminate the lease and to re-enter on the ground of forfeiture. Whatever view is taken of the nature of the tenancy, it is plain that the appellant was entitled to some compensation in respect of his interest which was destroyed by reason of the acquisition of the land. He was accordingly entitled to be heard upon the question of the adequacy of the award. 21. In Shanti Devi's case (supra) another Division Bench of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court held that for every property acquired or requisitioned all the persons interested are entitled to have their claims determined and assessed; particularly in the case of requisition, the effect of the requisition order is to deprive all parties who are interested in the property of their exercise of acts of possession or such other rights which were being exercised in respect of that property, under whatever title it may be. It is not necessary always to determine whether the person claiming is the original owner of the property, or he has a subsisting title to the property, though he may be in possession of the same. 22. The Court further reiterated the observations of the Judicial Committee in Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73 (B), confirming the decision of the High Court of Australia in --'Clissold v. Perry', 1 Com-WLR 363 (C) by observing that compensation was payable to every person who has been deprived of possession and it is not necessary to scrutinise strictly whether such a person had legal right to retain possession against the rightful owner. 23. In Puran's case (supra), it was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that once found in occupation of the premises whether in the capacity of tenant or licensee he is a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act and according to this definition any person claiming an interest, no matter whether the claim is valid or otherwise is a person interested and it is not for the Collector to determine the question of the right of any person. He is only concerned with the determination of the compensation and authorised to apportion the same between the persons claiming the compensation irrespective of the fact whether they have got a right or not. The only thing is that they must appear before the Collector and demand the same on one ground or the other and if there is any objection from any quarter that he is not a person interested then that matter must be referred to the civil Court by the Collector for determination of their right to apportionment of share in the compensation. 24. In S. Palani Velayutham's case (supra), it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that there was significant difference between 'persons known or believed to be interested' and 'persons interested'. A 'person interested' no doubt would include all persons claiming an interest in the compensation on account of the acquisition of land, including the vested reminder men. On the other hand, 'a person known to be interested' refers to persons whose names are recorded in the revenue records, as persons having an interest in the acquired lands, as the owner, sharer, occupier or holder of any interest. They are entitled to notice. 25. It was observed that there is no obligation on the part of the Collector to hold an enquiry to find out whether there are any other persons interested in the land or whether there are any vested reminder men, in addition to those whose names are entered as the owners/holders/occupiers of the acquired land. Nor does the Collector have any obligation to issue notices to persons whose names are not entered in the revenue records. This does not mean that the persons whose names are not entered in the revenue records do not have any right in the acquired land or that they lose their claim to compensation. Their interests and rights in regard to compensation are protected by the provision relating to apportionment of compensation and provision for referring the disputes to a civil court for apportionment of compensation. 26. Their interests and rights in regard to compensation are protected by the provision relating to apportionment of compensation and provision for referring the disputes to a civil court for apportionment of compensation. 26. It was further observed that persons are "believed" to be interested in the acquired land, if their names are disclosed to the Collector as persons having an interest in the acquired land (though their names are not entered in the revenue records) either in correspondence or otherwise and whom the Collector believes as having an interest in the acquired lands. The question whether a person is believed to be interested in the acquired land, would depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the Collector. 27. It was also observed that the Collector is not expected to hold mini enquiries to find out whether the persons whose names are disclosed, (other than those whose names are entered in the revenue records) are persons interested in the acquired land or not. Therefore no person has any right to assert that the Collector should recognise him to be a person interested in the acquired land, and issue notice to him, merely because someone informs the Collector that such person is also having an interest, if his name is not entered in the revenue records. 