JUDGMENT : S. Serto, J. Heard Ms. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Government Advocate appearing for the appellants and also heard Mr. C. Lalfakzuala, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. This is an appeal under Section 30 of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 directed against the judgment and award dated 27.09.2018, passed in W.C. Case No. 6/2017 by the Commissioner, Employees' Compensation, Aizawl. 3. On 20.06.2015, the respondent's son, late Mr. Govinda Karki, Muster Roll employee of Tourism Department, Government of Mizoram, as per his detailment Order dated 19.06.2015, issued by the Director, Tourism Department, Government of Mizoram vide his Office Order No. 60/2015 2016 under Memo No. A.45011/29/2009-DTE (TOUR) went to his work place at Tuirial Airfield to over-see safety of Departmental buildings and also to clean the compound as necessary. After the day's work was done, he along with his colleague, Mr. Ram Chandra, who was also IV Grade, Muster Roll employee of the same Department sat on the Departmental vehicle bearing registration No.MZ-01/F-4529 with one Mr. M.S. Dawngliana, driver of the same to return home. However, Mr. M.S. Dawngliana did not drive the Department vehicle but in his place, Mr. Ram Chandra (L) took the wheel on their way back home and when they reached Bung bungalow they met with an accident while overtaking a Truck. Govinda Karki succumbed to his injuries and when he was brought to the hospital, he was declared dead. After the death of Govinda Karki, the only earning member of the family, the respondent, who is the mother of the deceased filed a claim petition before the Commissioner, Employees' Compensation, Aizawl and the same was registered as W.C. No. 6/2017. During the trial, the claimant was examined as the only P.W. The P.W while narrating the facts stated that her son was Muster Roll employee of the Tourism Department and on the date the incident happened, he was on duty. She also exhibited the claim petition and the following documents; "The claim petition 1. Police report regarding the accident. 2. Post Mortem Examination report. 3. The Dead Certificate. 4. The Engagement Card of the deceased issued by Director, Tourism Department. 5. The Detailment Duty dated 19.06.2015 issued by the Director of the same Department. 6. The Birth Certificate of the deceased and 7. The Registration Certificate of the vehicle involved". 4. Police report regarding the accident. 2. Post Mortem Examination report. 3. The Dead Certificate. 4. The Engagement Card of the deceased issued by Director, Tourism Department. 5. The Detailment Duty dated 19.06.2015 issued by the Director of the same Department. 6. The Birth Certificate of the deceased and 7. The Registration Certificate of the vehicle involved". 4. On the other hand, the Under Secretary of Tourism Department, who filed a written objection on behalf of all the respondents gave her statement in the Court as O.P No. 1 and while doing so, exhibited her written objection wherein, she had stated that the deceased, Govinda Karki was engaged as Room Attendant on Muster Roll basis and on the day and time the incident occurred, he was on official duty as per the detailment issued vide Office Order No. 60/2015-2016, dated 19.06.2015. But as per Section 2(dd) of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 and Schedule-II to the Act, Room Attendant is not included as employee, therefore, Sh. Govinda Karki, who was Room Attendant, is not covered by the scheme for payment of compensation under the Act. However, on compassionate consideration of the loss of life of the employee, Ms. Menuka Karki, the sister of the deceased has been appointed as Room Attendant on Muster Roll basis w.e.f. 01.03.2017. The witness, after exhibiting her written objection stated also that on 11.07.2017, she was Under Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Tourism Department. Thereafter, she also exhibited the engagement card of the deceased and the Office Order by which, the deceased and others were detailed for duty at Tuirial Airfield. She also identified the Exhibit P-4 the Police report on the accident in which, the deceased Govinda Karki was involved and died. Further, she also exhibited the engagement card issued to the sister of the deceased. In her cross examination, she admitted that the deceased, Govinda Karki was a IV-Grade (MR) working as Room Attendant in the Department of Tourism and she was in her post when the accident occurred. The witness also admitted that the deceased was on official duty or was in the course of his employment when he met with the accident. She affirmed her statement that sister of the deceased has been employed as Muster Roll on compassionate ground. 5. The Cashier of the Department was examined as Witness- 2 of the O.Ps. The witness also admitted that the deceased was on official duty or was in the course of his employment when he met with the accident. She affirmed her statement that sister of the deceased has been employed as Muster Roll on compassionate ground. 