JUDGMENT : Manish Pitale, J. 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of learned Counsel appearing for the parties. 2. By this Writ Petition, the petitioner has challenged order dated 18-5-2018, passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Wardha, whereby an application filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for appointment of respondent No. 5 as a trustee of trust by name Shri Sant Bhojaji Maharaj Deosthan, Ajansara, has been allowed and the respondent No. 5 has been appointed as a trustee in the aforesaid trust. 3. By an order dated 30-10-2013, the respondent No. 3 framed a Scheme under section 50-A of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 (for short, 'the Act of 1950'), in respect of the aforesaid trust thereby, inter alia, appointing 10 persons as trustees and specifying the manner in which vacancies could be filled. Clause 12 of the aforesaid Scheme laid down the manner in which a vacancy under the Scheme could be filled. It is undisputed that one of the 10 trustees under the said Scheme expired, as a result of which the vacancy was required to be filled. It has also come on record that a Resolution was passed by the trustees by a majority of 7 against 2, the petitioner being one of the two persons in minority, to appoint respondent No.5 as a trustee in the aforesaid trust. Although Resolution was passed on 29-6-2017, further steps for formally filling up the vacancy by inducting respondent No. 5 were not taken. 4. In this situation, on 5-10-2017, respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the trustees of the aforesaid trust and also those who had supported the said Resolution for appointing respondent No. 5 in the said vacancy filed an application before the respondent No. 3 for appointment of respondent No. 5 in the vacancy, in terms of the aforesaid Scheme. The petitioner herein filed reply/objection to the said application filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In the said objection, it was claimed that the application would not lie before the respondent No. 3 as the relevant Clause 12 of the Scheme specified that such a vacancy could be filled by a Divisional Assistant Charity Commissioner. The petitioner herein filed reply/objection to the said application filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In the said objection, it was claimed that the application would not lie before the respondent No. 3 as the relevant Clause 12 of the Scheme specified that such a vacancy could be filled by a Divisional Assistant Charity Commissioner. There were other reasons given by the petitioner as to why the aforesaid Resolution in the meeting held on 29-6-2017 could not be considered by respondent No. 3 and that the application deserved to be dismissed. 5. By the impugned order dated 18-5-2018, the respondent No. 3 allowed the application of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, as a consequence of which respondent No. 5 stood appointed as a trustee of the aforesaid trust. It is an undisputed position that thereafter, on 30-11-2018, elections of the trust were conducted in which the respondent No.5 stood elected as the President. But, the present Writ Petition is not concerned with the subsequent event and the only question that arises for consideration is, as to whether the respondent No.3 was justified in allowing the application of respondent Nos.1 and 2 by appointing respondent No. 5 as a trustee. 6. Mr. S.K. Bhoyar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner Trust, claimed to be represented through Vasant Bhagwanji Yede as Secretary, submitted that the impugned order passed by the respondent No. 3 was without jurisdiction, because as per the Scheme, particularly Clause 12 thereof, only a Divisional Assistant Charity Commissioner could have entertained the application as was filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 and that therefore, the entire proceeding was rendered without jurisdiction. It was further submitted that even if the said application was entertained by respondent No.3, a proper enquiry ought to have been conducted before appointing respondent No.5 as a trustee, because respondent No. 3 was supposed to exercise power as contemplated under section 47 of the Act of 1950, mandating a detailed enquiry before appointing respondent No.5 as a trustee. It was submitted that in the absence of such an enquiry, the impugned order stood vitiated and that on this ground also it was required to be set aside. 7. On the other hand, Mr. A.P. Thakare, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.5 and Mr. M.B. Turankar, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. It was submitted that in the absence of such an enquiry, the impugned order stood vitiated and that on this ground also it was required to be set aside. 7. On the other hand, Mr. A.P. Thakare, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.5 and Mr. M.B. Turankar, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, pointed out that the appointment of respondent No.5 was in consonance with Clause 12 of the aforesaid Scheme framed by respondent No.3. It was submitted that only because the word "Divisional" was used in Clause 12, it would not mean that the impugned order passed by respondent No.3 was without jurisdiction. In this regard, attention of this Court was invited by learned Counsel to Clause 30 of the Scheme, wherein it has been specifically stated that any question regarding interpretation of the Scheme could be raised before the respondent No.3. On this basis, it was submitted that there was no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. It is further pointed out that section 47 of the Act of 1950, contemplated appointment of trustee when there was no trustee in a trust or the trust could not be administered in the absence of filling up such a vacancy. Such situation did not exist in the present case, hence, section 47 of the Act of 1950 was not applicable. Clause 12 of the aforesaid Scheme is very clear and the impugned order was clearly passed by respondent No.3 under the said Clause, particularly when the application filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was for appointment of trustee in accordance with the Scheme. It was further contended that the petitioner was shown to be represented through Vasant s/o. Bhagwanji Yede, claiming to be the Secretary of the trust, but there was serious dispute raised regarding the same due to election conducted on 30-11-2018, wherein the respondent No. 5 was elected as President and Change Report regarding the same was pending before the respondent No. 3. 8. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. The twofold contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner in the present case are; firstly that the order passed by the respondent No.3 was without jurisdiction, because the relevant Clause in the aforesaid Scheme itself provided that "Divisional Assistant Charity Commissioner" would have the power to appoint a trustee in a position that fell vacant and since the impugned order was passed by an Assistant Charity Commissioner, the same was without jurisdiction. Secondly, it was contended that the respondent No.3 ought to have exercised power in appointing respondent No. 5 by undertaking enquiry under section 47 of the Act of 1950 and that the power to appoint respondent No.5 could be traced only under the said provision and not under Clause 12 of the aforesaid Scheme. 9. A perusal of the Scheme in question shows that under Clause 12 thereof, when a vacancy arose in the trust it was expected to be filled by the existing trustee by taking a majority decision and if for some reason the vacancy could not be filled within a period of three months or there was lack of agreement between the trustees, such vacancy would be filled by the Divisional Assistant Charity Commissioner after hearing the trustees. A translated version of Clause 12 reads as follows:-- "(12) Procedure for appointment of new trustee in case of vacancy As per the scheme, if any vacancy of trustee occurs amongst appointed trustees due to death, resignation, on account of inability to perform any work or if such trustee resides for more than six months without permission of Assistant Charity Commissioner out of Maharashtra or if convicted by Court in any criminal case or wishes to get relieved of post of trusteeship or refuses such trusteeship or is not eligible to be appointed as such trustee or wishes to get relieved from responsibilities under the scheme, then such vacancy of trustee may be filled by remaining trustees, by majority by appointing a fit person. But if such vacancy is not filled within (3) months of its occurrence or if there is no unanimous decision amongst other trustees then such post may be filled by Divisional Assistant Charity Commissioner after hearing other trustees." 10. In the present case, the first objection regarding the jurisdiction of respondent No.3 needs to be dealt with. But if such vacancy is not filled within (3) months of its occurrence or if there is no unanimous decision amongst other trustees then such post may be filled by Divisional Assistant Charity Commissioner after hearing other trustees." 10. In the present case, the first objection regarding the jurisdiction of respondent No.3 needs to be dealt with. The only ground raised on behalf of the petitioner in this regard is the use of the word 'Divisional" as prefixed to the words "Assistant Charity Commissioner" in Clause 12 of the aforesaid Scheme. On this basis, it was contended that since the respondent No.3 did not fit the description of the authority mentioned in Clause 12 thereof, the impugned order was rendered without jurisdiction. But, in this regard learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 5 are justified in relying upon Clause 30 of the said Scheme, which specifically provides that if a question arises regarding the interpretation of the aforesaid Scheme, the same could be raised before the respondent No. 3. In fact, the Scheme itself has been framed by Assistant Charity Commissioner by exercising power under section 50A of the Act of 1950. Therefore, it becomes clear that the use of the word "Divisional" prefixed to the words "Assistant Charity Commissioner" in Clause 12 cannot lead to the conclusion that the respondent No.3 could not have entertained the application in the present case filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 or that the impugned order was rendered without jurisdiction for that reason. Therefore, the first ground raised on behalf of the petitioner is found to be unacceptable and it is rejected. 11. The second ground raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the respondent No.3 could have exercised power only under section 47 of the Act of 1950 for appointment of respondent No.5 as a trustee and since detailed enquiry as contemplated under the said provision was not undertaken, the impugned order stood vitiated. A perusal of section 47 of the Act of 1950, shows that the Assistant Charity Commissioner can appoint a new trustee where there is no trustee in a trust or the trust cannot be administered until such a vacancy is filled in. A perusal of section 47 of the Act of 1950, shows that the Assistant Charity Commissioner can appoint a new trustee where there is no trustee in a trust or the trust cannot be administered until such a vacancy is filled in. The very wordings of the provision make it clear that the Charity Commissioner exercises power under the said provision in a situation where the administration of the trust in absence of filling up the vacancy becomes impossible. In the present case, it cannot be said that if the vacancy that arose due to death of one of the trustees was not filled, the trust could not have been administered. Therefore, there is no substance in the said contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. It also goes to show that the petitioner is not justified in claiming that when a trustee in the present case could have been appointed only as per section 47 of the Act of 1950, which power could have been exercised only by the Charity Commissioner or Joint Charity Commissioner, the respondent No.3 could not have passed the impugned order. 12. In this backdrop, a perusal of the application filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shows that appointment of respondent No.5 as a trustee was sought in accordance with the Scheme of the trust and the insistence on the part of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was that the respondent No.5 could be appointed only under Clause 12 of the aforesaid Scheme, particularly in the backdrop of the fact that a Resolution had been already passed by majority by the members of the trust for appointment of respondent No.5. A perusal of the Resolution dated 29-6-2017 shows that 7 out of 9 trustees had voted in favour of the Resolution for appointment of respondent No.5 and only two trustees, including the person claiming to be Secretary of the trust in this Writ Petition, were in minority. The minutes of the meeting regarding passing of said Resolution further shows that even the said person had written a remark that he was in agreement with the resolution for appointing respondent No.5 as a trustee. The minutes of the meeting regarding passing of said Resolution further shows that even the said person had written a remark that he was in agreement with the resolution for appointing respondent No.5 as a trustee. In the face of such material, it is difficult to understand as to why the said person turned around and challenged appointment of respondent No.5 as trustee, apart from the fact that it is on record that respondent No.3 heard the said person as an objector before passing the impugned order appointing respondent No.5 as a trustee. As noted above, in the objection raised before the respondent No.3, there was no averment made as to why the respondent No.5 could be said to be unfit to be appointed as a trustee. The entire emphasis in the objection was with regard to jurisdiction of respondent No.3 and some allegations pertaining to the manner in which the majority of trustees had acted after the Resolution dated 29-6-2017. 13. In the face of such material and the nature of objection raised in the proceedings, the Assistant Charity Commissioner correctly took into consideration the Scheme, particularly Clause 12 thereof and appointed respondent No.5 in the vacancy that had arisen due to death of one of the trustees. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the power was indeed exercised under Clause 12 of the said Scheme. Reference made to Resolution dated 29-6-2017 and the material placed on record by the parties, shows that the Assistant Charity Commissioner did apply his mind before passing the impugned order. 14. In the light of the above, this Court finds that there is no merit in the present Writ Petition and hence it is dismissed. 15. Rule stands discharged. No costs.