28. It was lastly held that, of course, if the Collector is prima facie satisfied from his records that someone other than those whose names are entered in the revenue records, are also interested in the land, he may at his discretion, issue notice to them. If he is not satisfied, he need not issue notice to them. Who is to be 'believed to have an interest' is purely subjective administrative decision. Such persons have no right to claim that notice of acquisition should be issued to them. 29. As noticed above, in the instant cases, it has been categorically found that the private respondents have no lawful title and have failed to establish the title by way of adverse possession. The possession, if any, has only been recorded after 1982-83, which means as on the date of notification the private respondents even if in possession would be deemed trespasser over the land. 30. The possession, if any, has only been recorded after 1982-83, which means as on the date of notification the private respondents even if in possession would be deemed trespasser over the land. 30. Now the moot question is whether a trespasser, who has no right to possess the property, has right to disbursement of compensation, more particularly, when none of the judgments relied upon by the private respondents deal with this question. 31. In State of Maharashtra vs. Shrimant Govindrao Narayanrao, 1983 (2) Bom.C.R. 487 , a Division Bench of Bombay High Court held that a distinction has to be made between persons in occupation of the land with interest therein and those in occupation without any such interest. It may be that a rank trespasser cannot make any claim in the land acquisition proceeding for compensation because he is in no sense a person interested in the land as per the real import of the term. The interest contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act is the legal interest and not the trespasser's illegal desire to squat upon the land. 32. A Division Bench of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in RFA No. 199/85, titled as Tule Ram vs. Union of India & Ors., decided on 06.11.1997 held that since a trespasser has got no interest in the land which could be sold, there could not be any market-value of the land and therefore, such trespasser cannot claim any apportionment in the compensation amount. It shall be apt to reproduce the necessary observations which read as under:- "13. Since a trespasser has got no such interest in the land which could be sold, there could not be any market-value of the land. Consequently, on this score respondents, Suraj Narain and Balesh cannot claim any apportionment in the compensation award. 14.1 In this respect, Ld. counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that a person who is merely a licensee is not entitled to share of compensation. A trespasser certainly would not be a person having any better interest in the land. In this connection, Ld. counsel for the appellant relied upon Shankar Govind Vs. Kishan AIR 1917 Nagpur 23. The following observations were made in that case: "...The wajib-ul-arz recognizes not an interest in the land but a mere license to occupy: See Motiram Vs. Rup Khan. In this connection, Ld. counsel for the appellant relied upon Shankar Govind Vs. Kishan AIR 1917 Nagpur 23. The following observations were made in that case: "...The wajib-ul-arz recognizes not an interest in the land but a mere license to occupy: See Motiram Vs. Rup Khan. In England a license is not an interest in land within the meaning of S. 68, Land Clauses Act, 1845, so as to give a right to compensation for lands or any interest therein "taken for public purposes see Frank Warr & Co. Vs. London Council. It is true that to restore himself to the same position as he enjoyed before the site and the building thereon were acquired, the defendant must find another site but this would equally have been the case had he elected to sell the house privately. I hold, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to the whole of the compensation awarded for the site..." 14.2 Ld. counsel for the appellant further relied upon District Deputy Collector, Panch Mahals Vs. Mansangji Mokhamsangji Naik AIR 1928 Bombay 305. Following observations are noteworthy: The ordinary rule that has been adopted in England in the case of compulsory acquisition of land occupied by tenants, whose tenancies are determined by notice or efflux of time, is that they cannot claim compensation for loss of profits, even though they had reasonable expectation of continuing in possession or having the lease renewed. 