JUDGMENT : B.N. KARIA, J. 1. Since the challenge in both these appeals is common, on a request made by the learned counsel for the respective parties, the appeals were heard together and are decided by this common judgment. 2. So far as Second Appeal No. 48 of 2002 is concerned, learned counsel Mr. Zalak Pipalia submits that he has instructions to appear on behalf of the respondent in place of learned counsel Mr. T. V. Shah and Mr. R. V. Sampat. He has further submitted that learned counsel Mr. R. V. Sampat was practicing at Junagadh and he is no more and therefore, it would not be possible for him to obtain his no objection for filing the Vakalatnama. So far as learned counsel Mr. T. V. Shah is concerned, he has become jain monk and his whereabouts are not available and therefore, his endorsement relating to no objection in filing the Vakalatnama is also not possible to obtain. Accordingly, registry shall accept the vakalatnama of learned counsel Mr. Zalak Pipalia on behalf of the respondent in Second Appeal No. 48 of 2002. 3. Brief facts of the case on hand are that the respondents herein - original plaintiffs were serving with the police department as Armed Police Constables at Junagadh. That, they were served with the order of dismissal from the service by the appellant No. 2 herein without holding any departmental inquiry against them. It is the case of the respondents - original plaintiffs that they had served the department to their satisfaction and even, no adverse remarks were passed against them. That, in 1984- 1985 they were forced by their co-employees to participate in the activities of the union and therefore, they were active members of the union and hold the post in the union. The government declared the said police union derecognized as police employees at Ahmedabad had given a call of strike in July 1988. It is further the case of the respondents - plaintiffs that they had not taken any part in the union activities thereafter. In the Junagadh district, all the employees had remained present on duty because of the command of the State Government of not to go on leave. Thus, there was no reason to indulge the respondents - plaintiffs in the aforesaid activities and resultant action against them. In the Junagadh district, all the employees had remained present on duty because of the command of the State Government of not to go on leave. Thus, there was no reason to indulge the respondents - plaintiffs in the aforesaid activities and resultant action against them. However, the appellant No. 2 herein issued the order of dismissal on 27.07.1988 without holding any inquiry against the respondents - plaintiffs and without given any opportunity of being heard. The inquiry had been dispensed with by the appellants relying on the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and Section 26 of the Bombay Police Act stating that holding the inquiry would reflect badly in police force and safety of the life of the employees of the government would be put in danger. The respondents - plaintiffs were also prosecuted in the criminal Court; they are arrested and subsequently, released on bail. The respondents - plaintiffs filed the suits before the trial Court for declaration and permanent injunction. The trial Court decided the suits in favour of the plaintiffs by common judgment dated 30.12.1989 and the respondents - plaintiffs were ordered to be reinstated in service. Being aggrieved, the appellants herein filed the regular civil appeals before the District Court, Junagadh, which, by judgment and order dated 17.10.2000, confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, against which, present second appeals have been filed by the appellants. 4. Heard, learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Asmita Patel for the appellants as well as learned counsel Mr. Asit B. Joshi for the respondent in Second Appeal No. 46 of 2002 and learned counsel Mr. Zalak Pipalia for the respondent in Second Appeal No. 48 of 2002. 5. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for the appellants has submitted that the respondents - original plaintiffs were serving in the police department as Armed Police Constable at Junagadh and in view of Section 3(2) of the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966, which prohibits a member of police force from participating in or addressing any meeting or taking part in demonstration in any manner. However, in violation of the said provision, on 27.07.1988, both the plaintiffs addressed a group of policemen in the Police Headquarters, Junagadh and instigated them to resort to strike and also intimidated them to refrain from attending their duties in support of various demands of police and thereby, the plaintiffs were guilty of promoting and inciting agitational activities in the police force of Junagadh District. That, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the authorities were right in taking action under the provisions of Section 145(2) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (for brevity, ‘the Police Act’) and also under Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971. That, in view of gross indiscipline, misconduct and negligence in discharge of the duties, the authorities were justified in dismissing the plaintiffs from their services. It is further submitted by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the learned Courts below have not properly considered and appreciated the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record. That, the judgment and orders passed by the learned Courts below are bad in law and in the facts and circumstances of the case, liable to be quashed and set aside. It is further submitted that while exercising powers under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, it was reasonably not practicable to hold the inquiry against the plaintiffs. That, the competent authority i.e. the defendant No. 2 was satisfied to exercise the powers to dispense with the inquiry. The defendant No. 2 has assigned the reasons for dispensing with the inquiry in the order itself. That, the reasons are recorded in writing and that, it was not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry. That, the plaintiffs were found to be guilty of grave misconduct as shown in the order of dismissal and therefore, punishment of dismissal is proper and according to the provisions of law. Hence, it was requested by the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the appellants to quash and set aside the impugned orders passed by the learned Courts below. 