JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner calls in question the legality and validity of the order passed by the Commercial Court, Ahmedabad, dated 25th April 2019 in the Commercial Civil Misc. Application No. 83 of 2018 instituted by the petitioner herein under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as, 'the Act, 1996'). 2. The facts giving rise to this petition may be summarised as under: 3. The petitioner is a company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The company is engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing of transformers and allied products. M/s. Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited placed a purchase order dated 28th January 2012 with the petitioner company for manufacturing, assembling, stage/final testing, inspection and supply of 2300 KVA Power Transformers and 60 KVA Dry Type Transformers for its proposed 200 MV wind farm at Dangri, Pokhran, District Jaisalmer, Rajasthan. 4. The purchase order document is at page-29 of the paper-book annexed as Annexure-C to this petition. Clause 8.5 of the purchase order is with regard to arbitration. It reads thus: "All the disputes and differences if any shall be settled by arbitration in the manner herein after provided. Arbitration shall be conducted by three arbitrators; one each to be nominated by you and the owner; second-third to be appointed as an umpire by both the arbitrators in accordance to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of India, 1996. In case either party fails to appoint its arbitrator within sixty days after receipt of notice from the other party invoking the arbitration clause, the arbitrator appointed by the party invoking the arbitration clause shall become the sole arbitrator to conduct the arbitration. Arbitrator appointed by the party invoking the arbitration clause shall become the sole arbitrator to conduct the arbitration. The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any statutory modifications thereof. The venue of the arbitration shall be Jaipur. The decisions of the majority of the arbitrators shall be final and binding on both the parties. The arbitrators may from time to time with the consent of all the parties extend the time for making the award. The venue of the arbitration shall be Jaipur. The decisions of the majority of the arbitrators shall be final and binding on both the parties. The arbitrators may from time to time with the consent of all the parties extend the time for making the award. In the event of any of the arbitrators dying, neglecting, resigning or being unable to act for any reasons; it shall be lawfully binding for the party concerned to nominate another arbitrator in place of the outgoing arbitrator. The arbitrator shall have full powers to review and/or revise any decision, opinion, direction, certification or valuation in accordance with the agreement and neither party shall be limited in proceedings before such arbitrators to the evidence for arguments for the purpose of obtaining the said decisions. During settlement of disputes and arbitration proceedings, both parties shall be obliged to carry out their respective obligations under the agreement. In the event of arbitrators, award being not acceptable to either party, the party shall be free to seek lawful remedies under the laws of India, and the jurisdiction for the same shall be courts in the state of Rajasthan." 5. It appears that disputes arose between the parties. In such circumstances, the respondent herein preferred an application under Section 11 of the Act, 1996, being Arbitration Petition No. 3 of 2014 before this Court for appointment of the arbitrator. A learned Single Judge of this Court, vide order dated 5th September 2014, appointed Hon'ble Mr. Justice C.K. Buch (retired Judge of this Court) to act as the sole arbitrator to resolve the disputes between the parties arising out of the contract dated 28th January 2012. The order dated 5th September 2014 reads thus: "Learned advocate for the parties jointly submitted that matter be referred for arbitration of sole arbitrator. I request Shri C.K. Buch (retired Judge of this Court) to act as a sole arbitrator to resolve the disputes arising between the parties arising out a contract dated 28.01.2012. Disposed of accordingly." 6. In context with the aforesaid order passed by this Court referred to above, the averments made by the petitioner in this petition in paragraphs 4(D) and 4(E) are relevant. Disposed of accordingly." 6. In context with the aforesaid order passed by this Court referred to above, the averments made by the petitioner in this petition in paragraphs 4(D) and 4(E) are relevant. We quote the relevant averments thus: "(D) That the impugned order dated 25.04.2019 was passed by the Hon'ble Commercial Court, Ahmedabad with complete non application of mind and without even appreciating that the entire arbitration proceedings were held at Ahmedabad, further the award was also pronounced at Ahmedabad. More so, the parties by way of consent chose the arbitration proceedings to be conducted at Ahmedabad during the hearing of Sec. 11 application filed by the Respondent herein before this Hon'ble High Court. That as per original arbitration agreement between the parties, the venue for arbitration was at Jaipur and proceedings were subject to the jurisdiction of "Rajasthan Courts" as per clause 8.5. However, when the Respondent filed application u/s. 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before this Hon'ble Court for appointment of arbitrator, the parties arrived at consensus and upon joint submissions made by the parties hereto, this Hon'ble Court was pleased to pass order dated 05.09.2014 thereby by appointing Justice Shri C.K. Buch (Retd.) to act as arbitrator and thus the entire arbitral proceedings were conducted at Ahmedabad. In light of this, the consent given by parties before this Hon'ble Court amounts to be novation of arbitration agreement between the parties and thus the venue and seat of arbitration became at Ahmedabad. (E) That the impugned order dated 25.04.2019 passed by the Hon'ble Commercial Court, Ahmedabad is contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case and the same has caused grave prejudice to the rights of the petitioner herein." 7. It appears that the sole arbitrator passed an award dated 20th July 2018 at Ahmedabad. The final award passed by the sole arbitrator reads thus: "FINAL AWARD (i) The claimant do recover from the respondent the amount of Rs. 38,97,150/- (Rupees Thirty Eight Lakh Ninety Seven Thousand One Hundred Fifty only) with interest; (ii) The claimant do recover from the respondent the amount of Rs. 31,32,650/- (Rupees Thirty Lakh Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred Fifty only) as interest on the amount awarded from 10.3.2013 till the date of Award, i.e. 19.7.2018 (both days inclusive); (iii) The claimant do recover from the respondent Rs. 31,32,650/- (Rupees Thirty Lakh Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred Fifty only) as interest on the amount awarded from 10.3.2013 till the date of Award, i.e. 19.7.2018 (both days inclusive); (iii) The claimant do recover from the respondent Rs. 2,81,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh Eighty One Thousand only) as quantified costs; (iv) The claimant is not awarded interest further on the amount of interest awarded; (v) The claimant is awarded interest on the amount of costs @ 15% from the date of Award till realisation of this amount; (vi) The claim exceeding to the amount expressly awarded to the claimant stands dismissed; (vii) It is clarified further that if the respondent pays the amount awarded within 45 days, then the claimant shall not be entitled to interest on the awarded amount of costs; (viii) The counter-claims raised by the respondent are dismissed with no order as to further costs; (ix) Award accordingly. Pronounced and delivered today on 20th day of July, 2018 at Ahmedabad. Place : Ahmedabad Date : 20.07.2018 Sd/- (C.K. BUCH) Sole Arbitrator" 8. The petitioner herein, being dissatisfied with the award passed by the sole arbitrator, challenged the same by instituting the Commercial Civil Application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. However, as there was a delay of 27 days in preferring the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, the