14.3 Ld. counsel for the appellant also referred to Tulsiram Tukaram Vs. K.L. Pande and Ors. AIR 1956 Nagpur 11 . In that case, there was some difference of opinion between Chief Justice Sinha and Justice Hidayatullah and on difference of opinion, Justice S. Kaushalendra Rao gave his opinion in paragraph 39 as follows: (39) In presence of the true owner, which fact clearly distinguishes the instant case from that of 1907 AC 73 (F), even a licensee was held to be not entitled to be compensated. See _ 'Shankar Govind Vs. Kishan AIR 1917 Nag 23 (T). A trespasser cannot claim greater recognition than a licensee. In competition with true ownership, the possession of the non-applicant even if adverse on the date of the reference could not, before it ripened into title, be considered as an interest entitled to be compensated under the Land Acquisition Act. 15. Kishan AIR 1917 Nag 23 (T). A trespasser cannot claim greater recognition than a licensee. In competition with true ownership, the possession of the non-applicant even if adverse on the date of the reference could not, before it ripened into title, be considered as an interest entitled to be compensated under the Land Acquisition Act. 15. Hence, in the present case the respondents, Suraj Narain and Balesh, did not have any interest in the land in dispute to justify awarding any compensation. Interest in the present context should mean an estate or a right in property. The word 'interest' has a basic concept of right to have advantage or profit arising out of land. Since a rank trespasser would have no such estate or right in any such advantage or profit arising out of the land, he has no interest which could be said to be transferable. 16. According to Stround's Judicial Dictionary 4th Edn. Vol. 3 the term "interest" means as under: "INTEREST. (1) "Interest is vulgarly taken for a terms or chattel real, and more particularly for a future tearme; in which case it is said in pleading that he is possed de interesse termini. But ex vi termini, in legal understanding, it extended to estates, rights and titles, that a man hath of, in, to, or out of, lands; for he is truly said to have an interest in them: and by the grant of to turn inter see suum in such lands, as well reversions as possessions in fee simple shall passed". (37) "The interest of the landlord" (Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (c.56), s. 30 (2)) means his interest from the time it originally arose, and an interest under successive head leases is a single interest for this purpose (Artemion Vs. Procopion [1966] 1 Q.B. 878). The landlord's "interest" within the meaning of s. 30(2) is created at the date of execution of the lease and not at such later date as it may be expressed to commence (Northcote Laundry v. Donnelly [1968] 1 W.L.R. 562). Procopion [1966] 1 Q.B. 878). The landlord's "interest" within the meaning of s. 30(2) is created at the date of execution of the lease and not at such later date as it may be expressed to commence (Northcote Laundry v. Donnelly [1968] 1 W.L.R. 562). (38) Proprietary "interest" which gives a right to work minerals may be that of the owner in fee simple, of the lessee of the minerals or a person having a licence not presently revocable to work the minerals and carry them away: See Re East Yorshire Gravel Co.'s [1955] 1 W.L.R. 88; [1954] 3 All.E.R. 631." INTEREST IN LAND (1) By the construction put upon the Mortmain Act (c. 36; repealed, but its provisions re-enacted by the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888 c. 42. no interest in land could be given by will to charitable uses, but this is modified as regards will of persons dying after August 5, 1891 (Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1891 (c. 73). There have been numerous and frequently conflicting cases defining what is such an interest in land. In Jervis v. Lawrence (22 Ch. D. 202), Bacon V.C. said "I believe there is a fault that has been committed in great many of these cases. (21) An interest in land is not to be confounded with a mere CHARGE on land (per Page Wood L.J. Franks v. Bollans, 3 Ch. 718). See also Keith Vs. Twentieth Centaury Club, 73 L.J. Ch 549). (22) (defense (General) Regulations 1939 (No. 927). reg. 51(2). A requisitioning authority may do "anything which any person having an interest in the land would be entitled to do in virtue of that interest," interest there means any interest or interests which any person may have in the land and not merely a right adequate to enable the occupier to do anything necessary or expedient for the purposes of the occupation (Demetiades Vs. Glasgow Corporation [1951] 1 T.L.R. 396). "Interest in the land" within this regulation meant any interest which a person might have in the land and was not restricted to what was necessary to achieve the object of the occupation (Demetriades Vs. Glasgow Corporation [1951] W.N. 108." 17. Glasgow Corporation [1951] 1 T.L.R. 396). "Interest in the land" within this regulation meant any interest which a person might have in the land and was not restricted to what was necessary to achieve the object of the occupation (Demetriades Vs. Glasgow Corporation [1951] W.N. 108." 17. For the foregoing reasons, it is apparent that the respondent Suraj Narain and Balesh being rank trespassers are not persons having any interest in the land and as such they are not entitled to claim any apportionment. 18. Since the respondents do not claim to be tenants or lessee of Tule Ram, their case would not be covered by the ratio of the judgments of Mangat Ram Vs. State of Haryana, Inder Prashad Vs. Union of India, Col Sir Harinder Singh Brar Bans Bahadur Vs. Bihari Lal,. 