6. That, the plaintiffs were found to be guilty of grave misconduct as shown in the order of dismissal and therefore, punishment of dismissal is proper and according to the provisions of law. Hence, it was requested by the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the appellants to quash and set aside the impugned orders passed by the learned Courts below. 6. From the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents - plaintiffs vehemently opposed the submissions made by the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the appellants - defendnats and supported the impugned judgments and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Courts below, arguing that the appellants have not given any cogent reasons for waiver of departmental inquiry or grounds for dispensing with the same against the respondents - plaintiffs. It is further submitted that the appellants - defendants have not led any oral evidence before the trial Court to show that the circumstances as mentioned in the impugned order of dismissal were prevailing at the time of passing the order. That, if it is considered that such circumstances were prevailing and the appellant No. 2 - defendant No. 2 was satisfied that due to such circumstances, it was expedient to dispense with the inquiry, then also, the defendant No. 2 was further required to follow the provisions of Section 26 of the Police Act under which, the appellant No. 2 - defendant No. 2 was required to issue a show-cause notice for the proposed punishment and to afford an opportunity of being heard to the respondents - plaintiffs. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the circumstances, which have been shown in the impugned order of dismissal for dispensing with the inquiry, were not sufficient to do so. It is further submitted that power with employer vests to dispense with the inquiry invoking the Constitutional provisions, yet, appropriate reasons have to be ascribed and in absence of ascription of any reasons, the order is vitiated in law and eventual consequence would be quashment of the decision. That, the defendant No. 2 was clearly failed to satisfy to the Court that from the material placed before the defendant No. 2, it was not reasonably practicable to hold the departmental inquiry. That, the defendant No. 2 was clearly failed to satisfy to the Court that from the material placed before the defendant No. 2, it was not reasonably practicable to hold the departmental inquiry. At the end, it was requested by the learned counsel for the respondents to dismiss the appeals and confirm the impugned judgment and orders passed by the learned Courts below. 7. Having considered the facts of the case and the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties, indisputably, the plaintiffs were serving as Armed Police Constables at Junagadh and have served with the department till their dismissal order from service passed by the defendant No. 2 without holding any departmental inquiry against them. As per the averments made in the plaints, the plaintiffs were in armed force in 1984-1985. Their co-employees forced them to participate in the activities of the union and therefore, they were active member of the union and held the post in the union. The said union was declared to be derecognized by the government as police employees at Ahmedabad had given a call of strike in July 1988. The plaintiffs contended in the suit that they had not taken part in the union activities thereafter. The police employees in Junagadh District had given no response to the call of strike and all the employees had remained present on duty and because of the command of the State Government not to go on leave, both the plaintiffs had remained present on duty. Thus, there was no reason to indulge the plaintiffs by the defendant No. 2 and the State Government in any of the above activities of strike and to take action resulting into removal or dismissal of the plaintiffs. However, the defendant No. 2, issued the order of dismissal dated 22.07.1988 without holding any inquiry against the plaintiffs. It we consider and read the order passed by the defendant No. 2, it appears that departmental inquiry was dispensed with relying upon the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and under Section 26 of the Police Act stating that holding the inquiry against the plaintiffs will reflect badly in police force and safety of the life of the employees of the government would be put in danger. The plaintiffs and other employees, who were holding the membership of the union, were prosecuted by the department in criminal Court in respect of the complaint raising the false allegations against the plaintiffs and they were arrested and released on bail. In the said complaint, the higher officers and co-employees of the plaintiffs were cited as witnesses and in that case, the defendant has not felt any apprehension or any inconvenience in examining the said witnesses against the plaintiffs. But, at the time of passing the impugned order dismissing the plaintiffs from the service, it was held that if the plaintiffs are prosecuted departmentally, safety of the said officers would be in danger or it may cause inconvenience. Indisputably, no show-cause notice under the provisions of Section 26 of the Police Act was issued by the appellant No. 2 - defendant No. 2 before passing the impugned order of dismissal against the plaintiffs. Before the trial