JUDGMENT : S. MANIKUMAR, J. 1. Being aggrieved by the judgment made in W.P.(C)No.5706 of 2019 dated 21.8.2019 whereby the writ court declined to interfere with the proceedings No.H2/1203/2007 dated 11.1.2019 of the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram (Ext.P4) by which the said authority has resumed land admeasuring an extent of 4.69 Acres of land in plot No.48, 49, 50, 51 and 52/P in the industrial development area, comprised in Survey No.2623/94 of Kadakampally Village, Thiruvananthapuram Taluk, Thiruvananthapuram District, instant writ appeal is filed. 2. By the said order dated 11.1.2019, the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram has further directed the appellant to pay resumption interest at 6% from the date of allotment to the date of resumption. Appellant was also directed to remove the movable and immovable items in the land at his cost within 15 days failing which the losses to Government would be recovered through revenue recovery measures. The General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram has directed the Assistant District Industries Officer (T) who is the Estate Officer authorised to take possession of the land as per the rules and to report compliance. 3. Short facts leading to the writ appeal are:- M/s. T.K.Chemicals Ltd. was an allotee of 4.69 Acres of land in industrial development area. The allotment was based on hire purchase based on the rules framed under the Kerala Allotment of Government Land in Development Areas on Hire Purchase for Industrial Purpose Rules (for brevity, 'Hire Purchase Rules'). The said company was permitted to mortgage the land to IDBI Bank, Ernakulam to avail financial assistance. 4. M/s. T.K.Chemicals Ltd. defaulted in payment of loan to the bank which initiated recovery proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (In short, 'DRT'). Pursuant to the recovery certificate issued, DRT auctioned and sold the land admeasuring 4.69 Acres of land in Survey No.2623/94 in plot No.48, 49, 50, 51 and 52/P along with the trees, buildings and all improvements thereon. The appellant was the successful bidder in the auction. 5. After taking physical possession of the said land, the appellant submitted a letter dated 20.8.2010 to the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram stating that the project report for the proposed utilisation of the land was under preparation after examining the viability in detail and accordingly, project report and the plan of action for the implementation of the proposed project would be submitted in due course. Following the letter dated 20.8.2010, the appellant has also submitted an affidavit of undertaking dated 27.8.2010 to the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram stating that he has understood that the land can be used only for industrial purpose and affirmed that the land would be utilised for industrial purpose such as IT Industries, Computer based Industries or other Industries. 6. Appellant has not honoured the letter and the affidavit of undertaking. Therefore, the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram sent letter dated 10.5.2012 to the appellant stating that though the appellant had assured commencing an industrial unit in the name of 'Heera Technology Park', the same was not commenced till the issuance of letter dated 10.5.2012 and therefore, directed the appellant to furnish reasons as to why the project was not commenced, otherwise legal proceedings for resumption of land would be taken. 7. Contrary to the assurance made in letter dated 20.8.2010 and the affidavit of undertaking dated 27.8.2010, the appellant raised an issue that the General Manager, District Industries Centre cannot take action under the Higher Purchase Rules, for resumption of the land. Considering the issue raised and the rules, vide proceedings dated 11.1.2019, General Manager, District Industries Centre has directed resumption of the said land. Being aggrieved, W.P.(C) No.5706 of 2019 was filed to quash the same. 8. When the above said issue was raised in the writ petition, apart from the claim that the appellant is a patta holder and being an auction purchaser, the norms of the Hire Purchase Rules cannot be applied for resumption of land, writ court, by observing that the appellant who had stepped into the shoes of the previous allottee, cannot have a better claim than T.K Chemicals, that the appellant was bound by all the terms and conditions of hire purchase, even in the absence of any agreement executed by the appellant and further observing that the appellant having executed an affidavit of undertaking, cannot wriggle out from his obligations under the hire purchase scheme agreement with T.K Chemicals and also by recording that the appellant has not utilised the land for industrial purpose for over eight years and that such findings cannot be interfered with, dismissed the writ petition. 9. 9. Though the learned counsel for the appellant, by inviting the attention of this Court to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurjoginder Singh v. Jaswant Kaur (SMT) and another [ (1994) 2 SCC 368 ] and Janatha Textiles and others v. Tax Recovery Officer and another [ (2008) 12 SCC 582 ], submitted that the appellant is bona fide purchaser and therefore, properties purchased through the auction sale conducted by DRT cannot be resumed and that such sale, confers title on the appellant and in such circumstances, the appellant is not bound by the terms of allotment and hire purchase agreement executed between the allottee T.K.Chemicals and the competent authority under the Hire Purchase Rules, we are not in agreement with the said contention for the reasons that firstly, decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 10. On the aspect, as to when, a judgment could treated as Judicial Precedent, binding on the Courts, this Court deems it fit to consider few decisions, (i) In State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekar Misra, reported in AIR 1968 SC 647 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained as to when a decision can be taken as a precedent, which as follows:- “A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic, this is what Earl of Halsbury LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, reported in 901 AC 495. 