JUDGMENT : Sunil B. Shukre, J. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of petitioner and respondent no.1. Though, respondent nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 are served, none appears for and on their behalf. Notice to respondent nos.4 and 8 is dispensed with. 2. Petitioner is one of the bidders, who had submitted his bid for award of contract of Ground Handling Services at Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar International Airport, Nagpur. At the time of consideration of technical bid, it was found that the petitioner had no requisite experience in Ground Handling Services, as required under clause 8.3.1 (ii) of the MIHAN India Limited, Request For Proposal ('RFP' for short). There was also another reason for declaring the petitioner as disqualified to take part in the tender process and it was in relation to clause 8.3.2 (ii) of the RFP. This has been specifically mentioned in the impugned communication, by which the petitioner has been informed that he has been disqualified at the round of Technical Bid in not fulfilling criteria of clause 8.3.2 (ii). 3. According to Mr. Dhande, both these reasons are not borne out from the documents filed by the petitioner at the time of submission of his tender. He submits that the petitioner did possess the requisite experience of last seven years in standard ground handling services and that his net worth, as on 31.03.2017, was not less than Rs. 5 Crores. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has taken us through the documents, which are forming part of paper book. 4. Mr. Deopujari, learned counsel for respondent no.1, submits that there is not a single document filed by the petitioner at the time of submission of his tender, showing that he fulfilled the criteria mentioned in the aforesaid clauses, though now he concedes that the petitioner did fulfill the criterion of net worth mentioned in clause 8.3.2 (ii) of the RFP. Therefore, he submits that the petitioner has been rightly disqualified in the present case. 5. On going through the documents filed on record, we find that there is a great substance in argument of learned counsel for respondent no.1, insofar as non fulfillment of criterion described in clause 8.3.1 (ii) is concerned. Therefore, he submits that the petitioner has been rightly disqualified in the present case. 5. On going through the documents filed on record, we find that there is a great substance in argument of learned counsel for respondent no.1, insofar as non fulfillment of criterion described in clause 8.3.1 (ii) is concerned. There is no dispute about the fact that this criterion is one of the essential conditions of the RFP and it would then follow that unless this criterion is fulfilled, the bidder cannot be permitted to take part in the further tender process. 6. The conclusion, so made by us, is the result of what we have noted, upon consideration of all the documents which are forming part of paper book of this petition. But, before we deal with the documents, it would be necessary for us to understand the meaning that bears upon expression "Ground Handling Services". 7. Ground Handling Services are necessary for facilitating landings and departures of the aircrafts from the airport. The expression "Ground Handling Services" has been defined in the RFP itself. It reads thus: "Ground Handling Services" or "GH Services" "Ground Handling Services or "GH Services" means services necessary for an aircraft's arrival at and departure from an airport other than air traffic control and it includes- (i) Ramp handling including activities specified in scope of services of this RFP; (ii) Traffic handling including activities as specified in scope of services of this RFP; and (iii) Any other activity specified by the Authority from time to time." 8. It is clear from this definition that ground handling services are of varied nature and include many of the services which are necessary to assist the landings and departures of the aircrafts from an airport. These services also include ramp handling, including activities specified in the scope of services of a particular RFP and any other activity specified by the authority from time to time. Similar is the definition given in the notification dated 15.12.2017, issued by the Ministry of Civil Aviation. This definition does not categorically say that aircraft push-back service is also a kind of Ground Handling Services. Even if it is assumed to be so, just for the sake of argument, still such service, by itself, would not constitute a large group of services called the Ground Handling Services, contemplated by the RFP and the notification dated 15.12.2017. This definition does not categorically say that aircraft push-back service is also a kind of Ground Handling Services. Even if it is assumed to be so, just for the sake of argument, still such service, by itself, would not constitute a large group of services called the Ground Handling Services, contemplated by the RFP and the notification dated 15.12.2017. They envisage different or myriad