Commercial Civil Misc. Application No. 83 of 2018 was filed for the purpose of condonation of delay. The said application was adjudicated by the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad, and ultimately, vide order dated 25th April 2019 disposed of the same with an order to return the application to the petitioner herein for the purpose of filing it before the court of competent jurisdiction. The Commercial Court, while disposing of the application, held as under: "3. I have heard the Learned Counsels for the parties. Mr. M.R. Shah, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant has vehemently submitted that the Award was passed on 20th July, 2018, but the present application could only be filed on 15th November, 2018. Therefore, there is a delay of 27 days occasioned in challenging the Award passed by the Learned Arbitrator. Hence, the present applicant could not prefer the petition under section 34 within the prescribed time limit. Therefore, there is a delay of 27 days occasioned in challenging the Award passed by the Learned Arbitrator. Hence, the present applicant could not prefer the petition under section 34 within the prescribed time limit. He has further submitted that a copy of the Award and record was received by the lawyer of the applicant, but the lawyer of the applicant could not serve the said paper-book along with the copy of the Award to the applicant and the copy of the Award was supplied only on 9th October, 2018. He has further submitted that since the office of the applicant is situated at Noida, the said record was sent to the officials of the applicant at Noida and thereafter, the applicant contacted the Delhi based lawyer on 12th October, 2018. He has also submitted that thereafter, the Delhi based lawyer has visited Vadodara on 18th October, 2018. Thereafter, the petition could be prepared only on 3rd November, 2018, but on account of the Dipawali Vacation, the Court was closed with effect from 5th November, 2018 to 11th November, 2018. Therefore, the present application came to be filed only on 15th November, 2018. Hence, the delay of 27 days has occasioned in preferring the main petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Learned Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that there is no mistake on the part of the applicant, but it is the mistake on the part of the lawyer, who could not supply a copy of the record along with certified copy of the Award to the applicant. Hence, it is submitted by him that the delay of 27 days be condoned. 4. On the other hand, Learned Counsel Mr. T.N. Vyas, appearing on behalf of the respondent has vehemently opposed the present application, on the ground of jurisdiction. Learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction. The parties have chosen the jurisdiction of Vadodara Court. Not only this, as per the agreement, the seat of the arbitration is at Vadodara. In support of his contentions, Learned Counsel for the respondent has drawn the attention of this Court to clauses Nos. 9.11 and 9.12 of the agreement at page Nos. 142 and 143 of the paper-book. The parties have chosen the jurisdiction of Vadodara Court. Not only this, as per the agreement, the seat of the arbitration is at Vadodara. In support of his contentions, Learned Counsel for the respondent has drawn the attention of this Court to clauses Nos. 9.11 and 9.12 of the agreement at page Nos. 142 and 143 of the paper-book. Placing reliance upon clauses 9.11 and 9.12, Learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction and therefore, the delay cannot be condoned. 5. In rebuttal, Learned Counsel for the applicant has submitted that he be given an opportunity to appear before the appropriate Court. 6. I have considered the submissions of the Learned Counsels for the parties. Without going into the merits of the case, whether the delay can be condoned or not, but prior thereto, it has to be seen whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present application for condonation of delay. Perusal of the agreement transpires that the agreement entered into between the parties contains clause of arbitration. Clause 9.11 relates to the governing law and clause 9.12 relates to the dispute resolution. Clause 9.12 of the agreement clearly transpires that the seat of the arbitration is at Vadodara. For the sake of ready reference and proper understanding of the issue on hand, clause 9.12 of the agreement is required to be reproduced hereinbelow: 9.12. Dispute Resolution "The parties shall attempt in good faith to resolve any dispute, difference and/or claims arising out of this Agreement amicably through consultation, negotiations or conciliation. If the dispute cannot be settled within 90 days of the intimation of any of the aforesaid methods, the same shall be settled by arbitration by a sole arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Any arbitration Award granted shall be final and binding on the parties. The seat of the arbitration shall be at Vadodara. The Arbitration proceedings shall be in English." Since the seat of the arbitration at Vadodara, this Court has no jurisdiction. At this juncture, a reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited vs. Datawind Innovation Private Limited, reported in (2017) SCC 2015, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph No. 20 has been pleased to hold as under: 20. At this juncture, a reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited vs. Datawind Innovation Private Limited, reported in (2017) SCC 2015, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph No. 20 has been pleased to hold as under: 20. "A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the moment seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to seat is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of section 16 to 21 of CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment seat is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties. 7. Thus, in view of the ratio of the judgment of the Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited (supra), more particularly in view of section 10(3) of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division High Courts Act, 2015, this Court has no jurisdiction since the seat of the arbitration is at Vadodara. Hence, the present application is liable to be returned to the applicant to be presented before the appropriate Court and accordingly, I pass the following order:- ORDER 1. The present application, along with all the records are ordered to be returned to the applicant to approach the appropriate Court, having jurisdiction, within a period of 15 days from today. 2. No orders as to cost. 3. The present matter be disposed of from the CIS system of this Court, forthwith. " 9. The present application, along with all the records are ordered to be returned to the applicant to approach the appropriate Court, having jurisdiction, within a period of 15 days from today. 2. No orders as to cost. 3. The present matter be disposed of from the CIS system of this Court, forthwith. " 9. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Commercial Court referred to above, the petitioner is here before this Court with the present application, seeking to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: 10. Mr. Vaidankar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, vehemently submitted that the court below committed a serious error in passing the impugned order. Mr. Vaidankar submitted that the court below ought not to have declined to entertain the application preferred under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel, the court below committed an error by looking into a wrong agreement. The learned counsel pointed out that the court below looked into the business transfer agreement dated 30th March 2012 entered into between the Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited and the petitioner. In fact, according to the learned counsel, the Commercial Court ought to have looked into the purchase order dated 28th January 2012 (Annexure-C to this petition). 