'Now before discussing the case of Allen vs. Flood, reported in 1898 AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” It is not profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it.” (ii) In Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, reported in 1996 (6) SCC 44 = 1996 (7) Supreme 51 , the Supreme Court has explained, what constitutes a precedent, which as follows:- "Before adverting to and considering whether solatium and interest would be payable under the Act, at the outset, we will dispose of the objection raised by Shri Vaidyanathan that Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla reported in 1993 Supplement (2) SCC 149, is not a binding precedent nor does it operate as ratio decidendi to be followed as a precedent and is per se per incuriam. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates# (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. A inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi. ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges arc to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents. “ (iii) In State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., reported in (2004) 11 SCC 26 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the doctrine of precedents and when a judgment becomes per incuriam. Paragraph 334 is extracted:- Precedent 334. The doctrine of precedent is a well-accepted principle. “ (iii) In State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., reported in (2004) 11 SCC 26 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the doctrine of precedents and when a judgment becomes per incuriam. Paragraph 334 is extracted:- Precedent 334. The doctrine of precedent is a well-accepted principle. A ruling is generally considered to be binding on lower courts and courts having a smaller bench structure: “A precedent influences future decisions. Every decision is pronounced on a specific set of past facts and from the decision on those facts a rule has to be extracted and projected into the future. No one can foresee the precise situation that will arise, so the rule has to be capable of applying to a range of broadly similar situations against a background of changing conditions. It has therefore to be in general terms and #malleable# # No word has one proper meaning, nor can anyone seek to fix the meaning of words for others, so the interpretation of the rule remains flexible and open-ended. (See Dias Jurisprudence, 5th Edn., p. 136.)” 11. Indisputably, the said property falls within the industrial area. Government vide GO(MS)No.169/69/1D dated 05.04.1969 have framed rules in the matter of allotment of land in development areas on hire purchase for industrial use. As per Rule 4 of the Hire Purchase Rules, the land allotted under the rules can be utilised only for industrial purpose. As per Rule 12 of the said rules, the land allotted would be on hire purchase basis provided where outright purchase is requested by the allotee, it shall be considered by the Director of Industries & Commerce on its merits and he shall decide the matter. 12. Rule 16 of the Hire Purchase Rules reads thus:- “A period of 16 months is fixed as the period within which the allotee should utilise the land for the purpose for which it is allotted. However in deserving cases the Director of Industries & Commerce may allow time up to one year for utilising the land and for further extension of time, if found absolutely necessary, the allottee should obtain orders of the Government.” 13. However in deserving cases the Director of Industries & Commerce may allow time up to one year for utilising the land and for further extension of time, if found absolutely necessary, the allottee should obtain orders of the Government.” 13. In terms of Rule 18 of the said rules, in case of resumption from an industrialist, he shall be paid compensation for any improvements effected by him in the plot of land based on the valuation made by competent authorities, provided that instead of paying the value of the improvements it shall be open to the Director of Industries & Commerce to direct the allottee to remove any of the improvements within such time as may be specified, at the cost of the allotee and if he fails to do so, the Director of Industries & Commerce may arrange the same to be removed at the cost of the allottee and dispose of the materials by public auction. If, even after adjustment of the amount thus calculated further amounts are due from the allottee, the same shall be recovered from him as if such amount were arrears of land revenue. 14. As per Rule 20 of Hire Purchase Rules, interest at the rate of 5.5% shall be charged for the amount outstanding at the time of remittance of each instalment. As per Rule 22 of the said rules, in case of defaulted payment, penal interest @ 2% per annum over and above the normal interest of 5.5% shall be paid on the defaulted instalments calculated from the due date of actual payment. As per Rule 26, the Government shall have complete title and ownership to the land till the land is assigned to the allottee. 15. Admittedly, land had not been assigned to the allottee T.K.Chemicals. Proceedings dated 11.01.2019 of the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram, impugned in W.P.