JUDGMENT 1. In both the writ petitions subject matter pertains to the dismissal of the respondent-workman, therefore, both the writ petitions have been directed to be heard together and as such have been heard together and are being disposed of with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties by this common order. 2. W.P.(L) No.2368 of 2017 :- This writ petition is against the order dated 16.02.2017 passed in I.D. Case No.15 of 2014 which is an order on fairness of domestic enquiry whereby and whereunder the Labour Court has held that the management has not conducted the domestic enquiry fairly and after following the principles of natural justice, therefore, the enquiry conducted by the management is declared to be unfair and management has been directed to lead its evidence on merits. 3. W.P.(L) No.3321 of 2018 :- This writ petition is against the award passed in I.D. Case No.15 of 2014 dated 15.01.2018 directing therein to compensate the respondent-workman by holding him entitle for compensation of Rs.13,50,000/- that is equivalent to 50% of loss of basic + D.A. of monthly salary. 4. The brief facts of the case of the respondent-workman is that he has been appointed on 07.02.1985 as Sub-Inspector and has started discharging his duty with full sincerity without any complaint and stigma and while working, a letter of explanation has been issued upon him on 25.04.2013 holding therein that during duty hours at Jugsalai Muck dump gate the workman was found collecting money unauthorizedly for clearing the paper/entry/exit permits. Further allegation of collecting money unauthorizedly within the company premises without any sanction of the management which is an act of misconduct as per Order No.23 of the Works Standing Order, hence he has been directed to explain in writing within 48 hours of the receipt of the above letter as to why disciplinary action should not be initiated against him. 5. The respondent-workman has denied the aforesaid allegation by furnishing explanation upon the petitioner-management being not satisfied with the same, has decided to conduct an enquiry. Enquiry officer has been appointed. The respondent-workman has been directed to appear before the enquiry officer wherein the charge has been found to be proved and thereafter, the order of dismissal has been passed. 6. The respondent-workman has denied the aforesaid allegation by furnishing explanation upon the petitioner-management being not satisfied with the same, has decided to conduct an enquiry. Enquiry officer has been appointed. The respondent-workman has been directed to appear before the enquiry officer wherein the charge has been found to be proved and thereafter, the order of dismissal has been passed. 6. The respondent-workman has raised dispute by filing an application before the competent authority but on the 45 th day he has filed an application before the Labour Court invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1947) in which the petitioner-management has appeared after being noticed by the Labour Court and the Labour Court has first gone into the fairness of the domestic enquiry and came to the conclusion vide order dated 16.02.2017, which is the subject matter of challenge in W.P.(L) No.2368 of 2017 holding therein the domestic enquiry as unfair and directed the management to lead its evidence on merits. In view thereof, the evidence was laid by the parties, thereafter, the impugned award has been passed. The award contains the direction of compensation to the tune of Rs.13,50,000/- in lieu of the dismissal since the respondent- workman during pendency of the dispute has attained the age of superannuation. The said award has been impugned in this writ petition by the petitioner-management inter alia on the following grounds:- (i) the jurisdiction of the Labour Court has been invoked by the respondent-workman before the expiry of the period of 45 days as contemplated under the provision of Section 2-A, therefore, the same proceeding is ab-initio void and as such the entire subsequent order passed by the Labour Court will be said to be in nullity in the eye of law; (ii) the Labour Court has not appreciated the issue on merit in right perspective; (iii) the amount of compensation as has been awarded by the Labour Court is excessive; 7. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent- workman has submitted that there is no infirmity in the award reason being that the respondent-workman has been dismissed from service therefore, he has approached before the competent authority by filing an application for raising the dispute and on 45 th day when no decision has been taken by the competent authority, he has filed an application before the Labour Court invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Section 2-A of the Act, 1947 which has been entertained, thereafter, the issue has been dealt with by the Labour Court in detail on the basis of the factual aspect looking to the fairness of the domestic enquiry which has been held to be unfair since no evidence has been brought in the domestic enquiry rather only on the basis of the video recording, the charge has been proved and no clipping of the video recording has ever been produced before the enquiry officer, therefore, in the domestic enquiry there is no conclusive proof of proving of the charge and therefore, the Labour Court is right in coming to the conclusion about the unfairness of the domestic enquiry. Section 2-A is to be invoked by the respondent-workman in order to get the speedy disposal of the dispute which contains the provision to file