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2019 DIGILAW 86 (RAJ)

LR of Nandlal v. Harnarayan

2019-01-08

SANGEET LODHA

body2019
JUDGMENT : Sangeet Lodha, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against order dated 2.11.18 passed by Rent Tribunal, Bikaner, in Rent Case No. 65/15, whereby an application preferred on behalf of the petitioner-tenant under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, seeking leave to amend the reply, stands rejected. 2. The respondent filed a petition seeking petitioners' eviction from the commercial premises, a shop, on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement, in terms of the provisions of Section 9(i) of Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short "the Act"). The petition is being contested by the petitioners herein by filing a reply thereto. 3. The petitioners-tenant preferred an application seeking leave to amend the reply stating that during the pendency of the petition, the respondent-landlord has acquired vacant possession of a premises on 7.1.17 and therefore, the bona fide necessity as pleaded does not survive. 4. After due consideration of the rival submissions, the Rent Tribunal observed that the desired amendment regarding availability of the alternative premises is already on record. The court observed that on 21.1.17 an application was preferred by the petitioners for taking documents on record, whereby the documents relating to the landlord acquiring the premises pursuant to the order passed by the Additional Civil Judge No. 1, Bikaner in yet another suit were taken on record vide order dated 25.4.17. The Rent Tribunal observed that the amendment sought to be incorporated on the basis of order dated 7.1.17 passed by the High Court were well within knowledge of the petitioners at the relevant time and thus, the application preferred seeking amendment at the belated stage when after conclusion of the evidence, the matter is posted for final arguments, cannot be entertained. The court observed that the application does not disclose that the amendment sought for is based on any subsequent event. Accordingly, the application has been rejected. Hence, this petition. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the Rent Tribunal has seriously erred in rejecting the application merely on the ground of delay. The court observed that the application does not disclose that the amendment sought for is based on any subsequent event. Accordingly, the application has been rejected. Hence, this petition. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the Rent Tribunal has seriously erred in rejecting the application merely on the ground of delay. Learned counsel submitted that all amendment which will help the Rent Tribunal in adjudicating the real dispute between the parties, must be allowed and thus, the application could not have been rejected and thus, the order impugned passed by the Rent Tribunal without examining the relevance of the amendment sought for, to the lis between the parties, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 6. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel and perused the material on record. 7. A bare perusal of the order impugned reveals that while dismissing the application seeking leave to amend the reply preferred by the petitioners, all the relevant aspects have been considered by the Rent Tribunal objectively. It is noticed that in the instant case, the evidence of the parties stand concluded and the matter is posted for final arguments. It is not disputed before this court that the facts sought to be incorporated by way of amendment were well within the knowledge of the petitioners even at the time of making an application for taking the documents on record, relating to yet another premises acquired by the respondents pursuant to the decision of this court in S.B.C. Second Appeal No. 107/98 and thus, nothing prevented the petitioners from making the appropriate application seeking leave to amend the reply at the relevant time. It is pertinent to note that the amendment is sought for by the petitioners on the basis of the petitioners acquiring the possession of a premises pursuant to order dated 7.1.17. It is matter of record that after passing of the order dated 25.4.17 by the Rent Tribunal, the petitioners sought adjournment time and again for arguments and the application was preferred belatedly on 11.7.18. There was no explanation on record as to why the application was preferred after more than 1½ years since the factum of the petitioners acquiring possession of premises, came to the knowledge of the respondents-landlord. 8. There was no explanation on record as to why the application was preferred after more than 1½ years since the factum of the petitioners acquiring possession of premises, came to the knowledge of the respondents-landlord. 8. The question with regard to amendment of the petition for eviction on the ground of bona fide necessity, where the bona fide requirement is alleged to have become extinct on account of subsequent developments has been dealt with by this court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again in the various decisions. 9. In Hasmat Rai vs. Raghu Nath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: "If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use, he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non-residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the court which would be his cause of action. But that is not sufficient. This requirement must continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of the decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Restriction Act." 10. However, in the matter of Gaya Prasad vs. Sh. Pradeep Srivastava, (2001) 1 RCJ 522 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: "The crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps the utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in out litigative slow process system subsists. The subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. The subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. It is pernicious, and unjust to shut the door before the applicant just on the eye of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period." 11. In the matter of Om Prakash Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal, (2002) WLC (SC) CVL 169, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the question of courts power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief, observed that for the said purpose following triad conditions must be satisifed: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. 12. In Pratap Rai Tanwani and Another vs. Uttam Chand and Another, (2004) 8 SCC 490 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: "7. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period." 13. Thus, upshot of the various decisions of the Apex Court and this court is that if the subsequent events sought to be brought on record by way of amendment of the pleadings are of such nature that the bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the landlord stands completely eclipsed, then such amendment which is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issue with regard to bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord may be allowed by the courts. But, such subsequent event must be brought to the notice of court by making an appropriate application promptly. 14. In the backdrop of position of law settled as above, adverting to the facts of the present case, it is noticed that it is not even the case set out by the petitioners by way of amendment application that on account of landlord acquiring the possession of alternative premises, the bona-fide necessity as pleaded stands completely eclipsed. Further, as discussed above, the application seeking amendment is preferred by the petitioners at the belated stage without there being any explanation of delay and thus, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Rent Tribunal has committed no error in rejecting the application preferred by the petitioners. 15. In the result, the petition fails, it is hereby dismissed in limine.