JUDGMENT : Abdullah Gulamahmed Uraizee, J. 1. The appellant - Insurance Company has preferred present Appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ("M.V. Act" for short) to assail the judgment and award dated 17.09.2010 passed by the learned Chairman, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Vadodara, in MACP No. 1390 of 2008, wherein the appellant is directed to pay compensation to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 jointly and severally with respondent No. 3. 2. Facts in brief giving rise to present Appeal as could be covered from the impugned judgment and connected materials are that: 3. On 30.03.2008, Harshit Sureshbhai Doshi was riding motorcycle No. GJ-06-CN-8307 to go to Bhavnagar at his maternal uncle house. The motorcycle was of the ownership of respondent No. 3 herein. When he was passing by the Temple of Mohmai Mata, the motorcycle dashed with heap of stones due to darkness. As a consequence thereof, he suffered grievous injuries and died on the spot. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who happens to be his legal heirs and representatives being parents, filed an application under Section 163A of the MV Act. In MACT, Vadodara, to recover Rs. 4,84,500/- as compensation from the appellants and respondent No. 3 herein owner of the motorcycle. The Tribunal by impugned judgment and award partly allowed the claim petition and directed the Insurance Co. and respondent No. 3 herein to pay a sum of Rs. 3,30,900/- with 7.5% interest and proportionate costs jointly and severally to the claimants. The appellant Insurance Co. is not happy with fastening of the liability of the payment of the compensation, has preferred this appeal. 4. I have heard Ms. Aditi Raol, learned advocate with Mr. Shalin Metha, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Hiren Modi, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The respondent No. 3 is an ex parte. 5. Ms. Raol, learned advocate for the appellant has vehemently submitted that the deceased had borrowed the motorcycle from respondent No. 3 herein and accordingly, he had stepped in shoes of the owner. Relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ningamma and Another Vs. The respondent No. 3 is an ex parte. 5. Ms. Raol, learned advocate for the appellant has vehemently submitted that the deceased had borrowed the motorcycle from respondent No. 3 herein and accordingly, he had stepped in shoes of the owner. Relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ningamma and Another Vs. United Indian Insurance Company Ltd. reported in (2009) 13 Supreme Court Cases 710 and the decision dated 25.01.2011 of this Court rendered in First Appeal No. 3794 of 2010, she submitted that the application under Section 163-A of the M.V. Act was not competent as the deceased who had stepped into shoes of the owner as the owner cannot be recipient of the compensation as primary liability to pay the same is on him. She, therefore, urged that the appeal may be allowed and the impugned judgment and award may be quashed and set aside. 6. Mr. Hiren Modi, learned advocate for the claimants has supported the impugned judgment. He stoutly submitted that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji and Anr. Vs. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. rendered in Civil Appeal No. 2816 of 2018 dated 09.08.2018, wherein relying upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Sunil Kumar & Anr. reported in AIR 2071 SC 5710, it is held that in the proceedings under Section 163A of the Act, insurer cannot raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim to counter a claim for compensation. He further submitted that this Court has taken similar view in First Appeal No. 2680 of 2018 decided on 08.08.2018 and First Appeal No. 337 of 2007 decided on 01.03.2019. 7. Mr. Modi, learned advocate has relied upon the following decision of the other High Courts, wherein it is held that adjudication of the claim petition under Section 163A is required to be made without any requirement of any proof of negligence of the driver/owner of the vehicle (s) involved in the accident. 1. United India Insurance Co. Vs. S. Soundari CMA No. 2205 of 2015 in M.P. No. 1 of 2015 High Court of Madras. 2. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. A. Mahendran CMA (MD) No. 1186 of 2018 and CMA (MD) No. 12225 of 2018 3. National Insurance Co. 1. United India Insurance Co. Vs. S. Soundari CMA No. 2205 of 2015 in M.P. No. 1 of 2015 High Court of Madras. 2. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. A. Mahendran CMA (MD) No. 1186 of 2018 and CMA (MD) No. 12225 of 2018 3. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Usha Devi and Ors. FAQ No. 107 of 2012 High Court of Himachal Pradesh. 4. IFFO TOKIO General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Silangovan CMA No. 1053 of 2015 High Court of Madras 5. N. Kuppu and Anr. Vs. P. Mari & Anr. CMA No. 2451 of 2018 High Court of Madras. 8. He vehemently submitted that Section 2(30) of the M.V. Act contemplates the person in whose name the vehicle stands registered in the record of Registering Authority as owner of the vehicle. He, therefore, submitted that the person, who borrowed the vehicle from the owner is not recognized as the owner of the vehicle under Section 230 of the M.V. Act. In support of this submission, he has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Naveen Kumar Vs. Vijay Kumar and Ors. reported in (2018) 2 SCC 1 . He accordingly submitted that the impugned judgment and award of the Tribunal is in consonance with the proposition of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji and Ors. (Supra), does not warrant any interference in this appeal. 9. I have bestowed my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made at bar on either side. 10. In the case of Ningamma and Anr. (Supra), the deceased was travelling on Hero-Honda motorcycle, which he had borrowed from the real owner, met with an accident with bullock cart proceeding ahead of it. As consequence to the accident, Ramappa sustained fatal injuries over vital part of his body and on way to hospital, he died. His parents preferred Claim Petition under Section 163A of the M.V. Act, which was partly allowed by the Tribunal and the Insurance Co. was held liable to pay compensation. Insurance Co. challenged the decision of the Tribunal in the High Court and the appeal was allowed holding that claim petition before the Tribunal was not maintainable as there was no tortfeasor involved. The claimants therefore, approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. was held liable to pay compensation. Insurance Co. challenged the decision of the Tribunal in the High Court and the appeal was allowed holding that claim petition before the Tribunal was not maintainable as there was no tortfeasor involved. The claimants therefore, approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the backdrop of the aforesaid facts formulated question for consideration as under: (Para 12) "In the light of the aforesaid submissions, the question that falls for our consideration is whether the legal representatives of a person, who was driving a motor vehicle, after borrowing it from the real owner meets with an accident without involving any other vehicle, would be entitled to compensation under Section 163-A of MVA or under any other provision(s) of law and also whether the insurer who issued the insurance policy would be bound to indemnify the deceased or his legal representative?" 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court thereafter discussing the provisions of Sections 163A and 166 of the M.V. Act and various decisions rendered by it in respect of Section 163A of the M.V. Act, observed in para 17 to 22 as under: "17. The aforesaid decisions make it quite clear that the Parliament by introducing Section 163-A in the MVA provided for payment of compensation on structured formula basis by mandating that the owner of a motor vehicle or the authorised insurer would be liable to pay compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be in a claim made under sub- section (1) of Section 163-A of the MVA. In order to prove a claim of this nature the claimant would not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle concerned. 18. However, in the facts of the present case, it was forcefully argued by the counsel appearing for the respondent that the claimants are not the 'third party', and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any benefit under Section 163-A of the MVA. 18. However, in the facts of the present case, it was forcefully argued by the counsel appearing for the respondent that the claimants are not the 'third party', and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any benefit under Section 163-A of the MVA. In support of the said contention, the counsel relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajni Devi, (2008) 5 SCC 736 ; and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sadanand Mukhi. 19. In the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajni Devi and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 736 , wherein one of us, namely, Hon'ble Justice S.B. Sinha is a party, it has been categorically held that in a case where third party is involved, the liability of the insurance company would be unlimited. It was also held in the said decision that where, however, compensation is claimed for the death of the owner or another passenger of the vehicle, the contract of insurance being governed by the contract qua contract, the claim of the claimant against the insurance company would depend upon the terms thereof. 20. It was held in the said decision that Section 163-A of the MVA cannot be said to have any application in respect of an accident wherein the owner of the motor vehicle himself is involved. The decision further held that the question is no longer res integra. The liability under section 163-A of the MVA is on the owner of the vehicle. So a person cannot be both, a claimant as also a recipient, with respect to claim. Therefore, the heirs of the deceased could not have maintained a claim in terms of Section 163-A of the MVA." 12. In the case of Navin Kumar (Supra), the succession of transfer of the offending vehicle was put forth as a defence to the claim without substituting the name of the original owner first respondent in the record of the Registering Authority. The Hon'ble Supreme Court relying upon various earlier decisions, held as under: "The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges from the above decisions is that in view of the definition of the expression 'owner' in Section 2(3), it is the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who, for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the 'owner'. However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of the minor would be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle is subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement is treated as the owner. In a situation such as the present where the registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but continues to be reflected in the records of the registering authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand absolved of liability. Parliament has consciously introduced the definition of the expression 'owner' in Section 2(30) making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier Act of 1939. The principle underlying the provisions of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for compensation ought not to be burdened with following a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered with the registering authority. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the First respondent was the 'owner' of the vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The liability to pay compensation stands fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured. The High Court has proceeded upon a misconstruction of the judgments of this Court in Reshma and Purnya Kala Devi." 13. The conjoint reading of the decision in the case of Ningamma and Ors. (Supra) and Navin Kumar (Supra) makes it explicitly clear that the person, who borrowed vehicle from its registered owner for his personal use, his status become akin to the registered owner. To put in other words, the person borrowed the motor vehicle from its registered owner for his own personal use stepped into shoes of the registered owner of the motor vehicle as contemplated under Section 2(30) of the M.V. Act. To put in other words, the person borrowed the motor vehicle from its registered owner for his own personal use stepped into shoes of the registered owner of the motor vehicle as contemplated under Section 2(30) of the M.V. Act. However, the scenario dramatically changes when a registered owner of the motor vehicle as well as the vehicle to another person together with the position and relevant documents including registration certificate as also Form No. 29 and 30 for transfer of the vehicle in the name of purchaser in record of the Registering Authority before the accident occurred. It is a seller of the vehicle in show name the vehicle still continued in record of the Registering Authority remains as owner of the vehicle for the purpose of M.V. Act. I am therefore, of the considered view that the submission of Mr. Modi that it is registered owner alone who is recognized as owner of the vehicle and borrower of the vehicle does not pale take status of the owner of the vehicle and therefore, registered owner remains liable to answer the claim under the M.V. Act. 