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2019 DIGILAW 854 (ALL)

Sriram Singh v. State Of U. P.

2019-04-04

PANKAJ BHATIA, PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH BAGHEL

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for issuance of a writ of Certiorari to quash the reports dated 5.12.2018 and 25.2.2019. He has also sought a direction upon the respondents to demarcate the land of the petitioner i.e. Khasra No. 342 and further deliver the possession of the same to him. The reliefs sought in the writ petition amongst other are extracted below: “i) a writ of certiorari to quash the report dated 5/12/2018 and 25/02/2019 (Annexure 9 & 11 respectively) submi ed area lekhpal Raunapar district Azamgarh. (ii) a writ of mandamus directing to respondents to demarcate the land of the petitioner (KhasaraNo.342) situated in village Raunapur tehsil Sagari district Azamgarh and further deliver the possession of the same to him.” 2. The facts are these. The petitioner claims that Khasra No. 342 in Village Raunapur, Tehsil and District Azamgarh is recorded in revenue records in the name of the petitioner, Vishwanath and Ajay. Another Khasra No. 345 is recorded in the names of Lal Bihari, Parashuram and Durbali. Both Khasra Nos. 342 and 345 are adjacent to each other. It is stated that they have occupied the land of one Ramsurat who is owner of Arazi No. 343 and the sixth respondent has raised a boundary wall over the said property. In the month of June, 2018 the said boundary wall collapsed and all bricks and material are lying in the land of the petitioner and it has damaged sugarcane crop of the petitioner. The petitioner made a request to the sixth respondent to remove his building material but when he refused to remove the same, the petitioner made an application before the fourth respondent – Sub-Divisional Magistrate. On his application the Sub-Divisional Magistrate directed the fifth respondent and the Revenue Inspector to make an inspection of the disputed site. When the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was not complied with, the petitioner made an application to the second respondent-the District Magistrate and the Commissioner Azamgarh Division – the third respondent. The second respondent on 11.6.2018 directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to resolve the matter. It is stated that in spite of several applications and order passed on his application, no demarcation has been made by the officer concerned and the police has never visited the spot. The petitioner thereafter filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26334 of 2018 which was dismissed on 6.8.2018. It is stated that in spite of several applications and order passed on his application, no demarcation has been made by the officer concerned and the police has never visited the spot. The petitioner thereafter filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26334 of 2018 which was dismissed on 6.8.2018. The said order reads as under: "The dispute is apparently of measurement and demarcation of the land adjoining the plot of the petitionerandtherespondentno.6.Appropriateremedy open to the petitioner is to approach the Competent Authority under section 24 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 and not by way of general representation to the District Magistrate/Collector. This petition is accordingly dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to avail such remedy as may be available under the statutory provisions. Sri Hari Keshav, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents is presently." 3. It appears that the petitioner made a complaint to the District Magistrate on Sampoorna Samadhan Diwasalso. On the said complaint, the Revenue Inspector and Lekhpal were directed to submit a report. The Lekhpal on 5.12.2018 made an inspection in presence of the petitioner and private respondents and has recorded that Plot No. 342 area .534 hectare is recorded in the name of the petitioner as a bhumidhar with transferable rights but no demarcation could be made as the respondents did not give consent. Hence, the petitioner was asked to move an appropriate application under Section 21/24 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. A copy of the said report of the Lekhpal submitted to the District Magistrate is on the record as annexure-11 to the writ petition. 4. It appears that the petitioner has also moved an application to the Divisional Commissioner also. On the said application the Divisional Commissioner has directed the District Magistrate to resolve the matter. Pursuant to the said order a similar report has been submitted by the Revenue Authorities on 25.2.2019. The petitioner is aggrieved by the said report of Lekhpal. He has challenged the aforesaid two reports. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.K. Goyal, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. 6. Pursuant to the said order a similar report has been submitted by the Revenue Authorities on 25.2.2019. The petitioner is aggrieved by the said report of Lekhpal. He has challenged the aforesaid two reports. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.K. Goyal, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. 