11. The principal argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that as the venue of the arbitral proceedings was Ahmedabad and the award also came to be declared and signed at Ahmedabad, the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad has the jurisdiction to decide the application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. The learned counsel would submit that the order dated 5th September 2014 passed by this Court in the Arbitration Application (IAAP) No. 3 of 2014 appointing a retired Judge of this High Court as the sole arbitrator was with the consent of the parties. Once there was a consensus that the venue of the arbitral proceedings shall be Ahmedabad, then in such circumstances, the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad could be said to be having the jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. 12. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prays that there being merit in this petition, the same be allowed and the impugned order be quashed and set-aside. 12. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prays that there being merit in this petition, the same be allowed and the impugned order be quashed and set-aside. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS: 13. On the other hand, this petition has been vehemently opposed by Ms. Nidhi T. Vyas, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. Ms. Vyas would submit that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the court below in declining to entertain the application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, on the ground of jurisdiction. 14. Ms. Vyas would submit that the venue of the arbitral proceedings cannot be equated with the seat of arbitration. According to Ms. Vyas, what was agreed upon between the parties was the venue, i.e. the place of the arbitral proceedings, and not the seat of the arbitral proceedings. In short, the submission of Ms. Vyas is that neither did the parties agree to a jurisdictional place/seat as against the geographical location, nor was a determination made by the arbitrator in that behalf. 15. Ms. Vyas would submit that the execution proceedings have been instituted by her client at Vadodara and, therefore, the court at Vadodara would have the jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. 16. In such circumstances referred to above, Ms. Vyas prays that there being no merit in this application, the same may be rejected. 17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is, whether the court below committed any error in passing the impugned order. ANALYSIS: 18. It is not in dispute that the agreement in the form of purchase order between the parties dated 28th January 2012 provides the venue of the arbitration to be Jaipur. The agreement clause in the purchase order further clarifies that if either of the parties are dissatisfied with the arbitral award, then it shall be open for the parties to seek appropriate legal remedy before the appropriate court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Rajasthan. We are not able to understand why the Commercial Court has referred to the business transfer agreement dated 30th March 2012 between M/s. Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited and the petitioner. We are not able to understand why the Commercial Court has referred to the business transfer agreement dated 30th March 2012 between M/s. Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited and the petitioner. In the said agreement, the seat of the arbitration as fixed is at Vadodara. 19. Be that as it may, the short point for our consideration is, whether the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad has the jurisdiction to entertain the application preferred by the petitioner under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, on the sole ground that the arbitral proceedings were undertaken at Ahmedabad by the sole arbitrator and the award also came to be pronounced and signed by the sole arbitrator at Ahmedabad. 20. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, we may look into few provisions of the Act, 1996: Section 34 of the Act, 1996, reads thus: "34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-- (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Application for setting aside arbitral award.-- (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if-- (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that- (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this part; or (b) the Court finds that- (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation.- Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81. Explanation.- Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the part making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award." 21. The word "court" is not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, not even in the General Clauses Act. The word "court" is, however, defined both in the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Arbitration Act, 1996. Section 2(1)(e) of the new Act defines the word "Court" thus: ""Court" means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any court of Small Causes." 22. Section 2(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 also defined the word "Court" thus: ""Court" means a civil court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under Section 21, include a Small Cause Court;" 23. Like in the Arbitration Act, 1940, in the Arbitration Act, 1996, too the definition of "court" is more to define "jurisdiction" than to define "court". The word "court" is used in a limited sense in Sections 9, 27, 34, 37, 47 and 56. These courts are "courts of law" established by the Government as a part of "judiciary" wing of the State. Other judicial authorities may be set up for specific purposes and may not be a part of the judiciary wing. 24. Section 2(1)(e) defines which is the proper court for the purposes of the aforementioned sections. The definition of "court" in Section 2(1)(e) lays down the principles to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of law. Although intervention of courts in arbitral proceedings is minimized by the Arbitration Act, 1996, the courts still have some powers and functions. The parties and the Arbitral Tribunal may seek their assistance or intervention under the new Act as envisaged under Sections 9, 14(2), 27 and 34 which include reference to Sections 13(5), 16(6) and 36. Section 2(1)(e) defines which is the proper court for the purposes of the aforementioned various Sections. In terms of the definition of the word "court" under Section 2(1)(e), the proper court is the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district to cover complete pecuniary jurisdiction and it must be the court having subject-matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction in personam in the same way as determined in any civil suit, i.e., under Sections 15 to 20 of CPC. The word "court" within the meaning of the definition under Section 2(1)(e) means the court which is competent under the law to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit as under Sections 15 to 20 of CPC in case of law suits, but, the court for purpose of Arbitration Act would not include a court inferior to principal civil court in a district. 25. 25. The definition of the word "court" in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is narrower than the definition contained in Section 2(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. As per the definition under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the word "court" meant any Civil Court except the Court of Small Causes whereas as per the definition under Section 2(1)(e) of Arbitration Act, 1996, "court" means principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the "High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction", having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil court, or any Small Cause Court. The definition of the word "court" in the Arbitration Act, 1996 has thus restricted the expression 'court' for the purposes in Part-I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 to mean and include only the District Court and the High Court exercising its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. 