services, forming together a bundle of services rendered for facilitating landings and departures of the aircrafts. It follows then that, for the purpose of experience, what has to be seen is, whether a bidder has experience of requisite period in rendering majority of myriad services forming together the weighty bundle of Ground Handling Services or not. 9. In the present case, on consideration of the documents filed on record, we find that the petitioner is having experience in aircraft push-back service and as a ground handling agent for unscheduled aircrafts and nothing more. 10. Aircraft push back service, as said earlier, is not expressly included in the definition of the term "Ground Handling Services." Still, even when it is assumed to be so, just for the sake of argument, it would, by itself, not be sufficient to fulfill the criterion of clause 8.3.1 (ii) of RFP as the experience in "Ground Handling Services" would only mean experience in all or majority of services, which goes into the larger expression. 11. There is a document, which is in the nature of a chart at page no. 259 of the paper book. It has been tried to be shown by the petitioner as a document standing in proof of his claim that he fulfills the criterion of seven years experience in Ground Handling Services. Careful perusal of this document shows that it nowhere specifies the kind of services rendered by the petitioner. The agreements, which are filed on record, only show that the petitioner had some experience in pushing back of the aircrafts. There are other documents, which show that the petitioner was a handling agent but, he was so only for non-scheduled aircrafts and not the scheduled aircrafts. Clause 8.3.1 (ii) requires a contractor to be having experience of Ground Handling Services, as regards scheduled aircrafts. There are other documents, which show that the petitioner was a handling agent but, he was so only for non-scheduled aircrafts and not the scheduled aircrafts. Clause 8.3.1 (ii) requires a contractor to be having experience of Ground Handling Services, as regards scheduled aircrafts. Scheduled aircrafts, as admitted by both the sides, are those aircrafts, which run on regular basis, follow scheduled flights having specific timings of landings and departures and not those aircrafts, which arrive at the airports at an unscheduled time due to some exigency, or sudden use of private aircrafts by private parties. The exigencies could be of different kind as, for example; refueling, technical snag, emergency landings and, so on and so forth. There is not a single document shown to us by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which would indicate that the petitioner has had seven years' of experience in rendering comprehensively the ground handling services, for a continuous period of seven years, preceding the appointed date. 12. Coming back to the point of push-back experience, we find that there are two agreements, which are seen to be relied upon to prove the point. They show that the petitioner had an experience of pushing back the aircrafts. We must say, even if these agreements are to be favourably considered for the petitioner, still they would not further the case of the petitioner. Reason being that, they also do not fit into the criterion of experience of seven preceding years. These documents are for the period from 2015 to 2021 and, that too, on account of some ad hoc arrangement made between the employer and the contractor. Clause 8.3.1 (ii) requires that, such an experience should be at least with two different scheduled airlines and preceding seven accounting years from the bid due date. To have more clarity on issue, this clause is reproduced thus: "8.3 Conditions of Eligibility 8.3.1. Technical Capacity: For demonstrating technical capacity and experience (the "Technical Capacity), the Bidder shall have: (i) ..... (ii) The Bidder should have directly signed Standard Ground Handling Agreement (SGHA)/Airline Ground Handling Agreement with at least 2 different scheduled airlines in preceding 7 (seven) Accounting Years from the Bid Due Date. Letter from each airline with copies of SGHA/Airline Ground Handling Agreement to be submitted. (ii) The Bidder should have directly signed Standard Ground Handling Agreement (SGHA)/Airline Ground Handling Agreement with at least 2 different scheduled airlines in preceding 7 (seven) Accounting Years from the Bid Due Date. Letter from each airline with copies of SGHA/Airline Ground Handling Agreement to be submitted. (iii) & (iv) ...." It is obvious that the agreements, which are filed on record, do not fulfill the criterion of above clause. 13. Thus, we find that the petitioner has failed to prove its case that it was duly qualified to participate in the tender process. The petitioner did not fulfill the criterion prescribed in clause 8.3.1 (ii) of the RFP, which was an essential condition, and so was rightly disqualified. The decision, so taken by respondent no.1, was lawful and consistent with the terms and conditions of the RFP. We do not see any mala fides therein nor the learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out to us anything. Such decisions are part of administrative action of the State and though subject to judicial review, cannot be interfered with, if it is seen that proper procedure is followed, no favouritism is indulged in and no arbitrariness is committed. 