6. Our experience shows that a spate of writ petitions are filed everyday in this Court for somewhat similar relief, regarding demarcation of boundaries of agricultural fields, for issuance of a mandamus restraining the private respondent/s from interfering in their possession and restraining the private respondent/s not to alienate the immovable property in favour of the third party. In the present case also the petitioner has a dispute in regard to his agricultural land with private respondents. The U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (U.P. Act No. 8 of 2012) deals with all sorts of dispute relating to land. Section 230 of the Code repealed as many as 32 enactments mentioned in List-A of First Schedule including the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950; Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956; the United Provinces Board of Revenue Act, 1922; the U.P. Hindu Women's Right to Property (Extension the Agricultural Lands) Act, 1942; the U.P. Village Abadi Act, 1947 etc. 7. The Code, 2006 is designed to deal with the grievance relating to land tenures and land revenue and incidental matters. Chapter-II of the Code, 2006 provides that there would be a division of the State in which there would be revenue areas. Chapter III deals with the Board of Revenue its jurisdiction and various revenue officers. Chapter-IV deals with boundary and boundary marks. Chapter-V provides the scheme for maintenance of village records; Chapter-VI provides revision of village records; Chapter-VII about ownership of land other properties; Chapter-VIII provides management of land and other properties by Gram Panchayat or other local authorities; Chapter-IX deals with tenures; Chapter-X provides Government Lessees; Chapter XI & XII deals with assessment of land revenue and collection of that and Chapter-XIII deals with judicial procedure of the Revenue Courts. 8. A bird's-eye view of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 shows that the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952 have been incorporated in this Act and various procedures have been simplified. 8. A bird's-eye view of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 shows that the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952 have been incorporated in this Act and various procedures have been simplified. We find that without taking recourse to the remedy available under the Code, 2006 a large number of writ petitions are filed directly in this Court seeking reliefs under extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. 9. In the present case itself the petitioner without taking recourse to the remedy under the Code, 2006 has approached this Court earlier by way of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26334 of 2018 which was dismissed with an observation that the petitioner can move an application for demarcation under the provisions of the Code, 2006. After the dismissal of the writ petition the petitioner did not move any application under Section 21 read with Section 24, Chapter IV of the Code, 2006 and directly filed application to the Commissioner, District Magistrate and made the complaints to them. It appears that the order of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26334 of 2018 dated 6.8.2016 was not brought to the notice of the authority concerned. His representations to the District Magistrate and the Commissioner dated 27.10.2018 and 25.1.2019 respectively are on the record. 10. Having carefully perused the above representations, we find that the petitioner has concealed the fact that he has earlier approached this Court and his writ petition was dismissed leaving it open to him to file an application under Section 21 read with Section 24 of the Code, 2006. From his representation it is also evident that he had made complaint to the Chief Minister also. In spite of his earlier petition which was dismissed on 6.8.2016, the petitioner has filed this second writ petition for quashing of Lekhpal's report dated 5.12.2018. A perusal of annexure-9 indicates that it is simply a report of Lekhpal submitted to the District Magistrate on petitioner's complaint on Sampoorna Samadhan Diwas. 11. We find that the present writ petition is misconceived and ill-advised. In stead of moving an application under the Code, 2006 which was the appropriate remedy, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition which, in our view, is an abuse of the process of law. 11. We find that the present writ petition is misconceived and ill-advised. In stead of moving an application under the Code, 2006 which was the appropriate remedy, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition which, in our view, is an abuse of the process of law. This Court is overburdened with huge number of cases and its precious judicial time is wasted in such type of writ petitions which are filed in a large number. 