26. The definition of "court" in clause 1(e) of Section 2 of Arbitration Act, 1996, defines the court to mean the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district. The definition is both inclusive and exclusive. It specifically includes High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction within the ambit of the definition of "court" and excludes the civil courts of a grade subordinate to such Principal Civil Court and the Courts of Small Causes. The definition of the word "court" has thus been narrowed down to mean and include the District Court and the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The only condition is that it should have jurisdiction to decide the questions forming subject-matter of the arbitration if the same would have been a subject-matter of the suit. By using the words "means", "includes" and "does not include", in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the Parliament has exhaustively explained the meaning of the term "court" in that the word "means" is a term of restriction, while the word "includes" is a term of enlargement and when both the words "means" and "includes" are used together to define a thing, the intendment of the legislature is to supply restricted meaning to the terms. There is no reference in Section 2 (1) (e) to the place where the parties reside, dwell or carry on business. The jurisdiction of the court is made dependent not on any of these factors, but solely on the subject-matter. The omission of the reference to residence is presumably because in filing the award, there is no plaintiff and no defendant. It is only when the subject-matter of the dispute itself makes the jurisdiction to depend on residence that the place of residence becomes relevant. The emphasis is not on residence but on the subject-matter of the reference. 27. In view of the aforesaid definition of the term 'court' in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, 1996, and since a party has to prefer an application to a 'court' under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, for the purpose of challenging the arbitral award in order to decide the question, whether the application filed by the petitioner herein under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, before the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad is maintainable or not, and whether the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad has the jurisdiction to entertain such application or not, it becomes necessary for the court to first decide, whether the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad has the jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration if the same had arisen in a civil suit. 28. The law in the aforesaid context is quite well-settled. In Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971)3 SCR 314 , the Supreme Court observed as under: "It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act." 29. In the context of the facts of the present case, the venue of the arbitration in the event of any disputes and differences was fixed at Jaipur, State of Rajasthan. Such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act." 29. In the context of the facts of the present case, the venue of the arbitration in the event of any disputes and differences was fixed at Jaipur, State of Rajasthan. The terms of the agreement further provide that in the event of the arbitral award not being acceptable to either of the party, then it shall be open for either of the party to seek appropriate legal remedy before the court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Rajasthan. Therefore, the parties by agreement restricted the jurisdiction to the courts at Jaipur, State of Rajasthan, excluding the jurisdiction of other courts which may also have had the jurisdiction sans the agreement between the parties. This position of law is clear after the decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of A.B.C. Laminart Private Limited and another versus A.P. Agencies, Salem, reported in AIR (1989)2 SCC 163 . The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 18 of the said decision as under: "Thus it is now a settled principle that where there may be two or more competent Courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen there within, if the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such Court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves the agreement would be valid. If such a contract is clearly, unambiguous and explicit and not vague it is not hit by Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as Page 2409 parties contracting against the Statute. Mercantile law and practice permit such agreements." 30. In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court also indicated that when the court had to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause, it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. 31. The Supreme Court in A.B.C. Laminart (supra), was considering the clause which reads as under:- "Any dispute arising out of this sale shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction." 32. While considering the validity and effect of the aforesaid clause, the Supreme Court observed that an agreement which purports to oust the jurisdiction of the court absolutely is contrary to public policy and hence void. While considering the validity and effect of the aforesaid clause, the Supreme Court observed that an agreement which purports to oust the jurisdiction of the court absolutely is contrary to public policy and hence void. Construing Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Court held that every agreement by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunal, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent. However, this would be subject to two exceptions, namely, (1) a contract to refer to arbitration and to abide by its award, (2) as a matter of commercial law and practice to submit disputes on or in respect of the contract to agreed proper jurisdiction and not other jurisdictions though proper. The meaning, therefore, is clear that while a contract to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the court would be unlawful and void being against the public policy, restricting the jurisdiction in one of the many courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction would not be opposed to public policy. 33. After considering the entire case-law on the subject including the earlier decision in the case of Hakam Singh (supra), the court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. (supra), came to the conclusion that: "....where such an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of the ouster clause when words like 'alone', 'only', 'exclusive' and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' 'expression of one is the exclusion of another' may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed." 34. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed." 34. Applying the aforesaid principles in A.B.C. Laminart (supra), the Supreme Court construed the clause under consideration in the following words: "Thus Kaira court would even otherwise have had jurisdiction. The bobbins of metallic yarn were delivered at the address of the respondent at Salem which, therefore, would provide the connecting factor for court at Salem to have jurisdiction. If out of the two jurisdictions one was excluded by clause 11 it would not absolutely oust the jurisdiction of the court and, therefore, would not be void against public policy and would not violate Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. The question then is whether it can be construed to have excluded the jurisdiction of the court at Salem. In the clause 'any dispute arising out of this sale shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction' ex facie we do not find exclusionary words like 'exclusive', 'alone', 'only' and the like. Can the maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' be applied under the facts and circumstances of the case? The order of confirmation is of no assistance. The other general terms and conditions are also not indicative of exclusion of other jurisdictions. Under the facts and circumstances of the case we hold that while connecting factor with Kaira jurisdiction was ensured by fixing the situs of the contract within Kaira, other jurisdictions having connecting factors were not clearly, unambiguously and explicitly excluded. That being the position it could not be said that the jurisdiction of the court at Salem which court otherwise had jurisdiction under law though connecting factor of delivery of goods thereat was expressly excluded." 