JUDGMENT : S. Serto, J. 1. This is an appeal directed against the judgment and order dated 24.04.2017, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jorhat in Sessions Case No. 174 (J-J) of 2014. 2. Heard Ms. S. Choudhury, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellants and also heard Mr. T.K. Misra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State of Assam. 3. On 03.08.2013, one Sri Mohan Bhumiz lodged an ejahar before the Officer-in-charge, Ladoigarh Police out post stating that at about 10.00 P.M. on 02.08.2013, the two accused persons (appellants in the appeal) assaulted his brother namely, Sri. Tulsi Bhumiz with solid bamboo lathi in front of the house of one Sri. Debeswar Ghatowar and left his dead body at the spot. And, the incident was witnessed by one Sri. Dipak Bhumiz who is the son of the deceased. On receipt of the ejahar, the same was entered as Lahdoigarh GDE No. 44, dated 03.08.2013, and thereafter, it was forwarded to the Officer-in-charge of Teok Police Station. The Officer-in-charge of Teok Police Station registered the same as Teok P.S. Case No. 191/2013 under section 302 of IPC and entrusted one S.I. S. Ahmed to investigate the case. During the investigation, inquest was conducted over the dead body and thereafter, post-mortem was also conducted. On completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted and the same was committed to the learned Sessions Judge, Jorhat. The learned Sessions Judge, Jorhat after hearing the prosecution and the accused persons who are appellants herein framed the charge under Section 302/34 of IPC. The relevant portion of the charge framed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jorhat reads as follows; “Firstly, That both of you in furtherance of your common intention on or about 02.08.2013 at about 10.00 P.M. at Sotai Bhakat Gaon on the road near the residence of Sri. Debeswr Ghatowar, P.S. Teok, District-Jorhat committed murder of the younger brother of the complainant namely Sri Tulsi Bhumiz, by assaulting him with a bamboo with the intention of causing his death, And thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 302/34 of Indian Penal Code. Within my cognizance. And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charges. The charges being framed/read over and explained to the accused persons, to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. “ 4. Within my cognizance. And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charges. The charges being framed/read over and explained to the accused persons, to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. “ 4. After the charge was framed, the prosecution examined as many as 8(eight) PWs including the I.O. and the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination. Thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge, Jorhat examined the accused persons under section 313 of Cr.PC. The accused/appellants did not produce any witness in defence. The learned Sessions Judge, Jorhat after hearing the parties held the accused/appellants guilty of having committed the offence punishable under section of 302 of IPC read with section 34 of the same code and accordingly, sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 15,000/-each and in default of payment of fine to under gorigorous imprisonment for another period of 6(six) months. Being aggrieved, the two accused/appellants has come before this Court by filing the present appeal. 5. The learned Amicus Curiae, Ms. S. Choudhury at the very outset submitted that the appeal is not being press for total acquittal but only to the extent for modification of the section of IPC under which the appellants were convicted and sentenced. The learned Amicus Curiae confined her submissions on four grounds only; (i) That the conviction was mainly based on the evidence given by a child witness who was 6(six) years old when the incident happened and 8 (eight) years old at the time he gave the evidence before the Court. Therefore, his evidence without corroboration cannot be relied upon for convicting the accused/appellants for serious offence like murder. The learned counsel further submitted that the evidence of the child witness cannot be fully relied upon because of the fact that the incident happened in darkness and, therefore, he would not have been able to distinguish as to which of the accused did what and who used what kind of weapon. (ii) That the fact that there was no intention to kill the deceased by the appellants can be made out from the fact that the weapon allegedly used by them was only split bamboo. If, they had the intention to kill the deceased at all they could have picked up some other weapons which could have caused fatal injuries. (ii) That the fact that there was no intention to kill the deceased by the appellants can be made out from the fact that the weapon allegedly used by them was only split bamboo. If, they had the intention to kill the deceased at all they could have picked up some other weapons which could have caused fatal injuries. (iii) That the fact that both the accused/appellants and the victim had liquor together in the house of one of the accused namely, Biju Modi and the incident happened while they were having the same shows that they were friendly and in visiting terms, and they had no enmity prior to the incident. Therefore, intention to kill the deceased cannot be attributed to the accused/appellants. (iv) That the evidence of the Doctor shows that there was a mark of only a single blow on the vital part of the deceased and the same might have been caused by falling, therefore, the cause of death of the deceased cannot be entirely attributed to the assault committed by the appellants. The learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that if there was intention on the part of the accused/appellants to kill the deceased they could have given more blows on the vital part of the deceased. In support of her submission, the learned Amicus Curiae relied on the judgment and order of the Supreme Court passed in the case of Satish Narayan Sawant Versus-State of Goa, reported in (2009) 17 SCC 724 , the relevant portion of the judgment i.e. paragraphs-40, 41 &42 are reproduced below; “40. That being the well settled legal position, when we test the factual background of the present case on the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, we are unable to agree with the views taken by the High Court. As already noted, it is quite clear from the record that there was an altercation preceding the incident. The place of occurrence is a residence inhabited by both the parties and there is no evidence on record that the deceased was armed with any weapon. Initially the accused-appellant also did not have any weapon with him but during the course of the incident he went inside and got a knife with the help of which he stabbed the deceased. Initially the accused-appellant also did not have any weapon with him but during the course of the incident he went inside and got a knife with the help of which he stabbed the deceased. PW-7 in his cross examination has categorically stated that death due to stab injury was in consequence of Injury No. 1 and all other injuries were superficial in nature. So, it was only Injury No. 1 which was fatal in nature. Factually therefore, there was only one main injury caused due to stabbing and that also was given on the back side of the deceased and therefore, it cannot be said that there was any intention to kill or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness. 41. Records clearly establish that there was indeed a scuffle between the parties with regard to the availability of electricity in a particular room and during the course of scuffle the appellant also received an injury which was simple in nature and that there was heated exchange of words and scuffle between the parties before the actual incident of stabbing took place. There is, therefore, provocation and the incident happened at the spur of the moment. That being the factual position, we are of the considered view that the present case cannot be said to be a case under Section 302 IPC but it is a case falling under Section 304 Part II IPC. It is trite law that Section 304 Part II comes into play when the death is caused by doing an act with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but there is no intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 42. Accordingly, we convict the appellant under Section 304, Part II of IPC and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for a period of 7 years. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled and the appellant shall surrender immediately to serve out the remaining period of sentence. If, however, the appellant does not surrender by himself, the State shall take necessary steps to re arrest him to undergo the remaining part of sentence.” 6. The learned Additional P.P., Mr. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled and the appellant shall surrender immediately to serve out the remaining period of sentence. If, however, the appellant does not surrender by himself, the State shall take necessary steps to re arrest him to undergo the remaining part of sentence.” 6. The learned Additional P.P., Mr. T.K. Misra appearing for the State of Assam submitted that the offence committed by the accused/appellants is not the offence punishable under section 302 of IPC but would definitely attract the punishment provided in the first part of section 304 of IPC. The learned Additional P.P. submitted further that though the fatal blow as stated by the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination is only one it was on the head of the victim, head being a vital part of the body, this shows that the appellants had the intention to kill the deceased when they assaulted him. Therefore, their act will attract the punishment under the first part of section 304 of IPC. The learned Additional P.P. in support of his submission relied upon the judgment passed in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Versus Kalicharan & Ors., reported in AIR 2019 SCC 2637. 7. We have gone through the trial court records and we have considered the evidence of the P.Ws. We have also considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. 8. Now coming to the first ground of the appeal, the learned Sessions Judge at paragraphs-24, 25 & 26 of the impugned judgment had dealt with the same and while doing so, he had referred to three judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of; (i) Bhagwan Singh & Others Versus-State of Madhya Pradesh in Appeal (Criminal) No. 789/2002, (ii) Datttu Ramrao Sakhare Versus-State of Maharashtra, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 341 , and (iii) Panchhi Versus-State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in(1998) 7 SCC 2726. The above stated paragraphs are reproduced here below; “(24). Defence side raised the plea that PW-3 was aged only 6 to 8 years at the time of incident who is a child witness. The above stated paragraphs are reproduced here below; “(24). Defence side raised the plea that PW-3 was aged only 6 to 8 years at the time of incident who is a child witness. to support his above contention, the learned counsel has cited a ruling of Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt in Bhagwan Singh & Others-Versus-State of Madhya Pradesh in Appeal (Criminal) No. 789/2002, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court had held that “ the law recognises the child as a competent witness but a child particularly at such a tender age of six years, who is unable to form a proper opinion about the nature of the incident because of immaturity of understanding, is not considered by the court to be a witness whose sole testimony can be relied without other corroborative evidence. The evidence of child is required to be evaluated carefully because he is an easy prey to tutoring. Therefore, always the court looks for adequate corroboration from other evidence to his testimony. [See Panchhi & Ors vs. State of U.P : (1998) 7 SCC 177 ] In the case before us, the trial Judge has recorded demeanour of the child. The child was vacillating in the course of his deposition. From a child of six years of age, absolute consistency in deposition cannot be expected but if it appears that there was a possibility of his being tutored the court should be careful in relying on his evidence.” (25). It is well settled law that the conviction on the sole evidence of a child witness is permissible, if such witness is found competent to testify and the court, after careful scrutiny of its evidence. In the case of Datttu Ramrao Sakhare Versus-State of Maharashtra, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 341 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that- “A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one, such evidence be the basis of conviction. In other words, even in the absence of oath, the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, provided that such witness is able to understand the question and able to give rational answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. In other words, even in the absence of oath, the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, provided that such witness is able to understand the question and able to give rational answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored” (26). In another case, i.e. Panchhi Versus-State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 2726, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that –“It is not the law that if a witness is a child, hi/her evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable, the law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell them and this child witness is easy prey to tutoring”. On going through the three judgments referred to by the learned Sessions Judge what we have gathered is that evidence of a child witness is required to be evaluated carefully because