JUDGMENT : A.S. Chandurkar, J. Rule. Heard finally with the consent of learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The removal of the petitioner from the office of Sarpanch on account of disgraceful conduct pursuant to registration of a first information report against him and his consequent arrest is under challenge in the present writ petition. 3. The petitioner was elected as a Member of Gram Panchayat Wadki, Tah. Ralegaon, District Yavatmal in the elections that were held in June, 2015. The petitioner was thereafter elected as a Sarpanch. A complaint was lodged against the petitioner before the Anti-Corruption Bureau which laid a trap in which the petitioner was caught red-handed accepting the amount of illegal gratification. On that basis a first information report dated 16-2-2016 came to be registered against him under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Pursuant to that report, investigation was made and a charge-sheet was filed in the Special Court. In the light of such report being lodged against the petitioner, the Divisional Commissioner on 14-3-2016 granted permission to the Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla Parishad to conduct an enquiry under Section 39(1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959 (for short, the said Act). On that basis, the Dy. Chief Executive Officer issued a notice to the petitioner for holding an enquiry. The statement of the petitioner was thereafter recorded and a report was submitted to the Divisional Commissioner. The Divisional Commissioner passed an order on 27-6-2016 holding therein that since the petitioner was found prima facie involved and an offence was registered against him by virtue of the first information report, he was liable to be removed from the post of Sarpanch as well as Member of the Gram Panchayat under Section 39(1) of the said Act on account of his disgraceful conduct. The petitioner filed an appeal before the State Government and by the order dated 9-1-2017, the said appeal was dismissed and the removal of the petitioner under Section 39(1) of the said Act was confirmed. Being aggrieved, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Shri M. P. Khajanchi, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the removal of the petitioner under Section 39(1) of the said Act as a result of registration of the first information report was uncalled for. Being aggrieved, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Shri M. P. Khajanchi, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the removal of the petitioner under Section 39(1) of the said Act as a result of registration of the first information report was uncalled for. He submitted that merely on the basis of the allegations made in the first information report, it could not be said that the petitioner was responsible of any disgraceful conduct. The proceedings in that regard were pending before the Special Court and even before the petitioner was found guilty, he has been removed from the Office. The only ground for his removal is the registration of the first information report. The learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of a Constitutional Bench in Manoj Narula vs. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1 and submitted that the petitioner's removal was not sustainable in law. It was further submitted that the Chief Executive Officer himself had issued a communication to the Divisional Commissioner seeking permission to proceed in the matter for removal of the petitioner under Section 39 of the said Act. According to the learned Counsel when the enquiry was to be held by the Chief Executive Officer himself, he should not have sought permission from the Divisional Commissioner to hold the enquiry. By seeking such permission, it was clear that the Inquiry Officer - the Chief Executive Officer had already made up his mind on proceeding against the petitioner for his removal. This aspect had also vitiated the impugned order which was therefore liable to be set aside. 5. Ms. M. Naik, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Shri V. B. Bhise, learned Counsel for the respondent No.3 supported the removal of the petitioner. It was submitted that the fact that a serious offence was registered against the petitioner itself indicated that he was liable to be removed for his disgraceful conduct. Perusal of the first information report indicated that the petitioner in his capacity as Sarpanch had demanded an amount of Rs.5000/- from the complainant for issuing a notice to his neighbour. The petitioner had clearly misused his position as Sarpanch and therefore his removal under Section 39(1) of the said Act was justified. Perusal of the first information report indicated that the petitioner in his capacity as Sarpanch had demanded an amount of Rs.5000/- from the complainant for issuing a notice to his neighbour. The petitioner had clearly misused his position as Sarpanch and therefore his removal under Section 39(1) of the said Act was justified. It was submitted that both the Authorities had rightly held against the petitioner and hence there was no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and I have given due consideration to their respective submissions. The facts that are not in dispute are that the petitioner was elected as a Member of the Gram Panchayat and thereafter as a Sarpanch. On 16-2-2016 an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 came to be registered against the petitioner. It is further not in dispute that the trial in that regard is pending before the Special Court. The Chief Executive Officer on 26-2-2016 sought permission to hold an enquiry under provisions of Section 39(1) of the said Act against the petitioner for his removal. After such permission was granted by the Divisional Commissioner, an enquiry was held. The Chief Executive Officer by his order dated 27-6-2016 has removed the petitioner in exercise of powers under Section 39(1) of the said Act on the ground that the petitioner was caught red-handed in a trap and the first information report had been lodged against him. This amounted to disgraceful conduct on the part of the petitioner warranting his removal. That order has been confirmed by the Hon'ble State Minister, Rural Development Department of the State of Maharashtra. 