JUDGMENT : Dharmadhikari, J. 1. This intra Court appeal arises out of order dated 25/6/18 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 1739/2014, whereby the Award dated 30/8/2013 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.2, Gwalior in a dispute preferred by respondent/workman vide Reference Case No. 14/A/ID Act/12 adjudicated in favour of the respondent directing the appellants to reinstate him within 30 days of the passing of Award though without backwages, has been affirmed. 2. Brief facts leading to filing of this case are that respondent/workman was initially appointed as a daily waged employee on the post of Helper in the appellants' department on 1/1/1989. His services were terminated on 1/12/1995. A dispute was referred, but in the mean time, as per directions of the then Chief Minister, he was taken back in service on 11/8/2004. Thereafter, again, vide order dated 2/7/2005, his services were terminated. A dispute was again referred to the Labour Court which was registered as Reference Case No.73/08 and on 28/2/2011 an Award was passed in favour of the respondent/workman directing for his reinstatement. He was reinstated on 12/12/11. Again on 28/1/12, his services were terminated, aggrieved whereof, the dispute in question was raised by the respondent/workman before the Labour Court, in which statement of claim was submitted by him, contending therein that in place of 22 years retrenchment compensation, only 7 years retrenchment compensation had been paid; the retrenchment order dated 2/7/2005 had been struck down by the Labour Court and, therefore, he should be deemed to be in continuous service; there are more than 100 employees in the appellants' department and the same fall within the category of Industry and the provisions of Chapter 5-B of the Act are applicable thereto; the termination was against the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, it was prayed that the order dated 28/1/12 be quashed and respondent/workman be reinstated with backwages. Notices were issued to the appellants herein and in reply it was submitted that respondent/workman had been engaged not against any specific post, but as per availability of the fund and availability of work. He was purely engaged on daily wage basis and, therefore, appointment order was not issued in his favour. As such, no right or interest accrued to him. He was purely engaged on daily wage basis and, therefore, appointment order was not issued in his favour. As such, no right or interest accrued to him. It was further stated in the reply that as per policy decision for removal of daily waged employees who were appointed after 31/12/1988, his services had come to an end and thereafter again he was again engaged on the basis of availability of work and fund. It was further pleaded therein that the department had fully complied with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act"). The Labour Court, after appreciating the entire evidence available on record, allowed the reference holding that there had been violation of section 25N of the Act. The Labour Court found it proved that there was relationship of master-servant between the appellants and the respondent. No permission of the appropriate Government/Authority had been taken prior to his retrenchment. Accordingly, the Labour Court directed for reinstatement of the respondent/workman though without backwages. The said order was put to challenge in W.P. No. 1739/2014. The learned Single Judge, after going through the entire evidence on record and hearing the rival submissions, came to the conclusion that not only there had been violation of section 25N of the Act, but no notice even under clause (c) of section 25F of the Act was served on the appropriate Government/Authority. Resultantly, the learned Single Judge upheld the Award of the Labour Court while dismissing the writ petition, aggrieved whereof the instant appeal has been preferred. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the order of learned Single Judge primarily on the ground that the provisions of section 25N of the Act are not applicable to the appellants' department, inasmuch as it may be an Industry, but does not come within the definition of "Industrial Establishment" as defined under section 25L of the Act. It is further contended that the provisions of section 25F had been complied with and there was no necessity for complying with the provisions of section 25N of the Act. There was no relationship of master- servant between the appellants and the respondent. The respondent had never been engaged against any vacant post and, therefore, no right accrued to him for reinstatement. There was no relationship of master- servant between the appellants and the respondent. The respondent had never been engaged against any vacant post and, therefore, no right accrued to him for reinstatement. No finding was recorded by the Courts below as to respondent's continuous working of 240 days, in absence whereof, order of reinstatement could not have been passed. It is further contended that the learned writ Court and learned Labour Court fell in error while relying on decision in the case of M.P. Housing Board Vs. Smt Jyoti Chitnis ( 2008(3) MPHT 322 ), as the same is pending before the Apex Court in SLP (Civil) No. 18357/2008. Accordingly, it is prayed that the order of learned Single Judge, as well as, Award of the Labour Court, deserve to be quashed. 4. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent/workman has supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge, as well as, the Award passed by the learned Labour Court contending that cogent findings having been recorded therein, no indulgence is warranted.. 5. Heard, learned counsel for the parties. 6. The primary contention of the appellants is that though appellants/department is an "Industry", yet it does not fall within the purview of "Industrial Establishment", as defined under section 25L of the Act and, hence, the provisions of Chapter VB viz. Special Provisions Relating To Lay-Off, Retrenchment And Closure in Certain Establishment shall not be applicable to the appellants' department. 