an application after expiry of 45 days if the competent authority has taken no decision with respect to the issue laid down before it and if the respondent-workman has approached before the Labour Court on 45 th day and not after expiry of 45 days, on this ground, entire proceeding initiated by the Labour Court which has been arrived at a logical end cannot be vitiated. So far as quantum of punishment is concerned, the same is not to be looked into by this Court for the reason that without any evidence the respondent-workman has been dismissed from service merely on the basis of the video clipping without being corroborated by any witnesses and on that ground the Labour Court has held the domestic enquiry as unfair and in consequence thereof, the order of punishment has been held to be illegal and therefore, the direction for payment of compensation amount has been passed since the respondent-workman has retired in the meanwhile on attaining the age of superannuation. It is the further submission that apart from the petitioner, a charge-sheet was issued but the departmental proceeding has not been proceeded rather he has been allowed to be superannuated on attaining the age of superannuation while on the other hand the respondent-workman has been subjected to domestic enquiry and in consequence of the result of the enquiry, he has been dismissed from service, therefore, the parity in initiating the departmental proceeding or imposing the punishment has not been followed by the petitioner- management. In view of such grounds, the submission has been made that this Court may not interfere with the impugned orders. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and after appreciation of their rival submission, this Court deems it fit and proper before going across the factual aspect involved in this case to deal with the statutory provision :- (i) whether the entire dispute will vitiate if on the 45 th day the application has been filed before the Labour Court for adjudication of the issue ? (ii) whether the finality of the award is perverse as also the quantum of compensation is excessive? (iii) whether the action of the petitioner-management in choosing to initiate a domestic enquiry against the respondent-workman and concluding it by imposing punishment of dismissal but on the similar allegation the domestic enquiry initiated against the superior remain kept pending awaiting for his retirement and after retirement he has got all the post retiral benefits hence can it not be said to be contrary to the parity in initiating a domestic enquiry or imposing punishment? 9. Issue No.1- this issue pertains to applicability of Section 2-A of the Act, 1947 and if the application could not be filed after expiry of the period of 45 days, the entire proceeding will be vitiated. Section 2-A contains the provision of dismissal etc., of an individual workman after deemed to be an industrial dispute. The said provision is referred hereunder as :- "[2A. Section 2-A contains the provision of dismissal etc., of an individual workman after deemed to be an industrial dispute. The said provision is referred hereunder as :- "[2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute.-- [(1)] Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.] [(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.] [(3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).]" The aforesaid provision has been enacted by virtue of Amendment of Act, 24 of 2010 implemented w.e.f. 15.09.2010. This Section has been inserted in the Act of Amendment Act of 1965 and it has to be read as an extension of the definition of Industrial Dispute of provision of Section 2-K. The purpose of inserting this provision is to meet out the hardship of the individual workman who has been discharged, dismissed, retrenched from service or otherwise terminated when they could not find by a union or any appreciable number of workmen to spouse their cause and in such circumstances, the individual dispute will be converted into an industrial dispute, meaning thereby, the intendment of the legislature is that a workman whose services has been terminated unlawfully by the employer, should be given relief without it being necessary for the relationship between the employer and the whole body of employees being involved in that dispute. The aforesaid provision provides that a person is to invoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court without waiting for the completion of 45 days if the provision of Section 2-A (2) has been seen it would be evident that the application under sub-section (1) of Section 2-A "may" be made directly to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of 45 days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute and in support of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of the Act and all the provisions of the Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government. Sub-section (3) stipulates that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub- section (1). It is, therefore, evident that in sub-section (2) of Section 2-A there is insertion of words "may", make an application after expiry of 45 days and therefore, the said provision will be said to be enabling one and directory in nature. It is, therefore, evident that in sub-section (2) of Section 2-A there is insertion of words "may", make an application after expiry of 45 days and therefore, the said provision will be said to be enabling one and directory in nature. This can also be gathered from the specific stipulation made by inserting the word "shall" in