7. Under provisions of Section 39(1) of the said Act, any Member or Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch who has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct is liable to be removed from the office. The provisions of Section 39(1) (i) of the said Act being relevant, the same are reproduced hereunder: 39. Removal from office.- (1) The Commissioner may:- (i) remove from office any member or any Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch who has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or of any disgraceful conduct, or of neglect of or incapacity to perform his duty, or is persistently remiss in the discharge thereof. Removal from office.- (1) The Commissioner may:- (i) remove from office any member or any Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch who has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or of any disgraceful conduct, or of neglect of or incapacity to perform his duty, or is persistently remiss in the discharge thereof. A Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch so removed may at the discretion of the Commissioner also be removed from the panchayat." For removal from office, the concerned Member or Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch should be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duty or of any disgraceful conduct or of neglect or incapacity to perform his duty or should be persistently remiss in the discharge of his duty. In the present case, the removal of the petitioner is on account of his disgraceful conduct. The removal has been initiated by the Chief Executive Officer in the light of the involvement of the petitioner in an offence registered against him under the provisions of Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and he being trapped red-handed therein. The question, therefore, to be considered is whether the registration of the first information report pursuant to the petitioner being caught red-handed in the trap would be sufficient to hold the petitioner guilty of any disgraceful conduct? 8. To consider the aforesaid question, it would be necessary to first refer to certain provisions of the said Act. Section 13 of the said Act indicates the persons who are qualified to vote and be elected as members of the Gram Panchayat. A person whose name is in the list of voters shall unless he is disqualified under the said Act or any other law for the time being in force is qualified to vote at the elections of the Gram Panchayat. Section 14 of the said Act prescribes various disqualifications and the same prevents a person from being a member of the Panchayat or continuing as a member on incurring such disqualification. A person who has been convicted of certain offences as mentioned in Section 14(1)(a) of the said Act also stands disqualified. Section 14 of the said Act prescribes various disqualifications and the same prevents a person from being a member of the Panchayat or continuing as a member on incurring such disqualification. A person who has been convicted of certain offences as mentioned in Section 14(1)(a) of the said Act also stands disqualified. Section 16 of the said Act prescribes the disability from continuing as member of the Panchayat and it contemplates a member who has been so elected or appointed when he was subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 14 of the said Act or if he has incurred such disqualification after he has been so elected or appointed. From the aforesaid provisions it can be seen that amongst various disqualifications as prescribed by Section 14(1) of the said Act, conviction for the offences stipulated as well as for other offences wherein the sentence of imprisonment is for a period of not less than six months bars a person from being qualified for being a member of the Panchayat. In other words, the aforesaid disqualifications are based on conviction of the person concerned which acts as a disqualification from either being a member of the Panchayat or continuing to be a member of a Panchayat. 9. Section 39 of the said Act empowers the Commissioner to remove from office any member or Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch who has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or of any disgraceful conduct or of neglect or incapacity to perform his duty or if he is persistently remiss in the discharge thereof. The removal from office under this provision is independent and distinct from the disqualifications that have been prescribed by Sections 14, 14A, 14B as well as the disabilities prescribed under Section 16 of the said Act. While Sections 14, 14A, 14B and Section 16 prescribe statutory disqualifications, the removal from office under Section 39 of the said Act is based on acts committed by the concerned member or Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch which in the opinion of the Commissioner is unbecoming of such member or Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch. Such removal under Section 39(1) of the said Act renders a member, Sarpamnch or Upa-Sarpanch ineligible to seek re-election for the remainder of the term. Such ineligibility is distinct from the consequences of statutory disqualifications. 