JUDGMENT : – The victim/appellant has preferred the present appeal under section 372 of Cr.P.C., being aggrieved with the judgment of acquittal dated 13-6-2019 passed by learned District Judge, Sheopur in S.T.No. 75/2017 whereby respondents No. 1 and 2 have been acquitted from charge of offences under sections 341, 354-D(1)(i), 506 Part II and 509 of IPC and sections 11(1)/12 and 11(4)/12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the POCSO Act’). 2. Precisely stated case of prosecution is that victim aged 17 years lodged a complaint at Police Station, Karahal District Sheopur with the allegations that on 6-8-2017 around 8:30 a.m. when she was coming back with her friend Ranu Tiwari from tuition at Tomar Sir’s place and reached Kali Mata temple then the accused persons came on a motorcycle from back side and obstructed the path of victim and made explicit sexual overtures. They expressed their obscene gesture by commenting that she looks good and they love her. Complainant and her friend became frightened and they were told not to narrate the incident to anybody otherwise they will face dire consequences and threatened for death. They returned back to her home and victim narrated the incident to her parents. Thereafter, she along with her father Kamalkishore reached Police Station Karahal District Sheopur where FIR got registered at crime No. 120/2017 for offence under sections 354-D, 341, 506 of IPC and section 11(1) and 12 of the POCSO Act and investigation started. 3. Investigating Officer Sunil Sharma (PW-7) prepared spot map and statement of victim taken under section 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C. Document of admission register of victim was taken for age determination. Accused persons were arrested and statements of other witnesses were recorded. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused persons for the offences narrated above. 4. Trial Court framed the charge under sections 341, 354-D(1)(i), 506 Part II and 509 of IPC and sections 11(1) read with section 12 and 11(4) read with section 12 of the POCSO Act. Accused persons abjured their guilt and demanded for trial and therefore trial conducted. Accused took defence of false implication because of land dispute. On behalf of prosecution total eight witnesses were examined and on behalf of defence total three witnesses were examined. 5. Accused persons abjured their guilt and demanded for trial and therefore trial conducted. Accused took defence of false implication because of land dispute. On behalf of prosecution total eight witnesses were examined and on behalf of defence total three witnesses were examined. 5. After framing questions and appreciating the evidence (oral as well as documentary), trial Court came to the conclusion about innocence of accused and did not find the case of prosecution as proved beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, acquittal was recorded in favour of accused persons/respondents No. 1 and 2. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court, victim (referred as Miss X in the cause title just to protect her identity), preferred the instant appeal. It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellant/victim that trial Court grossly erred in coming to the conclusion while recording innocence of respondents No. 1 and 2 and caused illegality. Learned counsel referred the conclusion drawn by the trial Court in para 15 by narrating important omissions and contradictions which according to counsel for the appellant are nothing but perversity. 7. It is the submission of counsel for the appellant that all nine omissions and contradictions tried to be established by the trial Court while reaching to the conclusion about acquittal based upon perversity because omissions and contradictions were never existed to such extent where finding of acquittal could have been given by the trial Court. He referred contents of FIR (Ex-P/1 as well as Ex-P/5) and statements of victim under section 161 (Ex-D/3) and 164 (Ex-D/2) of Cr.P.C. and her Court statement as PW-2 which are almost on same page and no sufficient variation and omission existed in such documents. 8. It is further submitted that defence produced uncle of victim Parmanand Mudgal (DW-1) as witness, who referred the fact that the land dispute was going on between father of victim and father of accused Santosh Sharma (Ramsewak Sharma), therefore, through this evidence, defence tried to prove the case that it was motivated case at the instance of victim and her family just to exert pressure whereas no document was ever produced in respect of land related dispute and in absence of such documentary evidence, conclusion of trial Court is erroneous. 9. 9. It is submitted that the trial Court erred in recording acquittal ignoring the oral testimony of prosecution witnesses and believing the testimony of defence witnesses ignoring the factual and legal position that defence witnesses are not reliable witnesses in absence of any cogent document and in absence of establishing his bona fide as defence witness No. 1. Criminal antecedents of father of victim cannot be a ground for reaching to the conclusion of innocence of accused persons because no logical purpose exists for connecting the criminal past of father of victim with innocence of accused persons. It is to be tried and tested on the anvil of evidence produced and oral evidence is sufficient in the case to reach to the conclusion about guilt of accused persons. He prayed for setting aside of the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court in favour of respondents No. 1 and 2 and prayed for conviction of accused persons and awarding of proper sentence to them. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent /State did not oppose the prayer and supported the arguments of appellant, although no separate appeal has been preferred so far by the State against the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court. 11. Learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2/accused vehemently opposed the prayer and submitted that trial Court rightly passed the impugned judgment and acquittal has been recorded. It is submission of learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 that sufficient omissions and contradictions surfaced in the record to indicate that prosecution did not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt whereas it was duty of the prosecution to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. 12. Learned counsel also raised the point of existence of previous land related dispute between the parties and submitted that because of this dispute, instant case was registered and therefore, trial Court rightly passed the judgment of acquittal and based its findings on the basis of evidence led by the parties. Defence witnesses sufficiently projected the case of accused persons, therefore, trial Court rightly appreciated it. 13. It is further submitted that father of victim was of a tainted background and he bears criminal antecedents. Defence witnesses sufficiently projected the case of accused persons, therefore, trial Court rightly appreciated it. 13. It is further submitted that father of victim was of a tainted background and he bears criminal antecedents. Certain documents were also placed on record which have been exhibited from Ex-D/5 to D/8 which indicates reference of his criminal past, therefore, it is highly probable that he was instrumental in false implication of respondents No. 1 and 2. She prayed for dismissal of appeal. 