JUDGMENT : This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioners praying for quashing of the criminal proceedings being complaint case no.C-1820 of 2018 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act pending before the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 7th Court, Alipore, South 24 Parganas. The petitioners before this Court have been projected as accused nos.3 to 14 of the criminal proceedings pending before the Learned Magistrate. Before dealing with the rival submissions of the parties, it would be appropriate to set out the facts briefly. Opposite party Midaas Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. filed a petition of complaint on 28.05.2018 before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South 24 Parganas, Alipore against the present petitioners and others. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after taking cognizance, transferred the said petition of complaint to the Court of Learned Judicial Magistrate, 7th Court for disposal. On 08.06.2018, Learned Magistrate recorded the initial deposition under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and issued process against the accused persons to face trial for commission of alleged offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. From the petition of complaint, it appears that accused no.1 Hindustan Construction Company Limited is incorporated under the Companies Act and accused nos.3 to 14 are the Directors of the accused no.1 company. Accused nos.15 and 16 are authorized signatories of the cheques in question. It has been stated in the petition of complaint that all the accused persons are responsible and liable for the daily business management of the accused company. In the petition of complaint, the complainant has stated that Complainant Company is a reputed contractor for execution of various kind of infrastructure work. The accused persons through its management gave sub-contract work to the complainant company for project: 'Rehabilitation and Up-Gradation of Indo Nepal Border to Rudhauli Section' (KM 0+000 to 65+870) of NH 233 Uttar Pradesh to two lanes with paved shoulder with EPC mode under NHDP-Phase-IV. Accused company issued four cheques of rupees 1,00,00,000/- each to liquidate its past liability. All the cheques were deposited in the Bank Account of the complainant company for encashment on 01.02.2018. All the said cheques were dishonoured and returned unpaid on account of drawer's signatures authorization to operate account not received. Accused persons apologized from the complainant. Accused company issued four cheques of rupees 1,00,00,000/- each to liquidate its past liability. All the cheques were deposited in the Bank Account of the complainant company for encashment on 01.02.2018. All the said cheques were dishonoured and returned unpaid on account of drawer's signatures authorization to operate account not received. Accused persons apologized from the complainant. Complainant deposited that said cheques again, but the cheques were dishonoured on the same grounds. On three occasions the cheques were dishonoured on the same ground and one occasion the cheques were returned with remark 'Payment stopped by the drawer'. All the accused persons in spite of receiving notices failed and neglected to pay the amount covered by the cheques. Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners has forcefully submitted that the criminal proceedings pending against the present accused/petitioners cannot be allowed to be continued as they are not in-charge of and responsible for the day to day business activity of the accused company at the material point of time. Learned Counsel has laid emphasis on the ground that there is no specific averment in the petition of complaint to the effect that the present petitioners being the Directors of the accused company were in-charge of and responsible for the day to day business activity of the accused company. It is the specific contention of the petitioner that in absence of such basic averment in the petition of complaint the petitioners cannot be prosecuted for the commission of the alleged offence. At the time of making his submission in support of quashing of the criminal proceedings pending against the present petitioners, Learned Counsel has invited the attention of the Court to the averments made in the petition of complaint and contended that averments in the petition complaint that the accused are responsible and liable for the daily business management of the accused no.1 company are not sufficient to fasten the present petitioner with the alleged offence. In support of his contention, the Learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed his reliance on the following decisions:- (1) S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. V. Neeta Bhalla and Another reported in (2005) 8 SCC 89 (2) Shaleen Khemani & Ors. V. The State of West Bengal & Anr. reported in (2018)1 C.Cr.LR (Cal) 515 (3) Mahendra Kumar Rustagi and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal and Another reported in (2012)1 CHN 329 (4) Central Bank Of India Vs. V. The State of West Bengal & Anr. reported in (2018)1 C.Cr.LR (Cal) 515 (3) Mahendra Kumar Rustagi and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal and Another reported in (2012)1 CHN 329 (4) Central Bank Of India Vs. Asian Global Limited and Others reported in (2010)11 SCC 203 (5) K.K.Ahuja Vs. V.K.Vora and Another reported in (2009)10 SCC 48 On the other hand, Learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party/complainant has submitted that the averments made in the complaint petition are sufficient to fulfill the statutory requirements as contained in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. According to his contention there is no necessity for verbatim reproduction of the language of Section 141 of the Act. He has further submitted that the petition of complaint requires to be read as whole and if one goes through the petition of complaint as a whole then, it would be clear to him that the requirements of Section 141 of the Act have been complied with. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite party/complainant has forcefully submitted that no averments under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are required to be necessary against the Chief Executive Officer, being the petitioner nos. 8 to 11 or the Chief Financial Officer of a company, being petitioner no.4. In support of his contention, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite party/complainant has cited the following decisions:- (1) S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. V. Neeta Bhalla and Another reported in (2005) 8 SCC 89 (2) K.P.G. Nair V. Jindal Menthol India Limited reported in (2001)10 SCC 218 (3) A.K.Singhania Vs. Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Limited and Another with Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Limited Versus Vikram Prakash and Another reported in (2013)16 Supreme Court Cases 630 (4) Tamil Nadu News Print and Papers Limited Vs. D.Karunakar and Others reported in (2016)6 SCC 78 , (5) Standard Chartered Bank Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others reported in (2016)6 SCC 62 (6) Rallis India Limited Vs. Poduru Vidya Bhushan and Others reported in (2011)13 SCC 88 (7) K.K.Ahuja Vs. V.K.Vora and Another reported in (2009)10 SCC 48 (8) State V. M.Subrahmanyam reported in (2019)6 SCC 357 (9) Monaben KetanBhai Shah And Another Vs. State of Gujarat And Others reported in (2004)7 SCC 15 (10) N.C.Nag Pal & Ors. V. The State & Anr. Poduru Vidya Bhushan and Others reported in (2011)13 SCC 88 (7) K.K.Ahuja Vs. V.K.Vora and Another reported in (2009)10 SCC 48 (8) State V. M.Subrahmanyam reported in (2019)6 SCC 357 (9) Monaben KetanBhai Shah And Another Vs. State of Gujarat And Others reported in (2004)7 SCC 15 (10) N.C.Nag Pal & Ors. V. The State & Anr. reported in (1979) 2 CHN 198 (11) Municipal Corporation of Delhi V. Ram Kishan Rohtagi And Others reported in (1983) 1 SCC 1 Before going into factual details, rival contentions and the legal issues involved in the case at hand, it is useful to refer the relevant provisions of the statute: Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments reads as under:- "(1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence of prevent the commission of such offence. [Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this chapter.] (2)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,- (a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. It has been specifically argued on behalf of the complainant/opposite party that it is not necessary that the words contained in Section 141of the Act be inserted in a complaint as magic words but the substance of the allegation as a whole is sufficient to fulfill the requirement of the ingredients of the said provision for being proceeded against the Directors of the company. In view of action 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act a person although is not personally liable for commission of such an offence will be vicariously liable. In order to infer a person vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, the strict compliance of statutory requirements under Section 141 of the Act is necessary. Section 141 of the Act relates to the offence committed by the company and a person can be held vicariously liable for commission of an offence by the company. The question of application of vicariously liability arises only when the statutory requirements in Section 141 are complied with. During the course of hearing Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has given emphasis on the ratio of the judgment in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. V. Neeta Bhalla and Another reported in (2005) 8 SCC 89 . From that judgment, it appears that three questions for determination by a larger Bench were referred. Those three questions are as follows: "(a) Whether for purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it is sufficient if the substance of the allegation read as a whole fulfil the requirements of the said section and it is not necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the person accused was in charge of, or responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company. (b) Whether a director of a company would be deemed to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for conduct of the business of the company and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary. (b) Whether a director of a company would be deemed to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for conduct of the business of the company and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary. (c) Even if it is held that specific averments are necessary, whether in the absence of such averments the signatory of the cheque and or the managing directors or joint managing director who admittedly would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business could be proceeded against." In paragraph 19 of the said judgment our Apex Court gave the answers of those three questions as under: "(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied. (b) The answer to the question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases. (c) The answer to Question (c) has to be in the affirmative. The question notes that the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141." Learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that the ratio of that judgment is still good in law and that ratio has been followed by the Court in subsequent decisions also. In support of his contention he has placed his reliance on the decisions in K.K.Ahuja Vs. V.K.Vora and Another reported in (2009)10 SCC 48 and Central Bank Of India Vs. Asian Global Limited and Others reported in (2010)11 SCC 203 , in Shaleen Khemeni and Others Vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr. reported in (2018) 1 C.CR. L.R.(Cal) 515 and in Mahendra Kumar Rustagi and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal and Another reported in (2012)1 CHN 329 . Learned Counsel has further argued that the judgments as cited on behalf of the opposite party/complainant have been rendered by the two Judge Benche of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the judgment of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals has been rendered by a three judge Bench. According to his contention, the ratio of the decision in SMS Pharmaceutical Ltd. is applicable to the case at hand as a decision of two Judge Bench cannot overrule the decision of three Judge Bench. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has further submitted that in CRAN 3491 of 2018 the opposite party filed certain documents while making its prayer to vacate the interim order granted in favour of the petitioners and those documents were in possession of the opposite party prior to initiation of the compliant case against the petitioners. It is the specific submission of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners that those documents are not of unimpeachable character and sterling quality and are not the certified copies in terms of Section 76 of the Evidence Act. On the contrary, Learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party/complainant has submitted that the language of the statute need not be reproduced in the complaint. On the contrary, Learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party/complainant has submitted that the language of the statute need not be reproduced in the complaint. It is his specific contention that no-where in that judgment it has been mentioned that the substance of the allegation is not sufficient to prosecute the Directors of the company. It has been contended by the Learned Counsel for the opposite party/that the decisions in K.P.G. Nair V. Jindal Menthol India Limited reported in (2001) 10 SCC 218 and in Monaben KetanBhai Shah And Another Vs. State of Gujarat And Others reported in (2004) 7 SCC 15 clearly laid down that it is not necessary to reproduce the language of Section 141 of the Act in verbatim as the complaint has to be read as a whole. He has continued to argue that if the substance of the allegations made in the complaint fulfills the requirements of Section 141 of the Act and then there is no bar to proceed with the complaint. Learned Counsel has further submitted that the judgments as referred above got approval in the three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in SMS Pharmaceuticals Limited. He has drawn the attention of the Court to paragraph 17 of the said judgment. Paragraph 17 of the said judgment is as follows: "17.K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd. [ (2001) 10 SCC 218 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1038] was a case under the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was found that the allegations in the complaint did not in express words or with reference to the allegations contained therein make out a case that at the time of commission of the offence, the appellant was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. It was held that the requirement of Section 141 was not met and the complaint against the accused was quashed. Similar was the position in Katta Sujatha v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. [ (2002) 7 SCC 655 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 151] This was a case of a partnership. It was held that the requirement of Section 141 was not met and the complaint against the accused was quashed. Similar was the position in Katta Sujatha v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. [ (2002) 7 SCC 655 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 151] This was a case of a partnership. It was found that no allegations were contained in the complaint regarding the fact that the accused was a partner in charge of and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of business of the firm nor was there any allegation that the offence was made with the consent and connivance or that it was attributable to any neglect on the part of the accused. It was held that no case was made out against the accused who was a partner and the complaint was quashed. The latest in the line is the judgment of this Court in Monaben Ketanbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat [(2004) 7 SCC 15 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1857] . It was observed as under: (SCC p. 17, para 4) "4. It is not necessary to reproduce the language of Section 141 verbatim in the complaint since the complaint is required to be read as a whole. If the substance of the allegations made in the complaint fulfil the requirements of Section 141, the complaint has to proceed and is required to be tried with. It is also true that in construing a complaint a hyper technical approach should not be adopted so as to quash the same. The laudable object of preventing bouncing of cheques and sustaining the credibility of commercial transactions resulting in enactment of Sections 138 and 141 has to be borne in mind. These provisions create a statutory presumption of dishonesty, exposing a person to criminal liability if payment is not made within the statutory period even after issue of notice. It is also true that the power of quashing is required to be exercised very sparingly and where, read as a whole, factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint, it should not be quashed. All the same, it is also to be remembered that it is the duty of the court to discharge the accused if taking everything stated in the complaint as correct and construing the allegations made therein liberally in favour of the complainant, the ingredients of the offence are altogether lacking. All the same, it is also to be remembered that it is the duty of the court to discharge the accused if taking everything stated in the complaint as correct and construing the allegations made therein liberally in favour of the complainant, the ingredients of the offence are altogether lacking. The present case falls in this category as would be evident from the facts noticed hereinafter." It was further observed: (SCC pp. 18-19, para 6) "6. ... The criminal liability has been fastened on those who, at the time of the commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm. These may be sleeping partners who are not required to take any part in the business of the firm; they may be ladies and others who may not know anything about the business of the firm. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make necessary averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every partner knows about the transaction. The obligation of the appellants to prove that at the time the offence was committed they were not in charge of and were not responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, would arise only when first the complainant makes necessary averments in the complaint and establishes that fact. The present case is of total absence of requisite averments in the complaint." Learned Counsel has laid emphasis on the decision in A.K.Singhania Vs. Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Limited and Another with Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Limited Versus Vikram Prakash and Another reported in (2013)16 SCC 630 and submitted that no particular form is prescribed and it may not be necessary to reproduce the words of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. He has further contended that the Judgments of A.K.Singhania Vs. State of Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Limited and Another reported in (2013) 16 SCC 630 , Tamil Nadu News Print and Papers Limited Vs. D.Karunakar and Others reported in (2016) 6 SCC 78 , Standard Chatered Bank Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others reported in (2016) 6 SCC 62 and Rallis India Limited Vs. State of Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Limited and Another reported in (2013) 16 SCC 630 , Tamil Nadu News Print and Papers Limited Vs. D.Karunakar and Others reported in (2016) 6 SCC 78 , Standard Chatered Bank Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others reported in (2016) 6 SCC 62 and Rallis India Limited Vs. Poduru Vidya Bhushan and Others reported in (2011) 13 SCC 88 have been rendered after the judgment of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89 . It has been further contended that the complainant also brought on record by producing documents unimpeachable character and sterling quality that the petitioners no.8 and 11 are the Chief Executive Officers of the accused no.1 Company and the petitioners no.4 was the Chief Financial Officers of the accused no.1 company on the date of commission of the alleged offence by way of filing supplementary affidavit in connection with CRAN 3491 of 2018. All the Learned Senior Advocates appearing for the parties took much pain and advanced their eloquent arguments. They have cited a series of decisions. In addition to their oral arguments Learned Counsel filed written notes of arguments. I after carefully and assiduously examining the submissions and counter submissions advanced by the Learned Counsel for the parties both on the legal and factual aspects and after scrupulously scanning the materials placed on record and examining the arguments submitted by the parties, would like to deal with those contentions seriatim. On perusal of the petition of complaint, it appears that the exact words used in Section 141 of the Act have not been annexed in the said complaint stating that the accused persons/petitioners were in charge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. In paragraph 19(a) of the decision of S.M.S.Pharmaceutical Ltd. the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been observed as under:- "It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time of offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averments being in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied." The decision of Hon'ble Apex Court has been referred and relied on in various subsequent decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. In this connection, it would not be out of place to refer paragraph 14 of the decision of Apex Court in A.K.Singhania Vs. Gujarat State Fertilizer Co.Ltd. reported in (2013) 16 SCC 630 . "14. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident that every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and responsible to the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In the face of it, will it be necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the person accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company? In our opinion, in the case of offence by the company, to bring its Directors within the mischief of Section 138 of the Act, it shall be necessary to allege that they were in charge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the company. It is a necessary ingredient which would be sufficient to proceed against such Directors. However, we may add that as no particular form is prescribed, it may not be necessary to reproduce the words of the section. If reading of the complaint shows and the substance of accusation discloses necessary averments, that would be sufficient to proceed against such of the Directors and no particular form is necessary. However, it may not be necessary to allege and prove that, in fact, such of the Directors have any specific role in respect of the transaction leading to issuance of cheque. Section 141 of the Act makes the Directors in charge of and responsible to the company "for the conduct of the business of the company" within the mischief of Section 138 of the Act and not particular business for which the cheque was issued. Section 141 of the Act makes the Directors in charge of and responsible to the company "for the conduct of the business of the company" within the mischief of Section 138 of the Act and not particular business for which the cheque was issued. We cannot read more than what has been mandated in Section 141 of the Act." Again the said judgment of SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. was referred and discussed in Tamil Nadu News Print and Papers Ltd. Versus D.Karunakar and Others reported in (2016) 6 SCC 78 . In paragraph 14 of the said judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe as under: "Upon perusal of the complaint, we find that an averment has been made to the effect that Accused 3 to 10 were, in fact, in charge of the day-to- day business of Accused 1 Company." Hon'ble Court held that as there was an allegation to the effect that accused 2 to 10 were involved in day to day business of accused company and set aside the order passed by the High Court. In paragraph 2 of the present complaint, it has been stated that all the accused persons are responsible and liable for the daily business management of the accused no.1 company. It shows that the accused were involved in the day to day business of the company. Moreover, from the averments made in paragraphs 6,7 and 8, it appears that all the accused persons were involved in the commission of alleged offence. I have gone through the decisions cited by the Learned Counsel for the parties. Argument has been advanced on behalf of the petitioners that decision of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Limited has been passed by three Judge Bench and as such that Judgment would prevail over the subsequent judgments rendered by two Judge Bench. At the time of perusal of the decisions so cited at Bar, it appears to me that in all the