sub-section (3) of Section 2-A wherein there is complete ban in filing the application after expiry of three years, that will be said to be mandatory one. When the legislature contains a word "may" in sub-section (2) of Section 2-A and "shall" in sub-section 3 which mandates that sub- section (2) containing the period of expiry of 45 days will be said to be enabling one being directory in nature otherwise in sub-section (2) also in place of "may" the word "shall" would have been stipulated. The Legislature by considering the intent of the industrial disputes which is a welfare legislation and intended to protect and safeguard the welfare and interest of large work force working under various employers and therefore, the spirit of the Act is to protect workmen against victimization by the employer and to ensure termination of industrial disputes in a peaceful manner hence the purpose of the act being beneficial and therefore, is a peace to social legislation and keeping this fact into consideration the Section 2-A has been incorporated under the statute so that even in individual capacity the workman may file an application before the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court for the speedy disposal of the dispute. The power which has been conferred under the Act, 1947 upon the competent authority or the Conciliator may be exercised so that the dispute may be resolved at an early date and to provide such occasion the insertion of 45 days has been stipulated but that does not mean that if an application has been filed prior to the period of 45 days, the entire proceeding initiated by the Labour Court or the Tribunal will be vitiated. 10. The question of technicality is not of paramount importance considering the intent and spirit of legislation rather the paramount consideration would be proper adjudication of the dispute after providing an opportunity of hearing to the parties and therefore merely because the application has been filed before the expiry of the period of 45 days, the entire proceeding will not be vitiated. So far as the factual aspect in this respect is concerned, the respondent has been dismissed from services on 09.09.2013, the application was filed on 30.08.2014 before the Conciliator and the application has been filed before the Labour Court on 14.10.2014 and as such the respondent-workman has approached before the adjudicator on 45 th day, merely because it has not been filed on 46 th day rather on 45 th day, the entire proceeding after award having been passed will not be vitiated, therefore, this issue has been answered against the management. 11. Issue No.2 & 3:- These issues since pertains to the issue on merit with respect to the legality and proprietory of the award as such the same are being answered jointly. It is evident from the material available on record that the respondent-workman while working as Security Guard, was chargesheeted for allegation of collecting money unauthorizedly for clearing paper/entry/exit permits which is misconduct as per Order No.23 of Works Standing Order. The respondent-workman has been directed to submit reply, he has responded to such allegation by denying it seriously by submitting therein that the charge is not specific, no date and time is mentioned, no complaint has ever been made against him and no evidence to that effect has been provided, hence, the same would be said to be not providing adequate and sufficient opportunity to defend the charge. The petitioner management being not satisfied with the said reply, has appointed an enquiry officer by subjecting the respondentworkman to face the enquiry. He has appeared in the domestic enquiry wherein the statement of the management witnesses have been recorded. One of the management witnesses namely, Abhay Kumar Singh who was working as Manager Security Works has deposed that there is cogent evidence on record that the respondent workman while executing his official duty of verifying document that was produced before him was collecting cash from the persons who were submitting documents and in support of that contention a video recording of the respondent-workman interacting with the persons and collecting cash from them has been produced. He was cross-examined by the respondent-workman but was consistent in his reply, although it has come in his cross-examination that the CD which was produced in the enquiry as exhibit which contains no signature of witness or even of the said witness and not sealed from before. He was cross-examined by the respondent-workman but was consistent in his reply, although it has come in his cross-examination that the CD which was produced in the enquiry as exhibit which contains no signature of witness or even of the said witness and not sealed from before. On several query to the effect that can anyone corroborate the said CD but he has failed to disclose the name of any particular person. He has also stated that the respondent-workman is performing duty from last 27 years of having unblemished career. It is evident from this deposition about the CD which has been said to be very old and the face of the person is not clear. 12. The enquiry officer after going across the deposition has found the charge proved against the respondent and thereafter the same having been accepted by the disciplinary authority he has been dismissed from service. 