14. Alternatively, she submitted that if this Court ultimately comes to the conclusion about implication of respondents No. 1 and 2 in any manner then either matter be remanded back to the trial Court or leniency be shown in awarding the sentence to respondents No. 1 and 2. Reliance has been placed by counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 on the judgment of Bombay High Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra vs. Shivaji Haribhau Jirase, ILL Online. 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the evidence available on record. 16. It is the case where trial conducted for the offence under sections 341, 354-D(1)(i), 506 Part II and 509 of IPC and sections 11(1) read with section 12 and 11(4) read with section 12 of the POCSO Act and thereafter Learned Trial Judge acquitted respondents No. 1 and 2 from the charge so framed and allegations so levelled, mainly on Three Grounds; one is regarding Omissions and Contradictions crept into the evidence of prosecution witnesses, another is Previous Enmity shared by the family of complainant and accused and Third is criminal record of father of victim/complainant. 17. 17. So far as the allegations regarding omission and contradictions crept into statements of prosecution witnesses specifically victim (PW-2) is concerned, it would be apposite to reproduce FIR Ex-P/1 (Ex-P/5 also), statement under sections 161 (Ex-D/3) and 164 (Ex-D/2) of Cr.P.C. and Court statement of victim (PW-2) for ready reference : FIR ^^Qfj;kfn;k nkfeuh iq=h deyfd'kksj eqnxy mez 17 lky fuoklh djkgy us e; vius firk ds mifLFkr Fkkuk vkdj tqokuh fjiksVZ fd;k fd eSa d{kk 12oha dh Nk=k gwaA rksej lj ds ;gka i ढus tkrh gwaA djhc 3&4 fnu ls larks"k 'kekZ o /kesZUæ xkSre esjk ihNk dj jgs FksA vkt fnukad 06-08-2017 ds lqcg djhc 08-30 cts dh ckr gS fd eSa i&#2338dj ykSV jgh Fkh esjs lkFk esjh lgsyh jkuw frokjh Fkh ge dkyhekrk eafnj ds ikl igqaps rHkh ihNs ls larks"k o /kesZUæ nksuksa eksVjlkbfdy ls esjs lkeus vk x;s rFkk esjk jkLrk jksdfy;k o xans xans b'kkjs djus yxs vkSj cksys fd rqe eq>s cgqr vPNh yxrh gks ge rqels I;kj djrs gSaA eSa vkSj esjh nksLr nksuks Mj x;s FksA ge ogka ls vkus yxs rks nksuks cksy jgs Fks fd fdlh dks Hkh crk;k rks tku ls [kRe dj nsaxsA fQj ge Mjdj ?kj vk;s vkSj eSaus iwjh ckr vius eEeh ikik dks crkbZA rc ikik ds lkFk fjiksVZ djus vkbZ gw¡A lks fjiksVZ djrh gwaA dk;Zokgh dh tkosA** Statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. ^^uke & nkfeuh iq=h dey fd'kksj eqnxy mez 17 o"kZ fuoklh djkgy Fkkuk djkgyA us nj;kIr gky ij crk;k fd eSa dLCkk djkgy esa jgrh gwaA d{kk 12 dh Nk=k gwaA dLok djkgy esa gh rksej lj dh dksfpax iढrh gawA djhc 3&4 fnu ls larks"k 'kekZ o /kesZUæ xkSre dLck djkgy ds gh esjk ihNk dj jgs FksA vkt fnukad 6-8-2017 ds lqcg 8-30 cts dh ckr gSA fd eSa dksfpax ls i&#2338dj ykSV jgh Fkh esjs lkFk esjh lgsyh jkuw frokjh Hkh Fkh ge nksuksa tSls gh ckbZ ikl jksM ls dkyhekrk eafnj ds ikl iagqps rHkh ihNs ls larks"k rFkk /kesZUæ nksuks eksVjlkbfdy ls esjs lkeus vk x;s rFkk esjk jkLrk jksd fy;k o xans&xans b'kkjs djus yxs] vkSj eq>ls cksys fd rqe eq>s cgqr vPNh yxrh gksA ge rqels I;kj djrs gS eSa o esjh lgsyh nksuks Mj xbZA ge yksx ogka ls vkus yxs rks nksuks cksy jgs FksA fd fdlh dks Hkh crk;k rks tku ls [kRe dj nsxsa fQj ge nksuks Mj dj ?kj vk;s vkSj eSusa iwjh ckr vius eEeh ikik dks crkbZ rc ikik ds lkFk fjiksVZ djus vkbZ gawA viuh fjiksVZ ij dk;Zokgh pkgrh gawA^^Statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C.^^Á'u & vki dkSu lh Dykl es i&#2338rh gks\mRrj & eSa d{kk 12oha esa i&#2338rh gwaAÁ'u & vki ;gka D;ksa vkbZ gSa\mRrj & eSa U;k;ky; esa c;ku nsus vkbZ gwaAÁ'u & lgh cksyuk pkfg, ;k >wB\mRrj & lR; cksyuk pkfg,AuksV & lk{kh ls iwNs x;s Á'uks ds mRrjksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq,] lk{kh Á'uksa dks le>dj] muds mRrj nsus esa l{ke Árhr gksrh gSA vr% lk{kh ds cky lk{kh gksus ls mls fcuk 'kiFk fnyk;s mldk ijh{k.k vkjaHk fd;k x;kAlk{kh dks voxr djk;k x;k fd og dFku djus gsrq ck/; ugha gSA og LosPN;k tks dFku djuk pkgs] dj ldrh gSA lk{kh us Lor% ?kVukØe ds laca/k esa dFku djus dh lgefr nhA lk{kh ds gkoHkko ls ÁdV gksrk gS fd og LosPN;k 'kiFk ij dFku djuk pkgrh gSA vr% mlds dFku ys[kc) fd;s tk jgs gSAdFku¼1½ eSa xzke djkgy esa vius ekrk firk ds lkFk jgrh gwa ,oa d{kk 12oha dh ,xzhdYpj fo"k; dh Nk=k gawA eSa rksej lj ds ;gka lqcg 06-30 cts ls 08-30 cts rd dksfpax i&#2338rh gwa esjs lkFk esjh lgsyh jkuw frokjh Hkh tkrh gSA djkgy esa gh larks"k 'kekZ eksckbZy dh nqdku djrk gS vkSj mlh ds lkFk /kesZUæ xkSre jgrk gSA foxr pkj&ikap fnu ls larks"k 'kekZ vkSj /kesZUæ xkSre gekjk ihNk djrs gSa vkSj gesa ijs'kku djrs gSaA¼2½ eSa fnukad 06-08-2017 dks lqcg 08-30 cts dksfpax i&#2338dj viuh lgsyh jkuw ds lkFk ykSV jgh Fkh] rc dkyh ekrk eafnj ds ikl igqapus ij /kesZUæ tks eksVjlk;dy pyk jgk Fkk vkSj mDr eksVjlk;dy ij ihNs larks"k 'kekZ cSBk gqvk Fkk] us vkdj gekjs lkeus eksVjlk;dy yxk nh vkSj /kesZUæ eq>ls cksyk fd rqe eq>s vPNh yxrh gks] eSa rqEgsa I;kj djrk gwa vkSj larks"k cksyk fd rw vktk vkSj /kesZUæ ds lkFk jgus yxs rFkk nksuksa eq>s xans b'kkjs djus yxs vkSj vius gksaBks ij gkFk j[kdj Q~ykbax fdl djus yxs] tc eSaus vkSj esjh lgsyh us fojks/k fd;k] ;|fi ge nksuksa Mj x, Fks rFkk geus dgk fd ge vius ?kj ij crk,axs] rks /kesZUæ ,oa larks"k nksuksa gh dgus yxs fd ;fn ?kj ij crk;k rks ge tku ls [kRe dj nsaxsA¼3½ fQj eSa viuh lgsyh ds lkFk vius ?kj igqaph rFkk viuh eka dks iwjh ?kVuk crkbZ rFkk fQj esjh eka us firkth dks crkbZ] fQj esjs firk eq>s Fkkus ys x,] tgka eSaus fjiksVZ fy[kkbZ vkSj vkt viuh pkph :De.kh 'kekZ ds lkFk c;ku nsus U;k;ky; esa vkbZ gawA^^Chief Examination/Court statement of victim (PW-2):^^¼01½ eSa gkftj vnkyr vkjksihx.k larks"k vkSj /kesZUæ dks tkurh gwaA eSaus bl o"kZ d{kk&12oha dh ijh{kk nh gSA eSaus lu~ 2016 esa gkbZLdwy ikl fd;k gSA esjh tUefnukad 09 vxLr 2000 gSA ?kVuk 9&10 ekg iwoZ vxLr 2017 dh ?kVuk gSA lqcg 8-00 cts dh ?kVuk gSA eSa rksej lj ds ;gka ls bafXy'k dh dksfpax i&#2338dj okfil ?kj vk jgh Fkh] esjs lkFk esjh lgsyh jkuw frokjh Hkh vk jgh Fkh] tks viuh ekSlh ds ;gka tk jgh FkhA jkLrs esa dkyh ekrk eafnj ds ikl vkjksih larks"k us esjs vkxs ckbZd yxk nh ftlds ihNs /kesZUæ cSBk FkkA mDr nksuksa vkjksihx.k esjh rjQ xans&xans b'kkjs djus yxs] rks eSaus buls dgk fd eSa ?kj ij f'kdk;r d:axh] rks nksuksa cksys fd ?kj ij crk;k rks eSa tku ls ekj nwaxkA ;s yksx cnrehth dj jgs Fks vkSj rhu&pkj fnu ls ijs'kku dj jgs FksA tc eSa ?kj ls fudyrh rks mDr nksuksa vkjksihx.k esjs ihNs vkxs gksdj ihNk djrsA ¼02½ ?kVuk ds le; vkjksih /kesZUæ ckbZd ls esjk gkFk idMus dh dksf'k'k dj jgk Fkk rFkk vkjksih larks"k ckbZd pyk jgk Fkk bl dkj.k og ckbZd ij vkxs cSBk FkkA lk{kh ls ;g iwNs tkus ij fd fdl Ádkj ds xans b'kkjs dj jgs Fks rks mlus dgk fd Q~ykbZax fdl dj jgs Fks vkSj gkFk idMus dh dksf'k'k dj jgs FksA /kesZUæ dh eksckby dh nqdku gS rks og dgrk gS esjh nqdku ij vk tkukA fQj eSa rFkk esjh lgsyh jkuw Mj ds dkj.k Hkkxdj ?kj vk x;s] rc Hkh vkjksihx.k us esjk ihNk fd;kA fQj eSaus ?kVuk ds ckjs esa ?kj vkdj eEeh dks crk;kA fQj esjh eEeh us ikik dks crk;kA mlds ckn eSa vkSj esjs eEeh ikik Fkkuk djkgy fjiksVZ djus ds fy;s x;s FksA fjiksVZ ikik us fy[kkbZ FkhA fjiksVZ Án'kZ ih&1 ds , ls , Hkkx ds e/; esjs gLrk{kj gSA ¼03½ mlds ckn ';ksiqj c;ku nsus ds fy;s dksVZ esa vxys fnu vk;s FksA eftLVªsV lkgc ds ;gka esjk dFku gqvk FkkA eSaus iqfyl dks ?kVukLFky ij x;k Fkk] rc iqfyl us esjh fu'kknsgh ls ?kVukLFky dk uD'kkekSdk Án'kZ ih&2 cuk;k Fkk] ftlds , ls , Hkkx ds e/; esjs gLrk{kj gSaA¼04½ vkt d{kk&10 dh ekdZ'khV eSa vius lkFk ykbZ gwa] bldh Nk;kÁfr iqfyl ds }kjk igys tIr dh xbZ FkhA gkbZLdwy dh vadlwph Án'kZ ih&3 gS ftldh lR;kfir Áfr Án'kZ ih&3lh gS] tks Ádj.k esa layXu gSAuksV & vfHk;kstu dh vksj ls Jh ,eŒMhŒ lksuh us lk{kh dks i{kfojks/kh ?kksf"kr djds Áfrijh{k.k esa iwNs tk ldus okys Á'u iwNus dh vuqefr pkghA lk{kh dh lk{; dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq;s vfHk;kstu dks Áfrijh{k.k esa iwNs tk ldus okys Á'u iwNus dh vuqefr nh tkrh gSA¼05½ ;g ckr lgh gS fd vkjksih /kesZUæ us ,slk cksyk Fkk fd rqe eq>s vPNh yxrh gks eSa rqEgsa I;kj djrk gwaA ;g ckr lgh gS fd fjiksVZ eSaus fy[kkbZ Fkh] mlds ckn eSaus fjiksVZ ij gLrk{kj fd;s FksA^^18. Now omissions and contradictions referred by the trial Court in para 15 of the impugned judgment would be decided on the anvil of omissions and contradictions if any. <UL>Regarding omission/contradiction No. 1 In this clause perusal of FIR, statements under section 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C. and Court statements are without any material contradiction because in FIR she referred time of incident as 8:30 a.m., in statement under section 161 of Cr.P.C. she referred the time as 8:30 a.m., in statement under section 164 of Cr.P.C. as 8:30 a.m. but in Court statement she referred the time of incident as 8:00 am. Since FIR, statements under sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C. were in close proximity (within two days), therefore, she referred the correct time of incident, but Court statement held after almost 10 months, therefore, minor variation may crop up. That variation is only of 30 minutes and not much regarding time span. In other aspect, she remained firm about the fact that she was coming from her coaching classes with her friend Ranu Tiwari (PW-3). Therefore, the trial Judge grossly erred in coming to the conclusion treating the said omission or contradictions as major omission and contradiction. </UL><UL>Regarding omission/contradiction No. 2 In this clause, trial Court considered omissions and contradictions that in her Court statement victim referred the fact that her friend Ranu Tiwari (PW-3) was going to her Maushi’s place but the said fact has not been narrated by her in FIR and both her statements but on close security it is also an immaterial contradiction because FIR is information of incident at the first instance and therefore, FIR need not to contain minutest of details. Here, the victim categorically referred the fact that she and her friend Ranu Tiwari (PW-3) were coming back from coaching classes. Where the Ranu Tiwari (PW-3) was going, was immaterial because the point of significance is that both were coming together, therefore, if after 10 months in her Court statement victim explained the incident, which has no material bearing over the fact situation thus it cannot be treated as omission and contradiction. The Sessions Judge adopted hyper technical approach. Where the Ranu Tiwari (PW-3) was going, was immaterial because the point of significance is that both were coming together, therefore, if after 10 months in her Court statement victim explained the incident, which has no material bearing over the fact situation thus it cannot be treated as omission and contradiction. The Sessions Judge adopted hyper technical approach. </UL><UL>Regarding omission/contradiction No. 3 In this clause, the facts regarding driver and pillion rider of motorcycle were discussed and it is true that for the first time in her Court statement, she referred the fact that Santosh was driving the motorcycle whereas in statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. she referred the fact that Dharmendra was driving the vehicle and prior to it in FIR and in statement under section 161 of Cr.P.C. she did not mention the fact specifically. It is also true that in Court statement of victim (PW-2), she referred the fact that Santosh Sharma was driving the motorcycle whereas Dharmendra was sitting behind as pillion rider, therefore, some contradiction cropped up here between the Court statement and statement under section 164 of Cr.P.C. but that omission is not material omission because it is duty of trial Court to sift the chaff from the grains and here as stated earlier significant aspect of consideration is the Event which precipitated the offence and whether witnesses sufficiently explained in their Court statements as per their earlier statements or whether those facts corroborate with other ocular or documentary evidence or not. Here, such minor contradiction does not hold ground to the benefit of accused because of succeeding analysis. </UL><UL>Regarding omission/contradiction No. 4 In this clause, learned Sessions Judge found contradiction between FIR Ex-P/1 and police statement Ex-D/3 vis-a-vis Court statement of victim (PW-2). Here, this Court intends to clarify that trial Court totally proceeded with blind fold and caused sheer perversity ignoring the evidence surfaced in the record. FIR Ex-P/1 categorically contains the fact that the accused persons/respondents No. 1 and 2 were chasing the victim for last 3-4 days. The same fact has been narrated in her police statement under section 161 of Cr.P.C. Ex-D/3 and this fact also reproduced by the victim in her examination-in-chief when she made this statement in para 1 of chief examination. Even, this fact finds place in statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. also. The same fact has been narrated in her police statement under section 161 of Cr.P.C. Ex-D/3 and this fact also reproduced by the victim in her examination-in-chief when she made this statement in para 1 of chief examination. Even, this fact finds place in statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. also. How trial Court reached to such conclusion is not explained and therefore, it is a case where trial Court caused perversity. </UL><UL>Regarding omission/contradiction No. 5 Here again, trial Court treaded on the same path for committing perversity. In this clause, trial Court concludes that regarding criminal intimidation of accused no ingredients are available in FIR as well as in police statement whereas this fact finds place in Court statement. Said observation suffers from sheer perversity because perusal of FIR Ex-P/1 and police statement Ex-D/3 and even statement under section 164 of Cr.P.C. Ex-D/2 as well as Court statement, all contain this fact that both the accused intimidated the victim by giving threat of facing dire consequences¼tku ls [kRe dj nsaxs½ and therefore, how the conclusion has been drawn by the trial Judge is beyond the wisdom of a prudent mind. </UL><UL>Regarding omissions/contradictions No. 6 In this clause, the fact regarding holding of hand by accused Dharmendra has been referred. It is true that in examination-in-chief, the victim has narrated the fact that accused Dharmendra tried to catch hold of her hand and this fact has not been mentioned in FIR as well as in police statement but as explained earlier, this is minor omission and if said fact has been explained by the victim in her Court statement, then it does not render the contents of FIR and police statement as doubtful because whole story has been narrated by the victim in unrebutted fashion. </UL><UL>Regarding omission/contradiction No. 7 In this clause, trial Court gave the benefit of doubt to the accused