ORDER : G.R. Udhwani, J. 1. This appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure questions the judgment and decree dated 25.08.2014 rendered in Summary Suit No. 766 of 2008 by the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad, as confirmed by judgment and decree dated 28.04.2016 passed in New Trial Application No. 23 of 2015 by the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Chief Court, Ahmedabad. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has formulated following questions and submits that said questions are substantial questions of law: "(i) Whether both the Courts below were justified in coming to the conclusion that Ex. 36 can be said to be rightly held as 'promissory note'? (ii) Whether both the Courts below erred in concluding that the presumption raised on basis of promissory note in question was rebutted since respondent-plaintiff failed to produce relevant account books to establish consideration for which note was executed by appellant-defendant? (iii) Whether the judgment and order dated 25.08.2015 and 28.04.2016 passed by both the courts is illegal, unreasonable and are required to be set aside. (iv) Whether the both the courts have erred in concluding that on failure on part of plaintiff suing on basis of promissory note to produce necessary books for establishing factum of consideration may justify court in drawing adverse inference under section 114 of Evidence Act?" 3. Learned counsel for the appellant also, argued that in absence of evidence of the husband of the plaintiff, the best evidence to prove the promissory note Exh. 36 was not brought on record. He submitted that in absence of best evidence, no case for judgment and decree was made out. 4. On consideration of the rival submissions and having given anxious thought to the questions formulated as above and also the question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant during the course of arguments as above, it needs to be examined whether said questions would constitute substantial questions of law. 5. It is settled law that the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be entertained only if the substantial question of law is involved. The questions questioning a mere accuracy or correctness of the findings of the fact or even of law, would not constitute substantial questions of law. The legislature, has however, not provided the definition defining substantial questions of law. The questions questioning a mere accuracy or correctness of the findings of the fact or even of law, would not constitute substantial questions of law. The legislature, has however, not provided the definition defining substantial questions of law. It would be, therefore be difficult to lay any straitjacket formula or test to understand the substantial questions of law. It would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, it could be illustratively stated that questions like perversity in the judgment, misinterpretation of evidence or fact, misconceiving legal position, non-observance of certain procedure whereby miscarriage of justice is caused and non-observance of principles of natural justice, are some of the legal situations which may qualify as substantial questions of law. 6. This Court is of the opinion that none of the questions raised are substantial question of law. Though the first question is framed as if the construction of the promissory note is involved, during the course of argument it was submitted that the promissory note was not executed nor was it proved in accordance with law. As to question No. 2, the only argument is that the trial Court could not have raised the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in absence of the corroboration of the debt in the books of account of the plaintiff. A factual finding, after appreciation of evidence that promissory note was executed, was recorded. The appellate Court below concurred with such finding. No legal infirmity has been pointed out in such findings. Thus, the said question would not constitute a substantial question law. 7. Moreover, once promissory note was proved to have been executed, the trial Court was justified in invoking Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The provision does not require the person in whose favour the presumption is sought to be raised, to justify the debt by producing the books of account. The said question may arise only if the cogent evidence rebutting presumption is tendered. It is not pointed out that any such evidence in rebuttal was tendered and it is, therefore, misconceived to argue that presumption was rebutted. 8. This Court finds no involvement of substantial questions of law in this appeal thus, this appeal must fail, and therefore, is dismissed. 9. It is not pointed out that any such evidence in rebuttal was tendered and it is, therefore, misconceived to argue that presumption was rebutted. 8. This Court finds no involvement of substantial questions of law in this appeal thus, this appeal must fail, and therefore, is dismissed. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent would urge this Court to dismiss the appeal for non-compliance of the interim order rendered by this Court requiring the appellant to deposit the decretal amount with this Court. According to the learned counsel, the consequence of non-deposit of decretal amount would be the dismissal of the appeal itself. Learned counsel relied upon Order 41 Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads thus: "(3) Where the appeal is against a decree for payment of money, the appellant shall, within such time as the Appellate Court may allow, deposit the amount disputed in the appeal or furnish such security in respect thereof as the Court may think fit." 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant invited attention of this Court to Order 41 Sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 which reads thus: "(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the forgoing sub-rules, where the appellant fails to make the deposit or furnish the security specified in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1, the Court shall not make an order staying the execution of the decree." 11. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the consequence of non-compliance of the order under Order 41 Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 are spelt out in the said provision. He contended that the only consequence is the denial of interim relief to the appellant; but certainly not the dismissal of the second appeal. 12. Having given anxious consideration to the said arguments, this Court finds substance in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The reason being, the right to second appeal with all its limitations is governed by Sections 100, 101 and 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions are substantial in nature and this Court does not find therein any consequence of non-compliance with Order 41 Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 under Sections 100, 101 and 102. Even the procedural provision i.e. Order 41 Sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 does not spell out dismissal of an appeal on non-compliance with Order 41 Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1. 13. Even the procedural provision i.e. Order 41 Sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 does not spell out dismissal of an appeal on non-compliance with Order 41 Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1. 13. It is thus clear that non-compliance of the order of deposit of decretal amount would consequent into denial of stay of execution of the decree. If the intention was to ensure the dismissal as a consequence of non-compliance with Order 41 Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1, it would have been so spelt out in the provision itself. Thus, it appears to this Court that the second appeal cannot be dismissed for non-compliance of order made under Order 41 Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 and the only consequence thereof would be as spelt out in Order 41 Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1. This Court, therefore, is not inclined to dismiss the appeal on that count. The appeal shall, however, stand dismissed for lack of substantial question of law; herein.