35. However, in the facts of the present case, we find that the exclusion of the courts other than the courts at Rajasthan is specific inasmuch as the clause referred to above specifically provides that the courts in the State of Rajasthan shall have the jurisdiction. 36. However, in the facts of the present case, we find that the exclusion of the courts other than the courts at Rajasthan is specific inasmuch as the clause referred to above specifically provides that the courts in the State of Rajasthan shall have the jurisdiction. 36. Upon consideration of all the aforesaid decisions, the position becomes clear that where two or more competent courts have jurisdiction to entertain a matter, if the parties by contract agree to fix jurisdiction in only one of them, then such a contract or agreement would have to be held to be valid. The consequences thereof would be that the court on which the jurisdiction was conferred by agreement would be the only court entitled to exercise such jurisdiction. It is, in fact, not so much a question of conferment of jurisdiction but one of election or exclusion of jurisdiction. Where two or more courts have jurisdiction because part of cause of action may have arisen therewithin, the parties may contract to exclude jurisdiction and elect to restrict it to one or more of the courts. In the present discussion, we have proceeded on the assumption that the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad also has the jurisdiction, although it is the contention of Ms. Vyas that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Ahmedabad. Be that as it may, assuming that the court at Ahmedabad has the jurisdiction, in view of the said clause 8.5, such jurisdiction has been excluded by agreement between the parties and only the courts at Rajasthan would have the jurisdiction in the matter. 37. We now come to the principal argument of Mr. Vaidankar that the application filed before the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad being one under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, the appropriate court having the jurisdiction would be the court within whose territorial limits the arbitral proceedings were conducted and the award was made. According to Mr. Vaidankar, since the proceedings were conducted in Ahmedabad and that the impugned award was made in Ahmedabad, the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad would clearly have the jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. 38. According to Mr. Vaidankar, since the proceedings were conducted in Ahmedabad and that the impugned award was made in Ahmedabad, the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad would clearly have the jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. 38. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that even if the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad had the jurisdiction, assuming for the moment that the conduct of the arbitral proceedings and making of the award confers jurisdiction, the same is expressly excluded in view of the ouster clause (clause 8.5 referred to above). 39. In such circumstances, this argument of Mr. Vaidankar is of no consequence. However, as it has been argued that the situs of arbitral proceedings confers jurisdiction on the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad, we proceeded to deal with this proposition. 40. We are of the view that the situs of arbitral proceedings does not confer jurisdiction in the courts. While considering the question of territorial jurisdiction, it is vital, or rather, important to consider the competency of the court for deciding the subject matter of the dispute had the suit been filed instead of invocation of arbitration. One has to ascertain what are the questions forming the subject matter of reference to arbitration which resulted into award. Suppose, those questions arose in a suit, then one should try to find out which would be the competent court to decide such suits. 41. In the aforesaid context, we may straightway refer to and rely upon a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Brahmani River Pellets Limited v. Kamchi Industries Limited (Civil Appeal No. 5850 of 2019, decided on 25th July 2019). We quote the relevant observations thus: "10. As per Section 2(2) of the Act, Part-I would apply to all arbitration where the place of arbitration is in India. Section 2(1) (e) of the Act defines "court" with reference to Part-I of the Act and would govern the place of arbitration. 11. In BALCO, the issue arose before the Constitution Bench was as to whether in international commercial arbitrations whose juridical or legal Seat of arbitration was outside India whether the provisions of Part-I of the Act would be applicable for grant of relief as held in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. and another (2002)4 SCC 105 . 11. In BALCO, the issue arose before the Constitution Bench was as to whether in international commercial arbitrations whose juridical or legal Seat of arbitration was outside India whether the provisions of Part-I of the Act would be applicable for grant of relief as held in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. and another (2002)4 SCC 105 . The Constitution Bench in BALCO held that "if the legal or juridical seat of arbitration is outside India, then Part-I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall be inapplicable to such arbitrations; and even in case a clause in the arbitration agreement purports to apply Part-I of the 1996 Act to an arbitration where the juridical seat of arbitration is outside India, Part-I shall be inapplicable to the extent inconsistent with the arbitration law of the seat of arbitration. 12. In BALCO, the court highlighted the distinction between the "Seat" and "Venue" in the context of Section 20(3) of the Act. Section 20(3) of the Act allows the parties to hold meetings, proceedings and hearings at any place agreed by the parties. In BALCO, the court has held that in an international commercial arbitration "seated" in India, parties may by mutual agreement, hold arbitral proceedings outside India. This, however, would not have the effect of changing the Seat of arbitration which would continue to remain in India. The court then envisages a situation where the arbitration agreement designates a foreign Seat and also selects Arbitration Act, 1996 as the law applicable to the conduct of arbitration proceedings and in such circumstances, hearing of the arbitration conducted at the venue fixed by the parties would not have the effect of changing the Seat of arbitration which would remain in India. In para (100), the Supreme Court held as under: "100. True, that in an international commercial arbitration, having a seat in India, hearings may be necessitated outside India. In such circumstances, the hearing of the arbitration will be conducted at the venue fixed by the parties, but it would not have the effect of changing the seat of arbitration which would remain in India. True, that in an international commercial arbitration, having a seat in India, hearings may be necessitated outside India. In such circumstances, the hearing of the arbitration will be conducted at the venue fixed by the parties, but it would not have the effect of changing the seat of arbitration which would remain in India. The legal position in this regard is summed up by Redfern and Hunter, The Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (1986) at p. 69 in the following passage under the heading "The Place of Arbitration": This, in our view, is the correct depiction of the practical considerations and the distinction between "seat" [Sections 20(1) and 20(2)] and "venue" [Section 20(3)]. We may point out here that the distinction between "seat" and "venue" would be quite crucial in the event, the arbitration agreement designates a foreign country as the "seat"/"place" of the arbitration and also selects the Arbitration Act, 1996 as the curial law/law governing the arbitration proceedings. It would be a matter of construction of the individual agreement to decide whether: (i) the designated foreign "seat" would be read as in fact only providing for a "venue"/"place" where the hearings would be held, in view of the choice of the Arbitration Act, 1996 as being the curial law, OR (ii) the specific designation of a foreign seat, necessarily carrying with it the choice of that country's arbitration/curial law, would prevail over and subsume the conflicting selection choice by the parties of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Only if the agreement of the parties is construed to provide for the "seat"/"place" of arbitration being in India - would Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 be applicable. If the agreement is held to provide for a "seat"/"place" outside India, Part I would be inapplicable to the extent inconsistent with the arbitration law of the seat, even if the agreement purports to provide that the Arbitration Act, 1996 shall govern the arbitration proceedings." 