12. In our view the learned counsel for the petitioner before filing the writ petition should have given an advice to the petitioner not to file the second writ petition for the same cause of action when the petitioner has efficacious alternative remedy under the provision of the Code, 2006. In the case of T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and another, (1977) 4 SCC 467 the Supreme Court has reminded the lawyers about their professional duty while accepting the brief. Relevant part of the order reads as under: “7. ...We more than regret the circumstance that the party concerned has been able to prevail upon one lawyer or the other to present to the court a case which was disingenuous or worse. It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And remembering that an advocate is an officer of justice he owes it to society not to collaborate in shady actions. The Bar Council of India, we hope will activate this obligation. We are constrained to make these observations and hope that the co-operation of the Barwi be readily for the coming to the Bench for spending judicial time on worthwhile disputes and avoiding the distraction of sham litigation such as the one we are disposing of. Another moral of this unrighteous chain litigation is the gullible grant of ex parte orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy courts. A judge who succumbs to ex parte pressure in unmerited cases helps devalue the judicial process. We must appreciate Shri Ramasesh for his young candour and correct advocacy.” 13. In the case of Varinderpal Singh v. Hon'ble Mr. Another moral of this unrighteous chain litigation is the gullible grant of ex parte orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy courts. A judge who succumbs to ex parte pressure in unmerited cases helps devalue the judicial process. We must appreciate Shri Ramasesh for his young candour and correct advocacy.” 13. In the case of Varinderpal Singh v. Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. R. Sharma and others, 1986 (Supp) SCC 719 the Supreme Court has made an appeal to the members of the Bar to their cooperation and to share the burden of dispensing justice and it is a duty to see that burden should not be made unbearable on the Court. Relevant part of the judgment reads as under: “....On the face of it the petition is not maintainable. There is not even a semblance of a question of law or an error of jurisdiction. There is not even a remote justification for filing this petition. It is a pity that the time of this Court which is becoming acutely precious because of the piling arrears has to be wasted on hearing such petitions. Perhaps many such petitions may be avoided if learned counsel who are officers of the court and who are expected to assist the court tender proper advice to their clients. I appeal to members of the Bar to realize that the great burden of dispensing justice is a burden which it is their duty to share and it is their duty to see that the burden should not be needlessly made unbearable. The Judges of this Court are struggling bravely against the odds to tackle the problem of dispensing quick justice. But, without the cooperation of the gentlemen of the Bar, nothing can be done. I appeal to the members of the Bar for their goodwill and cooperation. If we are not able to cooperate and set our house in order, the people to whom all of us are accountable will surely intervene and ask wiser men than us to tell us what is good for us all. Please do cooperate. The petition is dismissed accordingly.” 14. In the case of Gurgaon Gramin Bank v. Khazani and another, (2012) 8 SCC 781 the Court has again taken a judicial notice regarding the rise of cases for small and tribal matters. "2. Please do cooperate. The petition is dismissed accordingly.” 14. In the case of Gurgaon Gramin Bank v. Khazani and another, (2012) 8 SCC 781 the Court has again taken a judicial notice regarding the rise of cases for small and tribal matters. "2. The number of litigations in our country is on the rise, for small and trivial matters, people and sometimes the Central and the State Governments and their instrumentalities like Banks, nationalised or private, come to courts may be due to ego clash or to save the officers' skin. The judicial system is overburdened which naturally causes delay in adjudication of disputes. Mediation Centers opened in various parts of our country have, to some extent, eased the burden of the courts but we are still in the tunnel and the light is far away. On more than one occasion, this Court has reminded the Central Government, the State Governments and other instrumentalities as well as to the various banking institutions to take earnest efforts to resolve the disputes at their end. At times, some give and take attitude should be adopted or both will sink. Unless serious questions of law of general importance arise for consideration or a question which affects a large number of persons or the stakes are very high, the courts jurisdiction cannot be invoked for resolution of small and trivial matters. We are really disturbed by the manner in which those types of matters are being brought to courts, even at the level of the Supreme Court of India and this case falls in that category." 15. In the case of Phool Chandra, and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 112 , the Supreme Court has again highlighted the need to curb frivolous litigation which results in wastage of public money and time. The court has also observed that the cost should be imposed not only on litigant but exemplary cost upon the learned counsel also who acts in irresponsible manner. Relevant part of the judgment in Phool Chandra (supra) is quoted below: "12. All these are aberrations in the functioning of the Apex Court of any country. Of late, there has been an increase in the trend of litigants rushing to the courts, including this Court, for all kinds of trivial and silly matters which results in wastage of public money and time. All these are aberrations in the functioning of the Apex Court of any country. Of late, there has been an increase in the trend of litigants rushing