13. It is evident from the defence reply submitted by the respondent workman that he apart from the issue regarding the allegation has raised an additional issue against one Surrendar Singh, Security-in- charge whom a letter bearing No.COS/15/2013 dated 25.04.2013 was issued by which he was also suspended vide order dated 25.04.2013 whose reply was also same and similar like that of the workman but was permitted to be superannuated on 01.07.2013 and all retiral benefits were granted to him and as such the workman has been discriminated by not following the principle of parity in initiating a departmental proceeding or imposing punishment in the matter of the disciplinary action. 14. The Labour Court has first passed an order regarding fairness of enquiry whereby and whereunder the enquiry has been held to be unfair [subject matter of W.P.(L) No.2368 of 2017]. It is evident from the aforesaid order that the Labour Court has come to the conclusion by looking to Exhibit-M/5 which is the charge-sheet which does not disclose the date and time when workman was found collecting money unauthorizedly for clearing paper/entry/exit permits, it also does not disclose the name of person from whom he has collected money and also does not disclose the vehicle/truck number for whose clearance of entry/exit, he has obtained money unauthorizedly. The enquiry proceeding which has been marked as Exhibit- M/6 shows that in reply to charge-sheet he had submitted his reply on 27.04.2013 marked as Exhibit-MEX-3 in which he has categorically stated that charges levelled against him were not specific as they did not disclose date and time of occurrence and name of the parties from whom money was obtained. The enquiry officer has admitted in paragraph 17 of his cross-examination that charge-sheet issued, work was not satisfactory as same did not disclose the date, time and name of person and therefore the charge has been held to be vague. 15. Even after the explanation having not found to be satisfactory to the management, has directed for domestic enquiry against him but even during the enquiry, management has not produced any person from whom the workman was stated to have obtained money unauthorizedly and therefore in absence of any complaint or complainant, the domestic enquiry has been held to be unfair. 16. It is the settled position of law that if the charge is vague, the disciplinary proceeding is held to be vitiated which is on the principle that if the charge will be vague it cannot be accepted from the delinquent employee to give proper reply in defence and further there is no complaint and in absence thereof, there is no complainant also, hence even if the charge is vague but it has to be corroborated by the complainant in case there is a complaint but that is also absent herein and merely on the basis of CD, the charge has been found to be proved. In view of such finding and on the basis of the principle of vitiating the domestic enquiry in case of vagueness of charge and in the considered view of this Court the order passed by the Labour Court holding the domestic enquiry as unfair does not want any interference. 17. The Labour Court after holding the domestic enquiry as unfair has directed the management to lead its evidence on merit but from its perusal it is evident from the award that no such evidence has been led in support of proving the charge against the respondent workman therefore, the Labour Court has come to conclusive finding that the decision of dismissal is not proper since based upon a domestic enquiry which has been held to be not fair on the ground stipulated hereinabove. 18. The respondent workman has also taken plea with respect to discriminating him with the security-in-charge against whom similar allegation was levelled who has given the similar reply also suspended along with respondent workman but no domestic enquiry has been initiated against him rather he has been allowed to be superannuated from service, therefore the principle of parity in the matter of initiation of disciplinary proceeding has not been followed. Although in the award this point has not been recorded but the petitioner since has taken specific plea in his defence reply, therefore, it needs to refer herein on the basis of the settled position of law that there should be parity in punishment as has been held by the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank and Anr. vs. Rajendra Singh, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 wherein the Hon''ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold at paras. 17 and 19.5 which reads as under:- "17. If there is a complete parity in the two sets of cases, imposing different penalties would not be appropriate as inflicting of any/higher penalty in one case would be discriminatory and would amount to infraction of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That is the ratio of Rajendra Yadav case, already taken note above. On the other hand, if there is some difference, different penalty can be meted out and what should be the quantum is to be left to the appellate authority. However, such a penalty should be commensurate with the gravity of misconduct and cannot be shockingly disproportionate. As per the ratio of Obettee (p) Ltd. case even if the nature of misconduct committed by the two sets of employees is same, the conduct of one set of employees accepting the guilt and pleading for lenient view would justify lesser punishment to them than the other employees who remained adopted the mode of denial, with the result that charges stood proved ultimately in a full-fledged enquiry conducted against them. In that event, higher penalty can be imposed upon such delinquent employees. In that event, higher penalty can be imposed upon such delinquent employees. It would follow that choosing to take a chance to contest the charges such employees thereafter cannot fall back and say that the penalty in their cases cannot be more than the penalty which is imposed upon those employees who accepted the charges at the outset by tendering unconditional apology. 