JUDGMENT : M. Sathyanarayanan, J. (Prayer: Contempt Petition filed under Section 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act to punish the respondents for willful disobedience of the order dated 19.07.2013 made in W.A.No.414 of 2012.) 1. The petitioner herein is the writ petitioner in W.P.No.16851 of 2010 and the respondent in W.A.No.414 of 2012. The petitioner herein filed the said writ petition praying for quashment of the proceedings of the third respondent, namely the District Collector, Karur District dated 28.07.2003 and the proceedings of the second respondent, namely the Director of Rural Development, Chennai-15 and the Government Letter dated 14.05.2007, issued by the first respondent, namely the Secretary to Government, Rural Development and Panchayatraj Department, Chennai-9 and quash the same and for a consequential direction that the petitioner is deemed to be continuing in service in the post of Junior Assistant with effect from the date of reversion in the Karur District Rural Development Unit and salary from the date of the order with all benefits such as promotion on par with junior, which has been withheld on account of the penalties together with monetary benefits and disburse all the arrears within a short date that may be fixed by this Court. 2. The writ petition, after contest, came to be allowed as prayed for by directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service as Junior Assistant with all consequential benefits within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The official respondents in the writ petition, aggrieved by the allowing of the same, filed a Writ Appeal in W.A.No.414 of 2012 and a Division Bench of this Court consisting of The Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice and one of us [M.Sathyanarayanan, J.] has considered the grounds urged on behalf of the appellants and also noted the fact that criminal prosecution was also launched against the writ petitioner and awarding benefit of doubt, he was acquitted and the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State was also dismissed by this Court and having gone through the contents of the judgment, had also observed that he was acquitted honourably for want of evidence. The Division Bench of this Court had dismissed the writ appeal, vide judgment dated 19.07.2013, confirming the order passed in the writ petition and directed the appellants therein to comply with the order passed in the writ petition within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. 3. An order of reinstatement dated 03.10.2013 was passed in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner, alleging that full compliance of the order have not been done, came forward with this Contempt Petition. The Contempt Petition was entertained and notices were ordered. 4. The third respondent has filed a counter affidavit dated 08.11.2017 stating among other things that the petitioner, in order to get promotion from the post of Junior Assistant to Assistant, has to serve as Rural Welfare Officer-II for a period of one year as per the Service Rules of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department and also has to serve in the post of Junior Assistant/Cashier for a period of not less than one year and in respect of further promotion as Deputy Block Development Officer, the petitioner has to serve as Rural Welfare Officer (Grade-I) for a period of not less than one year and also has to serve as Assistant/Accountant for a minimum period of one year and without acquiring service qualification, cannot be promoted to subsequent post and for relaxation of rules, it has been forwarded to the Government and are under consideration. 5. When this Contempt Petition was listed on 07.12.2018, this Court has taken note of the communication dated 09.12.2013 sent by the District Collector, Karur to the Government Pleader, High Court, Madras and also taken note of the Compliance Affidavit dated 07.12.2018 and since the stand taken in the Compliance Affidavit did not amount to full compliance and further taking note of the submission made by the learned Government Advocate seeking time for reporting full compliance, adjourned the matter to 19.01.2019. 6. The third respondent in the Contempt Petition has filed a Compliance Report dated 18.01.2019 and as per the said Compliance Report, the punishment (reversion) period of the petitioner from 01.08.2003 to 03.10.2013 (10 years and 2 months) was regularized in the cadre of Junior Assistant and monetary benefits (arrears) of Rs.11,93,344/- for the above period was disbursed to the petitioner. The third respondent in the Contempt Petition has filed a Compliance Report dated 18.01.2019 and as per the said Compliance Report, the punishment (reversion) period of the petitioner from 01.08.2003 to 03.10.2013 (10 years and 2 months) was regularized in the cadre of Junior Assistant and monetary benefits (arrears) of Rs.11,93,344/- for the above period was disbursed to the petitioner. The petitioner has also submitted a representation dated 22.06.2016 to relax the Service Rule 3 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Development Sub-Ordinate Service Rules in favour of the petitioner and notionally promote him as Deputy Block Development Officer on par with his Junior and also to fix the pay from the date of his joining. Accordingly, vide G.O.Ms.No.612, Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department (Pa.A.4) dated 29.12.2017, orders have been issued relaxing the relevant service rules from acquiring service qualification for promotion and ordered to fix the pay of the petitioner under Sub-Rule 17 of Rule 27 of Fundamental Rules (F.R.) and in continuation of the said Government Order, the third respondent, vide proceedings dated 29.01.2018 has promoted the petitioner as Deputy Block Development Officer on part with his junior, notionally with effect from 05.11.2008 and paid monetary benefits from the date of his joining i.e., 17.02.2018. The third respondent, by placing reliance upon Sub-Rule 17 of Rule 27 of F.R. took a stand that the monetary benefits have been conferred upon the petitioner from the date of his joining in the post of Deputy Block Development Officer with effect from 17.02.2018 and as such, the petitioner cannot express any grievance and further took a stand that the orders passed by this Court have been fully complied with. 7. Mr.B.Vijay, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that admittedly, the petitioner has been promoted from the post of Junior Assistant to Assistant, for which monetary benefits have not been paid and that apart, for notional promotion given to him to the post of Deputy Block Development Officer with effect from 05.11.2008, monetary benefits have been paid only from the date of his joining to the said post on 17.02.2008 and for the period between 05.11.2008 to 16.02.2008 also he is entitled to monetary benefits. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the decision in Union of India and Others v. K.V.Jankiraman and Others [ AIR 1991 SC 2010 ] and would submit that in similar facts and circumstances, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to such cases where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his and as such, FR 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon yet another order rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 20.12.2011 made in W.P.No.48365 of 2006 [K.Ramachandran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, Rep. by its Secretary to Government, PWD, Chennai-9 and another] and would submit that similar view has been taken and in the facts and circumstances of the case, Sub-Rule 17 of F.R.27 have no application. 