persons/respondents No. 1 and 2 on the ground that in FIR and police statement, victim has nowhere referred that accused were giving her flying kiss and she referred the fact of flying kiss in her Court statement only. </UL><UL>Regarding omission/contradiction No. 7 In this clause, trial Court gave the benefit of doubt to the accused persons/respondents No. 1 and 2 on the ground that in FIR and police statement, victim has nowhere referred that accused were giving her flying kiss and she referred the fact of flying kiss in her Court statement only. On perusal of all the statements reproduced above, it is apparently clear that in FIR she has referred the fact that they (accused persons) obstructed her path and made explicit sexual overtures¼Hkn~ns&Hkn~ns b'kkjs½ which has been reproduced by her in her police statement as well as statement under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code and in her statement under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code she explained that they were giving her flying kiss by putting their hand over their lips. Thereafter, in her Court statement she reproduced the said allegation by saying that they made explicit sexual overtures and given her flying kiss and tried to catch hold of her hand. These are nothing but ingredients of offence under section 354 of Indian Penal Code under different heads and when FIR was registered on 6-8-2017 and police statement under section 161 of Criminal Procedure Code/statement under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code were taken on 8-8-2018 then she was not required to explain each and every action of the accused persons. Still she concisely narrated her plight and later on explained in Court statement in the same tenor and texture. In this clause, instead of appreciation of evidence in correct perspective, trial Court faltered and committed perversity. </UL><UL>Regarding omission/contradiction No. 8 In this clause, victim referred the fact that accused Dharmendra Gautam runs a mobile shop whereas in her statement under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code she made statement that accused Santosh Sharma runs a mobile shop and on the basis of this contradiction, the trial Judge helped himself to reach the conclusion for acquittal but it was illegality caused by the trial Court because when victim narrated her whole story without any dent in narration and substance then it is minor contradiction which has no material significance in the controversy and can not be considered for recording acquittal. It is possible that one of the accused runs a mobile shop and another accused stays with him regularly for a considerable period of time, but both the accused roamed together and chased the victim for some days, therefore, in her Court statement, she faltered slightly regarding shop of the accused. Here ownership or running of shop by any accused has no material significance therefore, even if that fact would not have been explained by the victim, even then this fact had no significance in the controversy. Therefore, if event is seen holistically then it is apparent that the trial Judge caused illegality in coming to the conclusion about innocence of accused. </UL><UL>Regarding omission/contradiction No. 9 In this clause, trial Court referred the fact that father of victim (PW-2) caused registration of FIR whereas as per trial Court, FIR was signed by the victim and in column No. 6 her name figures as complainant which is a very trivial fact because in FIR, in police statement as well as in her statement under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code she narrated the fact that after coming back at home, she narrated the incident to her parents and thereafter with her father she came police station to lodge the FIR and in normal course of business when father goes with the victim then it is but obvious that he would narrate the incident. In Indian social milieu and ethos specifically in the area where victim was residing, was earlier infested with dacoity and murders (Ravines of Chambal) and partially because of the feudalistic pattern of society, it is natural that father explained the incident while victim sitting with him. </UL><UL>Therefore, nothing odd or unnatural gesture is shown by the victim and her father. When all her ingredients of allegations went home unrebutted and without any dent then it was the duty of the trial Court to appreciate evidence holistically. Interestingly, in para 5 of Court statement, victim explained that she lodged the report and signed over it and same gives answer to the doubt raised by the trial Court in omission and contradiction No. 9. </UL>19. Therefore, regarding ground No. 1, on which trial Judge considered omissions and contradictions and placed the balance in favour of accused persons is nothing but illegality and perversity. </UL>19. Therefore, regarding ground No. 1, on which trial Judge considered omissions and contradictions and placed the balance in favour of accused persons is nothing but illegality and perversity. His observations are contrary to the record available in the case and appreciation of evidence does not stand to judicial scrutiny. Perusal of Court statement of victim and her cross-examination indicate that she remained firm over her testimony and in her cross-examination she reiterated and explained the statement. Defence could not able to make any dent in the testimony of victim so as to suggest any chance of acquittal. Prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubts. 20. Other witness including Ranu Tiwari (PW-3) also in her police statement and Court statement explained the incident in categorical terms and in her cross-examination she even rejected the suggestion given by the defence (in para 3) that she has been tutored by Kamalkishore i.e. father of victim. She also rejected the suggestion that her family is receiving financial support from father of victim. 21. Mataprasad Mourya (PW-4) was Principal of Government Girls High School and on the basis of School Admission Register Ex-P/4 he explained the date of birth of victim as 9-8-2000 whereas the date of incident was 6-8-2017 therefore, it is established that the victim at the time of incident was minor and less than 18 years of age. 22. Mother of victim Smt. Manju Mudgal (PW-1) also narrated the incident and her testimony also remained intact and no dent was given in her testimony by the defence. 23. Scribe of FIR Sunil Sharma (PW-7) Inspector Police who was Investigating Officer of the case also explained the incident and investigation conducted. He rejected the suggestion that he is in good terms with father of victim and also rejected the suggestion that he was instrumental in registration of false case against the accused person. Asha Mourya Sub Inspector (PW-6) who took the statement of victim and her friend Ranu Tiwari (PW-3) and took her to Court for recording of statement under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code also deposed on oath and narrated the incident as told by the victim and her friend. She also rejected the suggestion that enmity is shared by both the family of complainant and accused. She also rejected the suggestion that enmity is shared by both the family of complainant and accused. Therefore, so far as evidence of different prosecution witnesses are concerned they proved their case through ocular evidence and no material omission and contradiction existed in testimony of victim vis-à-vis her other statements and contents of FIR. The trial Judge proceeded on wrong assumption and showed undue haste in recording acquittal in favour of accused persons because evidence nowhere suggested innocence of accused persons as well as drawing of such conclusion. 