7. Chapter VB of the Act provides for special provisions relating to Lay-off, Retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. Section 25K clearly provides that the provisions of the Chapter shall apply to Industrial Establishments in which not less than one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. Further, Section 25L provides the definition of "Industrial Establishment" for the purposes of Chapter VB. The same reads thus: 25L. Section 25K clearly provides that the provisions of the Chapter shall apply to Industrial Establishments in which not less than one hundred workmen were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. Further, Section 25L provides the definition of "Industrial Establishment" for the purposes of Chapter VB. The same reads thus: 25L. Definitions.- For the purposes of this Chapter,- (a) "industrial establishment" means- (i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948); (ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952); or (iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951); Now, clause 2(m) of the Factories Act defines "Factory" as under:- "factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof- (i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or (ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on,- (emphasis supplied) Further, the words "manufacturing process" have been defined in section 2(k) of the Factories Act as under:- "manufacturing process" means any process for- (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; or (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or (iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding; or (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels; (vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage; (emphasis supplied) 8. That there are more than ten workers working in the appellants' department is not disputed. That there are more than ten workers working in the appellants' department is not disputed. Appellants/Water Resources Department, formerly known as Irrigation Department, is one of the major establishments of Government of Madhya Pradesh, aimed at protecting the right of State in sharing Water of Inter State Rivers/Basins. The Department is responsible for creation and maintenance of irrigation potential through construction of water resources projects. It also looks after Calamity Managements in the form of construction and maintenance of flood control works, reservoir operation and reconstruction of structures damaged by cyclone; construction, maintenance and regulation of major, medium & minor irrigation projects, flood control and drainage works. Since pumping water and sewage etc. are included in the definition of "manufacturing process" occurring in Sec. 2 (k) of the Act of 1948 and since the appellants' department is involved in aforesaid activities including distribution of water over an irrigational area through various projects, the activities of Water Resource Department/Sindh Project fall within the definition of 'manufacturing process'. As such a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power it would certainly come within the definition of "factory" as defined under Sec. 2 (m) of the Act of 1948. 9. Now, the next point to be adverted to is the number of workers employed in the appellants' department on an average per working day. In this regard, the Labour Court in paragraphs 7 and 9 of the Award, on the basis of testimony of witnesses, has held that the appellants' department was having more than 100 workers. No evidence has been led to the contrary by the appellants. In such circumstances, there is no reason to disregard such a finding. 10. In view of the aforesaid, the provisions of Chapter VB, so also those of section 25N of the Act are clearly applicable to the appellants' department. No evidence was adduced by the appellants before the Labour Court and no material was commended before the Writ Court, as well as, before this Court to prove compliance of section 25N(b) of the Act of 1948 that permission of the appropriate Government or such other Authority specified by that Government, was obtained prior to retrenchment of respondent/workman. Even, nothing is brought on record to show compliance of section 25F(c) of the Act of 1948, to unsettle the finding of the learned Single Judge in that behalf. 11. Even, nothing is brought on record to show compliance of section 25F(c) of the Act of 1948, to unsettle the finding of the learned Single Judge in that behalf. 11. So far as the contention with regard to non existence of master-servant relationship between the appellants' department and respondent/workman is concerned, a specific issue was framed in this regard by the learned Labour Court and after appreciating the evidence available on record, the learned labour Court reached the conclusion that there was indeed master-servant relationship between the appellants and the respondent. Further, it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the initial termination order of the respondent/workman dated 2/7/2005 had been set aside by the Labour Court vide Award dated 28/2/2011 finding that respondent had put in 240 days of continuous service. Once the termination of services of the respondent was found to be bad in law by the learned Labour Court, the only consequence, which is bound to fall upon, is that he would be deemed to be continuing in service as it has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidylaya (D.Ed) ( (2013)10 SCC 324 ) that in cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service is the normal rule. As such, the contentions with regard to non existence of master-servant relationship between the appellants and respondent or for that matter that pertaining to respondent not having 240 days of continuous service, is more of frustration than of substance as no cogent evidence has been led to substantiate the same. Moreover, impugnation on reliance by the learned Single Judge upon decision in the case of M.P. Housing Board Vs. Smt. Jyoti Chitnis ( 2008 (3) MPHT 322 ) on the premise that the matter is sub judice before the Apex Court is inconsequential in view of the fact that that said case stands disposed of vide order dated 10/7/2019 passed in C.A. No.8504/2009. 12. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court does not find that any illegality or perversity has been committed in the order impugned. The appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.