JUDGMENT : Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J. 1. Supplementary affidavit filed today is taken on record. 2. Heard Sri Santosh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Jata Shankar Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. By means of the present petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated 15.03.2016 passed by JSCC/Civil Judge (Senior Division), Firozabad in SCC Suit No.17 of 2007 (Mahatma Gandhi Girls (P.G.) College Vs. Dinesh Chandra Gupta) and also the judgment and order dated 25.01.2019 passed by the II-Additional District Judge, Firozabad in Civil Revision No.18 of 2016 (Dinesh Chandra Gupta Vs. Mahatma Gandhi Girls (P.G.) College) whereby the revision filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. 4. Briefly stated facts of the case are that the respondent, Mahatma Gandhi Girls (P.G.) College is the owner landlord of the shop in question which was in occupation of the petitioner as a tenant. As per the case of the respondent-landlord, the petitioner tenant was in arrears of rent and also dues towards house tax and water tax, from 01.01.2004, and a registered notice dated 07.11.2006 terminating his tenancy was sent to him which was returned with the postal endorsement of refusal on 13.01.2006, and thereafter a suit for eviction and arrears of rent was filed which was registered as SCC Suit No.17 of 2007. 5. The petitioner tenant contested the suit by asserting that the provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 would be applicable over the demised premises and it was also contended that upon refusal of the landlord to receive the rent, the same was sent by a money order and thereafter the rent was being deposited by the tenant under Section 30 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. 6. 6. Documentary evidence was filed by the contesting parties and thereafter the trial court framed the following issues:- ^^1- D;k oknh o Áfroknh ds e/; ekfyd o fdjk;snkj ds lEcU/k gS\ 2- D;k fookfnr nqdku f'k{k.k laLFkku egkRek xka/kh ckfydk egkfo|ky; dh lEifRr gS\ 3- D;k fookfnr nqdku ij mŒÁŒ vjou fcfYMax ,DV 13 lu 1972 ds micU/k ÁHkkoh gS\ 4- D;k Áfroknh }kjk mDr nqdku dk fdjk;k oknh dks vnk djus esa pwd dh x;h\ 5- D;k oknh }kjk Hkstk x;k uksfVl fnukafdr 07-11-2006 oS/k gS\ 6- D;k nkok oknh dky ckf/kr gS\ 7- D;k oknh fookfnr nqdku dk Áfroknh ls fdjk;s ds vfrfjDr x`gdj o tydj ÁkIr djus dk gdnkj gS\** 7. As regards issue nos.1 and 2 there being no dispute between the parties, the same were answered in the affirmative. 8. The building in question having been held to be belonging to a recognized educational institution, in view of the exemption provided under Section 2(1)(b) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, the provisions of the said Act were held to be not applicable. 9. Taking note of the fact that the plaintiff-landlord had adduced evidence to demonstrate that payment of rent had been made only upto December, 2003, and as per the case of the defendant-tenant the money order was sent by him on 21.09.2006, and no evidence was placed by him to indicate that the rent for the period January, 2004 to October, 2006 was tendered by him, the trial court recorded a finding that the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent. 10. The issue with regard to the validity of the notice dated 07.11.2006 was decided in favour of the landlord upon considering the fact that the same had been sent by a registered post and the document showing the postal endorsement of refusal was on record. The defendant-tenant apart from denying the factum of service of notice could not adduce any evidence to prove that the notice had not been served. 11. The tenant having defaulted in payment of rent for January, 2004 and the notice to quit having been sent on 07.11.2006, the suit was held to be within limitation, and the issue in this regard was answered accordingly. 12. As regards the issue with regard to the liability to pay house tax and water tax, the same was decided in favour of the tenant. 13. 12. As regards the issue with regard to the liability to pay house tax and water tax, the same was decided in favour of the tenant. 13. Based on the aforesaid findings that the building belonged to a recognized educational institution and the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 was not applicable, and that the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent and the suit was within limitation, the trial court decreed the suit vide judgment dated 15.03.2016. 14. Against the aforesaid judgment dated 15.03.2016, the defendant-tenant preferred a revision, Revision No.18 of 2016. The revisional court has recorded that the landlord tenant relationship was admitted between the parties. Also, in the revision the tenant did not raise any challenge to the fact that the building in question belonged to a recognized educational institution and that the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 was not applicable to it. As regards the question of validity of notice, it was held that the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent from 01.01.2004 and a registered notice dated 07.11.2006 had been sent terminating the tenancy which was held to be served on the basis of the postal endorsement of refusal. The revisional court has taken note of the legal position that in a case where a notice sent by registered post is returned with the postal endorsement of refusal the same is held to be served, and the burden to prove the contrary is upon the addressee. 15. A contention was raised by the petitioner tenant that the Secretary (Sri D.N. Sharma) of the landlord institution was not authorized to have issued the notice dated 07.11.2006 for the reason that approval had been granted on 23.11.2006 by the university to the aforesaid Sri D.N Sharma as the Secretary of the institution, whereas the notice had been issued on 07.11.2006. In this regard the revisional court upon taking note of the approval letter which was on record came to the conclusion that the managing committee of the institution having been constituted on 15.07.2006 and the request for approval having been forwarded on 31.07.2006, upon approval being granted by the university vide letter dated 23.11.2006 the managing committee would be held to have come into existence from the date of it being constituted i.e. 15.07.2006, and accordingly the notice dated 07.11.2006 issued by Sri D.N. Sharma in his capacity as Secretary of the institution was held to be valid. 16. The finding recorded by the trial court with regard to notice being within limitation was also reiterated by the revisional court. 17. Further, upon take note of the fact that the finding recorded by the trial court with regard to U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 being not applicable, having not been challenged by the tenant, it was held that the tenant would not be entitled to the benefit of the plea sought to be raised with regard to sending of the amount due towards arrears of rent by money orders or making deposit under Section 30, and accordingly once the notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (The Act, 1882) having been held to be validly served, the tenancy stood terminated. 18. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record. 19. The present petition is directed against the judgments of the courts below which are based on the concurrent findings upon an appreciation of the facts of the case and the evidence on record. The petitioner-tenant having admitted to the existence of landlord relationship and also the factum of the landlord being a recognized educational institution having been not disputed, by virtue of the provision upon Section 2(1)(b) the demised premises were not covered by the provisions of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, and accordingly the petitioner could not claim the benefit of the deposit made under Section 30 of the said Act. Also, the notice terminating his tenancy under Section 106 of the Act, 1882 having been sent to him by registered post, and upon the postal endorsement of refusal, the same having been held to be validly served, the petitioner was also not entitled to raise the defence with regard to the dues towards rent arrears having been sent by money orders. The finding recorded by the courts below with regard to the managing committee having come into existence with effect from the date when the committee had been constituted once approval letter had been issued by the university, the authority of the secretary of the institution in respect of the notice also could not have been questioned, and the finding recorded in this regard by the courts below cannot be faulted with. The tenant being in arrears of rent having been proved and the suit being within limitation, the findings recorded in this regard suffer from no error. 20. It is legally well settled that if a notice is sent by landlord to the tenant by registered post and the acknowledgment is received back by the landlord with the postal endorsement of refusal by the addressee, presumption of service would have to be drawn against the tenant unless the tenant proves otherwise by adducing cogent evidence. 21. In this regard reference may be made to the judgment in the case of Green View Radio Service Vs. Laxmibai Ramji & Anr., (1990) 4 SCC 497 wherein it was held as follows:- "3. In this connection, we may also point out that the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act require that notice to quit has to be sent either by post to the party or be tendered or delivered personally to such party or to one of his family members or servants at his residence or if such tender or delivery is not practicable, affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. The service is complete when the notice is sent by post. In the present case, as pointed out earlier, the notice was sent by the plaintiff's advocate by registered post acknowledgement due. The acknowledgement signed by the party was received by the advocate of the plaintiff. Thus in our view the presumption of service of a letter sent by registered post can be rebutted by the addressee by appearing as witness and stating that he never received such letter. If the acknowledgement due receipt contains the signatures of the addressee himself and the addressee as a witness states that he never received such letter and the acknowledgement due does not bear his signature and such statement of the addressee is believed then it would be a sufficient rebuttal of the presumption drawn against him. If the acknowledgement due receipt contains the signatures of the addressee himself and the addressee as a witness states that he never received such letter and the acknowledgement due does not bear his signature and such statement of the addressee is believed then it would be a sufficient rebuttal of the presumption drawn against him. The burden would then shift on the plaintiff who wants to rely on such presumption to satisfy the court by leading oral or documentary evidence to prove the service of such letter on the addressee. This rebuttal by the defendant of the presumption drawn against him would of course depend on the veracity of his statement. The court in the facts and circumstances of a case may not consider such denial by the defendant as truthful and in that case such denial alone would not be sufficient. But if there is nothing to disbelieve the statement of the defendant then it would be sufficient rebuttal of the presumption of service of such letter or notice sent to him by registered post." 22. This Court, in the case of Brij Nandan Gupta Vs. III Additional District Judge, Rampur & Anr., (2012) 3 ARC 468 placing reliance upon the judgment in Anil Kumar Vs. Nanak Chandra Verma, (1990) 3 SCC 603 has held that in case of notice sent by registered post and the endorsement of postman that notice was refused by the tenant, a bare denial of service by the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption of service of notice. The observations made in the case of Brij Nandan Gupta (supra) are as follows:- "21. Similarly, if a notice has been sent by landlord by registered post and it is received back with an endorsement made by an official of Post Office namely Postman that it was refused by the addressee, presumption of service upon addressee shall be drawn unless the tenant prove that the letter was never offered to him by the Postman and endorsement made thereon is not correct. The tenant's bare denial would not be sufficient in such a case and he will have to prove his case by adducing relevant evidence. The tenant's bare denial would not be sufficient in such a case and he will have to prove his case by adducing relevant evidence. Such denial can be by making statement on oath and in such case onus would shift on the landlord to prove that refusal was by the tenant which he can show by summoning the postman and adducing his oral evidence. However, this is one aspect of the matter. Sometimes from the conduct of tenant or other circumstances, his denial even if on oath, can justifiably be disproved by the Court without having Postman examined. There is no hard and fast rule on this aspect as observed by the Apex Court in Anil Kumar Vs. Nanak Chandra Verma, (1990) AIR SC 1215." 23. In Samittri Devi & Anr. Vs. Sampuran Singh & Anr., (2011) 3 SCC 556 it was held that notice having been sent under certificate of posting and a copy of the notice alongwith certificate of posting having been produced before the court, in the absence of any allegation that the certificate was wrongly procured, a presumption that notice was duly served would be drawn. 24. Again, in the case of C.C. Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed & Anr., (2007) 6 SCC 555 in the context of a notice sent under Section 138 proviso of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 it was held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with the postal endorsement of refusal, due service has to be presumed. The observations made in the aforementioned judgment are as follows:- "13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read with Illustration (f) thereunder, when it appears to the court that the common course of business renders it probable that a thing would happen, the court may draw presumption that the thing would have happened, unless there are circumstances in a particular case to show that the common course of business was not followed. Thus, Section 114 enables the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Consequently, the court can presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. Consequently, the court can presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. When applied to communications sent by post, Section 114 enables the court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. But the presumption that is raised under Section 27 of the GC Act is a far stronger presumption. Further, while Section 114 of the Evidence Act refers to a general presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake of ready reference, Section 27 of the GC Act is extracted below: "27. Meaning of service by post.--Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ''serve' or either of the expression ''give' or ''send' or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post." 14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement "refused" or "not available in the house" or "house locked" or "shop closed" or "addressee not in station", due service has to be presumed. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement "refused" or "not available in the house" or "house locked" or "shop closed" or "addressee not in station", due service has to be presumed. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR 1992 SC 1604 ]; State of M.P. v. Hiralal, (1996) 7 SCC 523 ] and V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu, (2004) 8 SCC 774 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 393]). It is, therefore, manifest that in view of the presumption available under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to aver in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was evaded by the accused or that the accused had a role to play in the return of the notice unserved." 25. In Harcharan Singh Vs. Shivrani & Ors., (1981) 2 SCC 535 a three-Judge Bench held that notice sent by landlord to tenant by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, amounts to the proper service of notice and tenant's refusal to accept it would imply his knowledge of its contents. The observations made in this regard are as follows:- "7. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic-- "Meaning of service by post" and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus raises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgment due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under illustration (f) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by prepaying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee. Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise. In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept. In other words, there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal. In such circumstances, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope. It would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents thereof and, in our view, this follows upon the presumptions that are raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act." 26. The burden to rebut the presumption of service of notice sent under registered cover, is on the the party who seeks to challenge the factum of service. In this regard reference may be held to the judgment in the case of Gujrat Electricity Board & Anr. Vs. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, (1989) 2 SCC 602 :- "8. There is presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service. In the instant case the respondent failed to discharge this burden as he failed to place material before the court to show that the endorsement made by the postal authorities was wrong and incorrect. Mere denial made by the respondent in the circumstances of the case was not sufficient to rebut the presumption relating to service of the registered cover..." 27. Following the aforementioned judgment this Court in Jhabul Ram Vs. District Judge, Ballia & Ors., (1994) 23 AllLR 464 has held as under:- "8. Mere denial made by the respondent in the circumstances of the case was not sufficient to rebut the presumption relating to service of the registered cover..." 27. Following the aforementioned judgment this Court in Jhabul Ram Vs. District Judge, Ballia & Ors., (1994) 23 AllLR 464 has held as under:- "8. The courts below have categorically found that on behalf of the petitioner there was only bald denial in respect of the endorsement of refusal upon the registered cover containing the notice. The denial was not supported by any, further material. Mere denial of refusal on the part of the addressee of registered cover is not enough to rebut the presumption of service upon him. If the letter under registered cover returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same, there is a rebuttable presumption of service. The presumption of service can be rebutted by producing material to show that the endorsement of refusal was wrong. Dealing with the question of presumption with regard to service of a letter sent under registered cover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its decision rendered in the case of Gujrat Electricity Board v. Atam Ram, (1989) 59 FLR 474 (SC), has ruled thus: "There is presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service. In the instant case the respondent failed to discharge this burden as he failed to place material before the court to show that the endorsement made by the postal authorities was wrong and incorrect. Mere denial made by the respondent in the circumstances of the case was not sufficient to rebut the presumption relating to service of the registered cover." 9. Mere denial made by the respondent in the circumstances of the case was not sufficient to rebut the presumption relating to service of the registered cover." 9. Bald denial of the petitioner could not absolve him from the burden of rebutting the presumption of service of notice arising from the endorsement by the postal authorities on the registered cover containing the notice. The courts below did not commit any error, muchless an error apparent on the face of record, in holding that the notice in question was duly served on the petitioner." 28. Following the aforementioned authorities it may be concluded that the notice having been sent through registered post at the correct address of the tenant and the same having been received back with the postal endorsement of refusal would raise a presumption of service of notice, and in case of default it would be for the addressee to lead the evidence and prove the contrary, and in case he fails to do so, the legal presumption would go against him and would remain unrebutted unless there is other material to show otherwise. 29. In the case at hand, the landlord tenant relationship being undisputed and building in question having been held to be belonging to a recognized educational institution, in view of the exemption provided under Section 2(1)(b), the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 was held to be inapplicable. The tenant was thus held to be not entitled to the benefit of the plea raised with regard to making of deposit under Section 30 and was held to have defaulted in payment of rent. Accordingly, once the notice terminating his tenancy under Section 106 of the Act, 1882 was held to have been validly served upon him, the order passed by the trial court decreeing the suit cannot be faulted with. The findings recorded by the appellate court affirming the order of the trial court also do not suffer from any error. 30. In view of the aforementioned discussion, the judgments of the courts below which are sought to be challenged in the present writ petition, cannot be faulted with, and warrant no interference. 31. The is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.