(C) No.5706 of 2019 shows that after the purchase of the land, the appellant has testified before the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram that the land purchased would be used only for industrial purpose and accordingly, sent a letter dated 20.8.2010. Thereafter, he has also submitted a letter dated 23.12.2010 to the General Manager, District Industries Centre that he had intended to start 'Heera Technology Park' in the aforesaid land. Thereafter, he has also submitted a letter dated 23.12.2010 to the General Manager, District Industries Centre that he had intended to start 'Heera Technology Park' in the aforesaid land. Letter dated 20.8.2010 reads thus:- “I am in receipt of your letter under reference and I may inform you that the land purchased vide proceedings under reference (1) in pursuance of proceedings no.TDRC No.4 (Recovery proceedings no.214/02 in OA no.1001/2001 of Debt Recovery Tribunal no.2, Mumbai) will be utilised only for the Industrial purposes. As directed, I enclose herewith the notarised affidavit in stamp paper to the effect that the land comprising of 4 acres 69.850 cents purchased by me through auction by Debt Recovery Tribunal will be utilised only for Industrial purpose. I may further inform your good office that the Project report for the proposed utilisation of the Land is under preparation after examining the viability in detail and accordingly the Project report and the Plan of action for the implementation of the proposed project will be submitted to your good office in due course. 16. The appellant has also given an undertaking on 27.8.2010 by which he had stated that he has understood that the said land can be used only for industrial purpose. He has affirmed that above said land would be utilised for industrial purpose such as IT Industries, Computer based Industries or other Industries. Affidavit of undertaking dated 27.8.2010 submitted to the General Manager is reproduced. “6. I understand that the said land can be used only for industrial purpose. I hereby affirm that the said land situated in development areas in Veli shall be utilized for industrial purpose such as IT Industries, Computer based Industries or other Industries.” 17. Thus, from the above letter extracted (supra) and affidavit of undertaking dated 27.8.2010, it is manifestly clear that the appellant is aware of the fact that the said land is situated in an industrial area and that the said land cannot be utilised for any other purpose except industrial purpose. Accordingly, the appellant has informed the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram. 18. Accordingly, the appellant has informed the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram. 18. When the appellant did not honour the letter and the affidavit of undertaking, the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram has sent letter dated 10.5.2012 to the appellant stating that as per the Government Order dated 5.4.1969, land allotted within the development area/plot should be commenced with industries within six months, otherwise, the land would be taken back by initiating proceedings. Thereafter, the General Manager has requested the appellant to submit reasons as to why he has not commenced an industrial unit, otherwise, legal proceedings would be taken against him. 19. Quite contrary to the assurance made, the appellant has taken a stand that he has acquired absolute title of the property by virtue of DRT auction and that he is not bound by any of the terms and conditions of the Hire Purchase Rules. From the above, it is evident that at one stage, the appellant had given an undertaking that he will abide by the rules and also submitted an affidavit of undertaking to the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvananthapuram that project report and plan would be submitted in due course and later on, has gone back from the statement and claimed absolute title to the property. Though the appellant has claimed absolute title to the said property, use of the property cannot be changed for the reason that the land, initially allotted to M/s.T.K.Chemicals for the purpose of setting up industrial units, is situated in an industrial area. Failure to perform the obligations entail in resumption. Appellant cannot approbate and reprobate. (i). In New Bihar Biri Leaves Co. v. State of Bihar, reported in 1981 (1) SCC 537 , at paragraphs 48 and 49, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "48. It is a fundamental principle of general application that if a person of his own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms and works out the contract, he cannot be allowed to adhere to and abide by some of the terms of the contract which proved advantageous to him and repudiate the other terms of the same contract which might be disadvantageous to him. The maxim is qui approbat non reprobat (one who approbates cannot reprobate). This principle, though originally borrowed from Scots Law, is now firmly embodied in English Common Law. The maxim is qui approbat non reprobat (one who approbates cannot reprobate). This principle, though originally borrowed from Scots Law, is now firmly embodied in English Common Law. According to it, a party to an instrument or transaction cannot take advantage of one part of a document or transaction and reject the rest. That is to say, no party can accept and reject the same instrument or transaction (Per Scrutton, L.J., Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co., reported in 1921 2 KB 608 Douglas Menzies v. Umphelby, reported in 1908 AC 224, 232 see also stroud's judicial dictionary, Vol. I, p. 169, 3rd Edn.). 