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2019 DIGILAW 870 (CHH)

Tulsiram Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh

2019-08-23

GOUTAM BHADURI, P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON, RAJENDRA CHANDRA SINGH SAMANT

body2019
JUDGMENT : P.R. Ramachandra Menon, J. 1. "Whether the judgment rendered by a learned Judge of this Court, without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellants herein, who are the affected parties and whose appointments have been set aside, is liable to be sustained in view of violation of the fundamental rule of audi alteram partem?" "Whether the course pursued by the learned single Judge in taking an independent decision, contrary to the finding rendered by a Division Bench of this Court holding that the Rules (under challenge before the learned single Judge) were 'intra vires' and valid in all respects and that no interference was possible with the 'Advertisement' impugned in the writ petition, correct and sustainable? "Whether the learned single Judge, while rendering the verdict under challenge, has referred to all the relevant provisions of law, before arriving at the conclusion?" "Whether such a course is permissible in law, with reference to the 'principles of judicial discipline'?" These are some of the important points to be considered in these matters. We have raised these questions, because the 'Order of Reference' dated 22.03.2012 passed by the Division Bench does not specifically refer to any particular question, nor it mentions the terms of reference. 2. The sequence and events shows that the selection and appointment to the post of Headmaster in Primary Schools was the subject matter of dispute/challenge in the various writ petitions filed before this Hon'ble Court. As a matter of fact, Advertisements were issued for filling up the posts of Shiksha Karmies, Grade-I, II and III way back in the year 2010, which was a District-wise appointment and steps were being pursued accordingly. While so, the terminology mentioned in the Advertisement, that it was to be by 'Promotion' was sought to be corrected by the Director of Public Instructions, as per the relevant proceedings dated 20/09/2010 issued to all the District Education Officers in the State, to have it taken as 'Direct Recruitment', by way of a Limited Departmental Competitive Examination to fill up the posts. It was accordingly, that further steps were pursued by the District Education Officers in this regard. 3. It is to be noted in this context that, the said Advertisements and the Rules on the basis of which such Advertisements were issued were sought to be challenged by some of the aspirants by filing writ petitions before this Court. It was accordingly, that further steps were pursued by the District Education Officers in this regard. 3. It is to be noted in this context that, the said Advertisements and the Rules on the basis of which such Advertisements were issued were sought to be challenged by some of the aspirants by filing writ petitions before this Court. The challenge against the validity of the Rules and the Advertisements was repelled and a Division Bench of this Court, as per judgment dated 25.10.2010 in WPS No. 6055/2010. It was held that appointment to the posts in question, as per the relevant rules; in particular Rule 6 of the Chhattisgarh Non-Gazetted Class III Education Service (School Level Service) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2008 (for short 'the Rules, 2008), read with Schedule-II, was never by 'Promotion' but by way of 'Direct Recruitment'. Accordingly, the writ petitions were dismissed and the matter ended up there. 4. Pursuant to the Advertisements issued and the further steps taken, the selection was finalized; based on which the selected Shiksha Karmies were required to resign from the posts held by them as per the instructions given by the Competent Authority, so as to enable them to join the posts of 'Headmaster'. The selected persons concerned tendered their resignation, wherever it was necessary, and joined the posts along with other selected persons and have been continuing in service for nearly a decade. However, some candidates, who either were not qualified or who could not come out successful in the process of selection, sought to challenge the process, by questioning the validity of the Rules and the Advertisements. These matters were heard elaborately by the learned single Judge and during the course of hearing, the factum of having resulted finality in the matter, by virtue of the verdict already passed by the Division Bench as aforesaid upholding the validity of the Rules and the Advertisements was brought to the notice of the learned single Judge by some of the interveners. Observing that in the judgment dated 25.10.2010 passed by the Division Bench in Writ Petition (S) No. 6055 of 2010, it had been held that appointment to the post in question was never by Promotion: the learned single Judge proceeded further to hold that, by virtue of the Rules discussed therein, 100% of the posts could have been filled up only by way of 'Promotion' and there was no question of any 'Direct Recruitment'. The whole exercise in appointing the selected persons/Shiksha Karmies - which post was not in the feeder category for promotion, as per the Rules was held as not correct or sustainable and accordingly, the Advertisements were declared as bad, in turn setting aside the same and the selection. The learned single Judge held that all further proceedings pursued in effecting the appointments were also bad and hence that the appointments effected to the posts of Headmasters, Primary School from the post of Shiksha Karmies Grade-I, II and III were not liable to be sustained. They were set aside accordingly; holding that the persons concerned had to go back and work as Shiksha Karmies Grade-I, II and III. It was made clear that the Government would be free to amend the Rules, to an appropriate extent as desired and readvertise the posts, pursue the selection and effect the appointments thereafter. This made the appellants to feel aggrieved, who are before this Court by way of these appeals, with a petition to grant 'leave' to file the same, as they were never made parties and that their appointments were set aside without hearing them. 5. When the appeals came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court on 11.02.2019, the sequence of events was taken note of and it was observed that the verdict passed by the earlier Division Bench (in WPS No. 6055/2010) required 'reconsideration' and that the matter be heard by a Full Bench. It was accordingly that the above appeals were caused to be listed before the Full Bench, though specific questions on terms of reference have not been framed. Having the matters listed before the Full Bench, we noted on the last occasion, that the writ petitioners were being represented by the lawyers of their choice before this Court, some of whose names were mentioned in the orders passed on different dates. Having the matters listed before the Full Bench, we noted on the last occasion, that the writ petitioners were being represented by the lawyers of their choice before this Court, some of whose names were mentioned in the orders passed on different dates. However, so as to make the proceedings proper and complete in all respects, we found it appropriate to issue notice to all the Respondents - writ petitioners by speed post and also directed the Registry to show the names of all the lawyers who were representing the writ petitioners in the 'cause list' and accordingly, their name's have been shown. 6. We heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants as well as some of the learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the writ petitioners; in particular, Mr. Prateek Sharma, Mr. K.R. Nair and Ms. Veena Nair on the issues framed. No other counsel for the writ petitioners has come up with any submission, with reference to the questions mooted. 7. There is no dispute to the fact that the appellants herein, who were working as 'Shiksha Karmies' Grade-I, II or HI, who got selected and appointed to the posts of Head-masters in Primary Schools were never made parties to the writ petitions. The declaration made by the learned single Judge that the advertisements were bad, the process of selection was bad and that the appointments were liable to be set aside (which accordingly was set aside) has quite adversely affected the rights and interest of the appellants herein, who were not heard and hence we have granted 'leave' to file the appeals and admitted the same. 8. Mr. Prateek Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for some of the writ petitioners fairly conceded that there can't be any dispute with regard to the fact that the rule of 'audi alteram partem' has to be complied with, before making any adverse declaration or orders against anyone who may be affected. The law has been declared by the Apex Court in K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala & others, AIR 2006 SC 2339 (paragraphs 73, 75, 76) to the effect that there cannot be any compromise with regard to this fundamental principle. The appellants were admittedly not parties before the writ Court. The law has been declared by the Apex Court in K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala & others, AIR 2006 SC 2339 (paragraphs 73, 75, 76) to the effect that there cannot be any compromise with regard to this fundamental principle. The appellants were admittedly not parties before the writ Court. The learned counsel however sought to argue the merit involved, particularly with reference to the relevant rules and adding that, if the number of candidates involved was enormous; it might not be possible to have all the persons concerned to be impleaded in the party array. But in the instant case, it is to be noted that the affected parties were not impleaded even in 'representative capacity'. To a question raised by this Court as to whether anybody was impleaded in 'representative capacity', effecting necessary paper publication, it has been categorically answered in the 'negative'. 9. Mr. Nair, the learned counsel appearing for some of the private respondents submits that the rule of natural justice with regard to the opportunity of hearing is not an absolute one and that relief can be moulded in appropriate cases, more so when the appointment was per se wrong and illegal. Reliance is sought to be placed on Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India & others (2007) 4 SCC 54 (paragraphs 24, 26, 27 & 28) : (AIR Online 2007 SC 24, paras 31, 33, 34, & 35) and also Ramesh Gajendra Jadhav v. Secretary, S.G.S.P. Mandal & others (2010) 12 SCC 130 (paragraph 14) : ( AIR 2010 SC 3502 , para 6). 10. Coming to the first case, i.e. Ashok Kumar Sonkar's case (supra), it is to be noted that the facts and circumstances discussed therein are entirely different. There is a specific observation to the effect that in cases of the said nature, the course of action could be modulated; however making it clear that the rules of natural justice cannot be violated. Applying the said law to the given set of facts and circumstances in the said case, it was held that the 'Visitor' should have issued notice to the employee and that he should have been permitted to submit his version by filing a representation, though no personal hearing was to be given to him. Applying the said law to the given set of facts and circumstances in the said case, it was held that the 'Visitor' should have issued notice to the employee and that he should have been permitted to submit his version by filing a representation, though no personal hearing was to be given to him. The said judgment does not support the assertion made on the part of the above respondent to the effect that the affected party need not be heard at all, that too, by a Writ Court, before passing adverse orders. 11. Coming to Ramesh Gajendra Jadhav ( AIR 2010 SC 3502 ) (supra), it is quite discernible from the discussion made by the Apex Court that the Bench was considering the issue in the light of the 'undisputed facts' and as to whether a mistake of fact rectified subsequently in relation to implementation of roster of reservation would be a sufficient reason for terminating the services of a person appointed under that mistaken impression ? There is no observation or declaration to the effect that in a writ petition, the appointment of the person concerned could be set aside without affording an opportunity of hearing. The said decision also does not come to the rescue of the private respondents. In the instant case, the Rule, particularly Schedule-II (which of course is forming a part of the rule), to be read along with Rule 6 of the Rules, 2008, was not specifically subjected to challenge and it is with reference to that provision, that the proceedings were finalized and the selection and appointment has been effected. 12. The celebrated judgment with regard to the rule of audi alteram partem is a foreign judgment in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 143 ER 414, where it was held that even the 'God did not punish Adam without hearing him'. The said decision was cited by the Apex Court, explaining the principle, in Uma Nath Pandey & others v. State of Uttar Pradesh & another (2009) 12 SCC 40 : ( AIR 2009 SC 2375 , para 8). The relevant portion reads as follows: "10. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The relevant portion reads as follows: "10. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to "vocate, interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works [(1863) 143 ER 414], the principle was thus stated: "Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. "Adam" says God, "where art thou? hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat ?". Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond." From the above, it is crystal-clear that there cannot be any doubt, that any decision rendered adversely affecting the rights and interest of a party, without hearing him, is not liable to be sustained. Applying the said law to I the given set of facts and circumstances, the appellants were admittedly not made parties in the writ petitions considered by the learned single Judge. Applying the said law to I the given set of facts and circumstances, the appellants were admittedly not made parties in the writ petitions considered by the learned single Judge. The 'Advertisements' and their 'Appointments' have been set aside, without affording opportunity of hearing to them and as such, the verdict passed by the learned single Judge is liable to be set aside on this score alone. 13. As mentioned already, the validity of the Advertisement and the relevant Rules were subjected to challenge earlier, in the Writ Petition (S) No. 6055/2010. The matter had come up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court and after a threadbare analysis of facts and figures and the said provisions of law, it was held that the course of action sought to be proposed and pursued was 'not by Promotion' (of Shiksha Karmi Grade-I, II and III to the post' of Headmaster Primary School) but was by way of 'Direct Recruitment'. The Bench also observed that, by virtue of the specific incorporation in Schedule-II column No. 6. that such a course was permissible, as the Assistant Teachers had already been promoted and nobody was available for promotion (being a dying cadre) and it was accordingly, that 'Limited Departmental Examination' was provided confining in to the Shiksha Karmies Grade-I, II & III having 7 years' experience; thus holding that the course pursued by the respondents concerned was not liable to be assailed. The said writ petitions were dismissed upholding the validity of the 'Rules' and the 'Advertisement'. 14. The above verdict was brought to the notice of the learned single Judge, as taken note of in para 4 of the judgment under challenge. The learned single Judge held that, as per the declaration made by the Division Bench, the exercise was never by way of 'Promotion', but on the next breath, without referring to anything further, and in particular, the contents of paragraph 12 of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench (whereby it was held that it was a case of 'Direct Recruitment') held that the appointment, as per the Rules, was to be by way of 100% Promotion, there could not be any Direct Recruitment and that 'Shiksha Karmies' were never in the feeder category. The whole exercise was held as bad and it was accordingly, that the 'Advertisements' and the 'Rules' were set aside. The whole exercise was held as bad and it was accordingly, that the 'Advertisements' and the 'Rules' were set aside. The question is whether such a course was open for the learned single Judge, to be pursued; even after taking note of the verdict passed by the Division Bench upholding the validity of the 'Advertisements' and the relevant 'Rules' (which were same and subject matter of challenge before the learned single Judge)? 