13. As pointed out earlier, Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines the "Court" with reference to the term "subject-matter of the suit". As per Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, if the "subject-matter of the suit" is situated within the arbitral jurisdiction of two or more courts, the parties can agree to confine the jurisdiction in one of the competent courts. As pointed out earlier, Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines the "Court" with reference to the term "subject-matter of the suit". As per Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, if the "subject-matter of the suit" is situated within the arbitral jurisdiction of two or more courts, the parties can agree to confine the jurisdiction in one of the competent courts. In para (96) of BALCO, the Supreme Court held that the term "subject-matter" in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act is to identify the court having supervisory control over the arbitral proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the provisions in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act has to be read in conjunction with Section 20 of the Act which give recognition to the autonomy of the parties as to "place of arbitration". The observations in para No. (96) in BALCO pertaining to arbitrations governed by Part-I of the Act i.e. where the "place of arbitration" in India read as under:- "96. .......We are of the opinion, the term "subject-matter of the arbitration" cannot be confused with "subject-matter of the suit". The term "subject-matter" in Section 2(1)(e) is confined to Part I. It has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render Section 20 nugatory. In our view, the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral process. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral process. For example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the parties are from Delhi, (Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place as between a party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata) and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the appeal against such an interim order under Section 37 must lie to the courts of Delhi being the courts having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal. This would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be performed under the contract were to be performed either at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place in Delhi. In such circumstances, both the courts would have jurisdiction i.e. the court within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the suit is situated and the courts within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution i.e. arbitration is located." 14. The above observations in para No. (96) is in the context that on many occasions, agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. In such circumstances, it was observed that the two courts would have jurisdiction that is the court within whose jurisdiction "subject-matter" of the suit is situated and the court within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution i.e. the "venue" of arbitration is located. 15. As per Section 20 of the Act, parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. Party autonomy has to be construed in the context of parties choosing a court which has jurisdiction out of two or more competent courts having jurisdiction. This has been made clear in the three-Judges Bench decision in Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2013) 9 SCC 32 . In the said case, respondent-Indian Oil Corporation Limited appointed M/s. Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. situated at Jaipur, Rajasthan as their consignment agent. The dispute arose between the parties as huge quantity of stock of lubricants could not be sold by the applicant and they could not be resolved amicably. Ltd. (2013) 9 SCC 32 . In the said case, respondent-Indian Oil Corporation Limited appointed M/s. Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. situated at Jaipur, Rajasthan as their consignment agent. The dispute arose between the parties as huge quantity of stock of lubricants could not be sold by the applicant and they could not be resolved amicably. In the said matter, clause 18 of the agreement between the parties provided that the agreement shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. The appellant-Swastik invoked clause 18 - arbitration clause and filed application under Section 11(6) of the Act before the Rajasthan High Court for appointment of arbitrator. The respondent contested the application made by Swastik inter alia by raising the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court in the matter. The plea of Indian Oil Corporation was that the agreement has been made subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata and Rajasthan High Court lacks the territorial jurisdiction in dealing with the application under Section 11(6) of the Act. The designated judge held that Rajasthan High Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 11(6) of the Act and gave liberty to Swastik to file the arbitration application in Calcutta High Court which order came to be challenged before the Supreme Court. Pointing out that the words like "alone", "only", "exclusive" or "exclusive jurisdiction" have not been used in the agreement and use of such words is not decisive and non-use of such words does not make any material difference as to the intention of the parties by having clause 18 of the agreement that the courts at Kolkata shall have the jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held as under:- "31. In the instant case, the appellant does not dispute that part of cause of action has arisen in Kolkata. What appellant says is that part of cause of action has also arisen in Jaipur and, therefore, the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court or the designate Judge has jurisdiction to consider the application made by the appellant for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11. Having regard to Section 11(12)(b) and Section 2(e) of the 1996 Act read with Section 20(c) of the Code, there remains no doubt that the Chief Justice or the designate Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has jurisdiction in the matter. Having regard to Section 11(12)(b) and Section 2(e) of the 1996 Act read with Section 20(c) of the Code, there remains no doubt that the Chief Justice or the designate Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has jurisdiction in the matter. The question is, whether parties by virtue of Clause 18 of the agreement have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts at Jaipur or, in other words, whether in view of Clause 18 of the agreement, the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court has been excluded? 32. For answer to the above question, we have to see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement which provides that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like "alone", "only", "exclusive" or "exclusive jurisdiction" have not been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference. The intention of the parties-by having Clause 18 in the agreement- is clear and unambiguous that the courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like Clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner. 33. A clause like this is not hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner. 33. The above view finds support from the decisions of this Court in Hakam Singh v. Gammon India Limited (1971) 1 SCC 286 , A.B.C. Laminart Private Limited v. A.B.C. Agencies (1989) 2 SCC 163 , R.S.D.V. Finance Corporation Private Limited v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Limited (1993) 2 SCC 130 , Angile Insulations v. Davy Ashomore India Limited (1995) 4 SCC 153 , Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Limited v. Rama Mishra (2002) 9 SCC 613, Hanil Era Textiles Limited v. Puromatic Filters Private Limited (2004) 4 SCC 671 and Balaji Coke Industry Private Limited v. Maa Bhagwati Coke Gujarat Private Limited (2009) 9 SCC 403 ." 