49. The aforesaid inhibitory principle squarely applies to the cases of those petitioners who had by offering highest bids at public auctions or by tenders, accepted and worked out the contracts in the past but are now resisting the demands or other action, arising out of the impugned Condition (13) on the ground that this condition is violative of Articles 19(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution. In this connection, it will bear repetition, here, that the impugned conditions though bear a statutory complexion, retain their basic contractual character also. It is true that a person cannot be debarred from enforcing his fundamental rights on the ground of estoppel or waiver. But the aforesaid principle which prohibits a party to a transaction from approbating a part of its conditions and reprobating the rest, is different from the doctrine of estoppel or waiver.” (ii). In R.N.Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, reported in 1992 (4) SCC 683 , at paragraph 10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that #a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage”. [See: Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd, reported in 1921 (2) KB 608, 612 (CA) Scrutton, L.J.] According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. [See: Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd, reported in 1921 (2) KB 608, 612 (CA) Scrutton, L.J.] According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 16, “after taking an advantage under an order (for example for the payment of costs) a party may be precluded from saying that it is invalid and asking to set it aside”. (para 1508) (iii). In I.T. Commissioner v. Firm Muar, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1216 , at paragraph 13, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- ".........The doctrine of “approbate and reprobate” is only a species of estoppel; it applies only to the conduct of parties. As in the case of estoppel, it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute." (iv). In Prashant Ramachandra Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti, reported in 1995 Supp (2) 539, the principle of "approbate and reprobate" has been explained. At Paragraph 2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held thus:- "2. .........Similarly, on the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate, #a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais. The principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate expresses two propositions: (1) that the person in question, having a choice between two courses of conduct, is to be treated as having made an election from which he cannot resile, and (2) that he will not be regarded, in general at any rate, as having so elected unless he has taken a benefit under or arising out of the course of conduct which he has first pursued and with which his subsequent conduct is inconsistent#. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 16, para 1507." (v). In Cauvery Coffee Traders, Mangalore, v. Hornor Resources (International) Company Limited., reported in 2011 (10) SCC 420 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 33 to 35, held as follows:- 33. In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, reported in 1992 (4) SCC 683 = 2011 (1) SCC (Civ) 451, this Court has observed as under: (SCC pp.687-88, para 10) “10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, reported in 1992 (4) SCC 683 = 2011 (1) SCC (Civ) 451, this Court has observed as under: (SCC pp.687-88, para 10) “10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that 'a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage'.” 34. A party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold”, “fast and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience. (Vide Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, reported in AIR 1956 SC 593 , CIT v. V.MR.P. Firm Muar, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1216 , Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, reported in AIR 1969 SC 329 , .R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti, reported in 1998 (6) SCC 507 : AIR 1998 SC 2979 , Babu Ram v. Indra Pal Singh, reported in 1998 (6) SCC 358 : AIR 1998 SC 3021 , NTPC Ltd. v. Reshmi Constructions, Builders & Contractors, reported in 2004 (2) SCC 663 : AIR 2004 SC 1330 , Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement and Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD. reported in 2008 (14) SCC 58 : 2009 (1) SCC (L&S) 706 : AIR 2009 SC 713 . 35. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel--the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate inheres in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. (vi). The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. (vi). In Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots' Association of India (ALPAI) Vs. Director General of Civil Aviation, reported in 2011 (5) SCC 435 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 12, held as follows:- "12. The doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel--the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate inheres in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. Taking inconsistent pleas by a party makes its conduct far from satisfactory. Further, the parties should not blow hot and cold by taking inconsistent stands and prolong proceedings unnecessarily. [Vide Babu Ram v. Indra Pal Singh, reported in 1998 (6) SCC 358 , P.R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti, reported in 1998 (6) SCC 507 , and Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Golden Chariot Airport [ 2010 (10) SCC 422 : 2010 (4) SCC (Civ) 195]." 20. The fact that no improvement has been made for eight years even after the assurance given by him to start a project is not disputed. Had the appellant made any improvements and incurred any expenditure, Rule 18 of the Hire Purchase Rules enables the appellant to take appropriate recourse. As rightly observed by the writ court, the appellant cannot be permitted to wriggle out of his own obligations. In view of the above discussions, we are not inclined to interfere with the order impugned before this Court. Writ appeal is dismissed. No costs.