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Vs. Sunil Kumar (Supra), two Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was only to agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the of Coordinate Bench in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Sinitha and ors. reported in AIR 2012 SC 797 referred the matter for resolution of following question: "Whether in a claim proceedings under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it is open for the Insurer to raise the defence/plea of negligence?" 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after adverting to various decisions held as under: "8. From the above discussion, it is clear that grant of compensation under Section 163-A of the Act on the basis of the structured formula is in the nature of a final award and the adjudication thereunder is required to be made without any requirement of any proof of negligence of the driver/owner of the vehicle(s) involved in the accident. This is made explicit by Section 163A(2). This is made explicit by Section 163A(2). Though the aforesaid section of the Act does not specifically exclude a possible defence of the Insurer based on the negligence of the claimant as contemplated by Section 140(4), to permit such defence to be introduced by the Insurer and/or to understand the provisions of 163-A of the Act to be contemplating any such situation would go contrary to the very legislative object behind introduction of Section 163A of the Act, namely, final compensation within a limited time frame on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability was taking an unduly long time. In fact, to understand Section 163A of the Act to permit the Insurer to raise the defence of negligence would be to bring a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act at par with the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be self-contradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question arising by holding that in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act it is not open for the Insurer to raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim." 16. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji and Anr. (Supra) emanated from the decision of the Karnataka High Court rendered in cluster of appeals arising from the selfsame incident. The facts leading to those appeals can be usefully abstracted from the decision of Karnataka High Court, which are as under: "The accident occurred when the car dashed into a truck, bearing Registration No. KA-25/B-5363, resulting in his death; the death of two other persons and injuries to two more persons, all of whom were travelling in the car. " 17. The Claim Petition No. 1355 of 2010 was preferred by the parents of the deceased namely Shaji Shivaji Dudhade and awarded compensation in the sum of Rs. 4,60,800/-. The award was challenged by United India Assurance Co. " 17. The Claim Petition No. 1355 of 2010 was preferred by the parents of the deceased namely Shaji Shivaji Dudhade and awarded compensation in the sum of Rs. 4,60,800/-. The award was challenged by United India Assurance Co. being insurer of car Qualish on the ground of liability of 50% of the compensation is required to be shifted on the owner and insurer of the offending vehicle i.e. Qualish, whereas the claimants preferred appeal for enhancement of the compensation after referring the provisions of Section 163-A of the M.V. Act while allowing the appeal filed by the Insurance Co. of the Qualish and dismissed the appeal for enhancement of compensation by observing as under: "17. The very idea of legislating the aforesaid Section is to ensure that even in the absence of any mistake on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle the legal heirs of deceased person or for the permanent disability suffered by the victim in the said 29 accident, the owner and insurer are required to pay compensation on structured formula basis as per second schedule to M.V. 1968. 18. What is seen from a plain reading of the Section is protection given to the victim, if he is injured or his legal heirs, if he is dead in the said accident for no fault of the driver of the vehicle, the compensation should be paid for the use of the motor vehicle causing the accident. 19. The plain reading clearly indicates that the victim is a third party but not the person himself causing the accident and that is not the intent of the legislature as could be seen from a reading of the Section. If a person himself is responsible for causing the accident, under Section 163-A he cannot be decorated with compensation for the tortious act, which he has committed. In a situation where a person who himself 30 causes the accident being tort feasor, who is required to be prosecuted for the tortious act, under no circumstance he can be awarded compensation in any manner. 20. In fact, Section 163-A is very clear, the claim petition under 163(A) could be for injury suffered or as well as for the death of victim of accident. 20. In fact, Section 163-A is very clear, the claim petition under 163(A) could be for injury suffered or as well as for the death of victim of accident. If the tort feasor is injured and the entire accident is attributable to his negligence, the question of he being again awarded with the compensation by invoking aforesaid provision, does not stand to reason inasmuch as reading of said Section clearly indicates that it is to protect the innocent victim from suffering and also the legal heirs of innocent victim to withstand the untold misery for the tortious act of the rider of the vehicle, through the accident. In that view of the matter, this court find, the compensation awarded to tort feasor cannot be sustained by allowing this 31 judgment to continue and to saddle the liability to pay on the insurer. In that view of the matter the appeal filed by insurer in MFA No. 20469 of 2012 is allowed, on that count alone and compensation awarded by the tribunal in MVC No. 1355 of 2010 is hereby set aside, consequently the appeal filed by the legal heirs of deceased in MFA No. 22883 of 2012 would stand automatically dismissed as it does not survive for consideration." 