24. Another ground on which acquittal has been recorded is previous enmity factor. Trial Judge referred the evidence of Parmanand Mudgal (DW-1) who happens to be victim’s uncle. Apparently he came in the dock to support the accused persons because he explained that father of accused Santosh Sharma namely Ramsewak is having enmity with father of victim because of land dispute and Kamalkishore (who happens to be his elder brother) has filed false case against the accused person because of previous enmity and name of Dharmendra has also been added on false pretext because of his friendship with Santosh Sharma. In his cross-examination, he was shaken thoroughly. In examination-in-chief he submits that accused persons have not caused any incident in front of him nor he heard about the incident but in his cross-examination he admitted that incident had not taken place in front of him nor he had seen the incident and he has no inkling whether any incident with victim took place or not. Similarly in examination-in-chief he made the statement that Kamalkishore lodged false case against the accused persons because of previous land related dispute but when he was asked to explain the land on which dispute is existing, he could not explain particulars of the land including area, survey number etc. He accepted that because of relationship in village, accused Santosh Sharma is his nephew. Therefore, testimony of this witness cannot be relied upon and he is an interested witness. 25. He accepted that because of relationship in village, accused Santosh Sharma is his nephew. Therefore, testimony of this witness cannot be relied upon and he is an interested witness. 25. This witness admitted that he is uncle of victim, thus it is surprising that he is coming on behalf of defence meaning thereby he might be sharing estranged relationship with his brother and therefore he was used by defence as scapegoat and his narration and bald claim that false case has been registered against the accused persons for land dispute does not get substantiated without any document of any litigation or dispute shared by the family. Besides that, it is settled in law that testimony of interesting witness must be seen with caution and here Parmanand Mudgal (DW-1) is interested witness because of peculiar fact situation, therefore, it was duty of the trial Court to have scrutinized the testimony of other witnesses with utmost caution and care but such caution have not been shown by the trial Judge while appreciating the evidence. Therefore, the ground on which trial Judge relied his opinion for acquittal is misplaced. Defence could not prove the fact of land dispute between the family of victim and family of accused Santosh Sharma and therefore, the trial Judge caused illegality and perversity. 26. Illegality is further accentuated when it is seen that sections 29 and 30 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 raise presumption in favour of prosecution and for ready reference the said provisions are reproduced below : <UL>“29. Presumption as to certain offences. – Where a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit any offence under sections 3, 5, 7 and section 9 of this Act, the Special Court shall presume, that such person has committed or abetted or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be unless the contrary is proved. </UL><UL>30. Presumption of culpable mental state. – (1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Special Court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. </UL><UL>(2) For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the Special Court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability. </UL><UL>Explanation. – In this section, “culpable mental state” includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact.” </UL>27. Although section 29 of the POCSO Act raises presumption as to certain offences in respect of the offence under sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the POCSO Act and here the offence is of section 11 and 12 of the Act but if it is seen in juxtaposition with section 30 of the POCSO Act, where presumption of culpable mental state is raised then it is clear that the Court had to presume existence of such culpable mental state of accused and he has to discharge such burden. Here, no such discharging of burden by accused took place and therefore, on this count also case of accused lacks merit. It would not be out of place to mention the legal position that explanation provided in section 30 is inclusive in nature when it says that “culpable mental state” includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact and here this legal position has been completely ignored by the trial Judge and caused illegality and perversity in recording acquittal. 28. Another ground for acquittal relied by the trial Judge is criminal antecedents of father of victim namely Bhura alias Kamalkishore. Interestingly, certain documents Ex-D/5 to Ex-D/8 were placed on record to show that father of victim is a man of tainted background and his criminal antecedents are sufficient to infer that he had good contact with police. Same is not only surprising but ridiculous because if a person is of criminal background then how he has good relationship with police officer is beyond comprehension and the discussion made by the trial Judge that oral evidence of Bhura alias Kamalkishore was not registered by the prosecution because of his criminal background is ridiculously absurd. Criminal background of father cannot come in the way of seeking justice by victim. Criminal background of father cannot come in the way of seeking justice by victim. In fact if he would have been so apt in crime and well versed with the procedure then he would have been a good witness for prosecution. Nonetheless his absence in the dock nowhere shakes the case of prosecution and prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt but due to illegality and perversity caused by the trial Judge, acquittal has been recorded. It was the duty of the trial Judge to understand the social context in which these offences are being committed, registered and prosecuted. It is one of those rare cases where investigation was apparently prompt and prosecution led the evidence with authenticity and witness supported the story of prosecution with possibly best accuracy and still by not appreciating the evidence holistically the trial Judge committed grave error and passed the impugned judgment of acquittal. Appreciation of evidence in respect of omissions and contradictions as narrated by the trial Judge in para 15 are full of illegality and perversity. 