8. Per contra, Mrs.Narmadha Sampath, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents would submit that whatever benefits the petitioner is entitled in terms of the orders passed by this Court in the writ petition, as confirmed in the writ appeal, have to be complied with within the four corners of law and also drawn the attention of this Court to the entries made in the service record of the petitioner and would submit that the petitioner has been give notional promotion and his pay has been fixed in the post of Deputy Block Development Officer in the Time Scale of Rs.60,900/- with effect from 01.10.2017 and as such, he cannot express any grievance and would further add that the orders passed by this Court have been complied with in letter and spirit. 9. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions and also perused the entire materials placed before it. 10. It is to be noted at this juncture that the writ petition filed by the petitioner herein for various reliefs came to be allowed in toto and the said order has also been confirmed in the writ appeal. The Division Bench of this Court, in the said judgment, has also noted that the petitioner, who was facing criminal prosecution, was acquitted honourably. 11. The Division Bench of this Court, in the said judgment, has also noted that the petitioner, who was facing criminal prosecution, was acquitted honourably. 11. In Union of India and Others v. K.V.Jankiraman and Others [ AIR 1991 SC 2010 ], the following questions arose for consideration: (1) What is the date from which it can be said that disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against an employee? (2) What is the course to be adopted when the employee is held guilty in such proceedings, if the guilt merits punishment other than that of dismissal? (3) To what benefits an employee who is completely or partially exonerated is entitled to and from which date? The “sealed cover procedure” is adopted when an employee is due for promotion, increment etc., but disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against him at the relevant time and hence the findings of his entitlement to the benefit are kept in a sealed cover to be opened after the proceedings in question are over. One of the questions arose for consideration was that when the employee was completely exonerated on culmination of the disciplinary/Court proceedings, what are the benefits to be granted to him? The Hon’ble Apex Court, after extracting F.R.17(1), concluded as follows: 7...It was further contended on their behalf that the normal rule is “no work no pay”. Hence a person cannot be allowed to draw the benefits of a post the duties of which he has not discharged. To allow him to do so is against the elementary rule that a person is to be paid only for the work he bas done and not for the work he has not done. As against this, it was pointed out on behalf of the concerned employees, that on many occasions even frivolous proceedings are instituted at the instance of interested persons, sometimes with a specific object of denying the promotion due, and the employee concerned is made to suffer both mental agony and privations which are multiplied when he is also placed Under suspension. When, therefore, at the end of such sufferings, he comes out with a clean bill, he has to be restored to all the benefits from which he was kept away unjustly. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. When, therefore, at the end of such sufferings, he comes out with a clean bill, he has to be restored to all the benefits from which he was kept away unjustly. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases. (Emphasis Supplied) We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not ‘found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings. However, there may be cases’ where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down’ an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardise public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. While, therefore, we do not approve of the said last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz. “but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion”, we direct that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum: “However, whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what extent, will be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution. Where the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so.” (Emphasis Supplied) The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the above cited decision, had observed that “disciplinary/criminal proceedings are delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. 12. In Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh [ AIR 1962 SC 1334 ], the facts of the said case would disclose among other things that the order of dismissal passed against the public servant was declared as invalid by a Civil Court and denovo enquiry was ordered and challenge was made to the said procedure. The Hon’ble Apex Court, after extracting Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules framed by the State of Uttar Pradesh under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, held as follows: This rule has no application to cases like the present in which the dismissal of a public servant is declared invalid by a civil court and he is reinstated. This rule, undoubtedly enables the State Government to fix the pay of a public servant whose dismissal is set aside in a departmental appeal. This rule, undoubtedly enables the State Government to fix the pay of a public servant whose dismissal is set aside in a departmental appeal. But in this case the order of dismissal was declared invalid in a civil suit. The effect of the decree of the civil suit was that the appellant was never to be deemed to have been lawfully dismissed from service and the order of reinstatement was superfluous. The effect of the adjudication of the civil court is to declare that the appellant had been wrongfully prevented from attending to his duties as public servant. It would not in such a contingency be open to the authority to deprive the public servant of the remuneration which he would have earned had he been permitted to work. In the case on hand, the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner has been set aside by this Court in the writ petition with a consequential direction for conferment of all attendant benefits and challenge made to the said order by the official respondents had also ended in dismissal in the writ appeal. In the light of the above cited proposition, it is not open to the authority to deprive the public servant of the remuneration which he would have earned had he been permitted to work and therefore, the said decision would be applicable to the facts of this case. 13. In the proceedings of the third respondent dated 29.01.2018 in Na.Ka.Pav9/113/2018, while applying Sub-Rule 17 of F.R.27, the above said aspects have not been taken into consideration and even in paragraph No.3 of the Compliance Affidavit of the third respondent dated 18.01.2019, the reasons for granting monetary benefits from the date of joining of the petitioner on 17.02.2018 as Deputy Block Development Officer have not been clearly stated except by placing reliance upon the said Rule. The proceedings of the third respondent dated 29.01.2018 and the contents of the Compliance Report dated 18.01.2019 also do not throw light as to the conferment of monetary benefits to the petitioner while notionally promoting him to the said post and it is also silent as regards conferment of monetary benefits while notionally promoting him from the post of Assistant to Deputy Block Development Officer. 14. 14. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, the third respondent is directed to consider the claim of the petitioner afresh as to the above said observations and findings and pass appropriate orders within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and communicate the decision taken, to the petitioner. 15. The Contempt Petition is disposed of accordingly.