5. The Cashier of the Department was examined as Witness- 2 of the O.Ps. The witness, after affirming that he was the Cashier of the Department stated that he knew the deceased Govinda Karki, who died in June, 2015 in an accident. He also stated that the deceased was Room Attendant in the Department of Tourism and after his death, his sister Menuka Karki had been appointed as Room Attendant in his place. He also stated that Menuka Karki was paid Rs. 270/- per day as un-skilled worker and there was no any intention for her removal from service. In his cross examination, he affirmed that he knew the deceased and stated that he was engaged as Muster Roll in the Department of Tourism, Government of Mizoram as Room Attendant at the time of the accident. He also stated that the deceased was on official duty at the time of the accident. 6. After having heard the parties through their respective learned counsels and after having considered the evidence available on record and the law relevant to the subject matter, the learned Commissioner, Employees' Compensation, Aizawl delivered the judgment and award on 27.09.2018 wherein, he recorded his findings on the issues framed and awarded a sum of Rs. 7,59,943/- as compensation to the respondents. The issue on which the learned Commissioner recorded his findings and based his judgment and award are:- "1. Whether the deceased is a Workmen within the meaning of the Act. 2. Whether the accident arose out of or in the course of the deceased's employment. 3. Whether the amount of compensation claimed is due, or any part of that amount and 4. Whether the O.P is liable to pay such compensation as is due". 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and award, the appellants have come before this Court by filing this appeal under Section 30 of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. 8. Ms. 3. Whether the amount of compensation claimed is due, or any part of that amount and 4. Whether the O.P is liable to pay such compensation as is due". 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and award, the appellants have come before this Court by filing this appeal under Section 30 of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. 8. Ms. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Government Advocate for the appellants at the very outset submitted that the word "Workmen" is not found in the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 under which the claim was made, as such, the claim petition should have been dismissed at the threshold. Thereafter, the learned counsel submitted that the learned Commissioner had erred both in facts and law while framing the issues particularly Issue No. 1 because the deceased was not a workman under the Employees Compensation Act, 1923. The learned counsel further submitted that Room Attendant, which is the name of the assignment given to the deceased is not an employee under the provisions of Employees Compensation Act. In fact, the learned counsel strongly pressed that the work Muster Roll finds no mention anywhere in the Employees Compensation Act. After having submitted as such, the learned counsel submitted that the learned Commissioner has committed error both in facts and law while framing the first issue and while granting the claim of the respondent No. 1. 9. Ms. Mary L. Khiangte, the learned Government Advocate also submitted that Section 32 of the Employees Compensation Act provides that States should frame rules for the effective implementation of the Act, however, the State of Mizoram has not frame the same. The learned Government Advocate also submitted that if the rules had been in place, it is quite possible that the "Muster Roll" might have been included, but since no rules have been framed, Muster Roll which finds no mention in the Act cannot be brought in or read in to the Schedule of the Act so as to include the service of the deceased. The learned Government Advocate further submitted that Clause-(viii) of the Schedule II of Employees Compensation Act, under which the claimant has made her claim, also does not include Muster Roll, Room Attendant. Therefore, in any case, the service or the assignment given to the deceased was never within the ambit of the Employees Compensation Act. 10. The learned Government Advocate further submitted that Clause-(viii) of the Schedule II of Employees Compensation Act, under which the claimant has made her claim, also does not include Muster Roll, Room Attendant. Therefore, in any case, the service or the assignment given to the deceased was never within the ambit of the Employees Compensation Act. 10. The learned Government Advocate, thereafter, submitted that there is no evidence to show that the deceased employee was doing anything in connection with the maintenance of the Tourism buildings inasmuch as his assignment was to oversee only. 11. After having submitted as stated above, Ms. Mary L. Khiangte also submitted that no reason or reasons whatsoever were given by the Commissioner, for the findings and conclusions drawn by him, in his judgment and award. As per the provisions of Order XX Rule 5 of CPC, every finding or conclusion must be followed by reasons. Therefore, the judgment and award has failed to meet the requirement of law. As such, in consequence, it deserves to be quashed and set aside. Further, the learned Government Advocate submitted that though it is true that Employees Compensation Act is a socially beneficial Act, it cannot be read or interpreted to cover such employments and employees, which or who are not included in the Act. Therefore, the benefits of the Act ought not to have been extended to the claimant. 12. Lastly, the learned Government Advocate submitted that the driver, who drove the vehicle at the time of the accident was late Ram Chandra and not the official driver assigned to drive the vehicle. Therefore, the deceased ought to have acted prudently and not sit on that vehicle. Having not done so, the respondents cannot be made liable to pay for the consequence. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. C. Lalfakzuala submitted that Section 2 of the Workmen Compensation Act, 2009 has substituted the word "Workmen", which was used in the old Act by the word employees. Therefore, whether the word used in a particular case is workmen or employee there would be no difference in the implication. The learned counsel further submitted that the Act nowhere mentions the nature of the employment, whether it should be permanent or temporary or casual etc. The Act, in other words has not made any differentiation between any kinds of employment. The learned counsel further submitted that the Act nowhere mentions the nature of the employment, whether it should be permanent or temporary or casual etc. The Act, in other words has not made any differentiation between any kinds of employment. Therefore, the service of the claimant's son, who was a Muster Roll employee is well covered by the Employees Compensation Act. 14. The learned counsel, then, submitted that the O.P No. 1 both in her written statement and in her deposition given as P.W No. 2 had admitted that the deceased was an employee of the Tourism Department and he was in the course of his duty when the accident occurred. Therefore, there was no more requirement of any other evidence to proof that the deceased, son of the claimant/respondent No. 1 was an employee of the respondents and he was in the course of his duty when the unfortunate accident happened. 15. Thereafter, the learned counsel referred to the word "maintenance" in Clause-(viii) of the Schedule II of the Employees Compensation Act and submitted that the word "maintenance" means to preserve or to keep in good condition and the objective of maintenance of a structure is to prevent its falling into decay. In support of his submission referred to paragraph-23 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and Others versus- Devi Dayal Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 5 . The contents of the paragraph are reproduced here below; "23. The fourth and final principle enunciated in Jiya Lal case has been set out in para-13 of the judgment: "There is a real distinction between the cost incurred in the maintenance and the repair of a structure. The maintenance of a structure is a routine activity which has to be distinguished from its repairs. 'Maintenance' means 'to preserve or to keep in good condition'. The object of the maintenance of a structure is to prevent its falling into decay. On the other hand, the word 'repair' indicates the restoration to a good and sound condition of a structure which has been decayed or damaged. Section 2 of the Act of 1851 permits the levy of toll only if the road or bridge is repaired. It does not contemplate of a levy of toll merely on the ground of its maintenance. Section 2 of the Act of 1851 permits the levy of toll only if the road or bridge is repaired. It does not contemplate of a levy of toll merely on the ground of its maintenance. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the amount spent towards the cost of the construction of a bridge will not include any sum which had been spent in its maintenance. No toll is chargeable under Section 2 of the Act of 1851 to meet the expenses incurred in the maintenance". The learned counsel for the respondent after having submitted the meaning of the word "maintenance" further submitted that as per the detailment Office Order No. 60/2015-16, issued by the Director of Tourism Department the respondent's son was to oversee the safety of Departmental buildings and cleaning of the compound situated at Tuirial Airfield. The description of the job/duty profile shows that the respondent was engaged in the maintenance work of the Departmental buildings, therefore, his job/duty at that time or on the day the accident happened was very much within the ambit of Clause-(viii) of Schedule-II of Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. Mr. C. Lalkafzuala, learned counsel for the respondent, then, submitted that the deceased victim (son of the respondent/claimant) was, as admitted by the opposite party in the claim case, both in their written statement and in the deposition given by witness, was in the course of his duty when the accident occurred, therefore, nothing more was required from the respondent/claimant's side to prove that the accident occurred during the course of his duty. 16. Thereafter, the learned counsel also submitted that the word "employee" has been defined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para-4 of the judgment passed in the case of Union Public Service Commission versus- Dr. Jamuna Kurup and Others, (2008) 11 SCC 10 , and as per the definition the word "employee" would include both permanent, temporary, contractual or adhoc. Therefore, the master roll service of the deceased (son of the respondent/claimant), though it is temporary, is also covered by the word "employee" used in