JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , wherein, following reliefs have been sought for:- (i) For a direction including Writ of Declaration declaring that the respondents-authorities cannot declare the petitioners as ineligible for participating in the process of settlement of retail Excise Shops through lottery, pursuant to advertisement dated 22.02.2019 issued by Respondent No.2, merely because the petitioners have participated in the name of their partnership firm, namely, "Royal Infra and Logs", especially because under the Indian Law a partnership firm is not recognized as an entity distinct from the members comprising it and also especially because of the fact that partners of said partnership firm are citizens of India and are aged more than 21 years of age; (ii) For issuance of appropriate writ/order/direction including Writ of Mandamus directing the respondent- authorities to accept the security deposit of the petitioners in respect of retail Excise Shops bearing Group No. 5 and Group No. 40, notified for lottery in the district of Dhanbad, especially because the petitioners have been declared as winner no. 1 in the online lottery held for settlement of liquor shop on 05.03.2019; (iii) For issuance of further appropriate writ/order/direction including Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondents to consequentially after acceptance of security deposit amount from the petitioners as well as other requisite amounts from the petitioners, issue necessary Excise License in respect of retail Excise Shop pertaining to Group No. 5 and Group No. 40 as notified in the district of Dhanbad. (iv) In alternative to prayer nos. (i) to (iii), the petitioners further prays for issuance of appropriate writ/order/direction including Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondents to refund the earnest money deposit of Rs.7,20,000/- and Rs.5,04,000/- deposited towards participation in the lottery process for allotment of Retail Excise Shops being Group No. 5 and Group No. 40 in the district of Dhanbad. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioners, leading to the averments made in the writ petition, are that the petitioner no. 1 is an unregistered partnership firm having two partners, namely, Himangshu Mahato and Sri Lalan Kumar Singh and both the partners of petitioner no. 1 are citizen of India and are aged more than 21 years. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioners, leading to the averments made in the writ petition, are that the petitioner no. 1 is an unregistered partnership firm having two partners, namely, Himangshu Mahato and Sri Lalan Kumar Singh and both the partners of petitioner no. 1 are citizen of India and are aged more than 21 years. The State of Jharkhand has promulgated and notified Rules for settlement and grant of license in the State of Jharkhand, known, as Jharkhand Utpad (Madira Ki Khudra Bikri Hetu Dukanon Ki Bandobasti Awam Sanchalan) Nimayawali, 2018 " (hereinafter referred to as "Rule, 2018" in short) vide Notification dated 24.12.2018, wherein, it has been primarily provided that settlement of Retail Excise Shops shall be undertaken through the process of Lottery and the shops would be notified for such lottery after determining the annual minimum revenue to be paid in respect of the said shop. As per the said Rule, it has been provided that an applicant who is a person can participate in the auction process. Further, term person has been defined in the said Rule, 2018 which means a "person", who is citizen of India and who has attained the age of 21 years at the time of participating in the lottery process. The competent authority has issued an advertisement on 22.02.2019 in pursuance to the provision of Rule, 2018 notifying the process for settlement of Retail Excise Shops through lottery and the date of lottery was fixed on 05.03.2019 and it was provided, inter alia, that an applicant would be entitled to participate in the lottery process conducted district wise in the entire State of Jharkhand in respect of shops and/or group of shops, as may be notified, on deposit of earnest money deposit, application fee and agency charges, including G.S.T. For the District of Dhanbad, a detail list was published by the Respondent No.3, the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad, notifying the retail Excise Shops which were to be put up for auction (on the basis of lottery by including therein, the annual minimum revenue determined for the said shops in question). The petitioner no. 1, namely, Royal Infra and Logs, Dhanbad (Jharkhand), a partnership firm, through its partner, namely, Lalan Kumar Singh has participated in the Bid through online portal and its candidature has been accepted after considering all relevant documents as per the requirement. The petitioner no. 1, namely, Royal Infra and Logs, Dhanbad (Jharkhand), a partnership firm, through its partner, namely, Lalan Kumar Singh has participated in the Bid through online portal and its candidature has been accepted after considering all relevant documents as per the requirement. The petitioners have deposited altogether an amount of Rs.42,68,059/- through online transfer in the designated bank account of Respondent-Department for participating in more than one group of shops in the district of Dhanbad. In the process of selection, by virtue of