10. Such removal under Section 39(1) of the said Act renders a member, Sarpamnch or Upa-Sarpanch ineligible to seek re-election for the remainder of the term. Such ineligibility is distinct from the consequences of statutory disqualifications. 10. The expression "disgraceful conduct" as employed in Section 39(1) of the said Act has to be construed keeping in mind the object sought to be achieved by said provision. The removal of an elected member or Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch from office is a drastic action and the exercise of such power is based on the subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner in the light of any disgraceful conduct of the concerned member, Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch. In a way, the power of removal has been conferred on the Commissioner for being exercised in a situation which otherwise is not a disqualification prescribed under the said Act. For example, a member who is being proceeded against in a Court of law as an accused for a serious or heinous crime would not be disqualified until he is so convicted for being disqualified under Section 14(1) of the said Act. But if the alleged offence is committed during the term as member, Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch and in the opinion of the Commissioner, such act amounts to disgraceful conduct on his part, then to meet such situation which though does not become a disqualification till conviction could still be a reason to remove such member, Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch from the post held by him which would make him ineligible to contest for such post for the remainder of the term. In other words, a situation has been contemplated which empowers the Commissioner to remove a member or a Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch from the post held by him if it is found that such elected member is guilty of either misconduct in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct for the remainder of his term. 11. The expression "disgraceful conduct" in the context of an elected representative of a local body has been considered in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. District Collector, Raigad & Ors., (2012) AIR SC 1339. In paragraph 15, it has been observed thus: "15. The expression 'disgraceful conduct' is not defined in the statute. Therefore, the same has to be understood in given dictionary meaning. The term 'disgrace' signifies loss of honour, respect, or reputation, shame or bring disfavour or discredit. District Collector, Raigad & Ors., (2012) AIR SC 1339. In paragraph 15, it has been observed thus: "15. The expression 'disgraceful conduct' is not defined in the statute. Therefore, the same has to be understood in given dictionary meaning. The term 'disgrace' signifies loss of honour, respect, or reputation, shame or bring disfavour or discredit. Disgraceful means giving offence to moral sensibilities and injurious to reputation or conduct or character deserving or bringing disgrace or shame. Disgraceful conduct is also to be examined from the context in which the term has been employed under the statute. Disgraceful conduct need not necessarily be connected with the official duty of the office-bearer. Therefore, it may be outside the ambit of discharge of his official duty." In the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, the expression "disgrace" is shown to mean loss of reputation as a result of a dishonourable action and "disgraceful" is shown to mean shockingly unacceptable. 12. In the present case the report of the Chief Executive Officer indicates that pursuant to a complaint lodged by one Narayan Gaikwad, the petitioner is alleged to have demanded an amount of Rs.2500/- by way of illegal gratification for issuing a notice to one Shri Lohakare on account of the construction erected by him. The said amount was demanded for taking action in that matter by the petitioner in his capacity as the Sarpanch. The petitioner was trapped red-handed in that process after which an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 came to be registered against him. The petitioner was arrested in that process and the Chief Executive Officer in that background sought permission to make an enquiry under Section 39(1) of the said Act against the petitioner. The action in question is based on the arrest of the petitioner pursuant to a trap led by the Anti-Corruption Bureau on the basis of a complaint received by it. The act of demanding illegal gratification and subsequent arrest by the Anti-Corruption Bureau has been treated as an act amount to disgraceful conduct on the part of the petitioner warranting his removal. 13. It is to be seen that action of removal has been initiated against the petitioner on account of his aforesaid conduct. The same is based on the powers given to the Commissioner under Section 39(1) of the said Act. 13. It is to be seen that action of removal has been initiated against the petitioner on account of his aforesaid conduct. The same is based on the powers given to the Commissioner under Section 39(1) of the said Act. As noted above, there is a distinction between a disqualification prescribed which disqualifies a person either from becoming a member of the Panchayat or continuing as a member of Panchayat. Removal from office under Section 39(1) does not require such conviction and it is based on the conduct of the person concerned while he is a member or Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch. What is to be seen is the commission of an act by such person amounting to disgraceful conduct. The said act in question may lead to a future conviction or acquittal, but for the purposes of Section 39(1) of the said Act that aspect is not relevant. The nature of the act committed while in office has been given importance warranting action for removal from office. In other words, it is the subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner who has been granted such power to remove a member or a Sarpanch or a Upa-Sarpanch who has been found guilty of such disgraceful conduct. 