29. One interesting feature narrated by the trial Judge in para 18 is identity of Dharmendra Sharma. In this para the trial Judge explained how Dharmendra Sharma tried to take shelter of mistaken identity when witness Sunil Sharma (DW-3) referred his name as Sunil Sharma and submits that he was not involved in the case whereas accused Dharmendra Gautam in his statement under section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code admitted his name as Dharmendra Gautam but in his examination he signed as Dharmendra Sharma. At some place in proceedings, he referred his name Dharmendra Sharma but the trial Judge rightly concluded that it is not a case of mistaken identity of present Dharmendra Sharma as one of the accused in the case. Here, the attempt of accused to take advantage of mistaken identity, has been rejected by the trial Court. Thus, it was obvious before the trial Court that accused persons are playing mischief and had not come out in trial with clean hands, therefore, their demeanour and testimony once came in realm of doubt then how they could have been given the benefit of minor contradictions and omissions here and there, was the question which was not addressed by the trial Judge while passing an illegal and perverse judgment. 30. Some Crimes give Psychic Gains whereas some Crimes give Monetary Gains. 30. Some Crimes give Psychic Gains whereas some Crimes give Monetary Gains. If Cultural Norms affect the law, the law likewise affects cultural norms. The expressive function of punishment is the law’s capacity to send a message of condemnation about a particular criminal act. (See Joel Feinberg, the Expressive Function of Punishment, Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment). In Jeffrie Murphy’s formulation, a wrongdoer’s crime sends a message to the world about the value of his victim. Conversely, punishment sends a reciprocal message, in a kind of dialogue with the crime. Punishment allows the criminal justice system to condemn the criminal’s devaluation of the victim by devaluing him or her as a result of it. Expressive punishment therefore, recognizes the relationship between victim, offender and society as a whole that are all implicated by the offence. 31. Therefore, the expressive function of punishment is both retributive and utilitarian. Retributive punishment gives even if not proportional to the physical/psychic harm done to a victim even then it gives a chance to the perpetrator to purge his misdeeds and act as deterrent to other probable perpetrators. Similarly utilitarian function of punishment has the power to change social norms and behaviour via the messages it expresses and may help in reduction of crime. 32. The instant case is the case of Street Harassment and it has more psychological harm into its ambit than physical one because it has an enormously disruptive effect on women’s identities and self image. Street harassment is very pervasive. According to one account, street harassment can be observed in three level hierarchy with most severe incarnations including sexually explicit references to a woman’s body or sexual acts (1) gender based profanity (2) qualifying comments accompanied by slurs about race or sexual orientation (3) physical acts such as groping. Moderately severe harassment includes sexual innuendos or references to a woman’s gender or body that are not sexually explicit. Least severe category includes staring, whistling or comments made to a woman that are unnecessary or not political in nature. 33. Moderately severe harassment includes sexual innuendos or references to a woman’s gender or body that are not sexually explicit. Least severe category includes staring, whistling or comments made to a woman that are unnecessary or not political in nature. 33. In our society setup specifically in the area where incident took place where trappings of ignorance, feudalistic pattern of society (Chambal River and its Ravines) and poor sex ratio coupled with the palpable gender bias make life worst when girl (or female) encounter such street harassment because as explained earlier it amounts to Spirit Murder (Feminist Scholar has used this term, originally devised by Patricia Williams). Therefore, street harassment is problematic both in and of itself and as a reminder of the pervasive threat of literal sexual violation women face regularly while going to Schools, Colleges or their Working Places. 34. In fact street harassment is far more pervasive and humiliating than the threat of physical sexual assault, therefore, it is imperative that Investigation (Police Authority), Prosecution (Public Prosecutor) and Adjudication (Judge) must keep in mind that Crime and Disorder are strongly interrelated and therefore, Broken Windows Theory, a Criminological Theory mainly influence Police and law enforcement but has material bearing in realm of prosecution and adjudication also. According to this theory, targeting minor disorder is expected to reduce occurrence of more serious crime. Idea behind is can be summarized in an expression that if a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, all of the windows will soon be broken. Therefore, it is a theory of Order Maintenance Police but it has relevance for prosecution and for adjudication also as referred above because punishment of minor offences ought to have preventive effect on more harmful acts and therefore, if minor offences at the threshold are checked or objected then it may prevent commission of severe offences. 35. In India where we witness high rate of crime against women originates from the confidence of perpetrators that they would go unpunished because of lacuna in Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication and therefore, this tendency prompts them to commit more severe offences. 35. In India where we witness high rate of crime against women originates from the confidence of perpetrators that they would go unpunished because of lacuna in Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication and therefore, this tendency prompts them to commit more severe offences. Although illustrative in nature but may sufficiently bring home the point is example of violation of minor traffic rules if goes unnoticed/unpunished then those minor violations lead to road rage turned into offence under section 307 or 302 of Indian Penal Code, shooting indiscreetly or performing rash and negligent act while sitting on wheels to drove people down. Similarly if minor street harassments are not checked or not taken cognizance of or evidence is not appreciated properly and acquittal recorded then it emboldens the offender and may encourage them to go for bigger and more serious crime and therefore, acquittal of accused facing trial for offence under section 354 of Indian Penal Code (if evidence is sufficiently led by the prosecution, like in the present case), may lead to occurrence of more severe crime in future either in the hand of acquitted offender or by some other persons in the vicinity who do not have any deterrence because of acquittal recorded in favour of perpetrator. 36. In India non resolution of minor boundary dispute in agricultural field or delay in partition of land by revenue authorities at times result in offence under sections 325/326 or 307 or 302 of Indian Penal Code. Incrementally stage-wise. Therefore, nipping the crime at the budding stage is imperative and is need of hour otherwise lawlessness shall overshadow the ‘Rule of Law’. 37. Time has come when ‘Rule of Law’ shall become one of the essential components of infrastructure like, Water, Road, Electricity etc. because in absence of ‘Rule of Law’ these components of development may be sacrificed at the alter of Misgovernance. Investigator, Prosecutor and Adjudicator ought to keep this reality in mind while performing their respective duties. Here, investigation and Prosecution worked in tandem and gave their best as far as possible. 