15. There is a catena of decisions rendered by the Apex Court and various High Courts to the effect that 'judicial discipline' is of paramount importance and that the same cannot be watered down. We need not refer to all the precedents in this regard and it will be enough to make a reference to just one instance. The issue with regard to the regularization of employees appointed at different times and continuing for quite long, the course of action to be pursued etc. were matters under consideration before a 'Constitution Bench' of the Supreme Court and the law was laid down in crystal-clear terms in Secretary, State of Karnataka & others v. Umadevi & others (2006) 4 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 ). It was explicitly made clear that, merely for the reason that a person was continuing in service for quite long, by itself, will not confer any rights to have his service regularized. The Bench also made a distinction between the 'irregular appointment' and 'illegal appointment; holding that the persons who came through the back door had to be sent out through that door itself. However, in the case of irregular appointment, if it is not illegal i.e. if the persons appointed were satisfying all the requisite qualifications or experience, as the case may be, but for not pursuing and completing the procedural formalities, it was a matter for consideration and regularization, subject to the norms mentioned therein. It was accordingly that the Bench made it clear in 'paragraph 53' of the said judgment that regularization can be considered where 'irregular appointment' has taken place, subject to the condition that the persons concerned were having a total service of 10 years and it shall be done as a 'onetime measure'. 16. It was accordingly that the Bench made it clear in 'paragraph 53' of the said judgment that regularization can be considered where 'irregular appointment' has taken place, subject to the condition that the persons concerned were having a total service of 10 years and it shall be done as a 'onetime measure'. 16. Despite the declaration of law as above, a question related to regularization came up for consideration before a 'Two - Member Bench' of the Apex Court in U.P. State Electricity Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey & Ors. (2007) 11 SC 92 : (2007 AIR SCW 6904); where the Bench made an attempt to water down the effect of the Constitution Bench decision Umadevi's case AIR 2006 SC 1806 ) (supra). The said decision came up for scrutiny of a Larger Bench i.e. 'Three Member Bench' of the Supreme Court in Official Liquidator v. Dayanand (2008) 10 SCC 1 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1177, paras 59 & 70). The Larger Bench deprecated the course pursued by the 'Two Member Bench', holding that it was totally alien to the field of judicial discipline. The necessity to maintain judicial discipline was highlighted with regard to the cardinal principles of binding effect of judicial precedents, as reflected from paragraphs 77, 90 and 91; which are extracted below: "77. We have carefully analyzed the judgment of the two Judges Bench (in Pooran Chandra Pandey case) (2007 AIR SCW 6904) and are of the considered view that the above reproduced observations were not called for. The only issue which fell for consideration by two Judges Bench was whether the daily wage employees of the society, the establishment of which was taken over by the Electricity Board along with the employees, were entitled to be regularized in terms of the policy decision taken by the Board and whether the High Court committed an error by invoking Article 14 of the Constitution for granting relief to the writ petitioners. The question whether the Electricity Board could frame such a policy was neither raised nor considered by the High Court and this Court. The High Court simply adverted to the facts of the case and held that once the daily wage employees of the society became employees of the Electricity Board, they could not be discriminated in the matter of implementation of the policy of regularization. The High Court simply adverted to the facts of the case and held that once the daily wage employees of the society became employees of the Electricity Board, they could not be discriminated in the matter of implementation of the policy of regularization. Therefore, the two Judges Bench had no occasion to make any adverse comment on the binding character of the Constitution Bench judgment in State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi (supra). 90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by co-ordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct law and which one should be followed. 91. We may add that in our constitutional set-up every citizen is under a duty to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions. Those who have been entrusted with the task of administering the system and operating various constituents of the State and who take oath to act in accordance with the Constitution and uphold the same, have to set an example by exhibiting total commitment to the Constitutional ideals. This principle is required to be observed with greater rigour by the members of judicial fraternity who have been bestowed with the power to adjudicate upon important constitutional and legal issues and protect and preserve rights of the individuals and society as a whole. Discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. This principle is required to be observed with greater rigour by the members of judicial fraternity who have been bestowed with the power to adjudicate upon important constitutional and legal issues and protect and preserve rights of the individuals and society as a whole. Discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. If the courts command others to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and rule of law, it is not possible to countenance violation of the constitutional principle by those who are required to lay down the law." The above principle has been reiterated by a subsequent 'Three Member' Bench of the Apex Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra & another (2014) 9 SCC 129 : ( AIR 2014 SC 3519 ) as well. 17. Applying the law to the given case, if the learned Judge doubted the correctness of the verdict passed by the Division Bench for any tenable reason; the course of action open was not to take a different view and pass a contrary/conflicting verdict, but to express the doubt in clear terms and to cause the matter to be referred to a Division Bench. The learned Single, in the instant case, instead of following such a course with reference to the relevant provisions of law (if the same was not properly considered by the Division Bench) chose to lay down its own track and rendered a conflicting judgment, deviating from the dictum laid down by the Division Bench in W.P.(S) No. 6055/2010. In view of the law declared by the Supreme Court, we find that it was not at all correct or proper for the learned single Judge to have rendered a finding contrary to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench. The verdict passed by the single Judge is liable to be interdicted on this score as well. 18. The next point to be considered is whether the learned single Judge was right in making the declaration with regard to the Rules, to have it set aside and also in setting aside the appointments for the reason that it was not in conformity with the rules. Rule 6 of the Rules, 2008 with Schedule-II reads as follows: "6. 18. The next point to be considered is whether the learned single Judge was right in making the declaration with regard to the Rules, to have it set aside and also in setting aside the appointments for the reason that it was not in conformity with the rules. Rule 6 of the Rules, 2008 with Schedule-II reads as follows: "6. Method of Recruitment- (1) Recruitment to the Service after commencement of these rules shall be by the following methods, namely:-- (a) Direct recruitment by selection; (b) By promotion of substantive members of Chhattisgarh School Education Service from a lower cadre to a higher cadre as specified in Schedule IV. (c) By transfer of persons who hold in substantive or temporary capacity such posts in such services, as may be specified in this behalf. (2) The number of persons recruited under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-rule (1) shall not at any time exceed the percentage shown in Schedule II of the number of duty posts, (as specified Schedule I), (3) Subject to the provisions of these rules, the method or methods of recruitment to be adopted for the purpose of filling any particular vacancy or vacancies in the services as may be required to be filled during any particular period of recruitment and the number or persons to be recruited by each method shall be determined on each occasion by the Appointing Authority. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (2), if in the opinion of the Appointing Authority the exigencies of the service so required, he may, after seeking the approval of the Government adopt such methods of recruitment to the service other than those specified in sub rule as it may, by order issued in this behalf prescribe." Schedule II of the Rules, 2008 read as under: Sr. no. Name of Post No. of Posts Percentage of number of Posts to be filled. Remarks By direct recruitment By promotion of the member of service (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1. Head Master Primary School 22285 100% As the list of Assistant Teacher of School Education Departments is exhausted this post will be filled by Shiksha Karmi is Grade-1, 2 &3 having 7 years experience through limited examination by Panchayat & Urban Administration Development Department 19. Head Master Primary School 22285 100% As the list of Assistant Teacher of School Education Departments is exhausted this post will be filled by Shiksha Karmi is Grade-1, 2 &3 having 7 years experience through limited examination by Panchayat & Urban Administration Development Department 19. The Rules actually envisage appointment of Headmasters at Primary level by way of 'Promotion' to the extent of 100% as mentioned in Schedule-II. In column No. 6, it is stated that, as the list of Assistant Teachers of School Education Department was exhausted, the posts would be filled up by Shiksha Karmi Grade-I, II and III having 7 years of experience, through 'limited examination' by Panchayat and Urban Administration Development Department. The words "by Panchayat and Urban Administration Development Department" subsequently came to be amended as per Annexure A-3, which has been taken note of by the learned single Judge and the relevant portion has been extracted in paragraph 17 of the judgment. The said notification/amendment came into force on 29.05.2010. It is relevant to note that all the advertisements have been issued after the said date i.e. after 29.05.2010, which fact has also been taken note of by the learned single Judge in the next paragraph i.e. paragraph 18. 