14. In Jagdish Mandal Vs. State of Orissa & Ors., (2007) 14 SCC 517 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the principles governing judicial review of administrative action and tender or contractual matters. It held that judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Other factors, as expounded, that must be borne in mind while taking a judicial review of contractual matters, are; the purpose of judicial review, is to examine whether choice or decision is made "lawfully" and not to check if it is made in "sound" exercise of powers; evaluation of tenders and award of contracts are essentially commercial function and so natural justice and equity principles stay at a distance; and if decision relating to contract is bona fide and in public interest; no interference with it is warranted, even when procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to tenderer is made out. Same principles are stated in Michigan Rubber (India) Limited Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 216 . The decision made in this case and which has been impugned here, clears the test of these principles. 15. Same principles are stated in Michigan Rubber (India) Limited Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 216 . The decision made in this case and which has been impugned here, clears the test of these principles. 15. Before parting with the judgment, we would like to deal with the second reason relating to non fulfillment of criterion prescribed in clause 8.3.2 (ii) of the RFP, as it is necessary to make the record correct. We find from the reply of respondent no.1 that the reason given in this regard in the impugned communication is not correct and now it has been admitted by respondent no.1 itself that the petitioner indeed fulfills the criterion prescribed in this clause, which relates to financial worth of the petitioner. But, this would not affect the rejection of technical bid of the petitioner on the another ground discussed earlier, which was distinct from this condition. 16. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner, at this stage, makes a request for staying the effect of this order, in order to challenge this judgment before the Hon'ble Apex Court. 18. Mr. Deopujari, learned counsel for respondent no.1, has strongly opposed the request, contending that because of the status quo order passed by this Court on 17.10.2018, the Ground Handling Services at Nagpur Airport have been severely affected. He submits that it is respondent no.1, who has been required to take the brunt of the deficiency created by non grant of this crucial contract for such a period of time and respondent no.1 itself had to do the job in the meanwhile, thereby putting great strain on its resources. He also submits, on instructions, that Nagpur airport is one of the busiest airports of Central India, handling about 40 scheduled flights everyday and, if any further stay is granted, it is likely to have an adverse impact on the quality of Ground Handling Services, so essential for safe landings and departures of the aircrafts, as respondent no.1 is now too overburdened to do the job anymore. He also submits that it was because of such continuous adverse impact on the efficiency and efficacy of the services at Dr. He also submits that it was because of such continuous adverse impact on the efficiency and efficacy of the services at Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Nagpur International Airport, respondent no.1 was required to file an application for vacating of the interim order and considering the gravity of the situation, this Court directed the parties to submit their argument in a final manner, with a view to decide the petition finally, at the admission stage, instead of deciding the issue of interim stay and also of the admission of petition. He, therefore, urges that no further stay be granted. 19. We find substance in the argument of the learned counsel for respondent no.1. No doubt, the petitioner may have a perception about breach of his some right. But, when it comes to public interest, the Court also has to examine the issue of public interest vis-a-vis private right and decide which one of them, in a given set of facts and circumstances, would have to be given priority. The exercise needs to be carried out in the context of occurrence of irreparable loss to a party of such nature as is not capable of being compensated in monetary terms. Viewed from this angle, we find that case of respondent no.1 is more pithy and so, in our opinion, this is not a fit case for acceding to the request of learned counsel for the petitioner and it is rejected. Authenticated copy of the judgment may be supplied to the learned counsel for the parties.