to the courts, including this Court, for all kinds of trivial and silly matters which results in wastage of public money and time. A closer scrutiny of all such matters would disclose that there was not even a remote justification for filing the case. It is a pity that the time of the court which is becoming acutely precious because of the piling arrears has to be wasted on hearing such matters. There is an urgent need to put a check on such frivolous litigation. Perhaps many such cases can be avoided if the learned counsel who are officers of the court and who are expected to assist the court tender proper advice to their clients. The Bar has to realise that the great burden upon the Bench of dispensing justice imposes a simultaneous duty upon-them to share this burden and it is their duty to see that the burden should not needlessly be made unbearable. The Judges of this Nation are struggling bravely against the odds to tackle the problem of dispensing quick justice. But, without the cooperation of the gentlemen of the Bar, nothing can be done. 13. It is high time that the courts should come down heavily upon such frivolous litigation and unless we ensure that the wrongdoers are denied profit or undue benefit from the frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to control, frivolous and uncalled for litigation. In order to curb such kind of litigation, the courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive which can be ensured by imposing exemplary costs upon the parties as well as on the learned counsel who act in an irresponsible manner. (Vide Varinderpal Singh v. M.R. Sharma, 1986 Supp SCC 719; Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 1, and Gurgaon Grarftin Bank v. Khazani, (2012) 8 SCC 781 : AIR 2012 SC 2881 )" 16. Recently the Supreme Court in the case of Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and others, (2014) 8 SCC 470 , has again occasioned to consider the matter of frivolous petitions and need to curb them with firm hands. The Supreme Court has also held that exemplary costs should be imposed. "191. Recently the Supreme Court in the case of Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and others, (2014) 8 SCC 470 , has again occasioned to consider the matter of frivolous petitions and need to curb them with firm hands. The Supreme Court has also held that exemplary costs should be imposed. "191. The Indian judicial system is grossly afflicted with frivolous, litigation. Ways and - means need to be evolved to deter litigants from their compulsive obsession towards senseless and ill-considered claims. One needs to keep in mind that in the process of litigation, there is an innocent sufferer on the other side of every irresponsible and senseless claim. He suffers long-drawn anxious periods of nervousness and restlessness, whilst the litigation is pending without any fault on his part. He pays for the litigation from out of his savings (or out of his borrowings) worrying that the other side may trick him into defeat for no fault of his. He spends invaluable time briefing counsel and preparing them for his claim. Time which he should have spent at work, or with his family, is lost, for no fault of his. Should a litigant not be compensated for what he has lost for no fault? The suggestion to the legislature is that a litigant who has succeeded must be compensated by the one who has lost. The suggestion to the legislature is to formulate a mechanism that anyone who initiates and continues a litigation senselessly pays for the same. It is suggested that the legislature should consider the introduction of a "Code of Compulsory Costs". 192. We should not be taken to have suggested that the cost of litigation should be enhanced. It is not our suggestion that the court fee or other litigation related costs should be raised. Access to justice and related costs should be as free and as low as possible. What is sought to be redressed is a habituation to press illegitimate claims. This practice and pattern is so rampant that in most cases disputes which ought to have been settled in no time at all before the first court of incidence are prolonged endlessly for years and years and from court to court up to the highest court. 193. This abuse of the judicial process is not limited to any particular class of litigants. 193. This abuse of the judicial process is not limited to any particular class of litigants. The State and its agencies litigate endlessly up to the highest court just because of the lack of responsibility to take decisions. So much so that we have started to entertain the impression that all administrative and executive decision-making are being left to courts just for that reason. In private litigation as well, the litigant concerned would continue to approach the higher court, despite the fact that he had lost in every court hitherto before. The effort is not to discourage a litigant in whose perception his cause is fair and legitimate. The effort is only to introduce consequences if the litigant's perception was incorrect and if his cause is found to be not fair and legitimate, he must pay for the same. In the present setting of the adjudicatory process, a litigant no matter how irresponsible he is suffers no consequences. Every litigant, therefore, likes to take a chance even when counsel's advice is otherwise. 