20. The point to be considered is whether the authorities were justified in proceeding with the selection, as if it were an instance of 'Direct Recruitment'. Heavy reliance is placed on sub-rule (4) of Rule 6 from the part of the State to sustain their course of action. But according to this Court, sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 is also relevant, which clearly envisages the situation and stipulates that, subject to the provisions of these rules, the method or methods of recruitment to be adopted for the purpose of filling any particular vacancy or vacancies during any particular period or recruitment and the number of persons should be recruited by each method, shall be determined on each occasion by the Appointing Authority. As far as the present rules are concerned, the method of recruitment is given under sub-rule (1) of Rule 6, which refers to (a) Direct Recruitment by Selection (b) by Promotion, and: (c) by Transfer. As far as the present rules are concerned, the method of recruitment is given under sub-rule (1) of Rule 6, which refers to (a) Direct Recruitment by Selection (b) by Promotion, and: (c) by Transfer. Since all the three instances are provided under sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 as a method of recruitment, it is quite open for the Department to invoke the power and procedure under 'sub-rule (3) of Rule 6' to fix the method of recruitment for a particular period, on a particular occasion, so as to meet the exigency, if at all any, insofar as it is within the provisions of these rules. This is an additional provision, over and above sub-rule (4) of Rule 6. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 6 starts with a non obstante clause. With regard to the course of action mentioned under sub-rule (2), it says that, if in the opinion of the Appointing Authority, the exigency of service requires, notwithstanding what is stated in sub-rule (2), after seeking the approval of the Government, adopt such methods of recruitment to the service other than those specified in the sub-rule. In other words, it gives a power to go travel even beyond the rules to meet the exigency in service, after getting approval of the Government. To put it more clear, sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 refers to the instances of clauses (b) and (c) or sub-rule (1) i.e. 'Promotion' and 'Transfer', and by invoking the power under sub-rule (4), it is open for the Appointing Authority to travel beyond the rules to meet the exigency, subject to the condition that 'prior approval' of the Government is obtained. 21. On a close scrutiny and analysis of sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 6, in the light of the different methods of recruitment provided within the rules i.e. by way of Direct Recruitment, Promotion and Transfer, even though the post of Headmaster, Primary School, is actually intended to be filled up to an extent of 100% by way of Promotion, the circumstances narrated in column No. 6 (the list of Assistant Teachers of School Education Department having been exhausted) provides for appropriate course of action in filling up the vacancies by appointing Shiksha Karmies Grade-I, II and IE having 7 years of experience. This is virtually an instance of 'Direct Recruitment' and not a Promotion. This is virtually an instance of 'Direct Recruitment' and not a Promotion. It is for this reason, that the DPI, as per the proceedings dated 20/09/2010 alerted all the District Education Officers that they could proceed with further steps for issuing advertisement and fill up the posts accordingly. This must have naturally weighed with the minds of Division Bench while passing the judgment dated 25/10/2010 in W.P.S. No. 6055/2010, to have held that the course of action pursued in filling of the post with reference to Rule 6, read with Schedule-II, Column No. 6, was not an instance of Promotion, but an instance of Direct Recruitment, which was well within the rules. This being the position, it was not correct or proper for the learned single Judge to have rendered any finding to the contrary, instead of referring the issue, if at all there existed any doubt, that too, without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellants herein. 22. In the above circumstances, we answer the reference dated 22.03.2012 made by the Division Bench and hold that the verdict passed by the earlier Division Bench in W.P.S. No. 6055/2010 does not warrant any reconsideration. 23. Having declared the law as above, the question is whether the matter should be remitted to the Division Bench for further consideration. We have already held, based on the facts and figures and the relevant provisions of law, that the verdict passed by the learned single Judge is not liable to be sustained, being alien to the principles of 'judicial discipline' and also having rendered without affording an opportunity of hearing to the affected parties (appellants herein) whose appointments have been set aside. In the said circumstance, nothing remains further to be considered by the Division Bench. The appeals are allowed. The judgment passed by the learned single Judge is set aside. The writ petitions stand dismissed. No costs.