19.5 The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent in awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable." In view thereof, this Court is of the view that since the award has been passed taking into consideration the factual aspect based upon the evidence laid before it, this Court does not find any reason to hold it based upon perversity rather the award has been passed after taking into consideration the entire aspect of the matter based upon the cogent evidence, therefore, needs no interference in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. So far as the quantum of the amount of compensation is concerned, the issue has been framed by the Labour Court with respect to answering the decision of dismissal and the consequence would be after setting aside the order of dismissal would be reinstatement but order of reinstatement can only be passed if the concerned employee has not attained the age of superannuation but once the employee attains the age of superannuation there is no question of reinstatement as is the case herein since the respondent- workman has retired during pendency of the dispute, therefore, the Labour Court has not passed order of reinstatement in service, however, the distress and rigour which the respondent-workman has faced has been computed in terms of money and taking into consideration the date of dismissal from service and the monthly emoluments of the respondent-workman, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that he has suffered out a loss of Rs.27,23,952/- which he would have earned which he has not discharged but instead of awarding the entire back wages for the period of dismissal he has awarded 50% of it i.e., Rs.13,50,000/- in lieu of the loss of the basic + D.A. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner-management has raised the issue that before awarding the back wages the issue of gainfully employed has not been considered for the aforesaid period but according to the considered view of this Court the issue of gainfully employed will not come in the way in case of award of only compensating the workman by back wages where he has attained the age of superannuation and therefore, he has not been reinstated in service. The issue of gainful employment will only come when there is direction of reinstatement with back wages. If the issue of gainfully employed will come in the context of this case where there is no order of reinstatement now question would be that how and in what way the workman would get its relief that can only in terms of money, therefore, the contention raised in this context is not fit to be accepted, accordingly rejected. 20. If the issue of gainfully employed will come in the context of this case where there is no order of reinstatement now question would be that how and in what way the workman would get its relief that can only in terms of money, therefore, the contention raised in this context is not fit to be accepted, accordingly rejected. 20. Before parting with the order it needs to refer regarding the jurisdiction of the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interfering with the fact finding recorded by the Labour Court which is very limited as has been held by the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:- "The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. reported in 1955 Supreme Court 233 wherein at Paragraph-21, which is quoted hereinbelow :- "With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject- matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari." In another judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: "12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob''s case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice." In another judgment rendered by Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Heinz India (P) Ltd. Vrs. State of U.P. Reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordhsips have been please to hold at paragraph no.66 and 67 as under:- "66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant "the feel of the expert" by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangahara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed." In the case of Thansingh Vrs. Supdt. of Taxes reported in A.I.R. 1964 1419 Supreme Court , Hon''ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In another judgment rendered by Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. In another judgment rendered by Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- "17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi- judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority." 21. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority." 21. In view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove and on the basis of the principle laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court as has been stated in the aforesaid judgments according to the considered view of this Court, this Court refrains itself in interfering with the award/impugned orders, subject matter of both the writ petitions, otherwise this Court will be said to be acting as an Appellate Court. 22. In view thereof, both the writ petition stands dismissed. 23. Accordingly, interlocutory application being I.A. No.3279 of 2019 in W.P.(L) No.3321 of 2018 also stands disposed of.