18. The parents of the deceased driver Sahaji Duidhade assailed the decision of Karnataka High Court in the Hon'ble Supreme Court by preferring Civil Appeal No. 2816 of 2018, the Hon'ble Supreme Court by its decision in the case of Shivaji and Anr. (Supra) held as under: ''The issue which arises before us is no longer res integra and is covered by a recent judgment of three judges of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar and Anr.. wherein it was held that to permit a defence of negligence of the claimant by the insurer and/or to understand Section 163A of the Act as contemplating such a situation, would be inconsistent with the legislative object behind introduction of this provision, which is "final compensation within a limited time frame on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability was taking an unduly long time". The Court observed that if an insurer was permitted to raise a defence of negligence Under Section 163A of the Act, it would "bring a proceeding Under Section 163A of the Act at par with the proceeding Under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be self-contradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention". Consequently, it was held that in a proceeding Under Section 163A of the Act, the insurer cannot raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim to counter a claim for compensation.'' 19. It is thus vividly clear from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivaji (Supra) that when two vehicles are involved in the accident, the Tribunal is precluded from venturing into the array of negligence on the part of the drivers of vehicles involved in the accident. However, it is also manifestly clear from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ningamma and Anr. (Supra) that when only one vehicle is involved in the accident and the said vehicle was being driver by the victim after borrowing the vehicle from its registered owner, the victim or his legal representative cannot claim compensation from the registered owner of the vehicle and insurer as borrower steppes into shoes of the owner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ningamma and Anr. (Supra) itself has taken care of the situation where the vehicle is being driver by a person in the capacity of an employee of the owner of the vehicle, in which he cannot be said to have stepped into shoes of the owner. It is undisputed fact that in the case of Shivaji & Anr. (Supra), two vehicles namely Qualish and Truck were involved in the accident, the driver of Qualish Shaji had died in the accident, who was found to have caused accident and therefore, a charge-sheet was filed against him. Hence, when the deceased driver Shaji was driving Qualish as an employee of registered owner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, held that the insurer cannot raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim to counter the claim for compensation. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar (Supra) has considered following observation of the earlier decision in the case of Hansrajbhai Vs. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar (Supra) has considered following observation of the earlier decision in the case of Hansrajbhai Vs. Kodala reported in AIR 2001 SC 1832 ): "Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever-increasing motor vehicle accidents in a fast-moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no-fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking a long time. That mis- chief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163-A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured-formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation on fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles." On the basis of aforesaid observation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in the proceedings under Section 163A of the M.V. Act, it is not open for the insurer to raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim. 21. It is undisputed fact that in the instant case, the deceased had stepped into shoes of the respondent No. 3 owner as he had borrowed motorcycle from respondent No. 3. It is also undisputed fact that the motorcycle had dashed with heap of stones due to darkness as a result whereof, the deceased suffered fatal injuries. Thus, it is very clear that the motorcycle, which deceased was plying had not met with an accident with another vehicle. To put it in other words, in the accident two vehicles were not involved. In the backdrop of these scenario, there is no question of examining the negligence of drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident. As has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ningamma and Anr. (Supra), which is followed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. heirs and legal representative of Hiteshbhai Sureshbhai Patel & Others (Supra) that Section 163 dispenses with proof of fault only where the claimant/victim is not solely responsible for the accident. (Supra), which is followed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. heirs and legal representative of Hiteshbhai Sureshbhai Patel & Others (Supra) that Section 163 dispenses with proof of fault only where the claimant/victim is not solely responsible for the accident. It is trite law that the liability of payment of compensation primarily lies on the owner of the vehicle and the Insurance Co. only indemnifies, if the owner is found liable to pay compensation. When a person steps into shoes of the owner of the vehicle, he cannot be a recipient of compensation as he being the owner of the vehicle cannot claim compensation from himself. I therefore, of the view that Section 163-A of the M.V. Act cannot be said to have any application in respect of an accident wherein the owner of the vehicle himself is involved. 22. The judgment of Coordinate Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 337 of 2007 (United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Legal heirs of Decd. Maheshbhai Makwana & Anr.) the position of law in respect of Claim petition under Section 163A of the M.V. Act in light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar (Supra). In my considered view, this judgment is of no avail to the claimants in light of the discussion and observation made in the present judgment. 23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned judgment and award dated 17.09.2010 passed by Tribunal, Vadodara, in M.A.C.P No. 1390 of 2008 is hereby quashed and set aside. Parties are left bear their own costs. R & P be transmitted to the Tribunal forthwith.