JUDGMENT : Dinesh Mehta, J. 1. By way of the present intra-court appeal, the appellant has impugned the order dated 5.9.2018, passed by the learned single Judge of this Court, whereby his writ petition had been dismissed in light of a Division Bench judgment dated 9.5.2014, rendered in the case of Ganesha Ram v. State of Raj. & Ors. (DBSAW No. 1038/2013). 2. The appellant an elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Delwara, Panchayat Samiti Khamnor, filed the writ petition laying challenge to the order dated 21.8.2008, vide which he was placed under suspension by the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the Panchayati Raj Act" or "the Act of 1994"). 3. Before the learned single Judge, it was contended that the appellant-writ petitioner was not at all connected with the transaction and he had been falsely implicated. However, noticing the appellant's involvement in corruption and taking into consideration the fact that an inquiry under Section 38 of the Panchayati Raj Act had been initiated against him, as recorded in the impugned order dated 21.8.2018, the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition, following the Division Bench judgment in the case of Ganesha Ram (supra). 4. The appellant has challenged dismissal of his writ petition by way of the instant appeal. It is to be noted that at the time of motion hearing of the appeal, it was asserted by the appellant that though an FIR has been registered for offence under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, but no challan has been filed in the court of competent jurisdiction and thus it cannot be said that trial was pending against the appellant for which he could be suspended. Taking such assertion into consideration, a Division Bench of this Court, (of which one of us was a party), was impelled to pass an interim order in appellant's favour on 11.10.2018, while recording thus: "1. As per sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 the State Government may suspend any member including a Chairperson or a Dy. Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a court of law. 2. As per sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 the State Government may suspend any member including a Chairperson or a Dy. Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a court of law. 2. In the instant case an FIR has been registered for offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in which the appellant is named as an accused for a bribe, which ultimately was to reach the pocket of Officer Incharge of PS Delwara. 3. As per appellant, the Anti Corruption Bureau has not filed any challan in the court of competent jurisdiction and thus it is urged that there is no pending trial against the appellant. 4. Issue notice to the respondents, returnable after four weeks. 5. Order suspending the appellant as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Delwara, Panchayat Samiti Khamnor, District Rajsamand dated 21.8.2018 shall remain stayed." 5. It is pertinent that during the course of submission on 11.10.2018, the fact that no charge sheet had been filed against the appellant was highlighted; whereas the fact that the suspension was a result of initiation of inquiry had been surreptitiously suppressed. 6. No sooner had the matter been taken up for consideration, than Mr. Bissa learned counsel for the respondent, pointed out that the appellant had been placed under suspension, not because of the pendency of the criminal case against him, but as a consequence of the initiation of disciplinary inquiry against him, vide a separate order of even date. He pointed out that a look at the interim order dated 11.10.2018, which records assertion of the appellant clearly suggests that the appellant has been able to secure an interim order in his favour, simply by portraying the facts contrary to record. The appellant's appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs for an attempt of misleading, implored learned counsel for the respondents. 7. Not in a position to refute this factual position, learned counsel for the appellant however tried to impress that as far as his involvement in bribery is concerned, no charge sheet had actually been framed against him and thus there was no mis-statement of fact. 7. Not in a position to refute this factual position, learned counsel for the appellant however tried to impress that as far as his involvement in bribery is concerned, no charge sheet had actually been framed against him and thus there was no mis-statement of fact. In relation to suppression of factum of enquiry under the Rules of 1996, he meekly submitted that it has been stated in the memo of appeal that the charge sheet under Rule 22 of the Rules of 1996 has been issued and an inquiry against him has been initiated. 8. A perusal of the grounds taken in the memo of appeal, particularly grounds (B) and (C) thereof and tenor of the pleadings reveals that the appellant has premised his appeal inter alia on the ground that neither does the offence alleged against the appellant involve moral turpitude nor can the fact that an FIR has been lodged, can entail suspension, until and unless charges are framed. True it is, that a passing rather crafty reference has been made in relation to the inquiry under Rule 22 of the Panchayati Raj Rules, but the same is apparently with a view to ward off the possible allegation of suppression. 9. Be that as it may, the appellant's assertion at the time of admission of the appeal, duly recorded in the interim order dated 11.10.2018, evinces clear attempt to state facts which were completely contrary to the record. The ground for suspending the appellant was initiation of disciplinary enquiry and not lodging of the FIR against him. The appellant has projected his case, as if he had been placed under suspension because of the fact that he was caught red-handed. The appellant in no ambiguous terms had asserted: "though an FTR has been registered, but the Anti Corruption Bureau has not filed any challan in the Court and as such, provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act of 1994 cannot be invoked". 10. Needless, it is, to state that it was only because of such assertion, this Court was led to believe that the appellant has been placed under suspension for unsustainable ground viz., 'mere lodging of an FIR'. 11. However, a reading of the order of suspension dated 21.8.2018 reveals otherwise. The appellant had been placed under suspension, as a result of initiation of inquiry. 11. However, a reading of the order of suspension dated 21.8.2018 reveals otherwise. The appellant had been placed under suspension, as a result of initiation of inquiry. Needless to state that as per provisions of Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994, a Sarpanch can be placed under suspension during pendency of an enquiry under Rule 22 of the Rules of 1996. The appellant's case is squarely covered by the Division Bench judgment rendered in the case of Ganesha Ram (supra). 12. For what has been stated hereinabove, we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is therefore, dismissed. With the dismissal of the appeal, the stay application No. 15655/2018 also stands dismissed. 13. The facts noticed above clearly unravels appellant's attempt to mislead this Court, by portraying wrong facts; obviously, with a view to secure an interim order with an oblique motive to remain in the chair. 14. Being misdirected by the appellant, this Court had stayed the appellant's suspension and as a natural corollary, the appellant has remained in the office with impugnity. No cost can recompense the damage he has caused to the office he held, and the dent he has made to Courts confidence in counsels' statements. 15. In the facts and circumstances of the case at hands while dismissing the appeal, we impose a cost of Rs. 50,000/-, which the appellant shall deposit with the Legal Service Authority, Rajasthan, within a period of 15 days from today.