16. In Swastik, the Supreme Court held that clause like (18) of the agreement will not be hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act and it is not forbidden by law nor it is against public policy. It was so held that as per Section 20 of the Act, parties are free to choose the place of arbitration. This "party autonomy" has to be construed in the context of choosing a court out of two or more courts having competent jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. 17. The inter-play between "Seat" and "place of arbitration" came up for consideration in the case of Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd. and others (2017) 7 SCC 678 . After referring to BALCO, Enercon (India) Limited and others v. Enercon GMBH and another (2014) 5 SCC 1 and Reliance Industries Limited and another v. Union of India (2014) 7 SCC 603 and also amendment to the Act pursuant to the Law Commission Report, speaking for the Bench Justice Nariman held as under:- "18. The amended Act, does not, however, contain the aforesaid amendments, presumably because the BALCO (2012) 9 SCC 552 judgment in no uncertain terms has referred to "place" as "juridical seat" for the purpose of Section 2(2) of the Act. It further made it clear that Sections 20(1) and 20(2) where the word "place" is used, refers to "juridical seat", whereas in Section 20(3), the word "place" is equivalent to "venue". It further made it clear that Sections 20(1) and 20(2) where the word "place" is used, refers to "juridical seat", whereas in Section 20(3), the word "place" is equivalent to "venue". This being the settled law, it was found unnecessary to expressly incorporate what the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has already done by way of construction of the Act. 19. A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to "seat" is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction - that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Sections 16 to 21 of CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment "seat" is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties. 20. It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for the parties to exclude all other courts. For an exhaustive analysis of the case law, see Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2013) 9 SCC 32 This was followed in a recent judgment in B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal v. Chhattisgarh Investment Ltd. (2015) 12 SCC 225 Having regard to the above, it is clear that Mumbai courts alone have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts in the country, as the juridical seat of arbitration is at Mumbai. This being the case, the impugned judgment is set aside. ......" 18. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the court at a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all other courts. This being the case, the impugned judgment is set aside. ......" 18. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the court at a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all other courts. In the present case, the parties have agreed that the "venue" of arbitration shall be at Bhubaneswar. Considering the agreement of the parties having Bhubaneswar as the venue of arbitration, the intention of the parties is to exclude all other courts. As held in Swastik, non-use of words like "exclusive jurisdiction", "only", "exclusive", "alone" is not decisive and does not make any material difference. 19. When the parties have agreed to have the "venue" of arbitration at Bhubaneswar, the Madras High Court erred in assuming the jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act. Since only Orissa High Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Act, the impugned order is liable to be set aside." 42. We may also refer to a decision of the Bombay High Court rendered in the case of Videocon Industries Limited v. JMC Projects (India) Limited, reported in AIR 2013 Bombay 192, wherein the following has been observed: "4. On conjoint reading of section 2(1)(e) with section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, it is clear that the expression "recourse to court against arbitral award" mentioned in section 34 read with section 2(1)(e) would mean that only such court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration if the same have been subject matter of the suit, would have jurisdiction to entertain such petition. In view of the admitted fact that the contract was awarded to the respondent outside the jurisdiction of this court and the work was carried out at Bharuch, Gujarat, the respondents were having their registered office at Ahmedabad, no cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this court, as defined under section 2(1)(e) of the Act. If the respondents who were the original claimants before the arbitral tribunal were required to file a suit if there was no arbitration cause, such suit could not have been filed within the jurisdiction of this court and thus petition under section 34 could not have been filed in this court merely on the ground that arbitration award was delivered at Mumbai. In my view, the situs of arbitration or that the award was made at particular place would not be relevant for conferring jurisdiction. It is only subject matter of the arbitration construed in the manner as if the arbitration proceeding was such that it would be determinative of the court having jurisdiction to entertain and hear the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996." 43. We have to our advantage a very exhaustive decision of the Delhi High Court on the subject rendered in the case of Dwarika Projects Limited v. Superintending Engineer, Karnal, PWD (B&R), Haryana (O.M.P. (Comm) No. 420 of 2017, decided on 10th May 2019), wherein the following has been observed: "20.1 It is, however, common ground between the parties that arbitration proceedings were held both in Delhi and Chandigarh as per the convenience of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal; though a majority were held in Delhi. That being said, to my mind, the number of proceedings held in one or the other city, in absolute terms, would not be a relevant factor in determining as to whether one or the other city was designated as the seat of arbitration. 20.2 What emerges from the record, though, is that neither did the parties agree to a jurisdictional place/seat as against a geographical location nor was a determination made by the Arbitral Tribunal in that behalf. The Arbitral Tribunal, however, in consultation with the parties and their respective counsel and as per their convenience held the arbitration proceedings both in Delhi and Chandigarh. Therefore, in my opinion, the mere fact that the arbitration proceedings were held, largely, in Delhi would not have me hold that the seat of arbitration was New Delhi. 20.3 The provisions of Section 20 of the 1996 Act, in this behalf, are both instructive and facilitative. While Sub-section (1) of Section 20 recognizes the freedom that the parties have to fix a jurisdictional place of their choice, Sub-section (2) of the very same Section confers this power on the Arbitral Tribunal where parties have failed to arrive at an agreement in that behalf. The Arbitral Tribunal can thus fix the jurisdictional place for the conduct of arbitration proceedings having regard to the circumstances of the case including the convenience of parties. The Arbitral Tribunal can thus fix the jurisdictional place for the conduct of arbitration proceedings having regard to the circumstances of the case including the convenience of parties. On the other hand, Sub-section (3) of Section 20 gives the leeway to the Arbitral Tribunal to meet at a place other than the jurisdictional place i.e. the seat of arbitration, for variety of reasons such as a consultation among members, for hearing witnesses, experts or parties or for inspection of documents, goods or other property. This leeway is, however, given, subject to parties agreeing to the contrary. Sub-section (3) of Section 20, thus, speaks purely about the venue of arbitration, which, in a given case, can be different from the jurisdictional place or seat of arbitration. 