lottery, which was held on 05.03.2019, the petitioners were declared successful in respect of Retail Excise Shop bearing Group No. 5 and Group No. 40 for the district of Dhanbad and he has been communicated vide letter dated 05.03.2019 in its e-mail declaring the petitioner, as Winner no. 1 of online lottery and accordingly, he was communicated to deposit within five working days i.e. up to 11.03.2019, a security deposit amount in terms of Rule 23 (3) of the Rules, 2018 and further will be required to deposit 7.5 per cent of the total Excise Revenue in terms of Rule 23(4) of the Rules, 2018. Accordingly, the petitioner has deposited the entire amount, but to the utter surprise, the petitioner has received a telephonic communication from the office of the Respondent No. 4 on 06.03.2019 that the petitioners are not eligible to participate in the process and their declaration as winner no. 1 in the lottery process would be cancelled, the reason, which has been assigned by the respondents-authorities, orally that since the petitioners have participated in the name of partnership firm, namely, "Royal Infra and Logs" and not in the name of individual, in view of definition of applicant read with definition of person, contained in the Rules of 2018, notified by the State of Jharkhand and accordingly, the requisite draft towards balance security deposit was not accepted. The petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by assailing the aforesaid action of the respondents, inter alia, on the ground that the person includes the association of individuals and a firm and as such, merely, on account of the fact that the application has been made by the firm, rejection of candidature of the petitioners is not proper, more so, the firm has been represented through its partner, namely, Shri Lalan Kumar Singh, who has submitted the relevant documents. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has strengthened his argument by putting reliance upon the provision of Section 2 (42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 , which contains the definition of a "person", which includes any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not and therefore, the Firm will come under the definition of "person" and as such, as per the definition of "person", as contained in Rule, 2018, the firm will be eligible to be considered as applicant. He has also demonstrated by taking the aid of the provision of Section 4 of the Partnership Act, 1932 , which stipulates the definition of "partnership", "partner", "firm" and "firm name" and as such, "partnership", as has been defined, therein, is the relation between persons, who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Further persons, who have entered into partnership with one another are called individual "partners" and collectively a "firm" and the name under which their business is carried on is called the "firm name" and therefore, the rejection of candidature on this ground, also is not proper. 4. The matter has been heard by this Court on 02 nd April, 2019, wherein, the State of Jharkhand has been represented through Mr. Vikash Kumar, A.C. to learned Advocate General and on whose instance, the matter was adjourned enabling him to seek instructions and file counter affidavit and in pursuance thereto, counter affidavit has been filed by the State-Respondent, wherein, the stand has been taken that there is no error committed by the respondents-authorities in rejecting the candidature of the petitioners, in view of specific definition of "applicant" contained in the Rules, 2018, wherein, the "applicant" can only be a person and there is no reference of the firm and the association or body and therefore, the petitioner, although has been allowed to be participated in the lottery process, on scrutiny, when it has been detected that the firm cannot be an applicant in view of the definition of applicant under the provision of Rules, 2018, his candidature has been rejected. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the Respondents has taken the aid of Section 2(f) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 , which contains the definition of "person", which does not include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not and has submitted that, therefore, no illegality has been committed and after rejecting the candidature, the second winner in the lottery has been proposed to be allotted the shops in question. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties after appreciating their arguments and going across the pleading made in the writ petition as well as the counter affidavit, it transpires to the court that the whole dispute pertains to the cancellation of candidature of the petitioner, who has made an application for consideration of his candidature for allotment of Retail Excise Shop for the liquor, in pursuance to the provision of Rule, 2018. Before entering into the merit of the issue, it needs to refer that in the State of Jharkhand, the Rule in the name of Jharkhand Excise Act, 1915, is applicable, which contains a provision under Section 89, wherein, as per sub-section (1) of sub-section (3), the State Government has been conferred with the power to formulate its Rule and invoking the said jurisdiction, the State of Jharkhand has promulgated a Rule, i.e. the Rule, 2018, which is applicable for the entire State of Jharkhand. 7. The Act, means, the Jharkhand Excise Act, 1915. The consideration of this Court pertains to the definition of a "person" "Vyakti" and the applicant, which has been referred in Rule 2 (XXXI) and (XXXII). For convenience, Rule (XXXI) is being first referred. Since the Rule is in Hindi, for better appreciation, Hindi part is being referred hereunder, alongwith its English version. "Vyakti" se abhipret hai, aisa vyakti, jo awedan karne ke samay 21 varsh ki ayu se anyun ho evam bharat ka nagrik ho" The synonyms of the Hindi word Abhipret in Hindi is Abhipray and, as such, the English meaning would be means and therefore, the English version of the Hindi script of the "applicant" means, for making settlement of Retail Excise Shops, an application would be submitted by chief/main person or his co-applicant (person). The application can be given by the person in individual capacity or alongwith the co-applicant. The application can be given by the person in individual capacity or alongwith the co-applicant. "Awedak se abhipret hai, khudra utpad dukano ki bandobasti hetu avedan karne wala mukhya vyakti athwa uska sah awedak (vyakti). Awedan vyakti dwara ekal rup me athwa sah awedak ke sath bhi diya ja sakta hai." The English translated version of the person means, such person, who is not below the age of 21 years at the time of making an application and will be citizen of India. In view of the definition of applicant, application can be made by the main person or his co-applicant or by both. While, the person has been defined, which means such person, who is not below the age of 21 years and the citizen of India, therefore, there is specific definition of person, which denotes the definition, as has been defined, under the Citizenship Act, 1955, the definition, as contained in Section 2 (f), a person does not include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not? 8. The reference of the General Clauses Act, 1897 upon which the definition of person, contending under Section 2 (42) needs to be referred "person" shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. The provision of Section 4 of the Partnership Act, 1932, which contains the definition of "partnership", "partner", "firm" and "firm name", which reads hereunder as:- "Definition of "partnership", "partner", "firm" and "firm name". - "partnership" is the relation between persons, who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individual "partners" and collectively a "firm" and the name under which their business is carried on is called the "firm name" 9. It is not in dispute that the applicability of the General Clauses Act could be there, where there is no specific provision under the Statute, which is applicable and holding the field of consideration and in the light of that aspect, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners has been scrutinized. 10. It is not in dispute that the applicability of the General Clauses Act could be there, where there is no specific provision under the Statute, which is applicable and holding the field of consideration and in the light of that aspect, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners has been scrutinized. 10. The petitioners case is that the definition of person, as stipulated under the General Clauses Act, would be applicable and therefore, the firm being a body or association would be eligible to be an applicant, but, the question herein, is that whether the definition of person, as stipulated under the General Clauses Act, 1897 will be applicable, when there is specific definition of "person" under the Act and under the Statute, i.e. the Rule, 2018, as under Rule 2 (XXI). There is difference of the definition of the person as under the General Clauses Act, vis--vis the definition of person in the Rule, 2018, which is applicable herein. The definition of "person", as stipulated under Section 2 (42) speaks that person shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, meaning thereby the scope of the definition of person is exhaustive by inserting the word include but the said definition is to be tested from the applicable Rule of such Rule, 2018, wherein, the definition of "person" has specifically been defined, which means, such person, who is not below the age of 21 years and citizen of India, meaning thereby the definition of person under the provision of Rules, 2018, is not under inclusion of any Company or association or body of individuals, rather, it talks about the person in individual capacity. The reference with respect to the applicability of the General Clauses Act, vis--vis the applicable Rule in the present context, was the subject matter before the Honble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Ramanlal Bhailal Patel & Ors.-Vs.-State of Gujarat passed in Civil Appeal No. 4420 of 2004 , wherein, the Honble Apex Court while dealing with the applicability of the definition of person as per the definition, stipulated under the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the subject matter of the Ceiling Act, it has been laid down therein, at paragraph 14, 15, 16 and 17, which reads hereunder as :- "14. The appellants replied that even if the partition was ignored under Section 8 of the Ceiling Act, it would not affect the calculation of surplus land, as each co-owner was a "person" and each family (husband and wife) will be entitled to one unit. In regard to contention based on Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, it was submitted that while determining the surplus land under the provisions of the Ceiling Act, there was no question of holding any inquiry under Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. And at all events, even if the question as to whether the purchasers were agriculturists or not has to be gone into, the same being a question of fact that will have to be decided by a separate inquiry under the Tenancy Act and not in the proceedings under the Ceiling Act. 15. On the contentions raised, the following questions arise for our consideration: (i) Whether the definition of "person" in the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, includes a body of individuals/association of persons? (ii) Whether co-ownership, per se, is an "association of persons/body of individuals" and therefore constitutes a "person"? (iii) Whether the ten purchasers, who became co- owners of the land, together constitute a "body of individuals/association of persons" and therefore a "person" within the meaning of that expression in the Ceiling Act? (iv) Whether the partition dated 30-12-1971 among the co-owners is "deemed to have been made in anticipation to defeat the object of Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972" under Section 8(1) of the Ceiling Act; and if so what is the effect of failure to make an application under sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Ceiling Act? (v) What would be the position if some of the co- owners were non-agriculturists at the time of purchase of the lands? Whether the Mamlatdar can examine this issue when considering the question of surplus land under the Ceiling Act? Statutory provisions 16. The Ceiling Act was enacted to fix a ceiling on holding of agricultural lands and to provide for the acquisition and disposal of surplus agricultural land. Section 4 relates to delimitation of local areas and provides that there shall be different classes of local areas in the State as specified in Schedule I and the local areas falling in each such class shall be as respectively specified in Schedule II. Section 4 relates to delimitation of local areas and provides that there shall be different classes of local areas in the State as specified in Schedule I and the local areas falling in each such class shall be as respectively specified in Schedule II. Section 5 deals with ceiling areas. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), in relation to each class of local area as specified in Schedule I, the ceiling area with reference to each class of land shall be as specified in the said Schedule against the respective class of local area. Madheli Village, Waghodia Taluk (Baroda District) is specified as Class C area under Schedule II. It is not in dispute that the lands in question were found to be dry crop lands, and therefore the unit ceiling area was 36 acres under Schedule I to the Ceiling Act. 17. Section 6 deals with ceiling on holding of land. Subsections (1), (2), 3-B, 3-C, and 3-D which are relevant are extracted below: "6. Ceiling on holding land.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any agreement, usage or decree or order of a Court, with effect from the appointed day, no person shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (3-B) and 4 be entitled to hold whether as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant land in excess of the ceiling area. (2) Where an individual, who holds land, is a member of a family, not being a joint family which consists of the individual and his spouse (or more than one spouse) and their minor sons and minor unmarried daughters, irrespective of whether the family also includes any major son, land is also separately held by such individuals spouse or minor children, then the lands held by the individual and the said members of the individuals family excluding major sons, if any, shall be grouped together for the purposes of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the total land so grouped together as if such land had been held by one person. * * * (3-B) Where a family or a joint family consist of more than five members comprising a person and other members belonging to all or any of the following categories, namely: (i) minor son, (ii) widow of a predeceased son, (iii) minor son or unmarried daughter of a predeceased son, where his or her mother is dead, such family shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area to the extent of one-fifth of the ceiling area for each member in excess of five, so however that the total holding of the family does not exceed twice the ceiling area; and in such a case, in relation to the holding of such family, such area shall be deemed to be the ceiling area: * * * (3-C) Where a family or a joint family irrespective of the number of members includes a major son, then such major son shall be deemed to be a separate person for the purposes of sub-section (1)." 11. It is evident from the aforesaid paragraph, wherein, the Honble Apex Court has been pleased to consider the definition of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and has given emphasis on the inclusive definition, vis--vis the definition of person in the Ceiling Act, which also contains the inclusive definition of person. 12. But, herein, since the Rule, 2018 itself prescribes the definition of person without any inclusive definition of person, therefore, the person will be treated to be an applicant in the individual capacity and as per the definition stipulated under Section 2 (f) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, the body or corporation or firm will be excluded from the definition of person. The definition of person is to be tested, depending upon the enactment if that is in the case of the Income Tax Act, the definition of person would be entirely different, wherein, as per the provision of Section 2 (XXXI) (V), the definition of person will include the association of person and body of individuals, likewise in the Gifts Act, 1958, the definition of person is by way of inclusion of body of individuals and therefore, the definition of person is to be seen, depending upon the applicable Rule. 13. 13. The definition of the word "means" has been considered by the Honble Apex Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Limited (Southco) And Another v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill reported in (2012) 2 SCC 108 wherein, the Honble Apex Court at paragraphs 44 to 54 hold as follows:- "44. The unauthorised use of electricity in the manner as is undisputed on record clearly brings the respondent "under liability and in blame" within the ambit and scope of Section 126 of the 2003 Act. The blame is in relation to excess load while the liability is to pay on a different tariff for the period prescribed in law and in terms of an order of assessment passed by the assessing officer by the powers vested in him under the provisions of Section 126 of the 2003 Act. 45. The expression "means" used in the definition clause of Section 126 of the 2003 Act can have different connotations depending on the context in which such expression is used. In terms of Blacks Law Dictionary (8th Edn.) p. 1001, "mean" is"of or relating to an intermediate point between two points or extremes" and "meaning" would be "the sense of anything, but esp. of words; that which is conveyed". The word ordinarily includes a mistaken but reasonable understanding of a communication. "Means" by itself is a restrictive term and when used with the word "includes", it is construed as exhaustive. In those circumstances, a definition using the term "means" is a statement of literal connotation of a term and the courts have interpreted "means and includes" as an expression defining the section exhaustively. It is to be kept in mind that while determining whether a provision is exhaustive or merely illustrative, this will have to depend upon the language of the section, scheme of the Act, the object of the legislature and its intent. 46. "Purposive construction" is certainly a cardinal principle of interpretation. Equally true is that no rule of interpretation should either be overstated or overextended. Without being overextended or overstated, this rule of interpretation can be applied to the present case. It points to the conclusion that an interpretation which would attain the object and purpose of the Act has to be given precedence over any other interpretation which may not further the cause of the statute. Without being overextended or overstated, this rule of interpretation can be applied to the present case. It points to the conclusion that an interpretation which would attain the object and purpose of the Act has to be given precedence over any other interpretation which may not further the cause of the statute. The development of law is particularly liberated both from literal and blinkered interpretation, though to a limited extent. 47. The precepts of interpretation of contractual documents have also undergone a wide-ranged variation in the recent times. The result has been subject to one important exception to assimilate the way in which such documents are interpreted by Judges on the common sense principle by which any serious utterance would be interpreted by ordinary life. In other words, the common sense view relating to the implication and impact of provisions is the relevant consideration for interpreting a term of document so as to achieve temporal proximity of the end result. 48. Another similar rule is the rule of practical interpretation. This test can be effectually applied to the provisions of a statute of the present kind. It must be understood that an interpretation which upon application of the provisions at the ground reality, would frustrate the very law should not be accepted against the common sense view which will further such application. 49. Once the court decides that it has to take a purposive construction as opposed to textual construction, then the legislative purpose sought to be achieved by such an interpretation has to be kept in mind. We have already indicated that keeping in view the legislative scheme and the provisions of the 2003 Act, it will be appropriate to adopt the approach of purposive construction on the facts of this case. We have also indicated above that the provisions of Section 126 of the 2003 Act are intended to cover the cases over and above the cases which would be specifically covered under the provisions of Section 135 of the 2003 Act. 50. In other words, the purpose sought to be achieved is to ensure stoppage of misuse/unauthorised use of the electricity as well as to ensure prevention of revenue loss. It is in this background that the scope of the expression "means" has to be construed. 50. In other words, the purpose sought to be achieved is to ensure stoppage of misuse/unauthorised use of the electricity as well as to ensure prevention of revenue loss. It is in this background that the scope of the expression "means" has to be construed. If we hold that the expression "means" is exhaustive and cases of unauthorised use of electricity are restricted to the ones stated under Explanation (b) of Section 126 alone, then it shall defeat the very purpose of the 2003 Act, inasmuch as the different cases of breach of the terms and conditions of the contract of supply, Regulations and the provisions of the 2003 Act would escape the liability sought to be imposed upon them by the legislature under the provisions of Section 126 of the 2003 Act. Thus, it will not be appropriate for the courts to adopt such an approach. 51. The primary object of the expression "means" is intended to explain the term "unauthorised use of electricity" which, even from the plain reading of the provisions of the 2003 Act or on a common sense view cannot be restricted to the examples given in the Explanation. The legislature has intentionally omitted to use the word "includes" and has only used the word "means" with an intention to explain inter alia what an unauthorised use of electricity would be. It must be noticed that clause (iv) of Explanation (b) and sub-section (5) of Section 126 of the 2003 Act were both amended/substituted by the same amending Act 26 of 2007, with a purpose and object of preventing unauthorised use of electricity not amounting to theft of electricity within the meaning of Section 135 of the 2003 Act. This amendment, therefore, has to be given its due meaning which will fit into the scheme of the 2003 Act and would achieve its object and purpose. 52. The expression "means" would not always be open to such a strict construction that the terms mentioned in a definition clause under such expression would have to be inevitably treated as being exhaustive. There can be a large number of cases and examples where even the expression "means" can be construed liberally and treated to be inclusive but not completely exhaustive of the scope of the definition, of course, depending upon the facts of a given case and the provisions governing that law. 53. There can be a large number of cases and examples where even the expression "means" can be construed liberally and treated to be inclusive but not completely exhaustive of the scope of the definition, of course, depending upon the facts of a given case and the provisions governing that law. 53. In K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal14 this Court was dealing with a case under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and the expression "member of his family" as defined under Section 2(6-A) of that Act. Section 2(6-A) provides that: "2. (6-A) member of his family in relation to a landlord means his spouse, son, daughter, grandchild or dependent parents." If the principle of construction advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent is to be accepted, then even in that case, the Court could not have expanded the expression "member of his family" to include any other person than those specifically mentioned under that definition. The definition and the expression "means", if construed as exhaustive would necessarily imply exclusion of all other terms except those stated in that section but this Court, while adopting the principle of purposive construction, came to the conclusion that even a foster son, who is obviously not the real son or direct descendant of a person, would be included. 54. This Court, observing that there was consensus in precedent that the word "family" is a word of great flexibility and is capable of different meanings, held as under: (K.V. Muthu case14, SCC p. 58, paras 11-12) "11. While interpreting a definition, it has to be borne in mind that the interpretation placed on it should not only be not repugnant to the context, it should also be such as would aid the achievement of the purpose which is sought to be served by the Act. A construction which would defeat or was likely to defeat the purpose of the Act has to be ignored and not accepted. 12. Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case, is preceded by the words unless the context otherwise requires, the said definition set out in the section is to be applied and given effect to but this rule, which is the normal rule may be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition could not be applied." 14. The above judgment delivered by the Honble Apex Court wherein the definition of the word means has been considered, although delivered in the context of the Electricity Act, 2003 , while dealing with the provision of Section 126 , wherein, the definition of unauthorized use of electricity has been provided, wherein, the unauthorized use of electricity means the uses of electricity by the means and for the reasons stated in the sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Clause (b) of Explanation of Section 126 of the 2003 Act has been discussed and while dealing with the expression means, used in the definition clause of Section 126 of the 2003 Act. It has been held that the expression means is relating to intermediate point between the two points or extreme, but, especially of words, that, which is conveyed. The expression means by itself is a restrictive term and when used with the word includes, it is construed, as exhaustive. In this circumstance, the definition, using the term means is a statement of literal connotation of a term and the Courts have interpreted means and includes an expression, defining the section exhaustively. 