194. Does the litigant concerned realise that the litigant on the other side has had to defend himself, from court to court, and has had to incur expenses towards such defence? And there are some litigants who continue to pursue senseless and ill-considered claims, to somehow or the other defeat the process of law. The present case, is a classic illustration of what we wish to express. Herein the regulating authority has had to suffer litigation from court to court incurring public expense in its defence against frivolous litigation. Every order was consistently and systematically disobeyed. Every order passed by the SEBI was assailed before the next higher authority, and then before this Court. Even though High Courts have no jurisdiction in respect of issues regulated by the SEBI Act, some matters were taken to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (before its Lucknow Bench). Every such endeavour resulted in failure and was also sometimes accompanied with strictures. Even after the matter had concluded after the controversy had attained finality, the judicial process is still being abused for close to two years. A conscious effort on the part of the legislature in this behalf would serve several purposes. It would, besides everything else, reduce frivolous litigation. When the litigating party understands that it would have to compensate the party which succeeds, unnecessary litigation will be substantially reduced. A conscious effort on the part of the legislature in this behalf would serve several purposes. It would, besides everything else, reduce frivolous litigation. When the litigating party understands that it would have to compensate the party which succeeds, unnecessary litigation will be substantially reduced. At the end of the day, court time lost is a direct loss to the nation. It is about time that the legislature should evolve ways and means to curtail this unmindful activity. We are sure that an eventual determination one way or the other would be in the best interest of this country, as also, its countrymen." 17. We also wish to refer a recent judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Bank of Baroda and another, W.P.(C) No. 9828 of 2015, where the similar issue has been considered in the following terms "...The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is an extraordinary remedy, to be not invoked or allowed to be invoked ordinarily, as is found being done increasingly, leaving very little time for the High Courts to deal under Article 226 with issues really deserving consideration thereunder. Supreme Court, as far back as in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163 and Nain Sukh Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 384 held that prerogative writs are extraordinary remedies intended to be applied in exceptional cases in which the ordinary legal remedies are not adequate but in the last over half century the said principle appears to have been forgotten, with, the writ remedy being considered as a cure for all ordinary ailments also and for which the ordinary legal remedies under the civil law are adequate. The same has resulted in the High Courts being inundated with writ petitions, the disposal whereof axiomatically is found to be taking, in most cases, as much time as the disposal of an ordinary civil lis, and which has resulted in the High Courts facing difficulty in providing immediate relief even in deserving cases in writ jurisdiction and/or being left with little time to ponder over the important constitutional issues coming before it in the writ jurisdiction. In my humble view, a time has thus come for the High Courts to send out a clear-message of the writ remedy being an extraordinary remedy not available as an alternative to the remedy already available under the civil and general laws." 18. The Supreme Court in the case of Ramrameshwari Devi and others v. Nirmala Devi and others, (2011) 8 SCC 249 , has observed that the existing system needs to be drastically changed or improved if the realistic or proper costs ordering for prosecution is made in case of false pleadings, forged and fabricated documents are used by the litigant. Relevant part of the judgment is extracted below: "52. The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the prevailing delay in civil litigation can be curbed? In our considered opinion the existing system can be drastically changed or improved if the following steps are taken by the trial courts while dealing with the civil trials. A. ... B. .... C. Imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and/or ordering prosecution would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases the courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings." 19. This case is also an example where the petitioner is indulged in senseless litigation and the learned counsel has not properly advised the petitioner not to file this second writ petition for the same cause of action. 20. For all the reasons mentioned above, we find that the said writ petition is an abuse of process of law and meritless, moreover it is not maintainable for the same cause of action. We intend to impose heavy costs on the petitioner but having regard to the fact that he is in dire financial strait, hence, we are not imposing any cost on him but we put him on caution that in case he again indulges in senseless litigation and wastes the judicial time of this Court, the same mercy shall not be shown to him. 21. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.