38. Here, in the present case when trial Judge had the opportunity to appreciate the evidence in totality and thereafter weigh the evidence led by the parties but could not able to keep track of appreciation of evidence in correct perspective and caused illegality. Here, investigation and Prosecution worked in tandem and gave their best as far as possible. 38. Here, in the present case when trial Judge had the opportunity to appreciate the evidence in totality and thereafter weigh the evidence led by the parties but could not able to keep track of appreciation of evidence in correct perspective and caused illegality. If he would have kept this aspect in mind then he would have not caused such illegality and perversity. 39. In the case of Sheo Swarup and others vs. King Emperor, AIR 1934 Privy Council 227 (2) it has been held that High Court has full power to review the order of lower Court. Relevant extracts are reproduced below : <UL>“Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an Appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” </UL>40. It is settled in law that it is not quantity but quality of evidence which matters [See: Rajesh Singh and others vs. State of U. P., <a href='00100049670'>(2011) 11 SCC 444</a>] and therefore, trial Court ought to have considered the quality of evidence led by the prosecution by way of victim herself, her mother and her friend Ranu Tiwari (PW-3). It is settled in law that it is not quantity but quality of evidence which matters [See: Rajesh Singh and others vs. State of U. P., <a href='00100049670'>(2011) 11 SCC 444</a>] and therefore, trial Court ought to have considered the quality of evidence led by the prosecution by way of victim herself, her mother and her friend Ranu Tiwari (PW-3). It is also well settled in law that if judgment of trial Court is perverse and Appellate Court was alive to the fact that it was dealing with the judgment of acquittal and record the finding about illegal view taken by the trial Court then interference is just and proper. In the case of Rajesh Singh and others (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has made the following observations : <UL>“10. It is a well settled position now and we reiterate the same that while upsetting the judgment of acquittal, the Appellate Court must show the perversity in the judgment of the trial Court and the Appellate Court’s judgment must show that the Court was alive to the fact that it was dealing with the judgment of acquittal and further the Appellate Court also must record the finding that the view taken by the trial Court was not possible in law at all. </UL><UL>11. Testing the judgment from these angles, it has to be said that the Appellate Court’s judgment very clearly records a finding that the acquittal recorded by the trial Court was based on flimsy grounds and was wholly unjustified. The High Court has also considered the benefit of doubt awarded by the trial Court and has observed that it should not become a fetish. The High Court has also given very good reasons to set aside the findings arrived at by the trial Court.” </UL>41. Similarly the case of Ashok Rai vs. State of U. P. and others, <a href='00100054092'>(2014) 5 SCC 713</a> deserves worth consideration. Relevant extract is reproduced below : <UL>“10. Several Judgments of this Court have been cited on the principles which should guide the Court while dealing with an appeal against order of acquittal. The law is so well settled that it is not necessary to refer to those judgments. Relevant extract is reproduced below : <UL>“10. Several Judgments of this Court have been cited on the principles which should guide the Court while dealing with an appeal against order of acquittal. The law is so well settled that it is not necessary to refer to those judgments. Suffice it to say that the Appellate Court has to be very cautious while reversing an order of acquittal because order of acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. If the view taken by the trial Court is a reasonably possible view it should not be disturbed, because the Appellate Court feels that some other view is also possible. A perverse order of acquittal replete with gross errors of facts and law will have to be set aside to prevent miscarriage of justice, because just as the Court has to give due weight to the presumption of innocence and see that innocent person is not sentenced, it is equally the duty of the Court to see that the guilty do not escape punishment. Unless the Appellate Court finds the order of acquittal to be clearly unreasonable and is convinced that there are substantial and compelling reasons to interfere with it, it should not interfere with it. We will consider this case in light of these principles.” </UL>42. In the case of Mahavir Singh vs. State of M. P., <a href='00100058713'>(2016) 10 SCC 220</a>, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that evidence of interested witness need to be scrutinized with utmost care. It can only be relied upon if the evidence has a ring of truth to it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy. Contradicted testimony of an interested witness cannot be usually treated as conclusive. In Indian social setup we normally do not accept that paternal uncle of victim would come against his niece’s testimony and in support of perpetrator of crime as defence witness and if such relative comes on behalf of defence then his motive and intention deserve to be carefully scrutinized. Uncle of the victim Parmanand Mudgal (DW-2) had not seen the incident, therefore, he was not a chance witness but he was deliberately roped in by the defence and it was an attempt to dent the case of prosecution. Uncle of the victim Parmanand Mudgal (DW-2) had not seen the incident, therefore, he was not a chance witness but he was deliberately roped in by the defence and it was an attempt to dent the case of prosecution. But in fact, his testimony strengthened the case of prosecution in a way not because of his motive but because of his examination-in-chief and cross-examination (full of doubts) which has already been dealt with in preceding paragraphs. 43. Here, the said witness is neither natural witness nor chance witness, but an interested witness and interested witness with oblique motive. Therefore, it was the duty of the trial Court to sift the chaff from the grains. Ignoring the testimony of material witnesses led by the prosecution and relied upon interested witness by way of Parmanand Mudgal (DW-2), trial Court caused illegality as well as perversity and therefore, judgment of trial Court cannot be allowed to stand. 44. It is the duty of the Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication to re-synchronize and reconcile the theory of Broken Windows along with prevailing theory of Marginal Deterrence to address the growing menace of crimes against women and if possible contemplate in respect of strict enforcement of law and order over minor offences especially those which may result into major and heinous crime. Evidence of the prosecution witnesses also proved that accused wrongly restrained the victim and they threatened her to face dire consequences of life, sexual harassment and stalking and version of the defence lacks credence in all respect. 