19. In Union of India Vs. Ajit Singh, 1997 (43) DRJ 169, the following observations were made in paragraph 9 of the judgment: "9. ...The Court is required to take into consideration relevant factors, viz., the duration of the lease, the nature of the right to enjoyment of the leasehold interest and the improvements the tenant made on the land etc. It is equally settled law that if the Government is the owner of the land, before initiating the acquisition, it is entitled to terminate the lease and take possession of the lands in terms of the lease. Necessarily, in the above case the tenant cannot have any right to compensation as he is bound by the terms of the lease..." 20. In case the licensee who is in possession and whose licence has been terminated or in case of tenant, whose tenancy has been terminated or has come to an end by efflux of time, loose their interest in land appears to be the ratio of the above judgment. If it is so, one cannot say that any trespasser would have any better rights. 21. It was argued by the Ld. counsel for the respondents that since the possession being 9/10 of the ownership, the respondents would certainly have interest in land and in this regard Ld. counsel for the respondents referred to Manche Anege Akue Vs. Manche Kojo Ababio IV. There cannot be any dispute with this proposition, but there is a distinction between occupation and possession. counsel for the respondents that since the possession being 9/10 of the ownership, the respondents would certainly have interest in land and in this regard Ld. counsel for the respondents referred to Manche Anege Akue Vs. Manche Kojo Ababio IV. There cannot be any dispute with this proposition, but there is a distinction between occupation and possession. Possession is authorised and legal occupation while occupation is a mere entry or remaining on the land without having any legal authority. A mere entry on land is not possession of land. The general rule is that where the possession is doubtful, the possession follows a legal title. A trespasser not having any right to possess or to enjoy the land, cannot claim any interest in the land within the meaning of Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. 22. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the definite opinion that firstly, the respondents, Suraj Narain and Balesh Chand were not even in occupation at the time of acquisition of the land, leave aside possession. Secondly, even if for the sake of argument, it is held that Suraj Narain and Balesh were in occupation of one bigha land out of 19 bighas 10 biswas land in terms of the entries vide Ex. P-1 and P-2, the respondents, Suraj Narain and Balesh, could claim apportionments in compensation only in respect of one bigha of land and entire amount of compensation in respect of the remaining portion measuring 18 big ha 10 biswas land would go only to Tule Ram, the appellant. Thirdly, even if it is assumed that they were in occupation of one bigha land out of 19 bigha 10 biswas land being rank trespassers did not have any interest even in one bigha land to claim compensation for acquisition of the land. In respect of each of the three counts the apportionment of compensation in favour of the respondents as ordered by the Learned Reference Court cannot be justified by any stretch of imagination. 33. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haryana Wakf Board vs. State of Haryana, 2019 (1) Scale 100 , has held that because the status of the lessees under an impermissible and void arrangement is that of a deemed trespasser and "trespasser have no right to possess the property" as such the lessees/deemed trespasser are not entitle for disbursement of compensation. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haryana Wakf Board vs. State of Haryana, 2019 (1) Scale 100 , has held that because the status of the lessees under an impermissible and void arrangement is that of a deemed trespasser and "trespasser have no right to possess the property" as such the lessees/deemed trespasser are not entitle for disbursement of compensation. It was further held that the compensation has to be determined depending upon the right, title or interest which one possess. It would be opposite to refer to the relevant observations, which read as under:- "In the instant case, it is apparent that even if we accept the submission raised by learned counsel appearing on behalf of some of the lessees that the arrangement was on the year to year basis it would not confer any right. In fact, leases were for the period exceeding three years. It was an impermissible and void arrangement as such no title would accrue to the lessee. They were holding Wakf property, which by its very nature was dedicated for the public purpose and no right could be conferred to the lessees on the basis of void leases. In such cases Section 18 of Tenancy Act, 1953 is not applicable. In such case, the status of the lessees would be that of a deemed trespasser and trespasser have no right to possess the property as such could not said to be entitled for disbursement of the compensation to the extent of 3/4th. Only some amount of compensation owing to displacement could have been given or in case there was a crop, for damage of the crop. They could not successfully claim apportionment on the basis of the price of the land as there was no ownership right for occupancy right vested with such lessees. The extent of compensation to be paid in such cases would depend upon the facts of each case, nature of possession, rights, if any, and no straightjacket formula can be laid down in this regard. At the most in such a case where there is no right, title conferred or accrued by virtue of cultivation of the land of occupancy, the compensation to the extent of 5% to 15% could have been given for the purpose of resettlement in view of the fact that a person had been displaced and deprived of right to livelihood. At the most in such a case where there is no right, title conferred or accrued by virtue of cultivation of the land of occupancy, the compensation to the extent of 5% to 15% could have been given for the purpose of resettlement in view of the fact that a person had been displaced and deprived of right to livelihood. The major part of compensation must be paid to the owner in such cases." 34. Similar issue thereafter came up before the learned Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Writ C. No. 16412 of 2018, titled Harish Chander vs. Union of India and five others decided on 24.04.2019, wherein it was held that a trespasser or encroacher is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of another, without a privilege to do so being created or conferred by the possessor's consent or otherwise has no right under the Land Acquisition Act and further has no right to seek any benefit under the provisions of the Act or to challenge the acquisition thereunder. It was further held that since the petitioners are encroacher/trespasser, they cannot be treated as persons interested in the property in dispute. If the right of the trespasser in such a situation is either accepted or recognized, then no proceedings under the provisions of the Act would ever get concluded. 35. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, it can safely be held that the status of the private respondents was only that of rank trespassers as was rightly held even by the learned Reference Court, therefore, they are not entitled to any compensation whatsoever under the Act. 36. Having failed to convince this Court on the aforesaid ground, the learned Senior Counsels S/Shri G.D. Verma and Vinay Kuthiala, as a last ditch effort, would vehemently argue that it is settled law that when the State proceeds to acquire land on an assumption that it belongs to a particular person, then the award made by Collector cannot be called in question by State seeking a reference under Section 30 on the premise that the land did not belong to the person from whom it was purportedly acquired and was a land owned by the state having been vested in it. 37. In support of such contention, reliance has been placed on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- 1. 37. In support of such contention, reliance has been placed on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- 1. Collector of Bombay vs. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri, (1955) 1 SCR 311 2. State of Orissa vs. Brundaban Sharma, (1995 (Suppl.) 3 SCC 249 3. Mehar Rusi Dalai vs. Union of India, 2004 (7) SCC 362 . 38. No doubt, the submission on the first blush appears to be attractive, however, when considered in detail, I really do not find the aforesaid propositions as canvassed to be applicable to the facts of the instant case. 39. It is not in dispute that it is only by virtue of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh's case (supra), that the Court for the first time came to the categorical conclusion that the original respondent(s) was permitted to retain only 13 bighas and 12 biswas of the land in Jhakri whereas the remaining land measuring 1011 bighas + 64.12 bighas (-) 13.12 bighas =1062.06 bighas vested in the State and directed the original respondent(s) that the compensation that had already been withdrawn by the original petitioners or by his LRs in the land acquisition in the original proceedings under Section 28A shall be refunded alongwith interest @ 12% per annum within three months from 24.09.2018. Even the review preferred against the judgment shall stand dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 09.01.2019. 40. Earlier to this the land in question was being treated as one owned by the original respondent Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and it was in this background that the same was sought to be acquired. 41. Apart from that, the respondents or for that matter even the private respondents have failed to establish not only their respective titles but have further failed to establish that they are either "persons interested" or "persons known or believed to be interested" so as to be entitled to any compensation. 42. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit either in these appeals, cross-objections and in the contentions raised by learned counsels for the claimants who have not filed cross-objections seeking apportionment in the compensation. 43. Consequently, there is no merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any also stands disposed of.