JUDGMENT : ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J. 1. The appeal is against a decision of the learned First Court dismissing the writ petition of the appellant petitioner on the question of cancellation of provisional allotment of a plot in Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority. The appellant had applied for a plot within the aforesaid area for setting up a manufacturing unit for refectories. A letter of allotment was issued in its favour on 5th July, 2017 allotting Plot No. FE-2 near 7th Phase of the said area. The terms of allotment required the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 3,85,36,094/- on or before 30 days from the date of allotment. The appellant however did not deposit the aforesaid sum on the ground that there was no development work in the area concerned and even if the said amount was deposited, there was no chance of a developed plot being handed over to the appellant within a period of 10 days. The said timeframe for delivery of possession, according to appellant, is laid down in Clause 15 (v) of the Jharkhand Industrial Area Development Authority Regulations, 2016 (in short 2016 Regulations). The appellant had taken up the issue with the said authority but there was no response to its communication. The only communication the appellant received was an e-mail dated 21st August, 2017 enclosing to it a letter dated 14th August, 2017 issued by the Chief Executive Officer of the said Area Development Authority cancelling the allotment. 2. The appellant questioned the legality of the said action before the learned First Court. The learned First Court considering the materials available before it dismissed the writ petition holding:- “6. The Regulations, 2016 has been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 15 of Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority Act, 1974 as adopted by the Government of Jharkhand vide Notification No. 339 dated 02.03.2001. Clause 15 of the same deals with the scrutiny of applications, issuance of land allotment order and deposit of allotment amount. Clause-15(v) is quoted hereunder for ready reference:- “15(v). The allottee shall pay full premium of land within 30 (thirty) days from the date of receipt of letter of provisional allotment by way of demand draft or online payment in favour of the Authority. Clause-15(v) is quoted hereunder for ready reference:- “15(v). The allottee shall pay full premium of land within 30 (thirty) days from the date of receipt of letter of provisional allotment by way of demand draft or online payment in favour of the Authority. Any amount paid earlier by the allottee along with the application seeking allotment, except scrutiny fee, shall be set off with the amount of premium without interest. On payment of full premium the allottee shall be handed over physical possession of the land/shed within 10 (ten) days from the date of receipt of the same.” 7. The aforesaid clause explicitly provides that the premium for the allotted plot is to be paid within 30 days from the date of receipt of letter of provisional allotment and only on payment of the full premium, the allottee is to be handed over the physical possession of the land within 10 days of the receipt of the same. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the land was not ready for delivery and thus the payment of the premium was not paid. In my view, the same was not the condition precedent for payment of the premium. Subsequent to the provisional allotment of the land, the petitioner tried to put an additional condition for payment of the premium which was neither in terms with the Regulations, 2016 nor the parties had agreed for such an arrangement. 9. The next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that no show cause notice was served to it before issuing the impugned communication/letter cancelling the allotment of the plot and thus the respondents have violated the principles of natural justice which was a mandatory requirement to be followed before taking such action. I find no substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The terms and conditions of the allotment were well within the knowledge of the petitioner before issuance of the provisional allotment letter and at the time of entering into the agreement both the parties had made reciprocal promises to each other. I find no substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The terms and conditions of the allotment were well within the knowledge of the petitioner before issuance of the provisional allotment letter and at the time of entering into the agreement both the parties had made reciprocal promises to each other. Once the petitioner was issued the provisional allotment letter, it was the obligation of the petitioner to deposit the premium of the land within the stipulated time and then only to request the respondent-AIADA to fulfill its part of promise by handing over the possession of the plot within 10 days of the payment, as has been mandated in the Regulations, 2016. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I do not find any infirmity in the decision making process of the respondents-AIADA so as to warrant any interference with the same under the discretionary writ jurisdiction.” 3. Submission of Mr. Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant is that the authorities had failed to appreciate the scope of Clause 15 (v) of the 2016 Regulations which has been quoted in the judgment of the learned First Court. His submission is that the obligation of an applicant to deposit the amount is dependent upon the land being ready for delivery to the satisfaction of the applicant. He also submits that amenities were not ready. 4. We do not find the aforesaid Clause can be construed in that manner. The requirement of deposit is not made dependent upon the land being made ready for delivery. Of course an obligation is cast on the authority to deliver the physical possession of the land/shed within 10 days from the date of receipt of the said sum. But whether the land was developed or not is essentially a question of fact which cannot be gone into in a writ proceeding. The issue involved in this proceeding is purely contractual. The appellant sought to modify the terms of contract by insisting on proof of status of the land before making payment. That was not the term included in the contract. 5. We do not find any error in the judgment of the learned First Court. The appeal is dismissed. 6. Consequently, connected Interlocutory Application (I.A. No. 10850 of 2018) is also dismissed.