45. On the basis of cumulative analysis, this Court comes to the conclusion that respondents No. 1 and 2 are not only guilty of wrongly restraining the victim but also guilty of stalking, hence they are guilty of charge under sections 341, 354-D(1)(i), 506 Part II and 509 of Indian Penal Code and sections 11(1)/12 and 11(4)/12 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, the acquittal recorded in favour of respondents No. 1 and 2 deserves to be set aside and they deserve to be convicted and sentenced accordingly. Once this Court came to the conclusion about setting aside of the impugned judgment of acquittal and expressed the view regarding awarding of conviction then asked the counsel for accused persons to submit on the question of sentence. 46. Once this Court came to the conclusion about setting aside of the impugned judgment of acquittal and expressed the view regarding awarding of conviction then asked the counsel for accused persons to submit on the question of sentence. 46. Later on, counsel for the accused persons reiterated the prayer that respondents No. 1 and 2/accused persons are innocent and falsely implicated. It is further submitted that looking to their young age and looking to the fact that they don’t have criminal background, leniency be shown for them. 47. On the other hand, counsel for the victim opposed the prayer and submitted that looking to the evidence and fact situation, respondents do not deserve any sympathy. 48. It is further submitted that looking to their young age and looking to the fact that they don’t have criminal background, leniency be shown for them. 47. On the other hand, counsel for the victim opposed the prayer and submitted that looking to the evidence and fact situation, respondents do not deserve any sympathy. 48. After hearing the parties, specifically counsel for the accused persons on the quantum of punishment, this Court feels that suitable punishment would act as deterrent to the other perpetrators and would give a lesson to the accused persons also to mend their ways in future and to become better citizen, therefore, this Court consider it appropriate to convict both the accused persons and award them jail sentence in following terms :<blockquote> <table class="MsoTableGrid" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: medium none" width="572"> <tr> <td valign="top" style="width: 83; border: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> Offence </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 64; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> Act </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 75; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> Sentence </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 113; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> Fine </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 161; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> Default</td> </tr> <tr> <td valign="top" style="width: 83; border-left: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 341 </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 64; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> IPC </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 75; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 1 month RI </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 113; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> No</td> <td valign="top" style="width: 161; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in">  </td> </tr> <tr> <td valign="top" style="width: 83; border-left: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 345(D)(1)(i) </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 64; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> POCSO </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 75; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 3 years RI </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 113; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> Rs. 5,000/- each</td> <td valign="top" style="width: 161; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> In default, three months RI</td> </tr> <tr> <td valign="top" style="width: 83; border-left: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 506 Part II </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 64; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> IPC </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 75; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 3 years </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 113; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> No</td> <td valign="top" style="width: 161; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in">  </td> </tr> <tr> <td valign="top" style="width: 83; border-left: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 509 </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 64; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> IPC </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 75; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 3 years</td> <td valign="top" style="width: 113; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in">  </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 161; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in">  </td> </tr> <tr> <td valign="top" style="width: 83; border-left: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 11(1)/12 </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 64; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> POCSO </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 75; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 3 years </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 113; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> Rs. 5,000/- each</td> <td valign="top" style="width: 161; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> In default, three months RI</td> </tr> <tr> <td valign="top" style="width: 83; border-left: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 11(4)/12 </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 64; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> POCSO </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 75; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> 3 years </td> <td valign="top" style="width: 113; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> Rs. 5,000/- each</td> <td valign="top" style="width: 161; border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0in; padding-bottom: 0in"> In default, three months RI</td> </tr> </table></blockquote><UL></UL><UL>All the jail sentences shall run concurrently. </UL>49. Respondents No. 1 and 2 are directed to surrender before the trial Court within 15 days on or before 3-1-2020 to serve the jail sentence. Their bail bonds stand discharged. 50. Copy of the judgment be sent to the trial Court forthwith for ensuring further compliance in accordance with law. In case accused persons/respondents No. 1 and 2 do not surrender themselves then trial Court is free to take all necessary steps in accordance with law to get serve the jail sentence as awarded by this Court. 51. Copy of this order be sent to the Director General of Police, Bhopal and Director Prosecution, Bhopal to sensitize the Investigators (police officers) and Prosecutors (Public Prosecutors) about the concern expressed by this Court for checking and restricting minor offences with wider ramifications.<hr color=rgb(84,0,168)></body></html>

X (VICTIM) v. SANTOSH SHARMA