ORDER : N.V. Anjaria, J. 1. In the facts and circumstances of the case and with request and consent of learned advocates appearing for the parties, the petition is taken up for final consideration today. 1.1. Rule, returnable forthwith. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Rohan Shah waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the respondents. 1.2. Heard learned senior advocate Mr. Gautam Joshi assisted by learned advocate Mr. Vyom Shah for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents. 2. Respondent No. 3 herein - Superintendent of Police, Chhota Udaipur has passed order dated 21st March, 2018 dismissing the petitioner from service. Respondent No. 2 - Inspector General of Police, Vadodara, confirmed the said order on 15th June, 2018 dismissing the Appeal of the petitioner. The Revisional Authority - respondent No. 1 Directorate General and Inspector General of Police, Gandhinagar, rejected the Revision Application on 11th July, 2019. It is to challenge the said orders of dismissal of the petitioner, that the present petition is filed. 3. The facts in the backdrop are inter alia that the petitioner had been working as Unarmed Head Constable at Lunavada Police Station, Panchmahal. A case came to be registered against him in the year 2011. Under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1958 and the offences under the said law were alleged against the petitioner. The trial court convicted the petitioner by judgment and order dated 30th January, 2018 and he was punished to seven years' imprisonment with fine. 3.1. The said sentence was later came to be suspended by this Court on 08th February, 2018. Respondent No. 3 - Superintendent of Police exercised powers under Rule 3 of the Bombay (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1956 and dismissed the petitioner from service by order dated 21st March, 2018. The Appeal under Rule 9 of the said Rules and Revision under Section 27 before the Revisional Authority came to be dismissed as above and the dismissal was confirmed which was on the ground that the petitioner was convicted by the criminal court. 3.2. Looking at the order of termination of the petitioner, it mentioned about conviction and sentence of the petitioner in criminal case whereby petitioner was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and fine of Rs. 25,000/-. 3.2. Looking at the order of termination of the petitioner, it mentioned about conviction and sentence of the petitioner in criminal case whereby petitioner was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and fine of Rs. 25,000/-. It was stated that in cases where a government servant is held guilty in the criminal case, his services could be terminated without undertaking the departmental inquiry. It was stated that since the petitioner had been convicted in criminal offence, it was a serious misconduct committed by him and it was not desirable to continue the petitioner in service. Accordingly order of termination was passed, which came to be confirmed subsequently by appellate and revisional authorities. 4. Learned senior advocate for the petitioner relied on the decision on this Court in Budhsinh Jaisinh Patel v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No. 9967 of 2018 decided as per judgment dated 31st July, 2018. Since the facts were similar, ratio laid down in Budhsinh Jaisinh Patel (supra) would squarely apply to the facts of the present petitioner so as to entitle her to get the relief. In Budhsinh Jaisinh Patel (supra), this Court had relied on inter alia on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ahmadkhan Inayatkhan v District Superintendent of Police, Banaskantha [ (1989) 2 GLR 1301 ] to come to the conclusion that even if the service of the government service is to be terminated on the ground of conviction in the criminal case, prior notice was necessary in law and that absence of such prior would vitiate the action. 4.1. Respondent No. 3 contested the petition and the prayers by filing affidavit-in-reply. After stating the facts about involvement of the petitioner in the criminal case and the conviction recorded against him, it was stated that the disciplinary proceedings would be governed by the Bombay Police Act and the Bombay Police (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1956 and therefore, no show-cause notice was sent before passing the order of dismissal. Circular dated 10th December, 2004 was sought to be relied on which provided inter alia that a police employee who is convicted for any offence, termination of his service could be effected without issuance of notice. 4.2. While learned Assistant Government Pleader pressed into service the grounds of defence set-forth in the affidavit-in-reply, he was at receiving end when confronted with the decision of Budhsinh Jaisinh Patel (supra). 4.2. While learned Assistant Government Pleader pressed into service the grounds of defence set-forth in the affidavit-in-reply, he was at receiving end when confronted with the decision of Budhsinh Jaisinh Patel (supra). The said decision in Budhsinh Jaisinh Patel (supra) holds the field in terms of the legal position it enunciated. 5. It would be relevant to extract the entire relevant discussion from judgment in Budhsinh Jaisinh Patel (supra) to become part of the reasoning of this order applicable to the present petitioner. "4. Assailing the impugned order, primarily and principally on the ground of non-observance of principles of natural justice that prior notice was not given before passing the order of the dismissal, learned advocate for the petitioner Mr. Gautam Joshi pressed into service decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ahmadkhan Inayatkhan v. District Superintendent of Police, Banaskantha [ 1989 (2) GLR 1301 ]. Therein a government servant who was convicted by the criminal court and whose appeal against the conviction was pending in the High Court, came to be dismissed on the basis of the conviction. The dismissal did not precede with the issuance of notice. The Court held that failure to give notice vitiated the dismissal. 4.1 On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. K.M. Antani harped on the decision of this Court in H.N. Rao v. State of Gujarat [ 2000(3) GLH 358 ]. On the basis of this decision, it was submitted that the Court in terms held that notice was not necessary before passing order of dismissal upon the event of conviction. It was submitted that the decisions which were relied on by this Court in Ahmadkhan Inayatkhan (supra) were considered and contrary view was taken in H.N. Rao (supra) which is required to be followed. 4.2 The decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. V.K. Bhaskar [ (1997) 11 SCC 383 ] was relied on, in which it was held that dismissal from service on the ground of conduct which led to conviction on a criminal charge could be passed, for which pendency of an appeal against conviction was no bar. 4.2 The decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. V.K. Bhaskar [ (1997) 11 SCC 383 ] was relied on, in which it was held that dismissal from service on the ground of conduct which led to conviction on a criminal charge could be passed, for which pendency of an appeal against conviction was no bar. Learned Assistant Government Pleader proceeded to refer to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in V.D. Vaghela v. G.C. Raiger, Deputy IPG [ 1993 (2) GLH 1005 ] in which the meaning and import of the word 'conviction' was highlighted in the context of clause (a) of Second Proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, to lay down that the conviction is arrived at when recorded by the competent criminal court in the first instance. 5. The proposition of law in Ahmadkhan Inayatkhan (supra) relied on behalf of the petitioner and what is held in H.N. Rao (supra) stand in opposite. 5.1 However, the law has developed and travelled farther, which is to be learnt and gathered from decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Sarkar [ (2001) 3 SCC 414 ]. It would be worthwhile to advert to analyse. 5.2 In Kiritkumar D. Vyas v. State of Gujarat [ 1982 (2) GLR 79 ] this Court held, "mere conviction, therefore cannot be utilised for passing an order of dismissal blindfoldedly without hearing the delinquent on the question of sentence. Needless to add that this would be so even in case where the disciplinary authority exercises powers under Rule 14 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.". Kiritkumar D. Vyas (supra) was a Division Bench judgment. Relying on the same in a similar set of facts, learned Single Judge of this Court in Shankabhai Naginbhai Patel being Special Civil Application No. 2349 of 1998 set aside the order removing the petitioner of that petition keeping it open for the respondent to pass fresh order after giving opportunity. 5.2.1 The Division Bench in Ahmadkhan Inayatkhan (supra) relied on the decision in Kiritkumar D. Vyas (supra) as well as another decision also of this Court in Laxman Waghgimal v. K.N. Sharma, D.S.P., Kutch [1985 GLH (UJ-28) 20]. 5.2.1 The Division Bench in Ahmadkhan Inayatkhan (supra) relied on the decision in Kiritkumar D. Vyas (supra) as well as another decision also of this Court in Laxman Waghgimal v. K.N. Sharma, D.S.P., Kutch [1985 GLH (UJ-28) 20]. On the basis of the said decisions, in Ahmadkhan Inayatkhan (supra) it was ruled in paragraph 3 that, "In this decision, this Court held that even though this rule does not contemplate giving of the notice, it must be read into this rule that notice should be given to satisfy the principles of natural justice.". 5.2.2 Since in H.N. Rao (supra), a view was taken that show-cause notice was not necessary, in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment, the Court referred to the decisions taking contrary view including Shankabhai Naginbhai Patel (supra) and Kiritkumar D. Vyas (supra) to hold that they did not take the correct view. 5.3 Now proceeding to look at The Supreme Court decision in Sunil Kumar Sarkar (supra), it dealt with the case of a delinquent undergoing sentence of imprisonment. The respondent was found guilty and sentenced under the General Court Martial to rigorous imprisonment for six years under the Army Act. The High Court found fault with the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority on the ground that the same was solely based on conviction suffered by the respondent in the Court Martial proceedings. It was held by the High Court that the disciplinary authority had a predetermined mind when it passed the order of dismissal. 5.3.1 In the context of the aforesaid facts the Supreme Court held, "This is a summary procedure provided to take disciplinary action against a government servant who is already convicted in a criminal proceeding. The very foundation of imposing punishment under Rule 19 is that there should be a prior conviction on a criminal charge. Therefore, the question of having a predetermined mind does not arise in such cases. All that a disciplinary authority is expected to do under Rule 19 is to be satisfied that the officer concerned has been convicted of a criminal charge and has been given a show-cause notice and reply to such show-cause notice, if any, should be properly considered before making any order under this Rule. All that a disciplinary authority is expected to do under Rule 19 is to be satisfied that the officer concerned has been convicted of a criminal charge and has been given a show-cause notice and reply to such show-cause notice, if any, should be properly considered before making any order under this Rule. Of course, it will have to bear in mind the gravity of the conviction suffered by the government servant in the criminal proceedings before passing any order under Rule 19 to maintain the proportionality of punishment. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has followed the procedure laid down in Rule 19, hence, it cannot be said that the disciplinary authority had any predetermined mind when it passed the order of dismissal." (Para 8) 5.4 It is thus considered an essential requirement that before disciplinary authority passed the order of dismissal against the respondent who was convicted of criminal charge to give show-cause notice and to consider the reply given to the show-cause notice. The Supreme Court held that at that stage the question of having predetermined mind did not arise in such cases. In other words, the Court considered the procedure of giving notice and consider defence of the convict at that stage to be the meaningful exercise. Dispensation of notice before taking action of dismissal against the convicted person which is based on the theory of empty formality was found not tenable in law. 5.5 The authority could not have judged at the stage of taking the action of dismissal that the person to be dismissed was not prejudiced since there was already a conviction recorded against him. The stage to apply the test of prejudice would arrive at a subsequent point of time. The requirement of giving notice and appreciating the reply of the person concerned was not viewed as an empty formality but a condition precedent before passing the order of dismissal under the Rule. The observance of natural justice to this extent was treated as pre-requisite in law. 6. In view of the aforesaid decision in Sunil Kumar Sarkar (supra) and the ratio thereof, the decisions of this Court in H.N. Rao (supra) and those judgments taking the view that prior notice is not necessary, no more stand to be the good law. The observance of natural justice to this extent was treated as pre-requisite in law. 6. In view of the aforesaid decision in Sunil Kumar Sarkar (supra) and the ratio thereof, the decisions of this Court in H.N. Rao (supra) and those judgments taking the view that prior notice is not necessary, no more stand to be the good law. The ratio in Sunil Kumar Sarkar (supra) would prevail and the proposition of law laid down by this Court in Kiritkumar D. Vyas (supra), Shankabhai Naginbhai Patel (supra) as well as in Ahmadkhan Inayatkhan (supra) stand revived to be the law holding the field to be applied. 6.1 In the aforesaid view, the impugned action taken against the petitioner to terminate his service without issuance of notice prior to the order and without considering his reply is illegal. Therefore, order dated 24th February, 2017 passed by respondent No. 3-District Superintendent of Police, Dahod as well as further orders dated 25th May, 2017 passed by the Director General of Police, Panchmahals, Godhra Range, Godhra dismissing the appeal and the order of the revisional authority-respondent No. 1 Director General and Inspector General of Police further dismissing the Revision Application, cannot sustain and they are herewith set aside." 6. In view of above discussion and reasons, the petitioner shall be entitled to be reinstated in service on her original post with all consequential benefits and back wages. The reinstatement to the petitioner shall be granted within 15 days from the date of receipt of this order and the petitioner shall be paid consequential benefits including the back wages arising to be paid by virtue of this order, within four weeks from the date of her reinstatement. 6.1. It is clarified that the respondent authorities are not precluded from passing appropriate order afresh in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and considering the reply which may be filed. 7. The petition stands allowed as above. Direct service is permitted.