14. Heavy reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the observations in paragraph 122 of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Manoj Narula (supra). "122. The law does not hold a person guilty or deem or brand a person as a criminal only because an allegation is made against that person of having committed a criminal offence -be it in the form of an off-the-cuff allegation or an allegation in the form of a first information report or a complaint or an accusation in a final report under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code or even on charges being framed by a competent court. The reason for this is fundamental to criminal jurisprudence, the rule of law and is quite simple. Although it is often forgotten or overlooked-a person is innocent until proven guilty. This would apply to a person accused of one or multiple offences. At law, he or she is not a criminal-that person may stand "condemned" in the public eye, but even that does not entitle anyone to brand him or her a criminal. Although it is often forgotten or overlooked-a person is innocent until proven guilty. This would apply to a person accused of one or multiple offences. At law, he or she is not a criminal-that person may stand "condemned" in the public eye, but even that does not entitle anyone to brand him or her a criminal. Consequently, merely because a first information report is lodged against a person or a criminal complaint is filed against him or her or even if charges are framed against that person, there is no bar to that person being elected as a Member of Parliament or being appo0inted as a Minister in the Central Government." The aforesaid observations have to be read and understood in the context in which they have been made. The legality of a person with criminal background and/or charged with offences involving moral turpitude being appointed as Ministers in the Central and State Governments was in issue. The expression "criminal antecedents" or "criminal background" in that context was under consideration. The aspect whether there was any implied limitation on the appointment of a person as a Minister in the Government of India having a criminal background or criminal antecedents was examined. It is in that context that it was observed that the law does not hold a person guilty as a criminal only because an allegation is made against that person of having committed a criminal offence. It was held that merely because the first information report is lodged against a person or a criminal complaint is filed against him or her, that would not be a bar for such person to be elected as a member of Parliament or for being appointed as a Minister in the Central Government. The aforesaid position cannot apply to the case in hand as the petitioner is not being held guilty because a first information report has been lodged against him. It is the conduct in question of the petitioner being caught red-handed while allegedly accepting the amount of illegal gratification in a trap by the Anti Corruption Bureau which act is being examined as amounting to disgraceful conduct on the part of the petitioner especially when he was holding the post of Sarpanch. Hence, the aforesaid observations in the decision in Manoj Narula (supra) would not come to the rescue of the petitioner. 15. Hence, the aforesaid observations in the decision in Manoj Narula (supra) would not come to the rescue of the petitioner. 15. Though it was urged that initiation of the proceedings at the behest of the Deputy Chief Executive Officer has vitiated the action as the Chief Officer himself has to make necessary enquiry leading to removal under Section 39 of the said Act, this submission cannot be accepted. The Deputy Chief Executive Officer has merely brought the relevant facts to the notice of the Divisional Commissioner who has thereafter thought it fit to initiate steps for removal of the petitioner under Section 39 of the said Act. The intimation given by the Deputy Chief Executive Officer is only of the occurrence of the incident in question after which the Divisional Commissioner has thought it fit to proceed under Section 39(1) of the said Act. This aspect therefore does not vitiate the impugned order. 16. The Divisional Commissioner has taken into account the aforesaid aspects in the backdrop of the fact that the petitioner was a Sarpanch and has found the conduct in question to be disgraceful. It is to be noted that under Section 184 of the said Act every member of a Panchayat is deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. The act of being caught red-handed in a trap by the Anti-Corruption Bureau has been found to be disgraceful in the light of the fact that the petitioner was holding the post of Sarpanch. The Appellate Authority has concurred with the view expressed by the Divisional Commissioner and has dismissed the appeal. It is found that the subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner as affirmed by the Appellate Authority is based on material available on record. The Authorities having found the petitioner guilty of such disgraceful conduct, the approach in question is not found to be irrational or not based on any material whatsoever. A reasonable view of the matter having been taken by the Authorities concerned and there being no other view possible, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders. 17. In that view of the matter by confirming the orders passed by the Authorities, the writ petition stands dismissed with no orders as to costs.