20.4 Since fixing of the jurisdictional place or seat of arbitration has consequences for parties including identification of the Court before which the Award could be challenged, the Arbitral Tribunal, to my mind, would have to take into account the say of the parties before concluding one way or another which should be the jurisdictional place or seat of arbitration. To put it plainly, the fixing of the venue of arbitration by the Arbitral Tribunal would not be the same thing as fixing jurisdictional place or seat of arbitration. The latter will have to have a deliberative component which would involve taking into account the stand of the parties. Parties cannot be taken by surprise and be told that the venue fixed for arbitration had morphed into the jurisdictional place or the seat of arbitration. Fixing of geographical location for conducting arbitration proceedings cannot be equated with an Arbitral Tribunal fixing a jurisdictional place or seat of arbitration. (See: observations made in M/s. HLL Lifecare Ltd. Vs. M/s. Happy Electricals, passed in OMP (COMM) 173/2018, dated 11.07.2018, paragraph 13.3). "13.3 That being the position, it is clear that the Patna High Court would have jurisdiction in the matter since the contract was performed at Patna. On the other hand, neither the parties nor the Arbitral Tribunal took upon itself the burden of fixing the seat of arbitration and, therefore, that attribute in terms of the judgment in Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited, could not be used to suggest that this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the captioned petition. On the other hand, neither the parties nor the Arbitral Tribunal took upon itself the burden of fixing the seat of arbitration and, therefore, that attribute in terms of the judgment in Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited, could not be used to suggest that this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the captioned petition. The fact that the learned Arbitrator fixed Delhi as the venue is not [the] same thing as saying that he had zeroed down on Delhi as the seat of Arbitration. Since, with the fixing of the place or seat of Arbitration, several legal consequences follow including that which pertains to identification of the Court that would regulate arbitration proceedings, (act such of an) (SIC; "such an act of an") Arbitrator has to have an element of deliberation involving the say of the parties at lis. 20.5 The Supreme Court in the matter Union of India vs. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) INC., has taken a somewhat similar view, as is evident from the following observations:- "38. Be it noted, the word "determination" requires a positive act to be done. In the case at hand, the only aspect that has been highlighted by Mr. C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel, is that the arbitrator held the meeting at Kuala Lumpur and signed the award. That, in our considered opinion, does not amount to determination. The clause is categorical. The sittings at various places are relatable to [the] venue. It cannot be equated with the seat of arbitration or place of arbitration which has a different connotation as has been held in Reliance Industries Ltd. (I), (II) (supra), Harmony Innovation Shipping Limited (supra) and in Roger Shashoua (supra). 39. The word "determination" has to be contextually determined. When a "place" is agreed upon, it gets the status of [a] seat which means the juridical seat. We have already noted that the terms "place" and "seat" are used interchangeably. When only the term "place" is stated or mentioned and no other condition is postulated, it is equivalent to "seat" and that finalises the facet of jurisdiction. But if a condition precedent is attached to the term "place", the said condition has to be satisfied so that the place can become equivalent to[a]seat. In the instant case, as there are two distinct and disjunct riders, either of them have to be satisfied to become a place. But if a condition precedent is attached to the term "place", the said condition has to be satisfied so that the place can become equivalent to[a]seat. In the instant case, as there are two distinct and disjunct riders, either of them have to be satisfied to become a place. As is evident, there is no agreement. As far as determination is concerned, there has been no determination. In Ashok Leyland Limited and State of T.N, the Court has reproduced the definition of "determination" from Law Lexicon, 2nd Edition by Aiyar, P. Ramanatha and Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition. The relevant paragraphs read thus:-- "Determination or order.-- The expression "determination" signifies an effective expression of opinion which ends a controversy or a dispute by some authority to whom it is submitted under a valid law for disposal. The expression "order" must have also a similar meaning, except that it need not operate to end the dispute. Determination or order must be judicial or quasi-judicial. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmi Chand (Constitution of India, Article 136)." "A "determination" is a "final judgment" for purposes of appeal when the trial court has completed its adjudication of the rights of the parties in the action. Thomas Van Dyken Joint Venture v. Van Dyken." 20.6 Notably, in Hardy Exploration and Production's case not only were the proceedings held in Kuala Lampur but the Award was signed in Kuala Lampur. The Supreme Court notwithstanding the aforesaid factors obtaining in the case ruled that Kuala Lampur was not the seat or jurisdictional place of arbitration. 20.7 The judgment of the Supreme Court in Enercon (India) Limited which was considered in Hardy Exploration and Production's case also establishes this principle. In Enercon (India) Limited's case, the clause in issue referred to London as the venue. The Supreme Court was, thus, called upon to determine as to whether the venue, in that case, could be equated with the seat of arbitration. The Court, after having regard to the indicators embedded in the contract including the fact that the parties had agreed that the applicability of the provisions of 1996 Act to the arbitration proceedings, came to the conclusion that the seat of arbitration would be in India and not where the venue was i.e. London. (See: paragraphs 97 to 105 of the judgment). (See: paragraphs 97 to 105 of the judgment). In particular, in the context of the instant case, the observations made in paragraphs 103 to 105, being apposite are extracted hereafter: "103. Having chosen all the three applicable laws to be Indian laws, in our considered opinion, the parties would not have intended to have created an exceptionally difficult situation, of extreme complexities, by fixing the seat of arbitration in London. 104. In view of the above, we are unable to accept the submissions made by Dr. Singhvi that in this case, the term "venue" ought to be read as [the] seat. 105. We are also unable to accept the submission made by Dr. Singhvi that in this case the venue should be understood as [a]reference to [a]place in the manner it finds mention in Section 20(1), as opposed to the manner it appears in Section 20(3) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1996. Such a submission cannot be accepted since the parties have agreed that curial law would be the Indian Arbitration Act, 1996." 44. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the court below committed no error in passing the impugned order. 45. In the result, this petition fails and is hereby rejected. 46. It shall be open for the petitioner to take an appropriate legal steps before the appropriate forum in accordance with law for the purpose of invoking Section 34 of the Act, 1996.

Inox Renewables Limited v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd.