ORDER : 1. This application is directed against the order dated 05.08.2014 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Bokaro in Complaint Petition Case No. 299 of 2012 by which the learned court has dismissed the complaint application of the petitioner. 2. The facts of the case is that a complaint was instituted by the petitioner who was mother of the victim on the basis of protest petition after the police had submitted Final Report in the case. The complainant Tusu Bala Devi has alleged that the marriage of her son Fagu Lal Mahto was solemnized with Renu Devi about two years back and after marriage Renu Devi used to call her son an “idiot” and also used to tell him that she does not like him. It has also further been alleged by the petitioner Tusu Bala Devi in the complaint petition that the accused Renu Devi used to tell her that she does not want to lead a conjugal life with her husband, Fagu Lal Mahto. It has further been alleged in the protest petition that the accused Renu Devi often used to go to her parental house. On 06.05.2011 the daughter of Thakur Mahto (father of O.P No.2) was to solemnized marriage at Chechkadham Mandir for which the complainant along with her son had gone to attend the marriage at that place. The accused persons had humiliated Fagu Lal Mahto (son of the complainant). The further case of the complainant is that after marriage all the accused persons came to her house and fought with her son and told her son that he should accompany them to attend the party on 07.05.2011 at Murlidih. The son of the complaint, however, was not ready to go to the party as he feared that he might be killed. The further case of the complainant is that the accused Renu Devi had illicit relation with Manoj Mahto and on several occasions her son namely, Fagu Mahto had caught them in compromising position. It is further alleged in the complaint petition that on 07.05.2011 accused nos.2 to 5 went away and about 2:00 p.m., the accused person Renu Devi has served food to her son Fagu Lal Mahto. Few moments later her son started vomiting and he was shifted for treatment at K.M. Memorial Hospital and he died during treatment. It is further alleged in the complaint petition that on 07.05.2011 accused nos.2 to 5 went away and about 2:00 p.m., the accused person Renu Devi has served food to her son Fagu Lal Mahto. Few moments later her son started vomiting and he was shifted for treatment at K.M. Memorial Hospital and he died during treatment. The complainant further alleged that the accused persons including opposite party no.2 conspired and got her son killed so that accused no.1 namely Renu Devi (O.P. No.2 herein) to continue her illicit relationship. 3. The complainant in her solemn affirmation has answered to the court’s question that she was not present when her daughter-in-law (opposite party no.2 herein) mixed poison in the food. She has also admitted that her daughter-in-law (opposite party no.2 herein) has no issues and that she has lost the case against them. The learned court below has taken evidence of four witnesses on behalf of the complainant. C.W.1, Indar Mahto has supported the case of the complainant and in his answer to court’s question he stated that Renu Devi (O.P No.2 herein) has also lost case against them and the same is for killing her husband. All other witnesses have supported the case of the complainant and in support of the allegation the photocopy of admission form of K M Hospital dated 07.05.2011 was submitted which transpires that the patient was admitted by Indrajeet Mahto. They have also attached final bill stating that Fagu Lal Mahto was discharged on 08.05.2011 about 12:00 noon. 4. On perusal of the entire evidence on record it appears that the deceased Fagu Lal Mahto died on 07.05.2011 due to poisoning as the viscera report of State Forensic Lab, Ranchi states that pesticide was found in the viscera which is highly poisonous for human beings and this report is attached in the case diary submitted in P.S. Case No. 47 of 2011. 5. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention here that in this case no independent witness of village Sidhabad has been examined by the complainant. All the four inquiry witnesses are the family members of the complainant who have been made accused in Complaint Petition Case No. 122/2013 lodged by Renu Devi (O.P No.2 herein) are interested witnesses in this case. All the four inquiry witnesses are the family members of the complainant who have been made accused in Complaint Petition Case No. 122/2013 lodged by Renu Devi (O.P No.2 herein) are interested witnesses in this case. By critically examining the deposition of the enquiry witnesses it will appear that the witnesses have stated the parroted version as stated by the complainant. All of them have stated that Renu Devi (O.P No.2) had illicit relationship and that is why she has administered poison to her husband but no independent witness has been examined on this point. However, it is a fact that Renu Devi had remarried but not with Manoj Mahto who had also illicit relation with Renu Devi. It will further transpire from the inquiry report that none of the witnesses had seen the accused (O.P No.2) mixing poison with the food neither did any witness state that the deceased Fagu Lal Mahto had told them that her wife Renu Devi had given him poison. 6. Considering the whole chain of evidence, it is crystal clear, that Fagu Lal Mahto had died due to poisoning but who had administered poison to him is doubtful. It also a fact that both the parties have filed case against each other and in both the cases final form have been submitted by the police. 7. The learned court below has rightly come to the conclusion that motive behind as stated by the complainant and her witnesses appears to be concocted as it is stated hereinabove that Renu Devi had remarried but she did not marry with Manoj Mahto as stated by the complainant witness No.2. Based on the aforesaid enquiry and case diary, the learned court below dismissed the complaint petition filed under Section 203 Cr.P.C. 8. Now it is well settled that it is only a glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of acquittal and direct retrial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstances that a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court may in the opinion the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and direct the retrial of the accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstances that a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court may in the opinion the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and direct the retrial of the accused. The Revisional Court will not be justified in interference with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ finding of the fact reached by the Trial Court on the appreciation of evidence. 9. The Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised only in exceptional cases, when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on the point of law and consequently, there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. In this regard reference may be made to the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bansi Lal & others Vs. Laxman Singh, reported in AIR 1986 SC 1721 . Relevant paragraph nos. 9 &10 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow for ready reference:- “9. Even in an appeal against an order of acquittal no interference will be made with the judgment of the trial Court except in rare and exceptional cases where there has been some manifest illegality in the approach to the case or the appreciation of the evidence or where the conclusion of fact recorded by the Trial Judge is wholly unreasonable so as to be liable to be characterised as perverse and there has been a resultant miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is more narrow in its scope. It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial Court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care 'and caution. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care 'and caution. In K. C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1963) 3 SCR 412 : ( AIR 1962 SC 1788 ), this Court had occasion to consider the scope of the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court in relation to orders of acquittal passed by the trial Court and after referring to two earlier decisions of this Court reported in D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, 1951 SCR 284 : ( AIR 1951 SC 196 ) and Jogendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 : ( AIR 1951 SC 316 ), the legal position was explained thus : "These two cases clearly lay down the limits of the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal in revision; in particular, Jogendranath Jha's case stresses that it is not open to a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction in view of the provisions of S. 439(4) and that the High Court cannot do this even indirectly by ordering re-trial. What had happened in that case was that the High Court reversed pure findings of facts based on the trial Court's appreciation of evidence but formally complied with sub-s. (4) by directing only a re-trial of the appellants without convicting them, and warned that the Court retrying the case should not be influenced by any expression of opinion contained in the judgment of the High Court. In that connection this Court observed that there could be little doubt that the dice was loaded against the appellants of that case and it might prove difficult for any subordinate judicial officer dealing with the case to put aside altogether the strong views expressed in the judgment as to the credibility of the prosecution witness and the circumstances of the case in general." This decision was subsequently followed by this Court in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1974) 1 SCR 130 : ( AIR 1973 SC 2145 ), where this Court observed :- "The unrestricted right of appeal from acquittal is specifically conferred only on the State and a private complainant is given this right only when the criminal prosecution was instituted on his complaint and then also subject to special leave by the High Court. It is further provided in S. 439(5), Cr.P.C. that where no appeal is brought in a case in which an appeal is provided, no proceedings by way of revision would be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. The State Government, therefore, having failed to appeal, cannot apply for revision of an order of acquittal. Again on revision, the High Court is expressly prohibited from converting an acquittal into a conviction. Considering the problem facing the Court in this case in the background of this scheme, the High Court when approached by a private party for exercising its power of revision from an order of acquittal, should appropriately refrain from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice. It is not expected to act under Ss. 435/439, Cr. P.C. as if it is a hearing on appeal in spite of the wide language under S. 435 which empowers it to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of a finding, sentence or order and as to the regularity of any proceeding and also in spite of the fact that under S. 439 it can exercise inter alia the power conferred on a Court of appeal under S. 423, Cr. P.C. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously, and not arbitrarily. Judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system. In Amar Chand Aggarwal v. Shanti Bose, AIR 1973 SC 799 , this Court said that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 439, Cr. P.C is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law and there has consequently been flagrant miscarriage of justice. In the background of the position just stated a private complainant can only claim a right, in common with all aggrieved parties in a criminal proceedings, to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court for redress against miscarriage of justice arising from an erroneous order of acquittal." The same position has been reiterated by this Court in Satyendra Nath Dutta v. Rain Narain, (1975) 2 SCR 743 : ( AIR 1975 SC 580 ). 10. 10. It is unfortunate that the High Court did not keep in mind and principles laid down in the aforesaid rulings regarding the limits of its revisional powers while dealing with an order of acquittal passed by the subordinate Court. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside (of) the order of acquittal and directing a retrial of the accused. In the present case the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not suffer from any manifest illegality. The dominant justification of the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court is the view it took of the evidence of the two eye-witnesses. Having carefully gone through the records of the case we are satisfied that it was a possible view and it cannot be characterised as illegal or perverse. It may well be that the learned single Judge of the High Court was not inclined to agree with the said view on the basis of his independent scrutiny and appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case but that would not furnish any justification for interference in revision with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Even in an appeal the Appellate Court would not have been justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope. We accordingly hold that the High Court has clearly transgressed the limits of its revisional. jurisdiction under S. 439(4) of (old) Cr. P.C. in setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge and directing a retrial of the case.” 11. In the instant case, there is no defect in the procedure or any error of law in the order impugned. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussions and judicial pronouncement, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction, and as a result, the instant revision application is, hereby, dismissed.