the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. The content of the para-14 of the judgment cited by the learned counsel is given here below; "14. The term 'employee' is not defined in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. Nor is it defined in the advertisement of UPSC. The content of the para-14 of the judgment cited by the learned counsel is given here below; "14. The term 'employee' is not defined in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. Nor is it defined in the advertisement of UPSC. The ordinary meaning of 'employee' is any person employed on salary or wage by an employer. When there is a contract of employment, the person employed is the employee and the person employing is the employer. In the absence of any restrictive definition, the word 'employee' would include both permanent or temporary, regular or short term, contractual or ad hoc. Therefore, all persons employed by MCD whether permanent or contractual will be 'employees of MCD'. The respondents who were appointed on contract basis initially for a period of six months, extended thereafter from time to time for further periods of six months each, were therefore, employees of MCD, and consequently, entitled to the benefit of age relaxation. If the intention of MCD and UPSC was to extent the age relaxation only to permanent employees, the advertisement would have stated that age relaxation would be extended only to permanent or regular employees of MCD or that the age relaxation would be extended to employees of MCD other than contract or temporary employees. The fact that the term 'employees of MCD' is no way restricted, makes it clear that the intention was to include all employees including contractual employees. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court extending the benefit of age relaxation". 17. The learned counsel further submitted that the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 is a beneficial piece of legislation, enacted to compensate the workman and their dependants in the event of accidents during the course of employment. Therefore, hyper technical interpretation of its provisions would not only defeat the purpose of the Act but would be adding insult to injury. As such, such method of interpretation should be avoided to achieve the intends and objectives of the Act. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to para-15 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Govind Goenka versus- Dayawati and Others, (2012) 4 TAC 107 (Del.). The content of the paragraph are reproduced here below; "15. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to para-15 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Govind Goenka versus- Dayawati and Others, (2012) 4 TAC 107 (Del.). The content of the paragraph are reproduced here below; "15. For the expeditious grant of compensation in the event of such accidents taking place in favour of the victim's dependent members, this act was enacted and a hyper technical interpretation of the statute would not only defeat the purpose of the said Act but would be adding insult to injury. Hence, in the present case, this Court does not find any merit in the present appeal." The learned counsel also referred to para-11 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of the Works Manager, Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi versus- Vishwanath and Others, (1969) 3 SCC 95 . The content of the paragraph are reproduced here below; "11. The Factories Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the, law regulating labour in factories. It is probably true that all legislation in a welfare state is enacted with the object of promoting general welfare; but certain types of enactments are more responsive to some urgent social demands and also have more immediate and visible impact on social vices by operating more directly to achieve social reforms. The enactments with which we are concerned, in our view, belong to this category and, there-. fore, demand an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative purpose, without doing violence to the language. The definition of "worker" in the Factories Act, therefore, does not seem to us to exclude those employees who are entrusted solely with clerical duties, if they otherwise fall within the definition of the word "worker". Keeping in view the duties and functions of the respondents as found by the learned Additional District Judge, we are unable to find anything legally wrong with the view taken by the High Court that they fall within the definition of the, word "worker". Deletion of the word "whatsoever" on which the appellant's counsel has placed reliance does not seem to make much difference because that word was, in our view, redundant". 18. The learned Government Advocate, Ms. Deletion of the word "whatsoever" on which the appellant's counsel has placed reliance does not seem to make much difference because that word was, in our view, redundant". 18. The learned Government Advocate, Ms. Mary Khiangte both in reply to the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent and in reiteration of what she had already submitted earlier submitted further that the respondent's claim petition was filed under the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 but the claim in the application itself appears to have been made under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. As such, the claim should have been dismissed. The reason being that whereas, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the benefit is given to the workman but under the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 it is to the employee. The two words are different and carry different meanings. 