15. Therefore, if in the statute, the word means is there, it will be treated to be in the restrictive sense, but when means and include words is put, it will be treated to be in the exhaustive term and in the context of this underlying interpretation, the case in hand with the facts and the statutory provision, as contained in the Rule, 2018 has been scrutinized by this Court and it has been found that the definition of person is not with the word includes and therefore, this word means could be treated to be in the restrictive sense and hence, the argument, as has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner with the word means be treated in exhaustive term as per the definition stipulated in the General Clauses Act, is not fit to be acceptable and accordingly, rejected. 16. 16. Admittedly, in this case, application has been made by the person, rather by the firm through one of the partners and therefore, the application filed by the firm itself was to be rejected at the threshold, but somehow, it has been accepted, but when on scrutiny, it came to the notice of the authority, the candidature has been rejected and therefore, merely on account of the fact that, at the initial stage, the candidature of the petitioner has been accepted, he is having no accrued right for getting the settlement in his favour, if his candidature is itself under question and if such thing could have been allowed by the respondents authorities or any interference would be made by this Court against the decision taken by the authority, as impugned, it will lead to allowing the illegality to be perpetuated and it is settled position of law that the illegality, if committed and if known to the authority, the same has to be rectified, the moment it came to the notice on the position of law that the illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated, as has been settled in paragraph 13 of the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India and another v. International Trading Co. and another reported in (2003) 5 SCC 437 as also in paragraph 16 of the judgment rendered in the case of Kulwinder Pal Singh and another v. State of Punjab and others, reported in (2016) 6 SCC 532 , wherein the Honble Apex Court hold as follows:- "13. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (in short "the Constitution") cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case. They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality." 16. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that when the other candidates were appointed in the post against dereserved category, the same benefit should also be extended to the appellants. They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality." 16. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that when the other candidates were appointed in the post against dereserved category, the same benefit should also be extended to the appellants. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equalities. In State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma11 it was held as under: (SCC p. 337, para 15) "15. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly, that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. (See Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P.12; Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain13; State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann14; Faridabad CT Scan Centre v. DG, Health Services15; Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh16; State of Punjab v. Rajeev Sarwal17; Yogesh Kumar v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi)18; Union of India v. International Trading Co.19 and Kastha Niwarak Grahnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit v. Indore Development Authority20.)" Merely because some persons have been granted benefit illegally or by mistake, it does not confer right upon the appellants to claim equality." 17. So far as the alternative prayer of the petitioner is concerned, which pertains to the refund of the security money, which has been deposited by the petitioner, the same is to be decided in the light of the provision, as contained under Condition No. 5 of the Rule, which contains the provision to the effect that the application fee will not be refundable/adjustable, since the petitioners have participated in the Bid. The petitioners, since, have not raised this issue before the authority and therefore, the question of applicability of the aforesaid condition is first to be examined by the authority and therefore, this Court is not passing any order on this prayer, rather leaving it open to the petitioners to raise this issue before the competent authority for its consideration on their own end by taking decision in accordance with law. 18. In view thereof, the writ petition stands dismissed. 19. Consequently, I.A. No. 3447 of 2019 also stands disposed of.