subsequent decisions the judgment of S.M.S.Pharmaceuticals has been referred to and discussed and relied on. The question as raised by the petitioners that a two Judge Bench cannot overrule a three Judge Bench decision does not arise at all as there is no conflict of decisions between the larger Bench and smaller Bench. The question as raised by the petitioners that a two Judge Bench cannot overrule a three Judge Bench decision does not arise at all as there is no conflict of decisions between the larger Bench and smaller Bench. Subsequent Judgments passed by the Apex Court are in consonance with the ratio enunciated by the Apex Court in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. It is settled principle of law that three categories of persons are covered by Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The said three categories of persons: (1) The company who committed the offence as alleged; (2) Everyone who was in-charge of and was responsible for the business of the company; (3) Any other person who is a Director or a Manager or a Secretary or Officer of the Company with whose connivance or due to whose neglect the company has committed the office. In the petition of complaint, it has been specifically averred that all the accused persons are responsible and liable for the daily business management of the accused. There are no essential differences between the averments made in the petition of complaint and the language used in Section 141 of the Act i.e. accused are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Moreover, in the petition of complaint it has been specifically alleged that on three occasions the cheques in questions were returned unpaid as the drawer's signatures authorization to operate account not received and accused persons apologized and requested the complainant to deposit the cheques again. This prima facie indicates the involvement of the accused in the alleged crime. I think, the averments made in the complaint are sufficient to meet the requirements as contained in Section 141 of the Act. The contention of the Learned Advocate for the petitioners that the petition of complaint does not fulfill the basic requirements of Section 141 of the Act is not tenable. Moreover, when the petition of complaint discloses the commission of the alleged offence against the accused persons, then the question of quashing of the criminal proceedings arising out of the complaint does not arise at all. There are specific averments in the complaint that the accused mischievously issued the cheque with ulterior motive. Moreover, when the petition of complaint discloses the commission of the alleged offence against the accused persons, then the question of quashing of the criminal proceedings arising out of the complaint does not arise at all. There are specific averments in the complaint that the accused mischievously issued the cheque with ulterior motive. In this connection, I would like to refer to a decision in Criminal Appeal Nos.403-405 of 2019 in the matter of A.R.Radha Krishna V. Dasari Deepthi reported in Criminal Appeal Nos.403-405 of 2019 (2019 SCC Online SC 357). In paragraph 9 and 10 of the said judgment our Apex Court has been pleased to observe as under: "9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully scrutinizing the record, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in allowing the quashing petitions by invoking its power under S.482, Cr.P.C. In a case pertaining to an offence under S. 138 and S. 141 of the Act, the law requires that the complaint must contain a specific averment that the Director was in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of the company's business at the time when the offence was committed. The High Court, in deciding a quashing petition under S. 482, Cr.P.C., must consider whether the averment made in the complaint is sufficient or if some unimpeachable evidence has been brought on record which leads to the conclusion that the Director could never have been in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. While the role of a Director in a company is ultimately a question of fact, and no fixed formula can be fixed for the same, the High Court must exercise its power under S. 482, Cr.P.C. when it is convinced, from the material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court. [See Gunamala Sales Private Limited v. Anu Mehta, (2015) 1 SCC 103 ] 10. A perusal of the record in the present case indicates that the appellant has specifically averred in his complaint that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were actively participating in the day-today affairs of the accused no. 1 - company. Further, the accused nos. 2 to 4 (including the respondent nos. A perusal of the record in the present case indicates that the appellant has specifically averred in his complaint that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were actively participating in the day-today affairs of the accused no. 1 - company. Further, the accused nos. 2 to 4 (including the respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein) are alleged to be from the same family and running the accused no. 1 - company together. The complaint also specificies that all the accused, in active connivance, mischievously and intentionally issued the cheques in favor of the appellant and later issued instructions to the Bank to "Stop Payment". No evidence of unimpeachable quality has been brought on record by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 to indicate that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the court." In view of above, I am of the view that continuance of criminal proceedings against the petitioners would not be an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, the prayer for quashing of the proceedings is dismissed. Before parting with the case, I would like to clarify that the observations as made in this judgment should not be taken as an expression of any opinion regarding the merit of the criminal proceedings pending before the Learned Magistrate. The Learned Trial Magistrate shall proceed with the complaint and dispose of the same in accordance with the law with utmost expedition. Re: CRAN 3491 of 2018 and CRAN 2227 of 2019 In view of the order passed in main application being C.R.R.No.3270 of 2018, both the C.R.A.N. being No.3491 of 2018 and C.R.A.N. No.2227 of 2019 become infructuous and stand dismissed.