he is an easy prey. But we find nothing in the judgments which indicates that evidence of a child unless corroborated cannot be relied upon. The evidence given by a child can be relied upon once the same is found to be reliable and not a result of tutor. We agree with the findings and the conclusions drawn by the learned Sessions Judge that the evidence given by the son of the deceased is reliable and, therefore, conviction of the accused persons/appellants can be drawn on the basis of his evidence. We may mention here that there was no variance between the two narrations of the child witness, one under section 164 and the other before the trial court as PW No.3. What was recorded under section 164 Cr.PC was repeated in the evidence given before the Court. The statement under section 164 Cr.PC was recorded at the initial stage of the investigation whereas the evidence before the Court during the trial was recorded much thereafter. What was recorded under section 164 Cr.PC was repeated in the evidence given before the Court. The statement under section 164 Cr.PC was recorded at the initial stage of the investigation whereas the evidence before the Court during the trial was recorded much thereafter. But as stated there is no variance between the two and the child witness is consistent. We also find no trace of tutoring. Therefore, there is no reason why his evidence cannot be relied upon. The fact that the incident happened in darkness will not make any difference because the child witness (PW-3) saw the two accused/appellants assaulting his father in the house of one of the accused/appellants and thereafter on the road. There was no other person or persons present at that time the deceased was assaulted. Therefore, the only conclusion one can draw is, it is none other than the accused/appellants who assaulted the deceased and caused his death. 9. On the second ground raised by the learned Amicus Curiae, we are not inclined to agree with her because of the simple reason that the split bamboos which were used by the accused/appellants in assaulting the deceased victim can be as fatal or can easily cause death of a person, if the blows are given on vital parts of the body. The fact that the Doctor who conducted the postmortem found injuries over the head of the deceased and death was caused by that injuries shows that the split bamboos used by the accused/appellants had caused the fatal injuries. Therefore, no presumption as submitted by the learned Amicus curiae can be drawn. Further, the fights started in the house of one of the accused/appellants (Biju Modi) and thereafter, the deceased and his minor child walked out of the house to the street. But still the two accused/appellants followed them and continued with their assault on the deceased victim. All these shows that the accused/appellants had the intention to kill the deceased. If they had no intention to kill him, they would have stopped the assault when the victim and his son had walked out from the house of Biju Modi one of the accused/appellants. The post-mortem report shows at least 7(seven) injuries, though all of them are not fatal in nature. But from these, it can be seen that the accused/appellants were obsessed with their intent to kill the victim. The post-mortem report shows at least 7(seven) injuries, though all of them are not fatal in nature. But from these, it can be seen that the accused/appellants were obsessed with their intent to kill the victim. We, therefore, disagree with the submission of the learned Amicus curiae that there was no intention on the part of the accused/appellants to kill the deceased. 10. On the next ground of appeal i.e. the incident took place at the spur of the moment and there was no premeditation on the part of the accused/appellants, we have taken into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances prior to the incident under which the incident occurred. There is no dispute on the fact that the deceased and his minor child went to the house of Biju Modi one of the accused/appellant and when they reached there the deceased shared drinks with the two accused/appellants and the fight started while they were sharing the drink. On careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstance stated above and the fact that there is no evidence showing that there was enmity between the two parties, we are of the view that there was no enmity between them and they were not only close friends but in visiting terms, and the fight between them took place at the spur of the moment. Further, there is no whisper in the evidence as to how the fight started but from the facts and circumstances it can very well be concluded that the fight was not pre-planned or premeditated. Therefore, we conclude without any hesitation that there was no pre-mediation or pre-planning on the part of the accused/appellants to kill the deceased. 11. On the last ground of appeal pressed by the learned Amicus Curiae, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the submission that since the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem has testified that dead was due to coma as a result of injuries sustained by the deceased over the head only it can be concluded that the accused/appellants had no intention to kill him and, if they had the intention at all more fatal blows would have been given by them on vital parts of the deceased. The reasons is, as already stated above, the intention of the accused/appellants to kill the deceased can well be make out by the way how they persued the deceased even after he left the house of one the accused/appellants (Biju Mudi) and continued with their assault. If they had no intention to kill him, they would have stopped when the deceased left the house of Biju Mudi. In fact, as per the post-mortem report, the deceased suffered from as many as seven injuries, this evidence and circumstances shows that the accused/appellants for whatever reason it was they were intent in killing the deceased. 12. In view of the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the offence committed by the accused/appellants would come under the exception 4 of section 300 of IPC, therefore, cannot attract the punishment under section 302 of IPC. At best it would attract the punishment provided under the first part of section 304 of IPC. Accordingly, we held the accused/appellants guilty of having committed the offence punishable under the first part of section 304 of IPC and sentence them to imprisonment for a term of 8(eight) years with a fine of Rs. 15,000/-(Rupees fifteen thousand only) each and to a further period of 3(three) months imprisonment in case of default in payment of the fine. The appeal is allowed to the extent stated above. We record our appreciation of the learned Amicus Curiae for the assistance rendered by her and we direct the High Court Legal Services Committee to give her legal fees i.e. a sum of Rs. 7,500/-. Send a copy of this judgment & order to the Superintendent of Central Jail, Jorhat.