19. The learned Government Advocate also submitted that Courts should not place reliance on earlier decisions or judgments of Courts without considering as to how the factual situation fits in. Thereafter, the learned counsel further submitted that the judgment referred to by the learned counsel of the respondent in regard to liberal interpretation of socially beneficial legislations are not applicable in this case because, those judgments are relating to factory workers and the facts in those cases are different from the facts in the present case. In support of her submission, the learned Government Advocate referred to para-9 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Bharat Petroleum Cooperation Ltd. and Another versus- N.R. Vairamani and Another, 2014 8 SCC 579. The contents of the paragraph referred to by the learned counsel are reproduced here below; "9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton, (1951) AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge." 20. In reiteration of her earlier submission, the learned Government Advocate further submitted that no reason was given by the learned Commissioner while recording his findings and conclusions. The learned Government Advocate then referred to issue No.1 which reads; "whether the deceased is a workman within the meaning of the Act" and submitted that this needs lengthy discussion before the conclusion is drawn but the learned Commissioner's judgment is cryptic and does not content the reasons or basis for the decision or conclusion. The law requires that the judgment should be supported with reasons. In support of her submission, the learned Government Advocate referred to para-10 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmi Ram Bhuyan versus- Hari Prasad Bhuyan and Others, (2003) 1 SCC 197 The contents of the para-10 are reproduced here below; "10. Certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be noticed. Order VII Rule 1 of the CPC requires the plaintiff to give sufficient particulars of the relief, which the plaintiff claims. Order XX requires a judgment to contain all the issues and findings or decision thereon with the reasons thereof. The judgment has to state the relief allowed to a party. The preparation of decree follows the judgment. The decree shall agree with the judgment. The decree shall contain, inter alia, particulars of the claim and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The judgment has to state the relief allowed to a party. The preparation of decree follows the judgment. The decree shall agree with the judgment. The decree shall contain, inter alia, particulars of the claim and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The decree shall also state the amount of costs incurred in the suit and by whom or out of what property and in what proportions such costs are to be paid. Rules 9 to 19 of Order XX are illustrative of contents of decrees in certain specified categories of suits. The very obligation cast by the Code that the decree shall agree with the judgment spells out an obligation on the part of the author of the judgment to clearly indicate the relief or reliefs to which a party, in his opinion, has been found entitled to enable decree being framed in such a manner that it agrees with the judgment and specifies clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The operative part of the judgment should be so clear and precise that in the event of an objection being laid, it should not be difficult to find out by a bare reading of the judgment and decree whether the latter agrees with the former and is in conformity therewith. A self-contained decree drawn up in conformity with the judgment would exclude objections and complexities arising at the stage of execution". 21. The preliminary grounds of appeal raised by the appellant i.e. the word "workman" is not found in the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 under which the claim was made, as such, the claim should have been dismissed at the threshold and that employment of the deceased (son of the respondent/claimant) is not covered or does not come under the provision of Employee's Compensation Act, 1923, are being discussed in the light of the submissions of the learned counsels of both the parties, the relevant laws, the facts and circumstances and the evidence available in the record. The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 was amended by the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment Act, 2009) based on the recommendation of the Second National Commission of Labour set up in the year 2002. The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 was amended by the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment Act, 2009) based on the recommendation of the Second National Commission of Labour set up in the year 2002. Amongst other amendments made the word "workmen" which appeared in the long title was substituted by the word "employee" and the word "workmen" which appeared in the permeable of the principle Act was substituted with the word "employees". Further, the word "workmen's" which appeared in Schedule-1 of the principle Act was also substituted by the word "employee's. Moreover, throughout the principle Act the words "workman" and "workmen's" wherever they occurred in the Act were also substituted with the word "employee" and "employee's" respectively. In view of these amendments the used of either of the words "workman" or "employee" in a claim petition would not make any difference or bears any consequence as the two words carries the same meaning for the purpose of the Act. The only difference between the two words is the later word i.e "employee" will have wider application or implication. It is like putting a new wine in the old bottle. As such, the first part of the preliminary ground of the appeal submitted by the learned Government Advocate is not upheld as the same is not sustainable in view of the amendment stated above. On the second part of the preliminary ground, it may be mentioned here that the word "Workmen's Compensation Act, 2009" which is now Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 is a Central Act and it extends to the whole of India. It is a beneficial piece of legislation and it has been enacted to compensate the workmen or employees and their dependants in the event of accidents during the course of employment. In the said amendment coverage of the Act has been extended by omission of the restrictive clause in Schedule-II of the Act and inclusion of the additional hazardous activities. It is a beneficial piece of legislation and it has been enacted to compensate the workmen or employees and their dependants in the event of accidents during the course of employment. In the said amendment coverage of the Act has been extended by omission of the restrictive clause in Schedule-II of the Act and inclusion of the additional hazardous activities. In sub section-2 of the principle Act, in sub-section-(i) clause-(dd) has been added and under that the following words has been inserted "employee means a person, who is (i) a railway servant as defined in clause (34) of section 2 of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), not permanently employed in any administrative district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule-II"; All these amendments has enlarged the definition and ambit of the word employees under the Act of 1923. Reading together of the above stated amendments and the Schedule-II of the Act would mean that those employees mentioned in the Schedule-II who are not employed in such capacity permanently are covered under the scheme provided in the Act. In this case, the deceased employee was a Muster Roll, Room Attendant, as per his engagement card issued by the Director, Tourism Department, Government of Mizoram, exhibited as Ext. C-5 and he was detailed to oversee safety of Departmental buildings situated at Tuirial Airfield and also to clean the compound if necessary, on the day the accident occurred and where he died. The above stated documents reveals that the deceased employee though was engaged as Room Attendant was assigned the work of overseeing safety of the Departmental buildings at the relevant time. The expression "safety of the buildings" is akin to the expression "maintenance of buildings" since the two indicates performance of the same kind of work or duty i.e. to preserve the buildings. And, since the engagement card shows that he was only a muster roll and not permanent, this Court is of the opinion that he was covered under the scheme of the Act at that relevant time. The contents of the (viii) of Schedule-II are reproduced here below for easy reference; "(viii). Employed in the construction, maintenance, repair or demolition of". In view of the above discussions and conclusions, the preliminary ground of appeal cannot be upheld. 22. The contents of the (viii) of Schedule-II are reproduced here below for easy reference; "(viii). Employed in the construction, maintenance, repair or demolition of". In view of the above discussions and conclusions, the preliminary ground of appeal cannot be upheld. 22. The second ground of appeal raised by the learned Government Advocate that is, the State of Mizoram has not made a rule as provided under section 32 of the Employee's Compensation Act, therefore, the employment of the deceased can never be considered for compensation under the scheme of the Employee's Compensation Act is related with the first ground raised. In the discussion of the preliminary ground findings and conclusions have been made to the effect that the employment of the deceased is covered under the scheme provided in the Act. Therefore, this second ground is no longer relevant. Further, the contention of the learned Government Advocate that (viii) of the Schedule-II of the Employee's Compensation Act under which the claim is made does not include muster roll, room attendant has also been taken care of by the above discussions and conclusions. To say in the words of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as it was stated in the case of Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation versus- Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, (1985) 4 SCC 71 at para-4; "the principles of statutory construction are well settled. The word "covered" in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian dimensions". They should be rather given liberal interpretation for the purpose of achieving the larger objective of legislation specially in a welfare State like India. The contents of para-4 of the said judgment are given herein below; "4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and 'Human Rights' legislation are not to be put in procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its mis-application must be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the 'colour', the 'content' and the 'context' of such statutes. (We have borrowed the words from Lord Wilbei force's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds, 1971 3 AER 237. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its mis-application must be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the 'colour', the 'content' and the 'context' of such statutes. (We have borrowed the words from Lord Wilbei force's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds, 1971 3 AER 237. In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, un-isolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of the cases cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum-Labour Court, we had occasion to say, "Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is, not to make inroads by making etymological excursions". 23. Now I shall deal with the next ground raised by the appellants i.e. there is no evidence to show that the deceased employee was doing anything in connection with the Tourism infrastructure buildings. This ground of appeal appeared to be self defeating because, the written statement of the appellants before the Tribunal filed by the Under Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Tourism Department on their behalf and her evidence given before the Court clearly shows that the deceased was in the course of his duty when the accident occurred. In fact, the Under Secretary who gave the evidence before the Commissioner stated that the accident occurred and the deceased died in the course of his duty. Therefore, this ground raised by the respondent also cannot be upheld. 24. The next ground raised by the appellants as already stated is that the learned Commissioner judgment did not give the reasons for his findings and conclusions, therefore, the requirement of Order XX Rule-V of CPC was not met. Therefore, this ground raised by the respondent also cannot be upheld. 24. The next ground raised by the appellants as already stated is that the learned Commissioner judgment did not give the reasons for his findings and conclusions, therefore, the requirement of Order XX Rule-V of CPC was not met. On perusal of the judgment, this Court finds that the learned Commissioner before coming to the conclusion that the deceased was a workman within the ambit of the Act and he was working at that relevant time as muster roll, room attendant in the Department of Tourism on payment of daily wages recorded the facts and circumstances and the evidence given by the witnesses which are the basis of his conclusion. Therefore, this Court is unable to appreciate the submission made by the appellants that the learned Commissioner's judgment is devoid of reasons. A judgment has to be read as a whole and not selectively and in pieces. The overall reading of the impugned judgment would reveal that sufficient reasons have been given. Furthermore, the Commissioner under Employee's Compensation Act is quasi judicial, therefore, reading of its judgment and award like one would read a judgment in criminal or civil case is not called for. Suffice it would be if one can understand from the overall reading of the same that the facts and circumstances, the evidence thereof and the law applicable or relevant thereto have been considered or taken into view while recording the findings and arriving to the conclusions. In fact, in this case, the learned Commissioner, with due respect I would say, has done more than that. 25. The last ground pleaded by the learned counsel of the appellants i.e. the deceased fully knowing that it was not the official driver who was on the wheel of the ill fated vehicle had the option not to sit and travel by that vehicle as a prudent man would have done, but having not done so, the benefits of the scheme cannot be extended to him or his family members appears to this Court to be a lame excuse. Because, there is no denying of the fact that the vehicle belongs to the Department and it was provided for the conveyance of the deceased and his colleagues to and from the work place. Because, there is no denying of the fact that the vehicle belongs to the Department and it was provided for the conveyance of the deceased and his colleagues to and from the work place. It was the duty of the employer to ensure that a safe and secure means of transportation is provided. Moreover, the employer is vicariously liable for the act of his employee i.e. the driver who was on duty but did not take the wheel. In view of the above discussions and conclusions, I find no merit in the appeal. However, on the interest granted this Court is of the view that 12% per annum is on the higher side considering the current bank interest. Therefore, it is reduced to 8% per annum. The appeal is disposed in terms of the conclusions drawn.