Court, after receiving the summons as duly served to the defendants, they filed written statement in respect of the suit. It appears that before the trial Court, no oral evidence was led by the defendants to show the circumstances as mentioned in the order of dismissal prevailing at the time of passing the order of dismissal. If such a ground was in existence at the prevailing time, to dispense with the inquiry, the defendant No. 2 was required to follow the provisions of Section 26 of the Police Act under which, issuance of show-cause notice for the proposed punishment and to afford an opportunity of being heard to the plaintiffs was must. From the impugned order of dismissal, it does not appear that collecting or producing of any evidence was not possible on account of unavoidable circumstances. The defendant No. 2 was working under the Home Ministry and therefore, it was for him to see that law and order is maintained within the territory of his field. If any disturbance was to be created from the plaintiffs’ side, the defendant No. 2 could have taken necessary actions by providing the police personnel in the area and sufficient protection could have been given to the witnesses who would like to depose against the plaintiffs in the departmental inquiry. The reasons shown in the order would not be sufficient for dispensing with the departmental inquiry. The reasons shown in the order would not be sufficient for dispensing with the departmental inquiry. The apprehension that there would not be safety of the superior officers and colleagues of the plaintiffs if they were examined as a witness in the departmental inquiry, cannot be said to be a sufficient reason or a grounds for dispensing with the inquiry against the plaintiffs. If we consider the record of the trial Court, no oral evidence was led by the defendants to show that there was possibility of disturbance in the police force and the defendant No. 2 and the officers of the defendants were not in a position to control the alleged disturbance in the police force at the relevant time if the plaintiffs were prosecuted departmentally and that, there were such persons supporting the plaintiffs who may cause disturbance in it. In absence of such evidence, it cannot be said that such circumstances were prevailing at the relevant time that if the departmental inquiry was held against the plaintiffs, they would provoke the police personnel to agitate or to cause disturbance in the police force. Disciplinary authority is required to issue a show-cause notice and to give the delinquent a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against action proposed to be taken against him except in the cases referred in the proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 7.1 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghubir Singh V. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in, (2014) 10 SCC 301 in para 38 has held that, ‘The principle of the doctrine of proportionality is a well recognized one to ensure that the action of the employer against employees/workmen does not impinge their fundamental and statutory rights. The said important doctrine has to be followed by the employer/employers at the time of taking disciplinary action against their employees/workmen to satisfy the principles of natural justice and safeguard the rights of employees/workmen. Applying the doctrine of proportionality to the case in hand, it is found that the order of termination, even if justified, is disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct’. Applying the doctrine of proportionality to the case in hand, it is found that the order of termination, even if justified, is disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct’. 7.2 In another decision in the case of Reena Rani V. State of Haryan and Others reported in, (2012) 10 SCC 215 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has referred the case of Union of India V. Tulsiram Patel, wherein, the Constitution Bench considered the scope of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the second proviso to Article 311. While dealing with clause (b), Madon, J., who spoke for the majority of the Constitution Bench observed in para 130, 133, 134 and 135 as follows: “130. The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are “not reasonably practicable” and not “impracticable”. According to the Oxford English Dictionary “practicable” means “Capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “practicable” inter alia as meaning “possible to practice or perform : capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished : feasible”. Further, the words used are not “not practicable” but “not reasonably practicable”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “reasonably” as “in a reasonable manner : to a fairly sufficient extent”. Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry where the government servant, particularly through or together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidate witnesses who are going to given evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or where the government servant by himself or together with or through other threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or member of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the concerned government servant is or is not a party to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause(3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department’s case against the government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty..... * * * 133. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty..... * * * 133. The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. 134. It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must proceed the order imposing the penalty. The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not, therefore, find a place in the final order. It would be usual to record the reason separately and then consider the question of the penalty to be imposed and pass the order imposing the penalty. It would, however, be better to record the reason in the final order in order to avoid the allegation that the reason was not recorded in writing before passing the final order but was subsequently fabricated. The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not contain detailed particular, but the reason must not be vague or just a repetition of the language of clause (b) of the second proviso. For instance, it would be no compliance with the requirement of clause (b) for the disciplinary authority simply to state that he was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry. Sometimes a situation may be such that it is not reasonably practicable to give detailed reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. This would not, however, per se invalidate the order. Each case must be judged on its own merits and in the light of its own facts and circumstances. 135. Sometimes a situation may be such that it is not reasonably practicable to give detailed reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. This would not, however, per se invalidate the order. Each case must be judged on its own merits and in the light of its own facts and circumstances. 135. It was vehemently contended that if reasons are not recorded in the final order, they must be communicated to the concerned government servant to enable him to challenge the validity of that reasons in a departmental appeal or before a court of law and the failure to communicate the reasons would invalidate the order. This contention too cannot be accepted. The constitutional requirement in clause (b) is that the reason for dispensing with the inquiry should be recorded in writing. There is no obligation to communicate the reason to the government servant. As clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this point final, the question cannot be agitated in a departmental appeal, revision or review. The obligation to record the reason in writing is provided in clause (b) so that the superiors of the disciplinary authority may be able to judge whether such authority had exercised its power under clause (b) properly or not with a view to judge the performance and capacity of that officer for the purposes of promotion etc. It would, however, be better for the disciplinary authority to communicate to the government servant its reason for dispensing with the inquiry because such communication would eliminate the possibility of an allegation being made that the reasons have been subsequently fabricated. It would also enable the government servant to approach the High Court under Article 226 or, in a fit case, this Court under Article 32. If the reasons are not communicated to the government servant and the matter comes to the court, the court can direct the reasons to be produced, and furnished to the government servant and if still not produced, a presumption should be drawn that the reasons were not recorded in writing and the impugned order would then stand invalidated. If the reasons are not communicated to the government servant and the matter comes to the court, the court can direct the reasons to be produced, and furnished to the government servant and if still not produced, a presumption should be drawn that the reasons were not recorded in writing and the impugned order would then stand invalidated. Such presumption can, however, be rebutted by a satisfactory explanation for the non- production of the written reasons.” (emphasis supplied)” 7.2.1 In this case, the Superintendent of Police did not disclose any reasons as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold the regular departmental inquiry in a dismissal order issued to the delinquent. The dismissal order was not containing the reasons as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold the regular departmental inquiry against the appellant. Following the judgment in case of Tulsiram Patel, the Hon’ble Apex Court allowed the appeal and the dismissal order was quashed and set aside. 7.3 In another decision in the case of Risal Singh V. State of Haryan and Others, (2014) 13 SCC 244 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, ‘the decision to dispense with the departmental inquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the authority concerned. When the satisfaction of the authority concerned is questioned in a Court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whims or caprice of the officer concerned’. Hear, however, in the dismissal order passed by the defendant No. 2 showing the circumstances of dispensing the departmental inquiry against the plaintiffs, no oral evidence was led before the trial Court. The reasons ascribed in the order were never proved by the defendants before the trial Court and therefore, the trial Court has come to the irresistible conclusion that the impugned order passed by the defendant No. 2 dispensing with the inquiry is totally unsustainable and is hereby annulled. 8. Consequently, both these appeals are dismissed. The impugned judgment and orders passed by the learned Courts below are hereby confirmed and it is held that order of dismissal is rightly quashed and set aside by the learned Courts below. 8.1 Learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that the plaintiffs have attained the age of superannuation. 8. Consequently, both these appeals are dismissed. The impugned judgment and orders passed by the learned Courts below are hereby confirmed and it is held that order of dismissal is rightly quashed and set aside by the learned Courts below. 8.1 Learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that the plaintiffs have attained the age of superannuation. The appellants are not precluded from initiating any disciplinary proceedings if advised under law. However, it is clarified that observations passed by this Court herein above shall not be construed as a mandate to the authority to initiate the proceedings against the respondents - plaintiffs.